State Of Gujarat v. Erachasha Hiramasji Jinwala, Died During The Pendency Of The Suit Through His Legal Heirs.
2025-06-24
HEMANT M.PRACHCHHAK
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. Present appeal is filed by the appellant - State of Gujarat against the judgment and decree dated 28.04.1987 passed by Second Joint Civil Judge (S.D.) Ahmedabad (Rural) (hereinafter referred to as "trial Court") in Special Civil Suit No. 24 of 1970, whereby the trial Court has directed the defendants to jointly pay Rs.9,39,292/- to the plaintiffs together with interest from the date of the suit till realization. 2. The facts giving rise to present appeal are that the respondent Nos. 2 to 75 are the shareholders of Bhankoda estate which consist 12 villages. In 1925, as per Section 27 of Talukedari Act , 1988, the Government had given possession to Talukedar. At the relevant point of time, due to huge debt of Talukedar, the Talukedar decided to handover management to plaintiff. Therefore, 84% of shareholder executed ijarapatra for 15 years in favour of plaintiff by way of 5 registered deed and management and possession was handed over to the plaintiff. 2.1 Thereafter, creditor who had given money to Talukedar filed Civil Suit No.64 of 26 to recover the money and Collector was appointed as receiver. The Talukedar by executing mortgage deed with Maharani borrowed Rs. 1,69,000 and the amount was paid to the creditors and in 1928 possession was handed over to the plaintiff by the Collector. 2.2 Then, in 1934 Maharani filed Suit No.931 of 1934 to recover the amount against plaintiff and Talukedar and prayed to appoint receiver and during proceeding, plaintiff No.1 was appointed as the receiver and he tendered resignation which was accepted on 19.01.1950. Subsequently, the management had been taken by the Collector. 2.3 Thereafter, Mamlatdar of Viramgam was appointed as an estate manager. The Mamlatdar had issued notice to the Talukedar to submit their claims and objections and after receiving all accounts from year 1925 to 1950 of plaintiff, Mamlatdar directed Talukedars to submit their objections and after verifying documents as well as oral evidence produced by both the parties, Mamlatdar suggested for scheme of settlement. 2.4 The scheme was forwarded to Collector for approval however, Collector sent it to State Authority and authority has directed to verify again.
2.4 The scheme was forwarded to Collector for approval however, Collector sent it to State Authority and authority has directed to verify again. Then, revision application was filed and during pendency of the same by notification dated 15.4.1958, Government declared that management of estate Bhankoda put to an end as it was managed under the provision of Bombay Tenancy Act and possession was handed over to the estate holder. 2.5 Thereafter, since the request of the plaintiff was rejected by the Collector, the plaintiff filed writ petition before this Court. The same was decided and this Court observed that possession was with Talukedar and therefore, the Court cannot pass order of possession. Thereafter, different suits were filed by the plaintiff to restore the possession and recover the amount of compensation wherein, the suit bearing Civil Suit No. 24 of 1970 was rejected on 26.12.1973 and the Court held that the claim was time barred. 2.6 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 26.12.1973, the plaintiff had preferred First Appeal No. 218 of 1974, whereby this Court, by an order dated 9.10.1984 allowed the said Appeal and directed that the preliminary decree be drawn to the effect that the account shall be taken between the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 to 75 and also directed that the amount of compensation lying with the State shall not be parted. Then as per order dated 9.10.1984 passed in First Appeal, the Court Commissioner was appointed and Court Commissioner had submitted report and the respondent No. 1 i.e. State has deposited Rs.30,000/- towards compensation. 2.7 After considering the report of Court Commissioner, by an order dated 28.4.1987, the trial Court allowed the suit partly and directed all the defendants to pay Rs.9,39,292/-. 2.8 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said impugned order passed by the trial Court, the appellant State of Gujarat has filed present appeal. 3. Heard Ms. Roshni Patel, learned AGP for the appellant-State of Gujarat and Mr. Rushabh R. Shah, learned counsel for respondent No.1. 4. Ms. Patel, learned AGP for the appellant has submitted that this is second round of litigation. She has submitted that earlier the suit being Civil Suit No. 24 of 1970 was decided by the Court concerned on 26.12.1973.
Heard Ms. Roshni Patel, learned AGP for the appellant-State of Gujarat and Mr. Rushabh R. Shah, learned counsel for respondent No.1. 4. Ms. Patel, learned AGP for the appellant has submitted that this is second round of litigation. She has submitted that earlier the suit being Civil Suit No. 24 of 1970 was decided by the Court concerned on 26.12.1973. She has submitted that being aggrieved and dissatisfied wit the same, the plaintiff had preferred First Appeal No. 218 of 1974 before this Court which was decided vide order dated 9.10.1984. 5. Ms. Patel, learned AGP for the appellant has submitted that the trial Court ought to have considered that transaction took place through ijarapatrak and mortgage deed between plaintiff and respondent No.2 to 75. She has also submitted that the trial Court ought to have considered that suit was filed in capacity of partnership firm and said suit is barred by the provision of Section 69(2) of Indian PARTNERSHIP ACT . She has submitted that the claim of the plaintiffs is on the premise of Kabulatnama between the plaintiff and private parties (defendant Nos. 2 to 75), in which the State Government was never a party and in absence of any contractual liability, the State Government cannot be compelled to pay the dues of the private parties. 5.1 Ms. Patel, learned AGP for the appellant has submitted that the impugned order of the trial Court is silent on any reasoning as to why the State should bear the financial burden of the debts owned by private individuals or entities. She has submitted that the trial Court has failed to provide any reason for saddling the Government with such liability. She has submitted that the State Government is not an insurer of private debts or liabilities in cases where the private defendants are unable to meet with their financial obligations, the responsibility of the payment does not automatically develop upon the State. 5.2 In view of the above submissions, Ms. Patel, learned AGP for the appellant urges before the Court that present appeal may be allowed and impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court may be quashed and set aside. 6. As against that Mr.
5.2 In view of the above submissions, Ms. Patel, learned AGP for the appellant urges before the Court that present appeal may be allowed and impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court may be quashed and set aside. 6. As against that Mr. Shah, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff i.e respondent No.1 herein has contended that the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and decree and held liable the State of Gujarat, as the Court had directed the State to deposit Rs. 30,000/- and therefore, they are jointly liable to pay the amount and therefore, present Appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6.1 Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has submitted that the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment an decree and directed the defendants to jointly pay the amount of Rs.9,39,292/- to the plaintiff together with interest @ 4% p.a. from the date of the suit till realization. 6.2 Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has submitted that none of the original defendants have ever challenged the reports of Court commissioner dated 3.4.1987 and that report has also attained finality and based on the report of the Court Commissioner, an order dated 28.4.1987 came to be passed by the trial Court. 6.3 Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has submitted that after evaluating the evidence on record and after appreciating the material facts and after hearing both the sides, the trial court has passed the impugned judgment and decree, which does not call any interference by this Court and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court may be confirmed. 7. I have perused the material and documents available on record as well the record and proceedings. I have also gone through the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 8. It appears from the record that the original decree was passed by the trial Court, whereby the suit of the original plaintiff came to be dismissed on 26.12.1973. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the original plaintiff had preferred the Appeal before this Court being First Appeal No.218 of 1974 which was allowed vide judgment and order dated 9.10.1984.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the original plaintiff had preferred the Appeal before this Court being First Appeal No.218 of 1974 which was allowed vide judgment and order dated 9.10.1984. In the first round of litigation, this Court has observed that respondent No. 2 to 75 were liable to furnish the account with regard to the due and payable amount, wherein the Court has exonerated respondent No.1 State of Gujarat - i.e. present appellant. Thereafter, the matter was remitted for the purpose of furnishing the account to the Commissioner appointed by the court. However, trial Court has, without considering the observation made by this Court in the earlier round of litigation, while passing the impugned judgment and decree held that all the respondents including the State of Gujarat are jointly liable to pay the decreetal amount, which is absolutely illegal, unjust and against the order passed by this Court, based upon the evidence and therefore, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. It appears that while passing the impugned judgment and decree, the trial Court has committed serious error of law and on facts both and come to the conclusion that all the respondents including State of Gujarat are liable to pay the amount. 10. In earlier round of litigation, in the First Appeal No. 218 of 1974, by an order dated 9.10.1984, the Court has observed as below:- "The result is that, we allow this appeal partly and direct that a preliminary decree drawn to the effect that the accounts shall be taken between the plaintiffs on one hand and the defendant No. 2 to 75 on the other in respect of two sets of transaction evidence by Exh___to Exh.___ and Exh.163 to Exh.170. The trial Court, after proceedings a remitted to it, on the preliminary decree having been drawn, will appoint a Commissioner to take the accounts and then the normal procedure will follow. The Ld. Counsel Mr. Shelat states that in respect of the claims and accounts, the plaintiffs had already produced and proved various documents. If it is so, they will naturally be taken into account by the Commissioner. While taking the accounts, the Kabuliyat at Ex.161 and 162 which are also found proved by the Ld. Trial Judge will be taken into account for the purpose of taking accounts.
If it is so, they will naturally be taken into account by the Commissioner. While taking the accounts, the Kabuliyat at Ex.161 and 162 which are also found proved by the Ld. Trial Judge will be taken into account for the purpose of taking accounts. It is directed that, till the question of the dues of the plaintiffs, if any, is finally decided, the amount of compensation lying with the defendant No.1, State of Gujarat, shall not be parted with in favour of the defendants No.2 to 75. The appeal, accordingly, stand allowed with no order as to costs." 11. Having been remitted the suit to the trial Court, the suit again relisted as Special Civil Suit No. 24 of 1970 and the same came to be decided on 28.04.1987, whereby the trial Court directed all the respondents to deposit the decreetal amount i.e. Rs.9,39,292.11 paisa jointly including State of Gujarat. 12. At this stage, Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that since the Court is inclined to grant present appeal and inclined to exonerate the State of Gujarat from the liability, the respondent No1. may be permitted to file execution application against respondent Nos. 2 to 75. 13. In light of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and in the earlier round of litigation the observation made by this Court in First Appeal No. 218 of 1974, the submission made by learned counsel for the respondent No.1 is required to be considered. 14. In view of the above, if the original plaintiff i.e. respondent No.1 herein approaches the trial Court and file an Execution Application against the original respondent Nos 2 to 75, the same shall be considered by the concerned trial Court in accordance with law. As the interim relief was granted till date, the delay will not come in the way of the original plaintiff - respondent No.1 in filing Execution Application before the concerned trial Court against respondent Nos. 2 to 75. 15. Present appeal is hereby partly allowed qua liability of the State Government. It is hereby observed that the State of Gujarat-appellant herein is hereby exonerated from its liability. The impugned judgment and decree dated 28.04.1987 passed by trial Court in Special Civil Suit No. 24 of 1970, is hereby modified to the extent that the liability is of the original respondent Nos.
It is hereby observed that the State of Gujarat-appellant herein is hereby exonerated from its liability. The impugned judgment and decree dated 28.04.1987 passed by trial Court in Special Civil Suit No. 24 of 1970, is hereby modified to the extent that the liability is of the original respondent Nos. 2 to 75 and not of the State of Gujarat. 16. At this stage, Ms. Patel, learned AGP has submitted that in view of the earlier order passed by this Court, the appellant-State of Gujarat has deposited the amount of compensation before the trial Court and therefore, the same may be refunded to the appellant. 17. For that, Mr. Rushabh R. Shah, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has no objection. 18. In view of the above and considering the earlier decision of this Court dated 19.2.1983 passed in First Appeal No. 218 of 1974, if the appellant - State of Gujarat has deposited the decreetal amount before the trial court, the same shall be refunded to the appellant, after due verification and after deducting the amount of compensation.