ORDER : (V.R.K. Krupa Sagar, J.) This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is filed by the petitioner seeking anticipatory bail in connection with Crime No.411 of 2024 of Pulivendula UG Police Station, YSR Kadapa District, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 308(5), 351(3), 353(1)(c) , 111(2)(b) and 196 read with 3(5) of BNS and Section 3(1)(r)(s)(t) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act. 2. Heard arguments of Sri O.Manohar Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel being assisted by Sri V.R.Reddy Kovvuri, the learned counsel for petitioner and Sri K.Sandeep, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for respondent-State. 3. Case of the prosecution is that there were obscene postings in social media as against Sri Pawan Kalyan and women members of his family. The de facto complainant is a member of Jana Sena Party. He was aggrieved by it. According to him, one Mr. Varra Ravindra Reddy belonging to YSR Congress Party has been getting such defamatory and obscene material circulated in the social media. It is in that regard the de facto complainant went and questioned Sri Varra Ravindra Reddy, upon which, the said person allegedly abused him by caste name and also told him that to delete such postings it would cost Rs.2,00,000/- and demanded him to pay the said amount and intimidated him that in the event of his failure to pay he would kill and bury him. He also threatened him not to complain the same to others. Upon the written information of the de facto complainant, F.I.R. was registered on 12.11.2024. 4. The further case of the prosecution is that during investigation accused No.1 was arrested and in his confession he disclosed various facts among which the name of the present petitioner surfaced. 5. Apprehending his arrest by virtue of the alleged confession of A.1, the present petitioner seeks pre-arrest bail. 6. He is stated to be a personal secretary to the present Member of Parliament of Kadapa Parliamentary Constituency. 7. Sri O.Manohar Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel being assisted by Sri V.R.Reddy Kovvuri, the learned counsel for petitioner submits that as per the first information report the allegations are against Sri Varra Ravindra Reddy and the name of this petitioner is not even printed there. For oblique reasons the petitioner is sought to be implicated. 7. Sri O.Manohar Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel being assisted by Sri V.R.Reddy Kovvuri, the learned counsel for petitioner submits that as per the first information report the allegations are against Sri Varra Ravindra Reddy and the name of this petitioner is not even printed there. For oblique reasons the petitioner is sought to be implicated. The further submissions of the learned counsel are that the offences alleged against Sri Varra Ravindra Reddy include caste atrocity and this petitioner is innocent of all such acts. 8. Opposing the pre-arrest bail, Sri K.Sandeep, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor argued that by virtue of Section 14A of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘the Act, 1989’), the High Court cannot entertain an anticipatory bail petition on its original concurrent jurisdiction and in which case a petition for pre-arrest bail cannot be maintained before this Court. 9. In the above-referred circumstances, the first question that has to be considered is about the jurisdiction of this Court in considering an anticipatory bail in a crime where the offences alleged are not only under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) but also under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 10. Responding to the objection raised by the prosecution, the learned Senior Counsel submits that in a case there is an accusation of an accused having committed an offence under the Act, 1989, anticipatory bail cannot be maintained by virtue of Section 18 of the Act, 1989. However, when such an application for anticipatory bail is moved, the Court where it is filed has to verify and see whether the facts on record prima facie disclose any such accusations amounting to an offence under the Act, 1989 as otherwise the Court is entitled to grant anticipatory bail. For this purpose, the learned Senior Counsel cited Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249. 11. The further submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that Section 14A(2) of the Act, 1989 makes reference only to bails and not to anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is a special provision and it prevails over the general provision in Section 14A(2) of the Act, 1989. 11. The further submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that Section 14A(2) of the Act, 1989 makes reference only to bails and not to anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is a special provision and it prevails over the general provision in Section 14A(2) of the Act, 1989. Referring to the principles of statutory interpretation to substantiate the contention raised, the learned Senior Counsel cited Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani Cements Limited, (2014) 8 SCC 319 . 12. In response to the said contentions of the learned Senior Counsel, representing the State, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor argued that Section 14A of the Act, 1989 is a complete bar for bails as well as anticipatory bails and cited: 1. Lokesh v. State of Karnataka, 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 15742 2. K.M.Basheer v. Rajani K.T., 2022 LiveLaw(Ker) 472 3. Nakka Nagireddy v. State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine AP 5322 13. On considering the material on record and the submissions made on both sides and the precedent cited by both sides, the following aspects are to be stated: In terms of Section 2(d) read with Section 14 of the Act, 1989 and in terms of Section 2(bd) read with Section 14 of the Act, 1989, there are Special Courts and Exclusive Special Courts for dealing with offences under the Act, 1989. While these Courts are entitled to take cognizance and conduct trials, there is no specific provision addressing the aspect of bails. Therefore, the Special Court or Exclusive Special Court which entertain bails and anticipatory bails draw their powers from the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and presently from BNSS, 2023. Chapter XXXV of BNSS, 2023 is headed as provisions as to bail and bonds. They provide for bail in bailable offences and bail in non-bailable offences. In the same chapter there is Section 482 of BNSS which is given heading “direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest”. For reference, the section heading of Section 480 of BNSS reads “when bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence”. Section 2(b) of BNSS defines “bail”. There is no separate definition for pre-arrest bail. It needs to be kept in view that the question of bail presupposes detention or custody of the person where a person in detention or custody an order of bail could be obtained for his release. Section 2(b) of BNSS defines “bail”. There is no separate definition for pre-arrest bail. It needs to be kept in view that the question of bail presupposes detention or custody of the person where a person in detention or custody an order of bail could be obtained for his release. In such cases it is stated that he seeks regular bail. In cases of prayers for pre-arrest bail or anticipatory bail such orders come into effect only after the person is arrested and not otherwise. In other words, in both cases unless there is an arrest the need for bail does not arise. In regular bail an order is obtained after arrest whereas in pre-arrest bail the order is obtained earlier to arrest. However, such an order of pre-arrest bail operates only in the event arrest is affected and not otherwise. Therefore, in substance there is no difference between bail and anticipatory bail. 14. The aspect of statutory interpretation of special law or special provision prevailing over general law or general provision adverted to by the learned Senior Counsel the principle is well cherished and has been consistently followed by the Courts. In the cited ruling in Commercial Tax Officer’s case,[supra 2], their Lordships enunciated various statements of law in this regard. It is stated that the Court should examine every word of a statute in its context and must use the context in its widest sense. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. The reason for the ruling that general law yields to special law lies in the fact that if it is not construed in that way the result would be that the special provision would be wholly defeated. 15. It is now relevant to extract Section 14A of the Act, 1989: “14A. Appeals:—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. It is now relevant to extract Section 14A of the Act, 1989: “14A. Appeals:—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days. (4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal.” 16. It is undisputed that an order of bail is interlocutory in nature and normally there is no provision for appeal. However, the special enactment such as the Act, 1989 has departed from the general jurisprudence and made a provision for appeals. With reference to bails one would notice in Section 14A(2) of the Act, 1989, that appellate jurisdiction as against orders of the Special Court or Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail is vested with the High Court. From this provision two things are clear. As per the statute bails are to be considered by the Special Courts in the first instance. Orders disposing of bail petitions are appealable and High Court is the appellate Court for that purpose. According to the learned Senior Counsel, this is applicable only for bails and not for anticipatory bails. Now, this contention must be tested. Section 18 of the Act, 1989 is required to be noticed here: “18. Orders disposing of bail petitions are appealable and High Court is the appellate Court for that purpose. According to the learned Senior Counsel, this is applicable only for bails and not for anticipatory bails. Now, this contention must be tested. Section 18 of the Act, 1989 is required to be noticed here: “18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons committing an offence under the Act.— Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under this Act.” 17. From this provision it is clear that where the crime alleges offences under the Act, 1989, Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with anticipatory bails (presently Section 482 of BNSS) does not apply. Thus, the bar under Section 18 of the Act, 1989 being statutory applies to every Court including this Court. If allegations in the complaint/F.I.R. prima facie alleged offences under the Act, 1989 the bar operates. On the other hand, the facts alleged do not disclose existence of essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under the Act, 1989 the bar disappears and this consideration has to be on judicial side as held in Shajan Skaria’s case,[supra 1]. Therefore, the Special Court or Exclusive Special Court while dealing with an application for anticipatory bail must first ascertain whether a prima facie case for an offence punishable under the Act is made out or not. If the answer is ‘Yes’, the bar under Sections 18 and 18A of the Act, 1989 will come into play and there cannot be any further consideration on the entitlement of anticipatory bail. If the answer to the above question is ‘No’, the Special Court will be entitled to consider the anticipatory bail application on merits. Any such order that is passed by the Special Court or Exclusive Special Court is appealable to this Court as per Section 14A(2) of the Act, 1989. 18. If the argument of the learned Senior Counsel is accepted the result would be like this. With reference to regular bails the High Court is not holding original concurrent jurisdiction to decide and it can decide such prayers only in its appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, in a case where the prayer is for pre-arrest bail, this Court has to exercise its original concurrent jurisdiction. With reference to regular bails the High Court is not holding original concurrent jurisdiction to decide and it can decide such prayers only in its appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, in a case where the prayer is for pre-arrest bail, this Court has to exercise its original concurrent jurisdiction. When in law there is no difference between bail and anticipatory bail in their true purport there can be no occasion to read down the word bail used in Section 14A(2) of the Act, 1989 as applicable only to regular bails and not to anticipatory bails. This Court cannot be said to hold concurrent original jurisdiction as well as appellate jurisdiction in the similar subject matter. Anticipatory bail referred in Section 18 of the Act, 1989 cannot be said to be a special provision to say that it prevails over Section 14A of the Act, 1989. Any other interpretation would make Section 14A(2) of the Act, 1989 otiose. 19. Earlier on 23.07.2024 in Criminal Petition No.3807 of 2024 and on 13.08.2024 in Criminal Petition No.10005 of 2023 this Court entertained and granted pre-arrest bails in cases where caste atrocities were alleged. It must be made clear here that in those cases Section 14A of the Act, 1989 was not noticed since that was never contested. Subsequently, this Court had the occasion to consider the jurisdictional aspect in terms of Section 14A of the Act, 1989 and consistently took the view that this Court holds no original concurrent jurisdiction in bails as well as anticipatory bails. In this regard reference can be made to the prosecution cited ruling in Nakka Nagireddy’s case decided on 11.11.2024. Further this Court in Deepak Kumar Tala’s case decided on 22.10.2024 in Criminal Petition No.6487 of 2024 also reached to the same view. For all these reasons, it is recorded that the prayer made before this Court is misplaced and cannot be considered. 20. In the result, this Criminal Petition is dismissed. It is made clear that the petitioner is at liberty to move appropriate petition for appropriate relief before appropriate Court. In the event such petition is filed, the Special Court is to consider the same on judicial side and dispose of it in accordance with law.