ORDER : Leave granted. 2. The appellant before this Court is the Management Committee of Seth Soorajmull Balika Vidyalaya, who challenged the order of the Division Bench of the High Court, which has upheld the order of the learned Single Judge and allowed the writ petition of the private respondent. 3. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.1 - Asha Gupta was working as an Assistant Teacher on contractual basis since 2010. The last contract of the respondent commenced from 01.01.2019 and was to expire on 31.12.2019. 4. After the contract had expired, it was not renewed and after a period of two years, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court stating that she has been removed from service by giving her notice through a Whatsapp message, informing her that her services have come to an end. This was challenged by the respondent in writ petition before the High Court after one and a half year later in 2021. 5. The order of the High Court dated 03.07.2023, though suggests that the respondent i.e. the appellant before this Court, was not served, it is also the specific averment of the respondent that she had never received a notice, but be that as it may, the fact remains that the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that this is nothing but a case of 'hire and fire' and the school/institution cannot run in a manner the way it is being run and there was a clear violation of the principles of natural justice and fare play inasmuch as the respondent's services were terminated without affording an opportunity of hearing the respondent. This, in sum and substance, is the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition of the respondent (the teacher). 6. The fact of the matter remains that the respondent was not terminated from her service as the appellant would argue that there was no occasion for them to terminate her services since she was engaged only on a contractual basis and her services would in any case come to an end on 31.12.2019, of which an intimation was given to the respondent, which they now call as a Termination Order. But the present appellant never got an opportunity to raise this defence before the learned Single Judge. 7. But the present appellant never got an opportunity to raise this defence before the learned Single Judge. 7. The order of the learned Single Judge was challenged in a writ appeal before the Division Bench, which was also dismissed. The Division Bench also held that the principles of natural justice have been violated. These are the orders which have been challenged before this Court. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 9. In our considered view, both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court have not considered the primary fact that the respondent was working only on a purely contractual basis. Moreover, the school itself is not only a minority institution, but also an unaided institution, as it has been informed to us that it receives only the Dearness Allowance for 14 of its teachers as Aid. The school is not being run on the funds of the Government. It is a linguistic minority institution and the Certificate to this effect has also been placed before this Court. 10. The fact that the school itself is a minority institution and largely unaided, where the respondent was working on a purely contractual basis, are the factors which have not been appreciated by either the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court. We are clearly of the opinion that the respondent was working on a contractual basis and her services would have come to an end on 31.12.2019, the intimation of which, in any case, was given to her. 11. We see absolutely no illegality in the process adopted by the appellant and in our considered view, the High Court was totally wrong in interfering with this matter. Moreover, the respondent has also approached the High Court after a delay of one and half years. 12. We are not getting into the larger question as to whether the writ petition was maintainable or not, as this question has never been argued before the learned Single Judge, though the learned counsel would submit that this would have been their preliminary objection to the very maintainability of the writ petition. 13. Be that as it may, as far as termination of the respondent is concerned, we see absolutely no fault on the part of the appellant. 13. Be that as it may, as far as termination of the respondent is concerned, we see absolutely no fault on the part of the appellant. The respondent was working purely on contractual basis, and his contractual period had come to an end. Petitioner has no indefeasible right to renew her contract every year. Since there is no stigma attached to the termination, there was no requirement of hearing to the respondent's case. We thus allow the appeal and set aside the order dated 03.07.2023 of the High Court. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, is/are disposed of.