ORDER : NIKHIL S. KARIEL, J. 1. Heard party-in-Person Mr.Ramesh Jaicharan Sharma, Acting President of Petrofils Ex-Employees Action Committee. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought for the following reliefs:- “(A) Your Lordship be pleased to admit and allow this petition. (B) Your Lordship be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus declaring that, the vss given on the basis of OM dated 5-5-2000 annexure K is violating the article 14 and also against the directive principle of state policy part IV of Indian Constitution and also against the policy of Parity and declare that we the petitioners, ex-employees are entitle for the difference of amount of VSS compensation with 12% interest p.a. from the date of entitlement till the actual payment will be made as per the 60 days or 35/25 days scheme, whichever is beneficial to individual employee. (C) Your Lordship be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus declaring that, model standing order dated 9-03-1995 annexure H is wrongly considered and applied and wrongly deprived to those employees who appointed/ joined as trainees/GETs/Consolidated and wrongly deprived them for the benefit of training period for gratuity and VSS compensation. And declare that trainees/GETs/Consolidated are entitle for gratuity and VSS compensation for their training period with 12% interest p.a. from the date of entitlement till the actual payment will be made. (D) Your Lordship be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus declaring that para 4 of the circular dated 6-11-2001 annexure V is totally unjust, unfair and illegal and hence, respondent have not considered us for the Ex-gratia of 50% as wage revision from 1-1-1997 was not carried out so, we the petitioners, ex-employees those who are not benefited for wage revision from 1-1- 1997 are entitle for the 50% ex-gratia after considering the above pray of B and C with 12% interest p.a. from the date of entitlement till the date of actual payment will be made. (E) Your Lordship be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus declaring that, as the payment of VSS amount was paid late about 2.5 months so we the petitioners, all the ex- employees are entitled for the interest at the rate of 12% p.a for the said delayed period. (F) To grant any such other and further relieves as this Hon'ble court deems just and proper in facts and circumstances of the case. (G) To award cost of this petition.” 3. It would appear that the grievance of the petitioner is with regard to certain clauses in a scheme floated by the Petrofils Co-operative Limited for voluntary separation of its employees from the organization. It appears that the said scheme had been promulgated on 18.12.2000. It also appears that the petitioner and the employees of the Co-operative Limited whose cause the petitioner is seeking to espouse, have all accepted the scheme in question and have shown their desire to opt for the VSS scheme by making application before the cut off date. 3.1. The grievance which is being made today is with regard to Clause-3(i)(A) of the scheme in question inter alia on the ground that the scheme was detrimental to the interest of the employees more particularly the submission being that other employees of other organizations where such scheme had been implemented had got a better deal of 60 days’ emoluments as against the 45 days’ emoluments which had been contemplated under the scheme in question. 4. At this stage, before going any further, since a question of delay has arisen as a scheme promulgated in the year 2000 is sought to be questioned in the year 2025, the Party-in- Person had been asked to explain and whereas, attention of this Court has been drawn by the Party-in-Person to paragraph no.58 of the petition wherein the details of the action taken by the petitioner / union / employees individually etc. have been mentioned. 4.1. have been mentioned. 4.1. In this regard, it appears that in the year 2004, a writ petition being Special Civil Application No.2010/2004 had been preferred by the petitioner in individual capacity with the following prayers:- “(a) To admit this Special Civil Application; (b) To declare that the VSS given by the Respondent No.1 is discriminatory as not following the offer of the Respondent No.1, Government of India, by not giving the option of continuation of service to the petitioner. (c) ?? issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of the mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondents, their officers, agent and servants to pay ex-gratia payment on basis of 1997 settlement wherein 50 % of amount of ex-gratia shall be paid to the employees. (d) To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of the mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondents, their officers, agent and servants to pay the salary for the period 14.05.1979 to 14.05.1980 as it is the part of the service period. (e) To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of the mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondents, their officers, agent and servants to pay the gratuity amount under VSS for the service period of the petitioner from 14.05.1979 to 14.05.1980. (f) To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of the mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondents, their officers, agent and servants to pay the total amount of arrears as wages as per the settlement of 1997 which is not included in the total paid amount under VSS to the petitioner. (g) To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of the mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondents, their officers, agent and servants to pay the amount of HRA for the period of total service under the VSS to the petitioner in accordance with the VRS on Gujarat Pattem. (g) To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of the mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondents, their officers, agent and servants to pay the amount of HRA for the period of total service under the VSS to the petitioner in accordance with the VRS on Gujarat Pattem. (h) To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of the mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondents, their officers, agent and servants to pay the amount of 3 months salary as the total amount of VSS was not paid on 17.03.2001 which is the date of VSS, as continuation of service was extended, till the date of total payment of VSS, for a period of 3 months. (i) To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of the mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondents, their officers, agent and servants to pay interest at the rate of 15% on the amount of arrears as per the settlement of 1996, on the amount of salary of the 3 months which is considered to be continuation of service on default of total amount payable by 17.03.2001 and interest also on amount of gratuity for the period of 12 months from the date of joining training to the date of service. (j) To pass such order and further orders as the nature of the case may require; (k) To pass any other necessary order in the interest of justice; (l) The Cost of this Special Civil Application be awarded in favour of the Petitioners.” 4.2. It appears that the said writ petition had been withdrawn by the petitioner as recorded vide an order dated 14.08.2014. 4.3. It appears that the said writ petition had been withdrawn by the petitioner as recorded vide an order dated 14.08.2014. 4.3. It would also appear in this regard that the present petitioner i.e. Action Committee had preferred another petition being Special Civil Application No.17547/2015 with the following prayers:- “[A] Your Lordship be pleased to admit and allow this petition, [B] Your Lordships be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, declaring that the VSS given by respondents is discriminatory as no option/offer of 60 days for the completed years is given to the employees, [C] Your Lordships be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondents/Liquidator or respondent-company Petrofils Cooperative Ltd; to pay gratuity after considering the so called training period for calculation of gratuity with interest at 15 per cent on delayed period till actual payment is made, [D] Your Lordships be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondents/Liquidator of respondent - company to consider the training period for VSS and pay such difference to petitioners after making calculation, with interest at 15 percent on delayed period till actual payment is made. [E] Your Lordships be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondents to pay 'House Rent Allowance' after considering it for the calculation of VSS, with interest at 15 percent on delayed period till actual payment is made, [F] Your Lordships be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondents to consider the option of 60 days for the completed years for VSS or 35 days for completed years and 25 days for remaining years of service, whichever is higher and pay the difference of the same to the petitioners, with interest at 15 percent on delayed period till actual payment is made. [G] Your Lordships be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondents to calculate the amount of aforesaid relief [D], [E] and [F] and recalculate VSS compensation and to pay 50 per cent amount on the amount so arrived after calculation, to the petitioners, with interest at 15 percent on delayed period till actual payment is made. [H] Your Lordships be pleased to direct the respondents to pay interest of about three months for the delay caused in making payment of VSS, at 15 percent on delayed period till actual payment is made. [I] Your Lordships be pleased to direct the respondents to pay interest on unpaid wages i.e. arrears from 1/1/1992 to 30/6/1996, at 15 percent on delayed period till actual payment is made, even after order dated 5/10/2012 passed in S.C.A No. 3196 of 2001, [J] Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, be pleased to direct the Liquidator of the Petrofils - respondent no.2 herein to withhold some reasonable amount towards legitimate claims of the petitioners as claimed in this petition. [K] To grant any such other and further reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. [L] To award cost of this petition.” 4.4. It would appear that the said writ petition had been disposed of by a learned Coordinate Bench vide an order dated 05.08.2016 more particularly permitting the petitioner to put forth their claim before the liquidator and whereas, the liquidator upon such representations being received was directed to decide the same as expeditiously as possible. 4.5. It would appear that the petitioners had submitted their response to the liquidator on 26.08.2016 and whereas, vide a communication dated 03.07.2017, the liquidator has passed a detailed order dealing with all the submissions made by the petitioners and had rejected the same. 4.6. It would appear that the petitioner has thereafter approached this Court vide the present petition inter alia once again challenging the scheme in question. It would also appear that in the interregnum, i.e. after 03.07.2017, the petitioners had made certain representations to certain authorities and whereas, the petitioner has thereafter approached this Court vide the present petition. 4.7. 4.6. It would appear that the petitioner has thereafter approached this Court vide the present petition inter alia once again challenging the scheme in question. It would also appear that in the interregnum, i.e. after 03.07.2017, the petitioners had made certain representations to certain authorities and whereas, the petitioner has thereafter approached this Court vide the present petition. 4.7. The Party-in-Person has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His Lr, reported in AIR 2024 SC 1884 and in case of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vs. Rameshwar @ Ramesh Chandra Sharma (Dead) Through Legal Heir, reported in 2022 (16) Scale 653 in support of his submissions that delay ought to be condoned. 5. To this Court, it would appear that the present petition is hopelessly time barred more particularly the petitioner is seeking to question the scheme which the petitioner themselves have voluntarily and willingly accepted somewhere in the year 2000, in the year 2025. Upon perusal of the scheme, it would clearly appear that while the scheme did not have any mandatory requirement for every employee to join the scheme, whereas the scheme also envisages that employee who does not opt for the VSS scheme within the time period, would be entitled to retrenchment compensation in terms of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 5.1. It would appear that the petitioner having accepted the scheme at the relevant point of time, after a huge time gap, is seeking to question the same more particularity, to this Court, it would now appear that the entire issue had been laid to rest vide the detailed decision of the official liquidator dated 03.07.2017 i.e. the order rejecting the representation. At paragraph no.10, it is observed as under:- “10. Subsequent to the VSS being floated, various employees totaling 1906 signed the consent form for the voluntary separation scheme. The consent form specifically stated that the employees shall not raise any claim whatsoever including employment as per the Societies Rules. The dues payable under the Separation Scheme, as approved by the Government of India, shall be in full and final settlement”. The consent form categorically provided in no uncertain terms that the amounts payable under the Voluntary Separation Scheme dated 18 th December 2000 would be in final settlement.” 5.2. The dues payable under the Separation Scheme, as approved by the Government of India, shall be in full and final settlement”. The consent form categorically provided in no uncertain terms that the amounts payable under the Voluntary Separation Scheme dated 18 th December 2000 would be in final settlement.” 5.2. It would appear that while the employees were given an option of joining VSS scheme, the consent form specifically required the employees to undertake that they would not raise any claim whatsoever including any claim for any employment and whereas, the dues payable under the separation scheme as approved by the Government of India would be treated as full and final settlement. As noticed by the liquidator, the employees have all agreed to the said terms at the relevant point of time. From the order dated 03.07.2017, it would also appear that the organization in question i.e. M/s. Petrofils Cooperative Society was running into huge loss and whereas, it was by way of ex-gratia that employees who are working in the Cooperative Society were paid the emoluments by the Government of India through the scheme which it had approved. 5.3. At this stage, it requires to be noted that in the prayers, the petitioner has not challenged the order passed by the liquidator dated 03.07.2017, rather, the petitioner is seeking to challenge the VSS scheme itself based on Office Memorandum dated 05.05.2000. Thus, it would appear that the prayers sought for by the petitioner are after a period of 25 years from the action impugned. On the other hand, giving the petitioner the benefit of doubt even if one assumes that what is under challenge is order dated 03.07.2017, then also, the petition is suffering from delay of approximately 8 years. 5.4. While the petitioner seeks to rely upon averments made at paragraph no.58 of the petition, it would appear that after order dated 03.07.2017, the petitioner had approached the Prime Minister’s Office in July,2017 and had preferred appeal to the Joint Secretary, Government of India in the month of August, 2017. The said appeal, as per the chronology, is stated to be null and void. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Controlling Authority for amount of gratuity. Thereafter, the petitioner continued their correspondence with the Prime Minister’s Office and Chief Minister’s Office, concerned Minister etc. The said appeal, as per the chronology, is stated to be null and void. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Controlling Authority for amount of gratuity. Thereafter, the petitioner continued their correspondence with the Prime Minister’s Office and Chief Minister’s Office, concerned Minister etc. Thus, it would appear that except for submitting representations, the petitioners have not taken any substantive action. If at all, the petitioners were aggrieved by the order of the liquidator dated 03.07.2017, the petitioners ought to have challenged the same at the earliest and whereas, it does not appear that sufficient cause is presented by the petitioners. 6. Insofar as the decision relied upon by Party-in-Person in case of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the case of the petitioner since the Hon’ble Supreme Court was approached by the petitioner – Development Authority assailing a decision of the High Court which had condoned delay of 22 years in preferring First Appeals. The said decision does not lay down any proposition as regards under what circumstances delay has to be condoned or not, rather, perusal of the order clearly reveals that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has balanced the interest of both parties vide the said decision. 6.1. Insofar as the decision in case of Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (supra), the said decision lays down propositions which are completely against the submissions made by the Party-in-Person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had been approached by the Union of India being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court declining to condone delay of 12 years and 158 days. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had upheld the decision and contrary to the submissions made by the Party-in-Person, it would appear that the observations in the said decision are not helping the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. 6.2. Observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (supra) , paragraphs no.26, 27 as well as observations at paragraph no.33 whereby observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in earlier decision have been quoted and paragraph no.35 are quoted hereinbelow for benefit:- “26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. 33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , this Court made the following observations: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. ” 6.3. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it would clearly appear that a party cannot fix their own time period of limitation for institution of proceedings. While it is true that there may not be any period prescribed for filing of writ petitions, but, at the same time, it is a well settled principle that the petitioners intending to invoke a writ jurisdiction have to do so within a reasonable time. While it is true that there may not be any period prescribed for filing of writ petitions, but, at the same time, it is a well settled principle that the petitioners intending to invoke a writ jurisdiction have to do so within a reasonable time. Delay of 8 years, without any justification whatsoever, more particularly when the issue relates back to a scheme floated in the year 2000 which had been opted by the employees at that relevant point of time, cannot by any stretch of imagination appear to be reasonable time. It also appears that a party who has approached the Court after a huge delay, cannot plead that substantial justice deserves to be given against technical consideration. It also clearly appears, as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that question of limitation would not be treated as a mere technical consideration and rules of limitations are based on principle of sound public policy and principle of equity. 6.4. Furthermore, from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Esha Bhattacharjee quoted above, while it would appear that Courts are obliged to take a legal, liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach at the stage of condonation of delay, but at the same time, substantial justice being paramount, technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis. Furthermore, the term “sufficient cause” has to be understood in its proper spirit. Having observed as thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further has observed that there is a clear distinction between inordinate delay and a short delay and whereas, doctrine of prejudice would be attracted when the delay is inordinate. 6.5. In the instance case, the delay being substantial i.e. if challenge is treated as against order of liquidator dated 03.07.2017, then delay would be of 8 years and whereas, if one relates back to the prayers, then the delay is of around 25 years. Intermittent litigations and intermittent representations to dignitaries who may not be concerned directly with the nitty–gritty of the grievance of the petitioner, would not be enough material for the petitioner to claim that there is a sufficient cause for condonation of delay which has taken place. To this Court, it would appear that the delay being extraordinarily huge and not being sufficiently explained, the request of the petitioner for condoning such delay cannot be accepted. To this Court, it would appear that the delay being extraordinarily huge and not being sufficiently explained, the request of the petitioner for condoning such delay cannot be accepted. The decisions relied upon by the petitioner would not advance the cause of the present petitioner at all. 7. To this Court, it would appear that having accepted the scheme in the year 2000 and having objected to the scheme intermittently and having questioned the scheme vide earlier petition, now the present petition questioning the benefits conferred upon the employees 25 years ago, cannot be reopened. While it is true that a learned Coordinate Bench vide an order dated 05.08.2016 had directed the liquidator to consider the grievance of the petitioner therein i.e. present petitioner, yet, what would be more pertinent to note is the fact that the liquidator also had rejected the grievance of the petitioner in the year 2017 and whereas, while the present petition is preferred in the year 2025, the order of the liquidator is also not sought to be challenged in the present petition. As noticed, what sought to be challenged is the scheme itself i.e. promulgated in the year 2000. 7.1. Again, another important issue which has come to the notice of this Court is the fact that the present petitioner who claims to be an Acting President of one M/s. Petrofils Ex- Employees Action Committee and claiming right to file a petition based upon resolution dated 01.04.2025 of the Executive Committee of the Action Committee, has very fairly stated that there is no list of members of the Action Committee either with the petitioner or with anybody. While it is true that the present petitioner or a group of petitioners could have approached the Court for resolving their individual grievance, when a petition is preferred under the head of Ex- Employees Action Committee, to this Court, the basic minimum requirement would be that a list of members of the action committee would have to be tendered so as to ascertain that whose cause the petitioner is espousing. The said requirement not being fulfilled, the locus of the petitioner also is in question. 7.2. Be that as it may, since this Court is of the opinion that the present petition is not required to be entertained on the ground of unexplained delay and laches, the issue of locus is not entered into at this stage. The said requirement not being fulfilled, the locus of the petitioner also is in question. 7.2. Be that as it may, since this Court is of the opinion that the present petition is not required to be entertained on the ground of unexplained delay and laches, the issue of locus is not entered into at this stage. 8. Having regard to the above observations, the present petition stands disposed of as rejected on the ground of unexplained delay.