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2025 DIGILAW 551 (MP)

Tejasvini Narvariya v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited

2025-08-22

AMIT SETH

body2025
ORDER : Amit Seth, J. 1.The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition claiming following reliefs :- "To instruct the Respondent of serial no-1 Hindustan petroleum corporation Itd. Gwalior, to acknowledge and accept the candidature of petitioner rejected illegally, *Mandamus, commanding the Respondents to not to issue any Letter of Intent, or initiate any proceedings in line with the selection of the concerned location in favour of any other person except the petitioner . *That any other relief/direction/order as deemed fit, and proper looking to the present facts and circumstances the case." 2. The facts leading to filing of the present writ petition are that an advertisement dated 28/06/2023 was issued by the respondents for allotment of new retail outlet (Petrol Pump) dealership for various location in the State of M.P. including "within 3 km for police station Sesaipura on Shivpuri Sheopur Road (SH 51-A) Dist. Sheopur." The last date for submission of  application form was 17/10/2023. The petitioner submitted her application form in prescribed format on 16/10/2023 for location "within 3 km for police station Sesaipura on Shivpuri Sheopur Road (SH 51-A) District Sheopur" and was provisionally selected for allotment of dealership in question through draw of lots. However, at the stage of verification of documents, vide order dated 19/02/2024, the petitioner was informed as regards her candidature being ineligible and rejection of her candidature on the ground that lease deed dated 25/09/2023 bearing registration No. MP402682023A12401179 pertaining to the land at survey No. 336 of village Sesaipura offered by the petitioner in her application for setting up of the retail outlet is not executed by all co-owners of the land . Hence, lease deed is invalid as per dealer selection brochure. However, her candidature may get considered for selection along with (Group 3) applicants as per guidelines. Hence, lease deed is invalid as per dealer selection brochure. However, her candidature may get considered for selection along with (Group 3) applicants as per guidelines. By the impugned order dated 19/02/2024, the petitioner was also informed that against the rejection of her candidature as mentioned above, she may make representation by 29/02/2024 and pursuant thereto representation dated 25/02/2024 was submitted by the petitioner citing reasons for non-execution of the lease deed submitted by one of the co-owner on the ground that application pertaining to partition of the land at the relevant time was pending before the Tehsildar concerned, who thereafter has passed the order of partition and accordingly, petitioner later on submitted consent affidavit of one of the co-owner along with her representation with a request for reconsideration of her candidature. The representation submitted by the petitioner came to be rejected by the respondent No. 1 vide order dated 27/02/2024 stating therein that the defect in the lease deed in question submitted by the petitioner was not falling under the category of rectifiable deficiency and accordingly representation of the petitioner was rejected. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that rejection of her candidature vide order dated 19/02/2024 and further rejection of her representation vide order dated 27/02/2024 is per-se arbitrary and illegal. There has been bonafide error on the part of the petitioner in submitting lease deed un-executed by one of the owner, for which, no malafide could be attributable to her. Therefore, in all fairness, the consent affidavit of one of the co-owner of the land submitted by the petitioner at the later point of time ought to have been taken into consideration and her candidature ought to have been restored. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon clause (g) of sub clause (vi) of clause 4 of the allotment guidelines to contend that submission of consent letter in the form of affidavit (Appendix - III) of the concerned family member at the later stage is permissible, by further referring to Note 3 in the guidelines in question. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon clause (g) of sub clause (vi) of clause 4 of the allotment guidelines to contend that submission of consent letter in the form of affidavit (Appendix - III) of the concerned family member at the later stage is permissible, by further referring to Note 3 in the guidelines in question. Learned counsel further submits that the perusal of the order dated 21/02/2024 (Annexure P/6), passed by the Tehsildar concerned would reveal that ultimately the order of partition of land offered being passed by the competent authority, the deficiency, if any, in her application was made good and, therefore, the order rejecting her candidature by the respondents deserves to be set aside. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments delivered in the cases of Rupesh Kumar Verma vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Ors. reported in 2018 SCC online Pat 1328, Jaimal Kumar vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Ors. reported in 2014 SCC online P & H 8480, Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour vs. The Chief Executive Officer and Ors. passed in Civil Appeal No. 6741 of 2024 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (C ) No. 12941 of 2023) decided on 09/07/2024 and the order dated 26/03/2019 passed in W.P.No. 18769/2017 (Rajesh Parmar vs. Under Secretary, Petroleum Corporation and Another). 4. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondents No. 1 & 2 submits that allotment of retail outlet in question is governed by the "Guidelines On Selection of Dealers For Regular and Rural Retail Outlets, through draw of lots / bidding process." Clause 4 of said guidelines deals with eligibility criteria for individual applicants - proprietorship /partnership and sub clause (vi) of clause 4 deals with requirement of land which is required to be offered for setting up of the petrol pump retail outlet. Clause (a) of sub clause (vi) of clause 4 provides that land should be available with the applicant as on the date of application and should have minimum lease of 19 years and 11 months from the date or after the date of advertisement but not later than the date of application. If the offered land is on long term lease and there are multiple owners, then lease deed should be executed by all co- owners of the offered plot. If the offered land is on long term lease and there are multiple owners, then lease deed should be executed by all co- owners of the offered plot. In case, lease deed is not executed by all co- owners, such lease deed shall be treated as invalid. The learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the selection of petitioner through draw of lots was provisional and subject to further verification of documents/credentials, admittedly the lease deed dated 25/09/2023 bearing registration No. MP402682023A12401179 pertaining to the land at survey No. 336 of village Sesaipura offered by the petitioner in her application for setting up of the retail outlet is not executed by one of the co-owners of the land, and therefore an invalid lease deed of the land offered was submitted by the petitioner. He further submits that reliance placed by the petitioner on clause (g) of sub clause (vi) of clause 4 of the guidelines is misconceived inasmuch as the said clause would be applicable when the land offered is owned by the family members. Admittedly, in the instant case, the land which was offered by the petitioner vide long lease deed is not owned by family members of the petitioner and therefore her case is covered by Clause (a) of sub clause (vi) of clause 4. He further placed reliance upon the order dated 23/05/2024 passed by High Court of Uttar Pradesh main seat at Allahabad in Writ (C) No. 4605/2024 and order dated 06/03/2024 passed in Writ (C) No. 7354/2024 and submitted that relevant clause of the guidelines in question have been considered therein and identical writ petitions have been dismissed. He further submits that since in Clause (a) of sub clause (vi) of clause 4 of the guidelines, the consequences of submission of lease deed not executed by all the co-owners entailing invalid submission of the lease deed is alreday provided in the clause itself, the compliance of the said clause has to be interpreted to be mandatory in nature and therefore such defect cannot either be said to a bonafide and condonable error nor can be permitted to be cured at later stage and, therefore, no illegality has been committed by the answering respondents in rejecting the candidature of the petitioner. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the aforesaid conditions in the guidelines are being implemented and followed  uniformly by them through out the country and therefore the action of the answering respondents in rejecting the candidature of the petitioner cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal or tainted with malafides and therefore the judgments of various high courts relied upon by the petitioner are not applicable in the case in hand, he also submits that the relief clause pleaded in the petition does not even seeks the quashment of the rejection order. Accordingly, he prays for dismissal of instant writ petition. 5. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 6. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material available on record. 7. In view of facts narrated herein above, the issues arising for consideration by this Court are as under :- (i) Whether compliance of clause 4 (vi) (a) as regards submission of lease deed duly executed by all co-owners of the offered plot is mandatory or directory? (ii) Whether deficiency in the lease deed submitted by the petitioner can be said to be bonafide error on the part of the petitioner making the impugned action of the respondents unsustainable? 8. It is an admitted position of fact that the petitioner had applied for allotment of retail dealer outlet under Group 'A' category and offered land vide lease deed dated 25/09/2023 and submitted it along with Khasra for the year 2023-24. 9. On due verification of the documents of Khasra entry by four members committee of the respondents, it was found that the land offered by the petitioner was owned by eleven persons, but the lease deed was executed in favour of the petitioner only by ten persons and one person namely Uma D/o Suraj, who admittedly is co-owner of the land has not executed the lease deed. 10. Clause 4(vi) (a) relevant for consideration of the case in hand is as under :- "4. Eligibility Criteria for individual applicants - Proprietorship / Partnership:- xxxxxxx (i) to (vi)  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (a) The land should be available with the applicant as on the date of application and should have minimum lease of 19 years and 11 months (as advertised by respective oil company) from the date or after the date of advertisement but not later than the date of application. If the offered land is on Long-term lease and there are multiple owners, then lease deed should be executed by all co- owners of the offered plot. In case lease deed is not executed by all co-owners; such lease deed shall be treated as invalid." 11. Bare perusal of the aforesaid clause (a) would reveal that there is a clear and unambiguous requirement that in case there are multiple owners then lease deed "should" be executed by all co-owners of the offered plot. "In case, lease deed is not executed by all co-owners, such lease deed shall be treated as invalid". Thus, the use of word "should" and consequence of non-submission of lease deed executed by all co-owners of the offered plot as provided in clause (a) itself rendering the lease deed as invalid indicates that the compliance of the said clause is mandatory and any lease deed submitted without the said compliance renders the lease deed invalid. It is fairly well settled in law that if consequence of non-fulfillment of particular condition is provided in statute / law or in the terms and conditions and then the compliance of the same is held to be mandatory kindly see AIR 1961 SC 849 (Banwarilal Agarwalla vs. State of Bihar & Ors.), wherein, the Apex Court in para 6 of the judgment has held as under :- "6. It was not disputed before us that when the Regulations were framed, no Board required under S. 12 had been constituted and so, necessarily there had been no reference to any Board as required under S. 59. The question raised is whether the omission to make such a reference make the rules invalid. As has been recognised again and again by the courts, no general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that non-observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity or only directory, i.e., a direction the non-observance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity, whatever other consequences may occur. But in each case the court has to decide the legislative intent. Did the legislature intend in making the statutory provisions that non-observance of this would entail invalidity or did it not? But in each case the court has to decide the legislative intent. Did the legislature intend in making the statutory provisions that non-observance of this would entail invalidity or did it not? To decide this we have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same. In the present case we have to determine therefore on a consideration of all these matters whether the legislature intended that the provisions as regards the reference to the Mines Board could be contravened only on pain of invalidity of the regulation." 12. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that in the case in hand since the land offered by the petitioner had multiple co-owners then the lease deed of the land submitted by the petitioner was essentially required to be executed by all co-owners of the offered plot and in the event lease deed is not executed by one of the co-owner namely Uma D/o Suraj then invalid lease deed was submitted by the petitioner and, therefore, the respondents have committed no error in holding the petitioner candidature ineligible and thereby rejecting it. 13. Now coming to the second issue, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that non-execution of lease deed of the offered plot by one of the co-owner was bonafide error and in view of clause (g) of sub clause (vi) of clause 4 of the allotment guidelines, the submission of consent letter in the form of affidavit (Appendix - III) of the concerned family members of the later stage ought to have been appreciated by the respondents, is stated to be rejected as it has been rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents that clause (g) of sub clause (vi) of clause 4 of the allotment guideline is not applicable in the case of the petitioner as the land offered by the petitioner was not owned by her family member but was owned by the person from whom the petitioner had got lease deed executed in her favour. 14. Thus, it cannot be said that any bonafide error was committed by the petitioner in submission of the lease deed. 14. Thus, it cannot be said that any bonafide error was committed by the petitioner in submission of the lease deed. In fact, invalid lease deed was submitted by the petitioner having inherent deficiency of non compliance of mandatory requirement and, therefore, incurable at later stage. Thus, on this count as well, this Court finds that no fault could be attributable in the impugned action of the respondents No. 1 & 2. 15. The reliance placed upon by the petitioner on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour vs. The Chief Executive Officer and Ors. passed in Civil Appeal No. 6741 of 2024 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (C ) No. 12941 of 2023) decided on 09/07/2024 is of no consequence as the said judgment pertains to maintainability of the writ petition in the contractual matter and the instant writ petition filed by the petitioner has been entertained by this Court. Further reliance placed upon by the petitioner on the order dated 26/03/2019 passed in W.P.No. 18769/2017 (Rajesh Parmar vs. Under Secretary, Petroleum Corporation and Another ), Rupesh Kumar Verma vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Ors. reported in 2018 SCC online Pat 1328 & Jaimal Kumar vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Ors. reported in 2014 SCC online P & H 8480, are also of no consequence as none of the said cases are dealing with the issue of submission of invalid lease deed. It is fairly well settled in law that the judgments cannot be read as "Euclid's Theoems" even a slight change in the fact would make sea difference in the proposition laid down. 16. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no merit in the petition filed by the petitioner and, accordingly, instant writ petition stands dismissed.