JUDGMENT : (M.G. UMA, J.) The appellant in Crl.A.No.734/2025 being accused No.1; the appellant in Crl.A.No.732/2025 being accused No.3 and the appellant in Crl.A.No.735/2025 being accused No.4 in Spl.C.No.241/2018 on the file of the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chamarajanagar, are impugning the judgment of conviction dated 19.03.2025 and order of sentence dated 22.03.2025, convicting the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the P.C. Act'), and sentencing them to undergo SI for a period of 3 years and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 7 of P.C Act, and to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 4 years and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- each, for the offence punishable under Section 13 (2) of PC Act, with default sentences. 2. Brief facts of the case as made out by the prosecution is that, accused No.1 being the Commercial Tax Officer (CTO), accused No.2 being the Commercial Tax Inspector (CTI), accused No.3 being the Second Division Assistant, and accused No.4 being the Group D employee, working in the Commercial Tax check post at Gundlupet, were public servants. The accused were checking the vehicles and its documents, which pass through the check post, and the officials in the check post were being deputed on shift basis. 3. It is the contention of the prosecution that on 09.03.2017, accused Nos.1 and 4 were deputed in the check post, and they were stopping the vehicles passing through the check post for verification of documents. Accused No.2 and 3 were at the counter. A credible information was received by the Investigating Officer. On the basis of same, raid was held at the check post. Accused No.1 was found in possession of Rs.41,510/-, accused No.2 was found in possession with Rs.24,000/-, accused No.3 was found in possession of Rs.2,665/- and accused No.4 was found in possession of Rs.3,500/-. It is stated that the Cash Declaration Register as per Exhibit P26 was maintained and the amount that was in possession of accused Nos.1 to 4 was in excess of such declaration. 4. The accused have not given any satisfactory explanation for the cash which were found in their possession in excess of the declaration made in the Cash Declaration Register. 4. The accused have not given any satisfactory explanation for the cash which were found in their possession in excess of the declaration made in the Cash Declaration Register. Therefore, it is contended that accused Nos.1 to 4 being the public servants have demanded and accepted the bribe amount from the drivers/owners of the lorry who passed through the check post for the purpose of showing official favour i.e. for smooth passing through the check post. Thereby, they have committed the offence punishable under Section 7 , 13(e) read with Section 13 (2) of P.C. Act. 5. After filing of the charge sheet, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and summoned the accused. The accused have appeared before the Trial Court and they have pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. The prosecution has examined PW.1 to 15, got marked Exhibits P1 to 57 and MO.1 in support of its contention. The accused have denied all the incriminating materials available on record, but have not chosen to lead any evidence in support of their defence. However, they got marked Exhibits D1 to 7 during cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. The Trial Court, after taking into consideration all these materials on record came to the conclusion that the explanation offered by accused No.2 for being in possession of excess cash was satisfactory and therefore acquitted him for the above said offences. Whereas it has held that accused Nos.1, 3 and 4 were found in possession of the amount which was not satisfactorily accounted for the same. Therefore, they were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of P.C. Act. Being aggrieved by the same, accused Nos.1, 3 and 4 have preferred these appeals. 7. Heard Sri P. Prasanna Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No.732/2025, Sri. Veeranna G. Tigadi, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No.734/2025, Sri.Sharath S. Gogi, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No.735/2025 and Sri. Lethif B, learned Special counsel for respondent-Lokayukta. Perused the materials on record. 8. 7. Heard Sri P. Prasanna Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No.732/2025, Sri. Veeranna G. Tigadi, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No.734/2025, Sri.Sharath S. Gogi, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No.735/2025 and Sri. Lethif B, learned Special counsel for respondent-Lokayukta. Perused the materials on record. 8. In view of the rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for both the parties, the common point that would arise for my consideration is: “Whether the appellants in Crl.A.Nos.732/2025, 734/2025 and 735/2025 being accused Nos.3, 1 and 4 respectively have made out any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court and to acquit them for the charge leveled against them? My answer to the above point in the 'affirmative' in respect of appellant-accused No.3 in Crl.A.No.732/2025 and 'negative' in respect of appellants-accused Nos.1 and 4 in Crl.A.Nos.734/2025 and 735/2025 for the following: REASONS 9. Learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No.732/2025 contended that the appellant is accused No.3, who was working as SDA in Commercial Tax check post and he being the public servant is not in dispute. My attention was drawn to Ex.P26 - a Cash Declaration Register maintained in the check post. As on the date of incident, accused No.3 had declared cash with him as Rs.2,900/-. It is the contention of the prosecution that accused No.3 was found in possession of Rs.2,665/- only i.e., less than the amount which was declared in the Cash Declaration Register. 10. At the time of addressing the argument, learned counsel for the respondent contended that accused No.3 in anticipation of the raid must have declared the amount of Rs.2,900/- in the Cash Declaration Register even though he was not having any cash with him, and that the amount of Rs.2,665/- which was recovered from his possession was in fact the excess amount held by him. Such submission of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted even for a moment, as it was never the contention of the prosecution either while filing the charge sheet or at the time of leading evidence before the Trial Court. No such charge is framed by the Trial Court against accused No.3. Therefore, the respondent can not be permitted to make out new case against accused No.3 in that regard. 11. No such charge is framed by the Trial Court against accused No.3. Therefore, the respondent can not be permitted to make out new case against accused No.3 in that regard. 11. To prove the offence punishable under Section 7 of P.C. Act, the prosecution is required to prove the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification or undue advantage. The prosecution examined PWs.6 to 11-the drivers of various lorries who spoke about the demand and acceptance by the accused. But none of the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution. Apart from these witnesses no other witnesses have spoke about the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. Under such circumstances, the prosecution is not successful in proving the guilt of accused No.3 for the offence punishable under Section 7 of P.C Act. 12. To make out an offence punishable under Section 13 (2), which constitute misconduct on the part of the public servant, the prosecution is required to prove the offence as found in Section 13 (1) of P.C Act. Section 13 (1) (a to d) refers to acceptance of illegal gratification or undue advantage or dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriating or otherwise converting when the property entrusted to the public servant. Section 13 (1)(d) refers to the possession of any pecuniary resources of which the public servant cannot be satisfactorily accountable. Even if Section 13 (1)(e) is applied to accused No.3, admittedly, he had declared cash in Ex.P26 as Rs.2,900/- But when search was held he was found in possession of Rs.2,665/- only. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the public servant was in possession of the amount to which he cannot satisfactorily account for. 13. When the prosecution papers itself disclose that accused No.3 has declared the cash of Rs.2,900/- with him as on the date of the incident, the contention of the prosecution that the amount of Rs.2,665/- found in his possession was either excess or disproportionate. The contention taken by the learned counsel for the appellant that it was the money which he had brought while coming to the office is reasonable. Hence, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of accused No.3 beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, he is entitled for acquittal. 14. Accused No.4 was working as Group D employee and was found in possession of Rs.3,500/-. Hence, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of accused No.3 beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, he is entitled for acquittal. 14. Accused No.4 was working as Group D employee and was found in possession of Rs.3,500/-. As per the Cash Declaration Register-Ex.P26, he declared only Rs.800/-. Therefore he is liable to account for the excess amount which was found in his possession. Similarly, accused No.1 had declared cash of Rs.3,720/- in Ex.P26, but he was found in possession of Rs.41,510/- kept in the bag in his resting room. 15. Learned counsel for accused No.1 had contended that there is absolutely no materials to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. Even though the prosecution has examined PWs.6 to 11 to prove such demand and acceptance, they have not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore the Trial Court has committed an error in convicting the accused for the above said offences. 16. Learned counsel for accused No.1 places reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) , [ 2023 (18) SCC 251 ] , to contend that the offences under Section 7 and 13(1) are not proved by the prosecution. It is to be noticed that the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court was called upon to decide the question as to whether, in the absence of evidence of complainant direct or primary evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of P.C. Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. Since the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has referred the said question for decision of the Constitution Bench, the constitution bench has decided the matter and answered the reference in Neeraj Dutta (supra) and summarized its finding in paras 88 and 90 as under: “88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: 88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 88.2. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: 88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. 88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. 88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe- giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Sections 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. 88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. 88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 88.8. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in sub- para 88.5 (e), above, as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” 13. The referred question was answered in para 90 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus: “90. Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as under: In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence), it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Thus, the position of law is very well settled that in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence), it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. After the reference was answered by the Constitution Bench, the matter was again considered by the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta (supra) by referring to the finding of the Constitution Bench to decide the appeal on merits. The Division Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterating the decision of the Constitution Bench held in paras 20 and 21 as under: ""20. In view of what is laid down by the Constitution Bench, in a given case, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct, oral or documentary evidence. While answering the referred question, the Constitution Bench has observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the PC Act. While answering the referred question, the Constitution Bench has observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence. 21. The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof need not be only by direct, oral or documentary evidence, but it can be by way of other evidence including circumstantial evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must establish each and every circumstance from which the prosecution wants the court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand". (emphasis supplied) Plain reading of the above, makes the position of law on the subject very well settled and it is to be applied to the facts in the present case. 18. In the present case, the informant is PW.1, a Police Inspector is attached to the Lokayukta Police. PWs.6 to 11 are the drivers/owners of the lorry who were supposed to speak about demand and acceptance, none of these witnesses have supported the case and they have turned hostile to the case of the prosecution for the reasons best known to them. If the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta (supra), is applied it is to be considered as to whether reliance could be placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification or not. If the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta (supra), is applied it is to be considered as to whether reliance could be placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification or not. When the material witnesses who speak about demand and acceptance, have turned hostile, the circumstantial evidence placed on record could definitely be taken into consideration. 19. Admittedly, accused Nos.1 and 4 being the Commercial Tax Officer and Group D employee in the Commercial Tax Department were public servants and both of them were working in the Commercial Tax Check post as on the date of the incident. This fact is never disputed by them. It is also an admitted fact that Exhibit P26 is the Cash Declaration Register maintained in the check post, where, on the particular day, accused No.1 had declared cash of Rs.3,720/-, while accused No.4 had declared cash of Rs.800/-. It is also not in dispute that when a raid was held over the check post, cash of Rs.41,510/- was found in the resting room meant for CTO's i.e. accused No.1. 20. On personal search of accused No.4, cash of Rs.3,500/- was found in his possession which was in excess of the cash declared by him in Exhibit P26. When a public servant working in the check post declares that he is in possession of cash of Rs.800/- and later he was found in possession of cash of Rs.3,500/-, he is required to explain about the possession of the excess money satisfactorily. Accused No.4 has not taken any acceptable defence except saying that he was in possession of the excess amount as it was given by accused No.1. However, he has not stepped into the witness box, neither he has taken such a defence at the earliest point of time. Even in the absence of the direct evidence for demand and acceptance to prove the offence under Section 7 of P.C. Act, the recovery of excess amount from the person of accused No.4 which was in excess of the amount declared in Exhibit P26, coupled with the evidence of PWs.1 to 5 and 14 prove the contention of the prosecution that he had demanded and accepted the illegal gratification to show the official favour. As the witnesses have categorically stated that it was accused No.1 and 4 who were at the check post, checking the vehicles and the documents physically, no other conclusion could be arrived at on the basis of the materials that are placed on record. 21. With regard to the contention of the prosecution against accused No.1, he had declared cash of Rs.3,720/-, but in the resting room meant for him, cash of Rs.41,510/- was found in different paper pockets. PWs.4 and 5 are the CTO's C working in the same department. PW.5 had worked in the check post earlier to accused No.1 and PW.4 was expected to work in the next shift i.e. after accused No.1 hands over the charge. These witnesses have categorically stated that the room in which the cash was found was exclusively meant for CTO's for taking rest. Even during cross examination, this version of PWs.4 and 5 was not shaken. PWs.1 to 3 and 14 have reiterated the said fact, stating that the room shown as CTO resting room in the hand sketch Exhibit P.11 was exclusively meant for CTO's and nobody else was permitted to use the same. When such categorical oral evidence was available on record, the contention of the learned counsel for accused No.1 that the room had no doors and windows and it was not being exclusively used by the C.T.O's or accused No.1 at the relevant point of time, cannot be accepted. Even otherwise it is to be noted that accused No.1 being the CTO who is the superior officer working in the check post was required to monitor the working of his subordinates and to maintain the check post, he has absolutely no explanation about such excess cash of Rs.41,510/- kept in his resting room when the raid was held. 22. Exhibit P6 is the Explanation given in writing by accused No.1 at the earliest point of time i.e. immediately after raid. He only pleads ignorance about the cash that was found in the resting room stating that the same does not belong to him. The said explanation cannot be accepted to be a probable explanation. Even though the prosecution witnesses who have supported the case of prosecution, were cross-examined at length by the learned counsel for accused Nos.1 and 4, nothing has been elicited from them to disbelieve their version. The said explanation cannot be accepted to be a probable explanation. Even though the prosecution witnesses who have supported the case of prosecution, were cross-examined at length by the learned counsel for accused Nos.1 and 4, nothing has been elicited from them to disbelieve their version. When the accused were examined under Section 313 of Cr.PC, these accused have denied the incriminating materials on record but they have not neither given any written version explaining about the recovery of the excess amount in the check post or from the person of accused No.4 nor they have stepped into the witness box to speak about their defence. 23. If under these circumstances the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta (supra) is applied, the prosecution is successful in proving that accused Nos.1 and 4 were the public servants working in the check post concerned at the time of raid, they had declared the cash which was in their possession in the Cash Declaration Register-Exhibit P26. When the raid was held, excess cash was found in the person of accused No.4 and excess cash was found in the resting room of accused No.1, but they have not given any probable explanation for the same. Under such circumstances, the prosecution is successful in proving the guilt of the accused Nos.1 and 4 for the offence under Section 7 and 13(1)(e) punishable under Section 13 (2) of P.C. Act. Therefore, they are liable for conviction. 24. Learned counsel for accused No.1 contended that, recording of the statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC by the Trial Court was not in accordance with law and therefore accused No.1 is liable to be acquitted. Learned counsel contend that a common statement of accused Nos.1 to 4 were recorded which is not permissible under law. He has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vaijinath v. State of Karnataka , [ILR 1993 KAR 543] , where the Division Bench of this Court held that, a plain reading of Section 313 Cr.PC makes it amply clear that each and everyone of the accused persons, where there are more accused than one, should be separately and distinctly questioned on every one of the circumstances appearing against him in evidence. 25. 25. It is also held that if the Trial Court, to save labour or for reasons which cannot be made out, adopts a short-cut and puts the questions to the accused persons in a joint statement, it is a clear infringement of the mandatory provisions of Section 313 of Cr.PC. The Court has also referred to Section 342 in the old Code of 1898 which was replaced with Section 313 of the Code 1973 by adding the word "personally" and held that the object of Section 313 is to give opportunity to each and every one of the accused persons to offer their own explanation regarding any circumstances that may appear against them in the evidence. 26. If the statement under Section 313 Cr.PC recorded in the present case by the Trial Court is taken into consideration, no doubt the Trial Court has recorded the incriminating materials in a joint statement. However, the answers from each of the accused were separately taken. Thereby offered an opportunity to the individual accused to give their answer or explanation. It is settled position of law that the accused cannot be compelled to give answers to the questions in the statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC. If the accused answers the questions, the same shall be recorded in the statement in his own words, the same has been done by the Trial Court by recording the answers given by each of the accused if at all they have given the answers. 27. The statement makes it clear that, accused Nos.1 and 4 have not chosen to give any answer to some of the questions, while they have denied some of the incriminating materials. For few questions they pleaded ignorance. When accused Nos.1 to 4 were questioned as to whether they had got anything to say in question No.102, accused No.1 has answered in the negative while accused No.4 asserted that he will give his written version. Even though similar answer is given by accused No.2 that he will give the written version, the materials on record disclose that accused No.2 had in fact given the written version explaining the excess amount which was found in his statement. However, accused Nos.1 and 4 have never given any written version. Even though similar answer is given by accused No.2 that he will give the written version, the materials on record disclose that accused No.2 had in fact given the written version explaining the excess amount which was found in his statement. However, accused Nos.1 and 4 have never given any written version. Therefore, it is clear that accused Nos.1 and 4 have never given any explanation which will explain excess amount found in their possession satisfactorily as required under Section 13 (e) of P.C Act. 28. The contention of the learned counsel that since recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.PC by the Trial Court was not in accordance with law and that accused No.1 is entitled to be acquitted, cannot be accepted as accused No.1 being the Senior Officer of the rank of Commercial Tax Officer has never raised any objections while recording his statement. Even his counsel had not raised any objection at that point of time. When the answers of each of the accused were recorded by the Trial Court in the statements of accused Nos.1 to 4 separately, accused No.1 had not chosen to give any explanation for the incriminating materials, nor he has chosen to file his written version as could be filed under Section 313(5) of Cr.PC. Interestingly, no such defence was taken by the appellants while preferring the appeals as the memorandum of appeal is silent about such a ground. There is absolutely no reason as to why such a ground was not raised in the memorandum of appeal. 29. Learned counsel for accused No.1 contended that since non-recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.PC is a question of law, he could raise it at the time of argument without raising it as a ground in the memorandum of appeal. But it is interesting to note that, according to the learned counsel for accused No.1, accused No.1 could not understand the incriminating materials put to him by the Trial Court, and he was not in a position to give any answers and therefore he kept quiet. This contention taken by the learned counsel for accused No.1 was definitely not a question of law but should have been pleaded in the Memorandum of Appeal. This contention taken by the learned counsel for accused No.1 was definitely not a question of law but should have been pleaded in the Memorandum of Appeal. No prejudice whatsoever is stated by accused No.1 that was caused to him by recording the statements of accused Nos.1 to 4 by the Trial Court. Under such circumstances, no explanation whatsoever is forthcoming from accused No.1 for the excess amount found in his resting room. 30. From the materials on record the surrounding circumstances, it could be safely concluded that the accused No.1 being the public servant working as CTO in the check post had demanded and accepted illegal gratification from the drivers/owners for the purpose of showing official favour i.e. clearance to pass through the check post and was in possession of Rs.41,510/- and that, he has not satisfactorily accounted for the same. Similarly, accused No.4 was working as a Group D employee in Commercial Tax Department was with accused No.1 in the check post, physically checking the vehicles and the documents, and had declared cash of Rs.800/- in the Cash Declaration Register-Exhibit P26, but was found in possession of Rs.3,500/-. The oral, documentary evidence and the circumstantial evidence placed by the prosecution disclose that he had also demanded and accepted illegal gratification from the drivers/owners of the lorry to show official favour i.e. to pass through the check post, and has not explained the excess amount found in his possession satisfactorily. Thereby, both have committed the offences under Sections 7 , 13(1)(e) punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act. 31. I have gone through the impugned judgement of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court. It has proceeded to convict accused Nos.1, 3 and 4 while acquitting accused No.2. The reasons assigned by the Trial Court for convicting accused No.3 is not satisfactory. It has not taken into consideration the fact that accused No.3 had declared cash of Rs.2,900/- in the Cash Declaration Register- Exhibit P26, but he was found in possession of only Rs.2,665/- much less than the cash declared. Under such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that he had demanded and accepted illegal gratification and was found in possession of the cash for which he cannot satisfactorily account. However, the Trial Court was right in convicting accused Nos.1 and 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 7 , 13(2) of PC Act. Under such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that he had demanded and accepted illegal gratification and was found in possession of the cash for which he cannot satisfactorily account. However, the Trial Court was right in convicting accused Nos.1 and 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 7 , 13(2) of PC Act. 32. In view of the above, the appeal preferred by accused No.3 is liable to be allowed while the appeals preferred by accused Nos.1 and 4 are liable to be dismissed. Hence, I answer the above point accordingly and I proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) Crl.A.No.734/2025 and Crl.A.No.735/2025 preferred by appellants - accused Nos.1 and 4 are dismissed. (ii) Crl.A.No.732/2025 preferred by accused No.3 is allowed. (iii) The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.03.2025 passed in Spl. Case No.241/2018 by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge at Chamarajanagar, in so far as it relates to accused No.3 is hereby set aside. (iv) Consequently, accused No.3 is acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of P.C Act. (v). Bail bond of accused No.3 and that of his sureties shall stand cancelled. (v) Fine amount deposited, if any, by accused No.3 is ordered to be refunded to him on due identification.