JUDGMENT The petitioner is the Muthawalli of Androth Juma Mosque, Lakshadweep. The management and administration of the Mosque are vested with the eldest member of the Pattakkal Tharavadu, and the members of the Aliyathammada family are restrained from interfering in the rights of the former as per Exts.P1 and P2 judgments passed by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, respectively. While so, the members of the Aliyathammada family had filed a suit before the Wakf Tribunal, Lakshadweep, against some of their family members, claiming the right to hold the post of Katheeb in the Mosque. The dispute was decided by this Court as per Ext.P3 judgment, wherein it is directed that if there is no suitable person in the Aliyathammada family, the Mutawalli can appoint the Katheeb from outside the family. The selection process is to be conducted by the Mutawalli in consultation with the Chief Executive Officer of the Lakshadweep Wakf Board ? the 9 th respondent, and the senior members of the Aliyathammada family. After the passing of Ext.P3 judgment, certain persons claiming to be senior members of the Aliyathammada family had approached the petitioner to appoint them as Katheeb. Meanwhile, the Executive Magistrate of the Androth Island ? the 3 rd respondent ? intervened in the matter and compelled the petitioner to appoint persons of his choice. However, the petitioner did not adhere to the demand. Out of this animosity, the 3 rd respondent issued Ext.P4 order prohibiting Juma prayers in the Mosque. The petitioner challenged the order before this Court. Then, the 3rd respondent withdrew Ext.P4 order. Thereafter, the 3 rd respondent issued Ext.P6 order permitting some of the party respondents to perform the functions of Katheeb in the Mosque. The 3 rd respondent also passed Ext.P7 order, granting police protection to implement Ext.P6 order. The petitioner has challenged Exts.P6 and P7 orders before this Court, and Ext.P8 order has been passed, staying the impugned orders. The petitioner had taken steps to appoint the Katheeb from the Aliyathammada family after publishing notices and intimating the matter to the 9 th respondent and the senior members of the Aliyathammada family. But there was no response from anyone. As there is no suitable person in the Aliyathammada family to be appointed as Katheeb in the Mosque, the petitioner appointed a person named Mohammed Magroof Lateefi as the Katheeb as per Ext.P31 appointment order. But there was no response from anyone. As there is no suitable person in the Aliyathammada family to be appointed as Katheeb in the Mosque, the petitioner appointed a person named Mohammed Magroof Lateefi as the Katheeb as per Ext.P31 appointment order. Immediately, the members of the Aliyathammada family issued Ext.P32 letter demanding the withdrawal of the appointment letter. The Katheeb has joined the Mosque on 24.1.2025. Apprehending a law-and-order problem, the petitioner submitted Exts.P35 to 37 representations to the respondents 1 to 4 for police protection to enable the Katheeb to carry out his duties. However, no action has been taken. The inaction on the part of the respondents 1 to 4 is arbitrary. Hence, the writ petition. 2. The respondents 5 to 8 have filed a counter affidavit denying the allegations in the writ petition. They have, inter alia, contended that the petitioner has wrongly interpreted the directions in Ext.P3 judgment. By Ext.P3 judgment, this Court has explicitly held that the right to select the Katheeb is vested with the Aliyathammada family. Only when there are no suitable persons in the above family can an outsider be appointed as Katheeb, in consultation with the 9 th respondent and the senior members of the Aliyathammada family. The petitioner has not followed the procedure in appointing the present Katheeb. The petitioner has no unfettered right to select the Katheeb. The petitioner is seeking police protection in favour of a Katheeb, who is not a member of the Aliyathammada family. The respondents 5 to 8 had furnished a list of 13 persons who were selected by the senior members of the Aliyathammada family to be appointed to the post of Katheeb to the petitioner and the 9 th respondent. The contention of the petitioner that those 13 persons are unsuitable and some are fishermen is untenable. The persons, referred to as fishermen, own fishing boats and are engaged in the sale of fish. The selected persons have recited the Kuthuba on earlier occasions. The petitioner is trying to make the selection process to the post of Katheeb, similar to the selection process adopted by the Public Service Commission. The unilateral decision of the petitioner to select an outsider without consulting and having the concurrence of the members of the Aliyathammada family and the 9th respondent is ex-facie illegal. The petitioner is trying to make the selection process to the post of Katheeb, similar to the selection process adopted by the Public Service Commission. The unilateral decision of the petitioner to select an outsider without consulting and having the concurrence of the members of the Aliyathammada family and the 9th respondent is ex-facie illegal. The petitioner is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court and enforce a disputed right. Hence, the writ petition may be dismissed. 3. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit denying the allegations in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents 5 to 8. 4. Heard: Sri. Babu Karukapadath, the learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri. R.V. Sreejith, the learned counsel for respondents 1 to 4 and 9; and Sri. Sethu Madhavan, the learned Senior Counsel for respondents 5 to 8. 5. The crux of the dispute is whether an order of police protection is to be granted to the Katheeb appointed by the petitioner to conduct the prayers in the mosque. 6. It is undisputed, as matters stand now, all parties are governed by Ext.P3 judgment passed by this Court. The directions in the judgment read as follows: “For the reason stated above, we are of the view that the findings of the Tribunal are not sustainable in the eyes of law and suffer from illegality and perversity, accordingly are set aside. Declaration is granted that the additionally impleaded respondents, i.e., Mutawalli is to appoint the Katheeb from the members of Aliyathammada family by taking into consideration the CEO of Wakf Board, Lakshadweep, after following the due procedure by taking the process for appointment of Katheeb from the said family and when there is no suitable person, only then outsider is ordered to be permitted. The selection process of Katheeb has to be undertaken by the Mutawalli in consultation with the CEO and senior members of Aliyathammada family.” 7. The central plank of the petitioner's contention is that, although he made valid attempts to conduct the selection process in consultation with the members of the Aliyathammada family and the 9 th respondent, there were no suitable candidates in the Aliyathammada family to be appointed as Katheeb. Conversely, the respondents 5 to 8 contend that, even though they had furnished a list of 13 persons to be selected as Katheeb, the petitioner unilaterally appointed a Katheeb, violating the directions in Ext.P3 judgment. Conversely, the respondents 5 to 8 contend that, even though they had furnished a list of 13 persons to be selected as Katheeb, the petitioner unilaterally appointed a Katheeb, violating the directions in Ext.P3 judgment. 8. The learned Standing Counsel for the 9 th respondent submitted that, though the petitioner had informed the 9 th respondent regarding the initial publication of notice and the selection process, after that, the 9 th respondent was not informed or consulted about the selection and appointment of the present Katheeb. 9. In Ext.P3 judgment, this Court has, in unambiguous terms, directed the Mutawalli to appoint the Katheeb from the family members of the Aliyathammada family in consultation with the 9 th respondent. Only when there are no suitable persons in the said family can an outsider be appointed. However, even then the selection process of Katheeb is to be undertaken by the Mutawalli in consultation with the 9 th respondent and the members of the Aliyathammada family. 10. Prima facie, there are no materials placed on record to substantiate that the petitioner had consulted the 9 th respondent and the members of the Aliyathammada family before the selection and appointment of the Katheeb as per Ext.P31 order, which is a disputed question of fact, which has to be adjudicated and decided in an independent proceeding and not in this writ petition. 11 In P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar [ (2006) 4 SCC 501 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the question whether an order of police protection can be granted to protect a person's right to property or to an office, has held as follows: “12. It is one thing to say that in a given case a person may be held to be entitled to police protection, having regard to the threat perception, but it is another thing to say that he is entitled thereto for holding an office and discharging certain functions when his right to do so is open to question. A person could not approach the High Court for the purpose of determining such disputed questions of fact which were beyond the scope and purport of the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction as it also involved determination of disputed questions of fact. *** *** 17. A person could not approach the High Court for the purpose of determining such disputed questions of fact which were beyond the scope and purport of the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction as it also involved determination of disputed questions of fact. *** *** 17. A writ petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to a writ petitioner, cannot be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It is one thing to approach the High Court, for issuance of such a writ on a plea that a particular party has not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner, was deliberately flouting that decree or order and in spite of the petitioner applying for it, or that the police authorities are not giving him the needed protection in terms of the decree or order passed by a court with jurisdiction. But, it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated upon and when such an adjudication can only be got done in a properly instituted civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a writ petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession of a property without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil court. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations. 18. **** * A writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to the person of a writ petitioner can be issued, when the court is satisfied that there is a threat to his person and the authorities have failed to perform their duties and it is different from granting relief for the first time to a person either to allegedly protect his right to property or his right to an office, especially when the pleadings themselves disclose that disputed questions are involved. My learned Brother has rightly pointed out that the High Court was in error in proceeding to adjudicate on the rights and obligations arising out of the trust deed merely based on the affidavits and the deed itself. I fully agree with my learned Brother that the High Court should not have undertaken such an exercise on the basis that the right of the writ petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution is sought to be affected by the actions of the contesting respondents and their supporters and that can be prevented by the issue of the writ of mandamus prayed for”. (emphasis given) 12. Recently, in Padmanabhan N v. State of Kerala ( 2024 KHC Online 7177 ), the Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: “6. Police protection cannot be asked for issues that fall within the jurisdiction of civil courts, particularly when it involves resolving private disputes between parties. It is well established in law that civil rights must be adjudicated by competent civil courts. The enforcement of civil court orders should be carried out in accordance with the procedures outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or any relevant statute that establishes the appropriate forums for such matters. *** *** *** *** *** 8. Seeking and employing a police force cannot be a means to sidestep the need for dispute resolution in competent courts. Invariably, such directions are sought invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 13. Considering the facts and materials on record, particularly the disputed question regarding the validity of the appointment of Katheeb, I am not inclined to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and direct the respondents 1 to 4 to afford adequate police protection to the petitioner and the Katheeb to conduct the Juma prayers in the Mosque. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed, which is without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to work out his remedies, in accordance with law. Nonetheless, the 4 th respondent is ordered to ensure that law and order is maintained during the prayers at the Mosque, without interfering in any civil dispute between the petitioner and the party respondents.