ORDER : G. S. AHLUWALIA, J. This second appeal, under section 100 of CPC, has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 4/8/2010 passed by IV Additional District Judge, Morena in Civil Appeal No.1A/2010, as well as, judgment and decree dated 20/11/2009 passed by II Civil Judge Class I, Morena in Civil Suit No.12A/2008. 2. Appellant is defendant, who has lost his case from both the Courts below. 3. Facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that plaintiff Munni Devi filed a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction by pleading inter alia that she is the owner and in possession of House No.450, area 1107 square feet, situated in Ward No.30, Tulsi Colony, Ganeshpura, Morena. The said plot was purchased by plaintiff by registered sale deed dated 18/5/1994 from Ramjilal and, thereafter, with the help of her her husband and son, she has constructed a house and her name is recorded in the revenue records, as well as, in the records of Municipal Council, Morena in the capacity of owner. The suit house is the disputed property. It was pleaded that after the plot was purchased, defendant Nos. 4 and 5, either themselves or with the help of somebody else, had stolen the original sale- deed of the house and plaintiff could not get information about the theft of said registry and she was under the impression that her sale-deed has been misplaced. On 18/8/2006, a letter was received from the Office of defendant No.3 which was addressed to her son Bhupendra, according to which it was claimed that the house in dispute was mortgaged with M.P. Finance Corporation and, accordingly, Bhupendra was directed to vacate the disputed property as the house is under auction by defendant No.3. After receiving the said letter, plaintiff got surprised and, accordingly, she went to the Office of defendant No.3 along with her son Bhupendra and informed that she has not taken any loan. Then, the file of defendant Nos. 4 and 5 was called by defendant No.3. Then, plaintiff came to know that the house in question has been mortgaged. In the file, plaintiff saw that photograph of Meera W/o Purushottam is affixed in her place. Then, the file of defendant Nos. 4 and 5 was called by defendant No.3. Then, plaintiff came to know that the house in question has been mortgaged. In the file, plaintiff saw that photograph of Meera W/o Purushottam is affixed in her place. It is also pleaded that her son Bhupendra informed defendant No.3 that plaintiff has neither taken any loan nor has mortgaged the property, nor photograph is of plaintiff, nor thumb impression is of plaintiff. Thereafter, defendant No.3 did not show the file any further and instructed the plaintiff to call defendant Nos. 4 and 5. When plaintiff tried to obtain the attested copy of aforesaid document under RTI, then neither defendant No.3 accepted the application nor supplied the copy. Thereafter, plaintiff sent a notice under section 80 of CPC and also requested to take legal action against the persons who have manipulated the things, then defendant No.3 directed the plaintiff to deposit the fees. Accordingly, on deposit of Rs.80/-, copy of certain documents were provided from which plaintiff came to know that the sale deed of plaintiff is mortgaged with defendant No.3, which was in fact stolen either by defendant Nos.4 and 5 or through their agent. It was also pleaded that all the documents contained in the file of defendant No.3 are forged documents, which were never executed by plaintiff. It was the case of plaintiff that on the basis of forged documents, property which was in the ownership and possession of plaintiff, has been mortgaged and respondent No.3 has no right to auction and to evict the plaintiff from the said property. As soon as the plaintiff came to know about the concocted and forged documents, then she made complaint to various police officers and, therefore, suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction was filed. 4. Defendant No.3 filed its written statement and claimed that M.P. Finance Corporation is in the business of lending money and guarantors are required to mortgage their property in security of loan taken by the borrowers. Defendant No.3 had issued a notice dated 16/8/1999 for repayment of mortgaged amount and when the borrower did not deposit the amount, then on 6/10/2001, the property was attached and subsequently it was acquired. Defendant No.3 had issued a notice dated 16/8/1999 for repayment of mortgaged amount and when the borrower did not deposit the amount, then on 6/10/2001, the property was attached and subsequently it was acquired. Plaintiff was already in the knowledge of acquisition and mortgage of the property, but deliberately she did not take any action which clearly indicates that there was collusion between plaintiff and defendant Nos. 4 and 5. The suit is barred by time. In the light of S.32G of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, the suit is not maintainable. 5. The trial Court after framing issues and recording evidence, decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, appellant preferred an appeal, which too has been dismissed by the appellate Court. 7. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, it is submitted by counsel for appellants that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by time as she was having full knowledge about the mortgage proceedings, as well as, about attachment of property and in spite of that she did not file the suit within a period of three years, as required under Article 58 of the Limitation Act. 8. Per contra, it is submitted by counsel for respondents that notice dated 16/8/1999 was never issued to plaintiff or even otherwise, it was never received by plaintiff. Plaintiff came to know about fraud played by defendant Nos. 4 and 5 for the first time in the year 2006 and, therefore, the suit was filed on 15/1/2007 and thus the suit was within limitation. 9. The appeal is admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether the notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4-C) was received by plaintiff or not ? (ii) Whether the suit filed by plaintiff was barred by time ? 10. Since respondents are represented by their respective counsel, therefore, the appeal is heard finally. 11. The undisputed facts are that the mortgage deed does not bear the photograph as well as the thumb impression of plaintiff. 12. Before considering the facts of the case, this Court would like to consider the relationship of borrower with the guarantor/plaintiff. 13. Defendant No.4 Jairam and defendant No.5 Data Ram, Purushottam and plaintiff are real brothers and sister. Jairam and Dataram are borrowers. 12. Before considering the facts of the case, this Court would like to consider the relationship of borrower with the guarantor/plaintiff. 13. Defendant No.4 Jairam and defendant No.5 Data Ram, Purushottam and plaintiff are real brothers and sister. Jairam and Dataram are borrowers. Both the Courts below have given a specific concurrent finding of fact that mortgage deed bears photograph of Meera who is wife of Purushottam i.e. Bhabhi of plaintiff. This fact has been admitted by Bhupendra (PW2) in paragraph 7 of his cross-examination. 14. Undisputedly, mortgage deed (Ex.P/28) does not bear the photograph and thumb impression of plaintiff, therefore, the question is as to whether all the four brothers and sister namely plaintiff, Jairam, Dataram and Purushottam, as well as Meera wife of Purushottam have played fraud on defendant/appellant or Jairam/defendant No.4, Dataram/defendant No.5, as well as Meera wife of Purushottam have played fraud on the plaintiff? 15. The photograph affixed on mortgage deed (Ex.P/28) as well as thumb impression on the said mortgage were found to be of Meera, who is the real Bhabhi of the plaintiff, whereas Jairam and Dataram, defendant Nos. 4 and 5 are the real brothers of the plaintiff. 16. In order to find out as to whether there was any conspiracy amongst all these persons and they deliberately affixed the photograph and thumb impression of Meera by projecting her to be the plaintiff or it was a fruad played by Meera, Jairama and Dataram, the conduct of parties is to be seen. 17. It is the case of defendants that on 16/8/1999, they sent a notice (Ex D/4-C) to M/s Pankaj Agricultural Works, Dataram Sharma and Jairam Sharma and copy of this notice was sent to Jairam Sharma, Dataram Sharma, Purushottam Sharma, Vijay Singh Sharma and Munnidevi Sharma/plaintiff by registered post. Postal receipt of sending this registered notice has also been filed along with Ex.D/4-C. Thus, it is clear that a notice dated 16/8/1999 was sent by appellant to plaintiff by registered post. It is not out of place to mention here that Bhupendra (PW4) in Paragraph 10 of his cross- examination has admitted that Pankaj is the son of his maternal uncle Jairam and Pankaj Agricultural Firm to whom notice dated 16/8/1999 was sent is in the name of Pankaj. It is not out of place to mention here that Bhupendra (PW4) in Paragraph 10 of his cross- examination has admitted that Pankaj is the son of his maternal uncle Jairam and Pankaj Agricultural Firm to whom notice dated 16/8/1999 was sent is in the name of Pankaj. Therefore, it is clear that notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4-C) was sent to the Firm owned by Jairam and his son Pankaj, to Dataram and Jairam, to plaintiff, as well as, to Purushottam whose wife had affixed her thumb impression and her photograph by projecting herself to be the plaintiff. 18. By referring to paragraph 18 of cross-examination of plaintiff Munni Devi (PW1), it is submitted by counsel for respondents that respondents/plaintiff had denied that Madhya Pradesh Vitta Nigam had sent notice dated 16/8/1999 to her, therefore, it is submitted that once the plaintiff has categorically denied the receipt of notice dated 16/8/1999, therefore, appellant has failed to prove that notice dated 16/8/1999 was served on the plaintiff and thus the period of limitation would not start running from 16/8/1999, but it would start running from the date when the property was sought to be auctioned in the year 2006. 19. In reply, it is submitted by counsel for appellant that not only notice dated 16/8/1999 was sent to Plaintiff by registered post but the Panchnama pertaining to attachment/acquisition of property was prepared on 29/4/2000 (Ex.D/5). This Panchnama also bears the signatures of son of plaintiff namely Bhupendra Sharma (PW2). Therefore, it is clear that not only notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4-C) was sent to plaintiff by registered post, but it was lateron acted upon and the property was attached by preparing a Panchama on 29/4/2000 and the said document also contains signatures of Bhupendra Sharma and thus it is submitted that plaintiff was aware of mortgage of the property and since the suit was not filed within a period of 3 years from the said date, therefore, the suit is bared by time. 20. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties. 21. The notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4C) was sent by registered post. The address of plaintiff mentioned in registered notice (Ex.D/4C) reads as under:- "Smt. Munni Devi Sharma W/o Shri Ram Prakash Sharma, R/o Tulsi Colony, Ganeshpura, Morena". In the plaint, the same address has been given by Smt. Munni Devi/plaintiff. Even in her evidence, she has given the same address. 21. The notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4C) was sent by registered post. The address of plaintiff mentioned in registered notice (Ex.D/4C) reads as under:- "Smt. Munni Devi Sharma W/o Shri Ram Prakash Sharma, R/o Tulsi Colony, Ganeshpura, Morena". In the plaint, the same address has been given by Smt. Munni Devi/plaintiff. Even in her evidence, she has given the same address. Plaintiff is residing with her son Bhupendra, which is also evident from address of Bhupendra (PW2) mentioned in his deposition sheet. Thus, it is clear that the registered notice dated (Ex.D/4C) was sent through registered post after making payment of full postal dues at the correct address of the addressee. 22. S.27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as under:- "27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or either of the expressions “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post." 23. Thus, if the ingredients of S.27 of General Clauses Act i.e. "by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post" are proved, then this Court can draw a presumption to the effect that the service of registered post was effected, unless the contrary is proved. Appellant has proved that notice dated 16/8/1999 was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted by registered post. Therefore, there is no impediment for this Court to draw an inference in favor of appellant that notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4-C) was served on the plaintiff. However, this presumption is not absolute and it is rebuttable presumption and the same can be ignored if contrary is proved. The words "contrary is proved" are of much importance. As already pointed out, plaintiff has denied that appellant had sent notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4-C) to her. However, this presumption is not absolute and it is rebuttable presumption and the same can be ignored if contrary is proved. The words "contrary is proved" are of much importance. As already pointed out, plaintiff has denied that appellant had sent notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4-C) to her. Although she has not denied unequivocally that she has not received the notice dated 16/8/1999, but even for the sake of arguments, if it is accepted that she has denied that she received the notice dated 16/8/1999, then the question for consideration is as to whether simple denial of receipt of notice by the addressee is sufficient to give away the presumption as provided under S.27 of the General Clauses Act or not ? 24. The Supreme Court in the case of D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa, (2006) 6 SCC 456 has held as under:- "14. If a notice is issued and served upon the drawer of the cheque, no controversy arises. Similarly if the notice is refused by the addressee, it may be presumed to have been served. This is also not disputed. This leaves us with the third situation where the notice could not be served on the addressee for one or the other reason, such as his non-availability at the time of delivery, or premises remaining locked on account of his having gone elsewhere, etc. etc. If in each such case the law is understood to mean that there has been no service of notice, it would completely defeat the very purpose of the Act. It would then be very easy for an unscrupulous and dishonest drawer of a cheque to make himself scarce for some time after issuing the cheque so that the requisite statutory notice can never be served upon him and consequently he can never be prosecuted. There is good authority to support the proposition that once the complainant, the payee of the cheque, issues notice to the drawer of the cheque, the cause of action to file a complaint arises on the expiry of the period prescribed for payment by the drawer of the cheque. If he does not file a complaint within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act, his complaint gets barred by time. If he does not file a complaint within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act, his complaint gets barred by time. Thus, a person who can dodge the postman for about a month or two, or a person who can get a fake endorsement made regarding his non-availability can successfully avoid his prosecution because the payee is bound to issue notice to him within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. He is, therefore, bound to issue the legal notice which may be returned with an endorsement that the addressee is not available on the given address." 25. Thus, it is clear that whenever a presumption is raised under section 27 of the General Clauses Act, the addressee is required to prove that he had not received the notice and mere denial is not sufficient to hold that contrary to presumption has been proved because an unscrupulous person may get away from the presumption by making a simple denial or an unscrupulous person may also dodge the postman for about a month or two and can get a fake endorsement regarding his non availability and can avoid the consequences. Thus, a simple denial of non receipt of registered notice dated 16/8/99 (Ex.D/4-C) is not sufficient to hold that contrary to presumption has been proved by the plaintiff. 26. A reference was made by two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court to reconsider the law laid down in the case of D. Vinod Shivappa (Supra) and the Full Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed reported in (2007) 6 SCC 555 has held as under:- "13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with Illustration ( f) thereunder, when it appears to the court that the common course of business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the court may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post, Section 114 enables the court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised under Section 27 of the GC Act is a far stronger presumption. Further, while Section 114 of the Evidence Act refers to a general presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake of ready reference, Section 27 of the GC Act is extracted below: “27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘serve’ or either of the expression ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” 14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement “refused” or “not available in the house” or “house locked” or “shop closed” or “addressee not in station”, due service has to be presumed. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [ (1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR 1992 SC 1604 ] ; State of M.P. v. Hiralal [ (1996) 7 SCC 523 ] and V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu [(2004) 8 SCC 774 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 393] .) It is, therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was evaded by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the return of the notice unserved." 27. The Supreme Court in the case of Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 689 has held as under:- "22. In terms of the provisions of the General Clauses Act, a notice must be deemed to have been served in the ordinary course subject to the fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act reads as under: “27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘serve’ or either of the expression ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. 23. Thirty days' time ordinarily must be held to be sufficient for service of notice. In fact when the service of notice is sought to be effected by speed post, ordinarily the service takes place within a few days. 23. Thirty days' time ordinarily must be held to be sufficient for service of notice. In fact when the service of notice is sought to be effected by speed post, ordinarily the service takes place within a few days. Even under Order 5 Rule 9(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, summons is presumed to be served if it does not come back within thirty days. In a situation of this nature, there was no occasion for the Court to hold that service of notice could not be effected within a period of thirty days. 24. Presumption of service, under the statute, would arise not only when it is sent by registered post in terms of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act but such a presumption may be raised also under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Even when a notice is received back with an endorsement that the party has refused to accept, still then a presumption can be raised as regards the valid service of notice. Such a notice, as has been held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed [ (2007) 6 SCC 555 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 236] should be construed liberally, stating: (SCC p. 565, para 17) “17. It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure from the rule of criminal law, where there is no stipulation of giving of a notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the GC Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran case [K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1284] if the ‘giving of notice’ in the context of clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the ‘receipt of notice’ a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act.” (emphasis supplied)" 28. In the present case, it is not the case of anybody that notice was refused/returned unclaimed by the plaintiff, but service of notice was not returned back by postal department to defendant. Therefore, this Court is of considered opinion that when the service report is not received back either served or unserved within a period of 30 days, provisions of S.27 of the General Clauses Act would apply. 29. Thus, it is held that appellant had successfully pleaded and proved that notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4-C) was duly served on the plaintiff and at least on that day she came to know that her property has been mortgaged, but she did not take any action. 30. Furthermore, as already pointed out the Panchnama which was prepared for attachment/acquisition of property on 29/4/2000 also bears the signatures of Bhupendra (PW2)/son of plaintiff. Furthermore, the attachment Panchnama was prepared on the spot where plaintiff herself was residing. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that Panchnama was not in the knowledge of plaintiff or her son Bhupendra never informed her about the said Panchnama. Therefore, not only the notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4-C) was received by the plaintiff, but even on 29/4/2000 she came to know about the attachment but she did not take any action and the suit was filed only on 15/1/2007 i.e. only after the house was put to auction. 31. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that loan was taken by Jai Ram/defendant No.4 and Dataram/defendant No.5 in the name of M/s Pankaj Agricultural Works, which is owned by son of Jairam. Meera, wife of their another brother Purushottam put her thumb impression on the mortgage deed by impersonating herself as plaintiff and also affixed her photograph. Even original title deed of the house in question was also handed over to appellant. Meera, wife of their another brother Purushottam put her thumb impression on the mortgage deed by impersonating herself as plaintiff and also affixed her photograph. Even original title deed of the house in question was also handed over to appellant. Plaintiff has merely said that she was under an impression that original sale deed has been misplaced, but she has not given any explanation to show that how Jai Ram and Data Ram came in possession of the said original title deed. Furthermore, it is clear from the record that Jai Ram and Data Ram did not file their written statement and did not enter in the witness box. Thus, it is clear that in all probability it was a case of fraud played by all the persons on the appellant. 32. Be that whatever it may be. 33. Since the substantial question of law has been framed as to whether plaintiff has received the notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4-C) or not, therefore, nothing more is required to be said on the question of conspiracy or fraud played by the parties, but one thing is clear that plaintiff has received registered notice dated 16/8/1999 (Ex.D/4C) and she did not respond. Non response by plaintiff after receiving notice dated 16/8/1999 speaks in volumes because all her brothers and Bhabhi were involved in the scam. 34. Be that whatever it may be. 35. The suit was filed in the year 2007 and as per Rule 58 of the Limitation Act, period of limitation is 3 years and the suit was not filed within 3 years from the date of knowledge either from 16.8.1999 or 29.4.2000, therefore, it is held that suit filed by plaintiff was barred by time. 36. Accordingly, both the substantial questions of law are answered in affirmative. 37. Ex consequenti judgment and decree dated 4/8/2010 passed by IV Additional District Judge, Morena in Civil Appeal No.1A/2010, as well as, judgment and decree dated 20/11/2009 passed by II Civil Judge Class I, Morena in Civil Suit No.12A/2008, are hereby set aside. The civil suit filed by respondent No.1 is hereby dismissed. 38. Appeal succeeds and is, hereby, allowed. 39. Decree be drawn accordingly.