JUDGMENT : Michael Zothankhuma, J Heard Ms. Lalngaihsaki Fanai, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant. Also heard Ms. Vanneihsiami, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. C. Tlanthianghlima, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent No.2. 2. This is an appeal from Jail filed by the convict/appellant against the Judgment & Order dated 10.07.2023 passed by the Court of the Additional District & Sessions Judge -cum- Judge, Fast Track Court, Kolasib in S.R. No. 31/2022 (Crl.Trl.No. 156/2022), convicting the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and also under Sections 363 and 377 IPC. The appellant has been sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 20 (twenty) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, i/d of fine to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 1 (one) year under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The appellant has also been sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of 5 (five) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, i/d Simple Imprisonment for 5 (five) months under Section 363 IPC. The appellant has also been sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 5 (five) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, i/d Simple Imprisonment for 5 (five) months under Section 377 IPC. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that an FIR was lodged by the mother of the victim boy aged 11 years on 28.05.2022 before the Officer-in-Charge, Kolasib Police Station. The informant, who is the Prosecution Witness-1 (PW-1) stated in her FIR that the victim boy aged 11 years was threatened by a certain person between 3:00 a.m. to 6:47 a.m. on 28.05.2022 and took him from Diakkawn Thomas Tyre Works to the outskirts of Salem Veng. From there the victim was taken to a certain jhum hut located at Bakpuk road beyond Project Veng (locality) and then to Lalhlira’s jhum hut, where he forcefully had anal sex with the victim. The appellant even forced the victim to touch his private parts. The victim was also threatened by the appellant with a knife and was told that he would be stabbed if he did not follow the commands of the appellant. That the victim managed to escape when the appellant fell asleep. 4. Pursuant to the FIR, Kolasib P.S Case No. 51/2022 was registered on 28.05.2022 under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 read with Sections 363 and 377 IPC. That the victim managed to escape when the appellant fell asleep. 4. Pursuant to the FIR, Kolasib P.S Case No. 51/2022 was registered on 28.05.2022 under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 read with Sections 363 and 377 IPC. 5. The appellant was arrested on 28.05.2022 and both the victim and the appellant were taken for medical examination on the same date. The statement of the victim was also recorded under Section 164 CrPC on 01.06.2022 and on finding a prima facie case under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 read with Sections 363 and 377 IPC against the appellant, charge-sheet was filed. 6. The learned Trial Court thereafter famed charge against the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 read with Sections 363 and 377 IPC, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. The learned Trial Court thereafter examined 11 Prosecution Witnesses and after examining the appellant under Section 313 CrPC, the learned Trial Court found the appellant guilty of having committed the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 read with Sections 363 and 377 IPC. The appellant was thereafter convicted on the above 3 (three) charged Sections of law and sentenced accordingly. 8. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that there are inconsistencies in the evidence given by the victim in his examination-in-chief and cross-examination. She also submits that the medical report and the evidence of the Doctor do not prove that the appellant had raped the victim or had caused any aggravated penetrative sexual assault. She accordingly submits that the impugned Judgment & Order should be set aside. 9. On the other hand, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor and Mr. C. Tlanthianghlima, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent No. 2 submit that the evidence of the Prosecution Witnesses clearly proved the guilt of the appellant in having raped the young boy below 12 years and having unnatural sex, after kidnapping him. 10. They submit that the explanation given by the appellant while being examined under Section 313 CrPC also shows that the appellant has not denied the fact of the appellant inserted his penis into the anus of the victim boy. The appellant only claims loss of memory on the ground that he was fully intoxicated and that he was an HIV positive person. 11. The appellant only claims loss of memory on the ground that he was fully intoxicated and that he was an HIV positive person. 11. They submit that the evidence of the victim boy has been corroborated not only by PW-3, but also by the Medical Officer’s evidence. As such, they pray that the impugned Judgment and Order should be upheld. 12. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. We have also perused the materials available on record. 13. The evidence of the informant (PW-1), who is the mother of the victim boy, is to the effect that while the victim boy was out taking exercise between 3.00 a.m. to 6.47 a.m. on 28.05.2022, the appellant kidnapped the victim and took him to the jhum huts in the jungle near Bakpuk Road, one of them belonging to Lalhlira. The appellant sexually assaulted the victim in both the jhum huts by inserting his penis into the victim’s anus. Further, the victim boy was also made to touch the penis of the appellant. The appellant had also threatened to stab the victim with the knife he was holding if he resisted and did not obey the appellant. The victim was able to escape while the appellant fell asleep. PW-1 further stated that on learning about the incident, she lodged the FIR before the Kolasib Police Station. 14. In her cross-examination, PW-1 stated that on getting a phone call from her husband on 28.05.2022 between 7:00 a.m. to 7:30 a.m., informing her that her son had been kidnapped, she alongwith her neighbour Pu Denga went toward Bakpuk Road where they found the victim at a waiting shed with an old man. 15. The evidence of PW-2 is that on 28.05.2022 at around 6.47 a.m., the victim who was his step-son called him and said “Pa Zau”. Thereafter, the called ended. After a few minutes, the elder sister of the victim i.e. Lalremruati called PW-2 and informed him that the victim had been kidnapped and taken to the jungle near Bakpuk. PW-2 thereafter informed his elder brother Denga and requested him to go to Bakpuk. When he rushed home, he saw the victim inside the house crying. The victim informed them that while he was sitting in front of Timtom Store Diakkawn, Kolasib, one unknown person approached and spoke to him. PW-2 thereafter informed his elder brother Denga and requested him to go to Bakpuk. When he rushed home, he saw the victim inside the house crying. The victim informed them that while he was sitting in front of Timtom Store Diakkawn, Kolasib, one unknown person approached and spoke to him. The victim told them that he thereafter left the man and continued with his morning exercise. When he was near Thomas Tyre Works, Diakkawn CP Road junction, the same man approached the victim and took out his knife. The man threatened to stab him if he did not obey him. The appellant then took him towards Salem veng and to the jungle near Bakpuk and sexually assaulted him inside the jhum hut, by inserting his penis inside his anus. Thereafter, the appellant took him to the farm house of Lalhlira where he was again sexually assaulted. 16. PW-2 stated that on learning about the incident, he alongwith Denga and Rampana proceeded toward Lalhlira’s Farm House near Bakpuk and some other people also followed them. Before reaching Lalhlira’s Farm house, they met some Police on the way and they all went together to Lalhlira’s Farm house, where they found the appellant sleeping. The Police thereafter arrested him and he was handcuffed and made to sit inside the Police vehicle. However, the appellant broke the glass window of the vehicle and tried to escape. However, the appellant was caught before he managed to escape. 17. The cross-examination of PW-2 was declined by the defence. 18. The evidence of PW-3 is that on the morning of 28.05.2022 at around 7:00 a.m., he went to his farm at Muallungthu Zau and on the way near Bakpuk (Tuilut), he saw one minor boy who came from the forest crying. The minor boy was carrying his footwear. On being asked as to what had happened to him, the minor boy told him that he had been sexually assaulted and raped at Lalhlira’s farm. 19. The minor boy also told PW-3 that the appellant was drunk and while the appellant was sleeping, the victim boy managed to escape. While PW-3 and the victim were still talking, the relatives of the victim came. Thereafter, he saw the victim running towards one lady crying. PW-3 stated that thereafter he proceeded towards his farm. 20. 19. The minor boy also told PW-3 that the appellant was drunk and while the appellant was sleeping, the victim boy managed to escape. While PW-3 and the victim were still talking, the relatives of the victim came. Thereafter, he saw the victim running towards one lady crying. PW-3 stated that thereafter he proceeded towards his farm. 20. In his cross-examination, PW-3 admitted to the fact that he did not know anything about the incident other than what had been told to him by the minor victim. 21. The evidence of PW-4 is to the effect that on 28.05.2022 at around 7.00 a.m., the informant’s husband H. Lalramzauva called her through a phone and requested her to inform PW-1, regarding the rape and kidnapping of the victim. PW-4 also stated that she informed PW-1. Thereafter, PW-1 alongwith PW-4’s husband Dengthangzuala, went towards Bakpuk. After about 15 minutes, they brought home the victim, who informed them that he had been raped by one male person. 22. PW-5 evidence is to the effect that on the morning of 28.05.2022, he went to his farm at Project Veng below Court Office Complex and on his way back, he saw people gathered near the house of PW-1. On enquiry, he came to learn of the victim had been raped by one person in the farm house of Lalhlira. PW-5 stated that he immediately advised PW-1 to report the incident to the Police and when the Police arrived, they went toward the farm house of Pu Lalhlira. Inside the farm house, they found the appellant sleeping and the police apprehended him and handcuffed him. Thereafter, he was put inside the Police vehicle (Sumo) and they proceeded towards the town. While following the Police vehicle, PW-5 stated that he saw the appellant assaulting the Police personnel. Thereafter, he helped the Police and managed to keep the appellant under control. 23. PW-5 also stated that he saw the appellant breaking the glass window of the vehicle. PW-5 also stated that he saw the Police formally seizing the knife suspected to be used in threatening the victim. The seizure was made inside the farm house of Lalhlira. 24. The evidence of PW-6 is also similar to the evidence of PW-5, inasmuch as, he was amongst the party which participated toward Pu Lalhlira’s farm house where the appellant was apprehended. The seizure was made inside the farm house of Lalhlira. 24. The evidence of PW-6 is also similar to the evidence of PW-5, inasmuch as, he was amongst the party which participated toward Pu Lalhlira’s farm house where the appellant was apprehended. He also stated that he saw the knife identified by the victim as the one used by the appellant, which was about 15 inches long. The Police seized the knife and on the way back, he saw the appellant assaulting Police personnel and breaking the glass of the Police vehicle. He thereafter stopped his auto rickshaw and helped the Police keep the appellant under control. The appellant was then tied with a rope and taken to the Police Station. The evidence of PW-5 and PW-6 was not shaken during cross-examination. 25. The evidence of PW-7, who is a Medical Officer of the Kolasib District Hospital is to the effect that on 28.05.2022 at 10.30 a.m., the victim was brought for medical examination. Before conducting the medical examination, he asked the victim as to what had happened, to which the victim stated that the alleged incident occurred in the morning of 28.05.2022. In his examination, he found one laceration measuring 1 cm in length and 1 mm dept in the anus (anal wall) of the victim. 26. PW-7 further stated that the appellant was brought for medical examination on 28.05.2022 at around 12.45 p.m. There was blood stain on his clothes. There was also laceration injury at the right index and middle fingers. 27. There was also laceration injury at the right index and middle fingers and tenderness at the left side of the appellant’s chest. There was small multiple lumps and tiny ulceration around the base of glan penis. PW-7 also collected specimen of 1) pubic hair 2) scalp hair 3) saliva sample 4) penile swab 5) blood sample and 6) nails clippings of the accused and handed over the same to the Police. 28. The Medical Examination Report of the victim and the appellant were also exhibited by PW-7. In his cross-examination, PW-7 stated that the anal wall laceration on the victim did not indicate proof of any sexual assault. 29. PW-7 further stated that the anal wall laceration on the victim could occur due to multiple reasons, including sexual activity. 28. The Medical Examination Report of the victim and the appellant were also exhibited by PW-7. In his cross-examination, PW-7 stated that the anal wall laceration on the victim did not indicate proof of any sexual assault. 29. PW-7 further stated that the anal wall laceration on the victim could occur due to multiple reasons, including sexual activity. PW-7 further stated that as per his findings, he could neither prove or affirm that the victim was subject to any sexual assault. 30. The evidence of PW-8 and PW-9 is to the effect that he was a witness to the seizure of the copy of the Birth Certificate of the victim and the underwear of the victim. 31. The evidence of PW-10, who is the Case I.O is that an FIR was submitted by PW-1 on 28.05.2022 regarding the kidnapping and rape of her son by the appellant. PW-10 stated that after the FIR was registered, he went to the place of occurrence, wherein a sketch map was drawn. His evidence showed that the appellant had committed aggravated sexual assault on the victim after kidnapping him by threatening him with a knife. He also stated that the appellant was found sleeping in Lalhlira’s farmhouse and that he was put in a Police vehicle. On the way back, the appellant bashed the rear glass of the Police vehicle with an intention to escape from Police custody. The appellant was thereafter tied with a rope and brought to the Police Station. The appellant’s knife was seized by the Police and he was also taken to the Medical Officer for examination. During investigation, it was learned that the appellant was involved in many other cases and was a habitual offender. The cases that the appellant was involved in and his previous conviction orders were narrated by PW-10 as follows:- “ Previous conviction orders : 1.Klb Ps C/No: 108/15 Dt 28.9.2015 U/S 376 (1) IPC.. The accused Laihlimpuia is sentenced to undergo R.I for a period of 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs 3000/- by pu Lalbiakzama, Judge, Fast Track Court, Kolasib, Mizoram._(Memo No 148 FTC (K)/2018 dt. 19.7.2018). 2. Kulikawn Ps C/No: 31/2005 U/S 363/376(1)/324 IPC. The accused Lalhlimpuia is sentenced to undergo R.I for a period of 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs 1000/- ID/SI for 1 month by Pu Saingura Sailo, ADSJ, Aizawl. 3. 19.7.2018). 2. Kulikawn Ps C/No: 31/2005 U/S 363/376(1)/324 IPC. The accused Lalhlimpuia is sentenced to undergo R.I for a period of 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs 1000/- ID/SI for 1 month by Pu Saingura Sailo, ADSJ, Aizawl. 3. Klb Ps C/no.18/94 Dt 11.5.1994 U/s 457/380 IPC -- Judgement order not received. 4. Klb Ps C/no. 19/94 11.5.1994 U/s 457/380 IPC - Judgement order not received. 5. Klb Ps C/no. 43/95 Dt 29.4.1995 U/s 457/380 IPC. - Judgement order not received. 6. Klb Ps C/no.114/95 Dt 19.11.1995 U/s 376 IPC - Judgement order not received. 7. Klb Ps C/no. 115/95 Dt 21.11.1995 U/s 376 IPC - Judgement order not received.” 32. The evidence of the victim who is eleven (11) years old, is to the effect that the appellant had kidnapped him and sexually assaulted. On 28.05.2022, at around 3:00 a.m., while out on a morning walk, he sat down in front of Timtom Store at Diakkawn, Kolasib and was browsing on his phone as it was too early. The appellant came besides him with his dog and he also saw the appellant scolding a non-Mizo truck driver. The appellant thereafter approached him and asked him where he was from. The appellant also told the victim that he had drunk the liquor at Thlanmual Veng, Diakkawn. After a few minutes, the victim left the appellant and proceeded to start his morning walk. While in front of Thomas Tyre Works at Diakkawn, Kolasib, the appellant again came beside the victim and asked him how he would defend himself. When the victim told the appellant that he did not know how to defend himself, the appellant took out a knife and threatened him saying, “Do you want to be stabbed?” The victim begged the appellant not to stab him. The appellant then took the victim towards CP road and thereafter towards the forest near College Veng burial ground. Before reaching Pu Hlira’s Picnic Spot, the appellant took the victim inside one jhum where there was a mat. The appellant then asked the victim to remove his clothing and to lie flat on the floor. While lying flat on the floor, the appellant tried to insert his penis inside the victim anus, due to which the victim was in deep pain. However, the victim did not scream as he was afraid that he would be stabbed if he screamed. While lying flat on the floor, the appellant tried to insert his penis inside the victim anus, due to which the victim was in deep pain. However, the victim did not scream as he was afraid that he would be stabbed if he screamed. On hearing some noise, the appellant went out to look and locked the jhum hut door from outside. After a few minutes, the appellant came back and again tried to insert his penis inside the victim’s anus. Thereafter, the appellant told the victim to put on his clothes and took him to Lalhlira’s Picnic Spot. At the Picnic Spot, there were two (2) jhum huts. Firstly, the appellant took the victim to the bigger jhum hut where the victim put his sweater. Then the appellant took the victim to the smaller jhum hut, where he sexually assaulted the victim, by trying to insert his penis inside the victim’s anus. The appellant also put his fingers inside the victim anus. Thereafter, while the appellant was sleeping, the victim managed to escape from the Picnic Spot. He thereafter called his relatives through phone and on the way back, he met his family members near Bakpuk (Tuilut). In his cross-examination, the victim stated that he met an old man after he left the place of the occurrence. The victim then told the old man what had happened to him and in the meantime, the victim’s mother and others reached the place where he was with the old man. 33. The statement of the victim under Section 164 CrPC has been recorded as follows:- “ VICTIM's STATEMENT u/s 164 Cr. P.C The following questions have been asked by me to examine the victim's competency and to make him feel comfortable. Q. Can you tell me your name? Ans: Lalrempuia Q. How old are you? Ans: 11 years Q. In which locality do you stay? Ans: Venglai East, Silchar Road Q. Can you tell me what actually happened? Ans: Yes. On 28th May, 2022 after 3:00a.m, I went for a walk near Timtom shop however as I felt that it was still early, I sat down for a while and touched my phone. While I touched the phone someone who introduced himself as TP-a came and he had a black and white dog that he takes for a walk. On 28th May, 2022 after 3:00a.m, I went for a walk near Timtom shop however as I felt that it was still early, I sat down for a while and touched my phone. While I touched the phone someone who introduced himself as TP-a came and he had a black and white dog that he takes for a walk. He scolded the non- mizo vehicle owners who parked their vehicle outside the shopping centre and he sat near me thereafter. He asked me my name and locality and he said many other things. He also mentioned that he drank alcohol at Thlanmual Veng area. After a while, I said "I am leaving for a walk. It is getting late."While I was standing near a tyre repair shop at CP road watching my phone, I saw his dog on my side and when I looked back he stood just about 7 steps away from me and he looked at me in anger. He stood before me and blabbered about strange topics. He asked me if I knew self defense and he laughed at me when I told him that I do not know self defense. He pointed a knife at me and said "Do you want to be stabbed?" I said "Sir, please forgive me and do not stab me please." He said "Follow me if you do not want to be stabbed."He made me sit near the vehicle tyre repair shop and said "Do you know why I showed you the knife?" After he said many other things, he took me towards CP road and took me at the bottom of College Veng Cemetary. He opened the lock of one of the houses that was located before reaching Mr. Hlira's Picnic Spot and took me in. He asked me to place the wooden mat properly on the floor and I followed his instruction. He asked me to take off my sweater and I did. He again asked me to take off my pant and I did. He again instructed me to take off the leggings that I wore underneath my shorts. I again take off my underwear as instructed. He asked me to bend down and he too bend on top of me. He opened his pants and he pushed my ass with his private part. It almost entered my hole and I even felt excruciating pain. I again take off my underwear as instructed. He asked me to bend down and he too bend on top of me. He opened his pants and he pushed my ass with his private part. It almost entered my hole and I even felt excruciating pain. I however did not have the guts to shout out as I was afraid of getting stabbed with his knife. There was some sound during this period and so he went to check it and asked me to open the window during this period. He went outside and bolted the main door from outside and as he did not see anyone, he entered from the window and he brushed his private part in and around my ass. He then asked me to get dressed and we left. He took me to Mr. Hlira's spot and we entered the bigger jhum hut first. I kept my sweater there and and we entered the smaller jhum hut again. He again asked me to take off my clothes and I pulled my pant down till my knee. He asked me to lie on my stomach on the bed and he again attacked me. After he was done, he said “You can leave anytime you like” and he then fell asleep. I was still scared that he will stab me when he wake up and so I decided to wake him up. He said "Go to sleep, you will leave after my birthday celebration in the evening." He then asked me to touch his private part and he went off to sleep again. I checked the time on my phone watch and it was 6:46a.m. I took my sneakers and rushed out. I collect my sweater from the bigger hut and quickly headed towards the gate. I escaped from underneath the gate and I called my family members and informed them of the incident. When I reached near Bakpuk, I met my family members there and we decided to lodge a complaint with the Police after reaching home.” 34. There is consistency in the victim’s testimony given before the learned Trial Court and as per the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC. When I reached near Bakpuk, I met my family members there and we decided to lodge a complaint with the Police after reaching home.” 34. There is consistency in the victim’s testimony given before the learned Trial Court and as per the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC. In fact, the chain of events from the time the boy escaped to meeting the old man and his family and the eventual apprehension of the appellant, who was sleeping in a farm house, lends credence to the testimony of the victim. The laceration found on the finger of the appellant also lends credence to the evidence of the victim, who stated that the victim had also put his finger inside the victim’s anus. Further, there was laceration in the victim’s anus which could imply that the same had been caused due to the sexual assault committed by the appellant on the victim. 35. The evidence of the other prosecution witnesses also corroborates the fact that the appellant had run away/escaped from the appellant, while he was asleep. The appellant has taken the stand that he was intoxicated, as per his answers given during his examination under Section 313 CrPC. The examination of the appellant under Section 313 CrPC and the answers given to the questions, as to whether he had inserted his penis into the anus of the victim was answered as follows:- “I have an infection in my private part as I am a HIV positive and I doubt that the incident had happen as I was strongly intoxicated.” “As I was strongly intoxicated I cannot recall what had happened, as far as I can recall I did not commit the alleged offence.” 36. Section 85 IPC states that nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law, provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. 37. Section 85 IPC thus implies that the Court must attribute to the intoxicated person the illegal act, unless the said person can show that he had become intoxicated by someone administering the intoxicant to him, without his knowledge or against his will. 38. 37. Section 85 IPC thus implies that the Court must attribute to the intoxicated person the illegal act, unless the said person can show that he had become intoxicated by someone administering the intoxicant to him, without his knowledge or against his will. 38. In the present case, though the appellant has taken a stand in his examination of Section 313 CrPC that he was strongly intoxicated and as such, could not recall what had happened, the fact of the matter is that there is nothing to show that the appellant was administered the thing that intoxicated him, without his knowledge or against his will. As such, voluntary drunkenness cannot be an excuse for commission of a crime. 39. With regard to whether the appellant could still be convicted in the absence of any corroboration of medical evidence, the Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Deva Alias Dyava Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in ( 2007) 12 SCC 122, has held that even in the absence of any collaboration by medical evidence, the oral testimony of the prosecutrix which is found to be cogent, reliable, convincing and trustworthy, has to be accepted. 40. The Supreme Court further held in the above case that though the report of the Gynaecologist pertaining to the medical examination of the prosecutrix does not disclose any evidence of sexual intercourse, yet even in the absence of medical evidence, the oral testimony of the prosecutrix which is found to be cogent, reliable, convincing and trustworthy, has to be accepted. 41. With regard to the minor inconsistencies in the evidence of the witnesses, this Court is of the view that the same cannot be a ground to reject the evidence of the prosecution in its entirety, so long as it does not affect the core of the prosecution case. It was held in the case of Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta ( Dr.) & Ors . Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in ( 2010) 13 SCC 657 that minor contradictions, inconsistencies, improvements cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution evidence in its entirety, if it does not affect the core of the prosecution case. 42. In the present case, there were lacerations found in the anal wall of the victim, besides laceration being found in the finger of the appellant. 43. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. 42. In the present case, there were lacerations found in the anal wall of the victim, besides laceration being found in the finger of the appellant. 43. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sanjay Kumar Alias Sunny, reported in ( 2017) 2 SCC 51 , the Supreme Court has held that the testimony of the victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of a statement, the Court should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault alone to convict the accused. However, the testimony of the victim has to inspire confidence. 44. We find that the statement given by the victim under Section 164 CrPC is similar and consistent with the testimony given by the victim before the learned Trial Court. 45. In the case of R. Shaji Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2013) 14 SCC 266 , the Supreme Court has held that Section 157 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC can be relied upon for the purpose of corroborating statements made by witnesses in the committal Court or even to contradict the same. However, as the defence had no opportunity to cross examine the witnesses whose statements are recorded under Section 164 CrPC, such statements cannot be treated as substantive evidence. 46. In the present case, the testimony of the victim is consistent with his statement given under Section 164 CrPC. Besides the above, the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-5 and PW-6 also show the consistency in the evidence given by the victim boy. 47. On considering all the above testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the fact that the appellant has not been able to give any reasonable explanation in relation to the evidence adduced against him, except to say that he was totally intoxicated, we are of the view that the testimony of the victim boy which is consistent vis-a-vis his statement under Section 164 CrPC, is reliable and trustworthy. We accordingly accept the evidence of the victim boy as being cogent and convincing. 48. The explanation given by the appellant during his examination under Section 313 CrPC shows that he is basically side-stepping the evidence that has been recorded against him. We accordingly accept the evidence of the victim boy as being cogent and convincing. 48. The explanation given by the appellant during his examination under Section 313 CrPC shows that he is basically side-stepping the evidence that has been recorded against him. Though, Section 313 CrPC confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence, the appellant has given a vague explanation which has neither denied nor accepted the evidence recorded against him. The appellant has basically taken the plea that he could not recall anything as he was totally drunk. However, the evidence of the victim shows that though the appellant had consumed liquor, there is no evidence to show that the appellant did not know what he was doing. The appellant had taken a knife and threatened the victim and thereafter taken him to a jhum hut at Lalhlira’s Farm house, to sodomise him. 49. The above being said, the evidence of the case I.O, i.e. PW-10 is to the effect that the appellant had previous conviction orders under Section 376(1) IPC in two separate police cases. He also has three other pending criminal cases under Section 457/380 IPC and two cases under Section 376 IPC, in which judgments have not been passed by the learned Trial Court till date. 50. The above clearly goes to show that the appellant is a habitual offender preying on victims, to satisfy his lust. The appellant appears to be a depraved person, who is a very grave threat to society. Such a person with his track record cannot be shown any leniency, especially when his actions have endangered the life of the victim, being an HIV positive person. No report has been made as to whether the victim was tested for HIV. 51. In view of the reasons stated above, we do not find any ground to come to a different reasoning than the learned Trial Court, who had convicted the appellant, on finding him guilty under Section 6 of the POCSO Act read with Section 363/377 IPC. 52. The above being said, one issue that is to be decided is with regard to whether the appellant could have been sentenced under both Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 377 IPC. 52. The above being said, one issue that is to be decided is with regard to whether the appellant could have been sentenced under both Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 377 IPC. Section 6 of the POCSO Act would come into play, in view of the appellant having committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault as defined under Section 3 and 5(m) of the POCSO Act on a child below 12 years, while Section 377 IPC deals with persons of the same gender having forceful anal sex. 53. Penetrative sexual assault as defined in Section 3(a) of the POCSO Act provides that a person is said to commit penetrative sexual assault if he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child and under Section 3(b) if he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of the child. 54. Section 377 IPC on the other hand states that whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. The explanation to 377 IPC provides that penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary for the offence described in Section 377 IPC. 55. Section 42 of the POCSO Act, 2012 provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence punishable under the POCSO Act and also under Sections 166A, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 370, 370A, 375, 376, [376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB], [376E, Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to punishment under this Act or under the Indian Penal Code as provides for punishment which is greater in degree.] 56. In the present case, Section 377 IPC is not to be found under Section 42 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and as such, it appears that punishment/sentencing can be done separately under Section 377 IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act also. 57. In the present case, Section 377 IPC is not to be found under Section 42 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and as such, it appears that punishment/sentencing can be done separately under Section 377 IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act also. 57. However, Article 20(2) of the Constitution states that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. Further, Section300(1) CrPC which is now Section 337 of BNSS states that a person who has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall not be tried again for the same offence. 58. Article 20(2) of the Constitution states as follows : “20(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.” The Supreme Court in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat & Another , reported in (2012) 7 SCC 621 has held that the fundamental right which is guaranteed under Article 20(2) enunciates the principle of “autrefois convict" or "double jeopardy" i.e. a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The doctrine is based on the ancient maxim "nemo debet bis punire pro uno delicto", that is to say that no one ought to be twice punished for one offence. 59. Paragraph nos.14 and 33 of the judgment passed in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (supra) states as follows : “14. This court in Maqbool Hussain vs. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1953 SC 325 held that the fundamental right which is guaranteed under Article 20(2) enunciates the principle of “autrefois convict" or "double jeopardy" i.e. a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The doctrine is based on the ancient maxim "nemo debet bis punire pro uno delicto", that is to say that no one ought to be twice punished for one offence. The plea of “autrefois convict” or "autrefois acquit" avers that the person has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. The plea of “autrefois convict” or "autrefois acquit" avers that the person has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other and not that the facts relied on by the prosecution are the same in the two trials. A plea of "autrefois acquit" is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter.” “33. In view of the above, the law is well settled that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution i.e. doctrine of autrefois acquit or Section 300 Cr.P.C. or Section 71 IPC or Section 26 of General Clauses Act, ingredients of the offences in the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same is not identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offence. Motive for committing offence cannot be termed as ingredients of offences to determine the issue. The plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the judgment of acquittal in the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter charge.” 60. In the case of S.A. Venkataraman vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1954 SC 375 , the Supreme Court has held that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution, there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words ‘prosecuted’ and ‘punished’ are to be taken not distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors must co-exist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted. 61. Section 71 of IPC states as follows : “71. Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences .-Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such his offences, unless it be so expressly provided. Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences .-Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such his offences, unless it be so expressly provided. [Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one of such offences]. Illustrations (a) A gives Z fifty strokes with a stick. Here A may have committed the offence of voluntarily causing hurt to Z by the whole beating, and also by each of the blows which make up the whole beating. If A were liable to punishment for every blow, he might be imprisoned for fifty years, one for each blow. But he is liable only to one punishment for the whole beating. (b) But, if, while A is beating Z, Y interferes, and A intentionally strikes Y, here, as the blow given to Y is no part of the act whereby A voluntarily causes hurt to Z, A is liable to one punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to Z, and to another for the blow given to Y.” 62. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 states as follows : “26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments .--Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” A reading of the provisions of Section 300(1) Cr.PC or Section 71 or Section 26 of the General Clauses Act along with Article 20(2) of the Constitution clearly shows that a person cannot be vexed twice for the same issue, thereby barring the punishment being given for the same offence twice wherein the facts are the same. 63. 63. In the present case, Section 3(b) read with Section (m) of the POCSO Act clearly shows that the insertion of the appellant’s penis into the anus of the victim attracted the above said provisions and consequently the prosecution had been done in terms of Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The offence committed by the appellant against the victim also attracts Section 377 IPC, as the ingredients of the offence is the same. However, the issue is as to whether in terms of Article 20(2) of the Constitution, Section 300(1) Cr.PC and Section 71 IPC, the appellant could have been sentenced/punished under both Section 6 of POCSO Act and Section 377 of IPC. 64. In the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Sayyed Hassan Sayyed Subhan, reported in (2019) 18 SCC 145 , the Supreme Court has held that there is no bar to trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. Where an act or an omission constitutes and offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. An Act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under IPC and at the same time, an offence under any other law. 65. On considering the above judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Sayyed Hassan Sayyed Subhan (supra) it shows that the same set of facts in conceivable cases can constitute an offence under two different laws and the offender can be prosecuted under either or both the enactments, but can be punished only under one law. 66. 65. On considering the above judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Sayyed Hassan Sayyed Subhan (supra) it shows that the same set of facts in conceivable cases can constitute an offence under two different laws and the offender can be prosecuted under either or both the enactments, but can be punished only under one law. 66. Section 300(1) CrPC states as follows:- “ 300 – Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence- (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.” 67. In the present case, the offence remains the same, i.e. the offence can be prosecuted under both Section 6 of the POCSO Act and under Section 377 IPC. 68. Sections 363 & 377 of the IPC states as follows:- “363. Punishment for kidnapping. - Whoever kidnaps any person from [India] or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 377. Unnatural offences. - Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 69 . Sections 3, 5, 6, 42 & 42A of POCSO Act, 2012 states as follows:- “ 3. Penetrative sexual assault. Sections 3, 5, 6, 42 & 42A of POCSO Act, 2012 states as follows:- “ 3. Penetrative sexual assault. - A person is said to commit "penetrative sexual assault" if -(a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such person or any other person.” 5. Aggravated penetrative sexual assault. (a) Whoever, being a police officer, commits penetrative sexual assault on a child – (m)whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or 6 . Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault. - (1) Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine, or with death. (2) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of such victim. 42. Alternate punishment. - Where an act or omission constitutes an offence punishable under this Act and also under sections 166A, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 370, 370A, 375, 376, [376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB], [376E, Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 ( 21 of 2000)], then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to punishment under this Act or under the Indian Penal Code as provides for punishment which is greater in degree. 42A . Act not in derogation of any other law. - The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency.” 70. In the case of Navtej Singh Johar & Others Vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 10 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court was to decide as to whether Section 377 IPC was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and whether Section 377 criminalised a person, on the basis of their sexual orientation and hence discriminatory under Article 15 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court was also to decide as to whether Section 377 IPC had a chilling effect on Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which protects the Fundamental Right of Freedom of Expression including that of LGBT persons, to express their sexual identity and orientation and whether Section 377 violated the Right to Life and Liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution, which encompasses all aspects of the right to live with dignity, the right to privacy and the right to autonomy and self determination with respect to the most intimate decision of a human being. 71. The Supreme Court decided the above case on 06.09.2018, by overturning the earlier decision of the Supreme Court and holding that Section 377 IPC, in so far as it criminalises consensual sexual acts between competent adults, between homosexuals and heterosexuals in private space, violates Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. However, if any man and woman, engages in any kind of sexual activity with an animal or between two individuals without the consent of any one of them, the same would invite the penal liability under Section 377 IPC. 72. Paragraphs 268.14, 268.15, 268.16 and 268.17 in the case of Navtej Singh Johar & Others Vs. Union of India (Supra) states as follows:- “268.14. An examination of Section 377 IPC on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution reveals that the classification adopted under the said section has no reasonable nexus with its object as other penal provisions such as Section 375 IPC and the POCSO Act already penalise non-consensual carnal intercourse. Union of India (Supra) states as follows:- “268.14. An examination of Section 377 IPC on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution reveals that the classification adopted under the said section has no reasonable nexus with its object as other penal provisions such as Section 375 IPC and the POCSO Act already penalise non-consensual carnal intercourse. Per contra, Section 377 IPC in its present form has resulted in an unwanted collateral effect whereby even "consensual sexual acts", which are neither harmful to children nor women, by the LGBTs have been woefully targeted thereby resulting in discrimination and unequal treatment to the LGBT community and is, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 268.15. Section 377 IPC, so far as it criminalises even consensual sexual acts between competent adults, fails to make a distinction between non- consensual and consensual sexual acts of competent adults in private space which are neither harmful nor contagious to the society. Section 377 IPC subjects the LGBT community to societal pariah and dereliction and is, therefore, manifestly arbitrary, for it has become an odious weapon for the harassment of the LGBT community by subjecting them to discrimination and unequal treatment. Therefore, in view of the law laid down in Shayara Bano, Section 377 IPC is liable to be partially struck down for being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 268.16. An examination of Section 377 IPC on the anvil of Article 19(1)(a) reveals that it amounts to an unreasonable restriction, for public decency and morality cannot be amplified beyond a rational or logical limit and cannot be accepted as reasonable grounds for curbing the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and choice of the LGBT community. Consensual carnal intercourse among adults, be it homosexual or heterosexual, in private space, does not in any way harm the public decency or morality. Therefore, Section 377 IPC in its present form violates Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 268.17. Ergo, Section 377 IPC, sò far as it penalises any consensual sexual relationship between two adults, be it homosexuals (man and a man), heterosexuals (man and a woman) or lesbians (woman and a woman), cannot be regarded as constitutional. Therefore, Section 377 IPC in its present form violates Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 268.17. Ergo, Section 377 IPC, sò far as it penalises any consensual sexual relationship between two adults, be it homosexuals (man and a man), heterosexuals (man and a woman) or lesbians (woman and a woman), cannot be regarded as constitutional. However, if anyone, by which we mean both a man and a woman, engages in any kind of sexual activity with an animal, the said aspect of Section 377 is constitutional and it shall remain a penal offence under Section 377 IPC. Any act of the description covered under Section 377 IPC done between two individuals without the consent of any one of them would invite penal liability under Section 377 IPC.” 73. In the case of State of UP Vs. Sonu Kushwaha, reported in (2023) 7 SCC 475, the Supreme Court was seized of a matter, where the accused had put his penis into the mouth of the victim boy, aged about 10 years. The accused was prosecuted for the offences punishable under Section 377 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 5 & 6 of the POCSO Act. The Trial Court convicted the accused for all the three offences and sentenced him to undergo punishment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The Allahabad High Court held that the accused was guilty of the offence under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and not under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Accordingly, the sentence imposed upon the accused was brought down to 7 years by the High Court. The Supreme Court on considering the above facts, held that the POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and for which maximum punishment had been prescribed in Section 4, 6 & 8 of the POCSO Act, for various categories of sexual assault on children. It held that Section 6 left no discretion to the Court, but to impose the minimum sentence, as given by the learned trial Court, as the offence committed by the accused came within the provisions of Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act. Accordingly, the judgment passed by the High Court was set aside and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court was restored. 74. In the case of Puran Vishal S/o Mohit Vishal Vs. Accordingly, the judgment passed by the High Court was set aside and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court was restored. 74. In the case of Puran Vishal S/o Mohit Vishal Vs. State of Chattisgarh, reported in [2024] 0 CGHC 32453, the Division Bench of the Chattisgarh High Court held that in light of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act and Section 71 of the IPC, it was necessary to consider whether punishment should be given in only one enactment, in respect of a common act which was made penal in two or more enactments, having identical ingredients in the offence. It held that as there was essentially one culpable act under two different labels, just because two different offences had been made out by reason of two different enactments, the same did not allow for the offender to receive punishments in more than one of the enactments. In the above case, the accused male person had committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a minor victim. The accused therein had been charged under Section 6 of the POCSO Act read with Section 377 of the IPC. It was in the above fact scenario that the Chattisgarh High Court held that the learned trial Court had committed an error of law, while sentencing the accused separately to undergo imprisonment for life for having committed an offence punishable under Section 377 IPC and also under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. It held that since the accused had been sentenced under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, no separate sentence was required to be awarded to the accused for having committed the offence punishable under Section 377 IPC, though he had been held guilty of having committed both the offences. Consequently, the Chattisgarh High Court, while affirming the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 377 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, upheld the punishment/sentence awarded only under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 75. In the case of Manoj Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2339, the accused had been held guilty of the offence of penetrative sexual assault on the minor child under Section 376(2)(i) of the IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 75. In the case of Manoj Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2339, the accused had been held guilty of the offence of penetrative sexual assault on the minor child under Section 376(2)(i) of the IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He was also held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 377 of the IPC, which provided for an independent punishment. In view of Section 71 of the IPC, which speaks of the limit of punishment for offences made up of several offences, the Bombay High Court in the above case, without going into the question with regard to whether Section 42 of the POCSO Act could be applied for giving alternative punishment, either under Section 376 of the IPC or under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, had held that though the accused could be tried for the offences punishable under Section 377 read with Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, he could not be separately be punished under both the IPC and POCSO Act, in view of Section 371 IPC. 76. In the present case, as the question of the appellant having penetrated his penis into the anus of the victim boy has been proved, we do not find any infirmity with the conviction of the appellant, both under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and under Section 377 of the IPC. Article 20(2) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be punished for the same offence more than once. Section 71 IPC provides that where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than which could have been awarded for any one of such offences. Further, Clause 26 of the General Clauses Act provides that if an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more laws, the offender can be prosecuted and punished under any one of those laws. However, he shall not be punished twice for the same offence. 77. Further, Clause 26 of the General Clauses Act provides that if an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more laws, the offender can be prosecuted and punished under any one of those laws. However, he shall not be punished twice for the same offence. 77. In the present case, the appellant’s penis having penetrated the anus of the victim child has been proved and comes within the provisions of Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act and under Section 377 of the IPC. The ingredients of the offences under both the enactments are also the same. As such, even though Section 377 of the IPC may not have been included in Section 42 of the POCSO Act, which provides that in cases falling under the POCSO Act and under certain provisions of the IPC or the Information Technology Act, 2000, where alternative sentences which is of a greater degree is to be given, we are of the view that punishment/sentence can be awarded to the appellant only under Section 6 of the POCSO Act or under Section 377 of the IPC, even though he has been convicted under both the enactments. As such, on a combined reading of Article 20(2) of the Constitution, Section 71 IPC and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, we hold that even though the prosecution and conviction of the appellant can be done under both Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 377 IPC, the punishment/sentence would have to be awarded under one enactment only. The Supreme Court’s observation in the case of Sonu Kushwaha (supra) is to effect that the POCSO Act having been enacted for providing stringent punishment for all kinds of sexual offences on children and when minimum punishment have been prescribed, there is no option on the Court, but to impose the minimum sentence. We are accordingly of the view that as a stringent punishment is imposed or can be imposed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act for sexual offences against minor children, it would be in the interest of justice if the sentence inflicted upon the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act should be affirmed, which we accordingly do. We are accordingly of the view that as a stringent punishment is imposed or can be imposed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act for sexual offences against minor children, it would be in the interest of justice if the sentence inflicted upon the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act should be affirmed, which we accordingly do. However, the sentence imposed upon the appellant for the offence under Section 377 of the IPC is hereby set aside, on the ground that no separate sentence/punishment could have been imposed, as that would have amounted to the offender being given double punishment for the same offence. The conviction of the appellant by the learned trial Court under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, read with Section 363 and 377 of the IPC is however affirmed. Consequently, the impugned judgment & order dated 10.07.2023 passed by the learned Trial Court is modified to the extent that the punishment given to the appellant to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 5 (five) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, i/d Simple Imprisonment for 5 (five) months under Section 377 IPC is hereby set aside. The appeal is dismissed, subject to the modification of the impugned judgment and order, to the extent indicated above. 78. The Trial Court records be returned. 79. In appreciation of the assistance provided by the learned amicus curiae and the learned legal aid counsel for the respondent No.2, the fees payable to them should be paid by the State Legal Services Authority.