JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of this petition, the petitioners have, prayed for the following reliefs:- “(A) That the Order dated 24.07.2023 passed by Himachal Pradesh Private Educational Institute Regulatory Commission in case No. 02 of 2021 titled, "Dr. Nivedita Rao & Another Versus Maharishi Markendeshawar University & Others" (Annexure P-45) may be quashed and set aside. (B) That the Order dated 24.07.2023 passed by the respondent Commission rejecting the Application under Section 10 of HPPERC Act (Annexure P-43) may also be quashed and set aside. (C) That Order dated 24.07.2023 passed by the respondent Commission in case No. 02 of 2021 Dr. Nivedita Rao & Another Versus Maharishi Markendeshawar University & Others" (Annexure P-45) rejecting the Application for conducting the proceedings afresh in terms of the orders passed by this Hon'ble Court may also be quashed and set aside.” 2. In terms of order dated 24.07.2023 (Annexure P-45), Himachal Pradesh Private Educational Institutions Regulatory Commission, Shimla (hereinafter to be referred as “the ‘Commission’), disposed of the complaints filed by two complainants, who had undergone the MBBS Course from the petitioner-University/Medical College by passing the following order:- “As per record submitted before the Commission, the respondent No. 1 and 2 is hereby directed to refund the excess amount of fee charged from the complainants amounting to Rs. 14, 45,500/- (Fourteen lakhs, forty five thousand and five hundred rupees) in the name of tuition fee (for six and half year.) from Dr. Nivedita and Rs. 22,45, 500 (Twenty Two Lakhs Forty Five Thousand And Five Hundred Rupees) from Dr. Yamini in the name of tuition fee (for six and half years) university charges (for five years) hostel charges (for five years and development charges (for five years) which amounts to total Rs. 36,01,000/- (Thirty Six Lakhs and one thousand Rupees) As per section 11 of HP Private Educational Institutions (Regulatory Commission) Act, 2010 and rule 6 (B) of the Commission hereby impose penalty of 1,0000000/- (One Crore Rupees) on Respondent No.1 and 2 for charging excess fee from the complainants and penalty amount shall be deposited within 3 months in the bank account of HPPERC from issuance of this orders. Further, it was observed from the documents on record that the respondent No 1 and 2 has also charged excess amount of tuition fee (beyond the approved period of four and half years) university charges and hostel charges from the other MBBS students from as well beyond, which is approximately, amounting to Rs. 1,03,965,3000/- One Hundred Three Crores Ninety Six Lakhs and Fifty three thousands) from eight batches w.e.f 2013-14 to 2020-2021 In this regards students may approach the college for the refunding of excess amount of fees taken from them. The above order shall come into force with immediate effect. Matter stands adjudicated the representation /other application pending if any in this matter also stand disposed of.” This order was passed by the Commission on the complaints filed before it under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Private Educational Institutions Regulatory Commission Act, 2010. 3. During the course of the hearing of this Writ Petition, learned Senior Counsel attacked the impugned order passed by the Commission on the ground of jurisdiction. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that respondent-Commission was not vested with any jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate any complaint under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Private Educational Institutions (Regulatory Commission) Act, 2010 (hereinafter to be referred as “the 2010 Act”) against the petitioners, for the reason that the regulation of admission, fixation of fee etc. in the Institutions like the petitioners was governed by the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Private Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Fixation of Fee) Act, 2006 (hereinafter to be referred as “the 2006 Act”), which Act was both procedural as well as substantive law and the complainants, if aggrieved, qua the issue of fixation of fee, had the remedy to invoke the provisions of the 2006 Act. In the light of said Act being a Special Act, no complaint regarding regulation of admission and fixation of fee in a private Medical Educational Institution or violation thereof was either maintainable or adjudicatable under the 2010 Act. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents argued that the Commission rightly entertained and adjudicated the complaints filed before it as it was having jurisdiction under the provisions of the 2010 Act to go into the issuing of fixation of fee and irregularity committed therein by the present petitioners even in the matter of private Medical Educational Institutions. Learned counsel argued that the complainants, i.e. the private respondents could have invoked the jurisdiction either under the 2006 Act or under the 2010 Act and as they chose the jurisdiction under the 2010 Act, respondent No.1-Commission rightly entertained and decided their complaints and there is no infirmity in the order under challenge on the ground of jurisdiction. 5. When this case was heard on 12.03.2025, the following order was passed:- “Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners as well as learned counsel for the respondents on the issue of the jurisdiction of the learned Regulatory Commission to have had entertained the complaints on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed by the Authority. The order is reserved on this aspect of the matter.” 6. Before proceeding further, at this stage itself, it is relevant to refer to the issue that was agitated by the complainants before the respondent-Commission. The case of the complainants before the respondent-Commission was that the petitioners/ Medical College charged tuition fee from the complainants for five years instead of four and half years for undergoing MBBS Course without having the requisite approval of the State Government. Private respondents took admission in the MBBS Batch in the course being run by petitioner No.2 in the Academic Session 2013-14. Duration of the course was four and half years, followed by one year Rotatory Inturnship. It was after they had passed out the same that they had filed the complaints before the Regulatory Commission, alleging therein that the tuition fee was charged from them for five years, whereas it ought to have charged only for four and half years. It was further their grievance that they were also charged certain University charges which were not in accordance with law and hostel fee amounting to Rs.96,000/- per annum, which included the Room and Mess charges was also excessive. These complaints of the private respondents have been allowed by the Regulatory Commission in terms of the impugned order. 7. This Court would now like to refer to the relevant statutory provisions of the two Acts in question. 8. The complaints were filed by the private respondents before the Regulatory Commission under the provisions of the 2010 Act. 9. These complaints of the private respondents have been allowed by the Regulatory Commission in terms of the impugned order. 7. This Court would now like to refer to the relevant statutory provisions of the two Acts in question. 8. The complaints were filed by the private respondents before the Regulatory Commission under the provisions of the 2010 Act. 9. The 2010 Act, i.e. Himachal Pradesh Private Educational Institutions (Regulatory Commission) Act, 2010, was enacted to provide for establishment of the Regulatory Commission in the State for the purpose of ensuring appropriate standard of admission, teaching, examination research and protection of interest of students in the private Educational Institutions and the matters connected therewith or incidental therewith. Section 9 of the Act deals with powers and functions of the Commission and the same provides as under:- “9. Powers and functions of the Commission. - (1) It shall be the duty of the Commission to ensure that standards of admission, teaching, examination, research, extension programme, qualified teachers and infrastructure, are being maintained by the Private Educational Institutions in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Regulatory Bodies of the Central Government or the State Government or by the Central Government or the State Government from time to time. In case of failure of the Educational Institution to meet the standards laid down, the Commission shall have the power to penalize the Educational Institutions under section 11 of the Act and in case of successive failure of an Institution to meet the standards, the Commission may recommend to the State Government/ Regulatory Body for the winding up of the Institution. (2) The Commission shall ensure that the admissions in the Private Educational Institutions are based on merit achieved in National Common Entrance Test or the State Common Entrance test or any other test as notified by the State Government and where there is no National Level Common Entrance Test, or State Level Common Entrance Test or any other test, the merit shall be determined strictly on the basis of the marks obtained in the qualifying examination. (3) The Commission shall develop an appropriate mechanism for receipt and redressal of grievances of students and parents, and direct the private institution to set-up a proper Grievances Redressal mechanism for redressal of complaints reported to the Commission. (3) The Commission shall develop an appropriate mechanism for receipt and redressal of grievances of students and parents, and direct the private institution to set-up a proper Grievances Redressal mechanism for redressal of complaints reported to the Commission. Such complaints shall be addressed within the time fixed by the Commission with details of the steps taken by the institution to redress such complaint. (4) The Commission may conduct inspections of Private Educational Institutions as and when required and may form expert committees, for inspections of Private Educational Institutions. (5) The Commission shall have the power to monitor and regulate fees in Private Educational Institutions.” Thus, sub-section (5) of Section 9 confers upon the Commission the power to monitor and regulate the fee in Private Educational Institutions. 10. Section 11 thereof deals with penalties, which provides as under:- “11. Penalties.- (1) The Commission may, for the contravention of any of the provision of this Act or the rules or regulations made there under, or directions issued by the Commission, impose penalty, in such manner as may be prescribed, but not exceeding one crore rupees: Provided that the maximum penalty for a second or subsequent contravention shall be five crore rupees; Provided further that no penalty shall be imposed unless the institution concerned is given an opportunity of being heard. (2) The penalty imposed under sub-section (1) shall be recoverable from the endowment fund or any other Fund or as arrear of land revenue from the Educational Institution concerned.” 11. There is also in force in the State of Himachal Pradesh the Himachal Pradesh Private Medical Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Fixation of Fee) Act, 2006. This Act received the ascent of the Governor of Himachal Pradesh on 27 th September, 2006 and was published in English and Hindi Rajpatras (extraordinary) on 20 th September, 2006. This Act is in force since 7 th of July, 2006 in terms of Section 1, sub-section (3) thereof. This Act was brought into force to provide for regulation, admission and fixation of fee in private Medical Educational Institutions in the State of Himachal Pradsh and for matters connected therewith or incidental therewith. 12. Section 3 of the 2006 Act deals with regulations of admission, fixation of fee and madding of reservation. The same reads as under:- “3. This Act was brought into force to provide for regulation, admission and fixation of fee in private Medical Educational Institutions in the State of Himachal Pradsh and for matters connected therewith or incidental therewith. 12. Section 3 of the 2006 Act deals with regulations of admission, fixation of fee and madding of reservation. The same reads as under:- “3. Regulation of admission, fixation of fee and madding of reservation.- (1) The State Government may regulate admission, fix fee and make reservation for different categories in admissions to Private Medical Educational Institutions. (2) The State Government shall ensure that the admission under all the categories in an institution is done in a fair and transparent manner; (3) The State Government, may constitute an Admission and Fee Committee, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Committee')' consisting of such members as may be specified by the State Government, by notification, to recommend the mode of admission, making of reservation, allocation of seats and fixation of fees etc.to the State Government. (4) The State Government, shall oversee the working of Admission and Fee Committee. (5) The terms and conditions of the Committee constituted under sub-section (3) and its members shall be specified, by the State Government, by notification from time to time. (6) If the State Government is satisfied that the institution affiliated to the Himachal Pradesh University, has contravened any provision of this Act, it may recommend to the Himachal Pradesh University for withdrawal of recognition or affiliation of such institution. (7) The State Government, shall take appropriate action wherever deemed necessary, with regard to improvement in the system in the system of making admissions in the institutions, charging of fee by the institutions and on any other matter, which may be necessary to facilitate smooth running of the system and to remove grievances.” 13. Section 9 of the Act deals with penalties and the same reads as under:- “9. Section 9 of the Act deals with penalties and the same reads as under:- “9. Penalties.-(1) The State Government if it is satisfied that a Private Medical Educational Institution has contravened any of the provisions of this Act or any notification issued there under, take any or all of the following actions, namely:- (a) cause the withdrawal of affiliation of recognition of such institution from the university or any other authority or body to which such institution is affiliated; (b) impose a fine on such institution, which may extend to fifteen times of the excess fee charged and in the event of non-deposit of fine, it shall be recoverable as arrear of land revenue; (c) direct such institution to cancel the admission or registration of a student, who has been admitted to such institution in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the notification issued thereunder; and (d) direct such institution to admit a student to whom admission has been wrongly denied. (2) Before taking any action under any action under sub-section (1), a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be provided to such institution by the State Government.” 14. A comparison of the 2006 Act and the 2010 Act demonstrates that whereas the 2010 Act is a General Act which has been brought into force for the establishment of a Regulatory Commission and Regulatory Mechanism in the State for the purpose of ensuring appropriate standard of admission, teaching, examination etc. in the private Educational Institutions and matters connected thereto or incidental thereto, the 2006 Act has been brought into force specifically and specially for the regulation of admission and fixation of fee in private Medical Educational Institution in the State of Himachal Pradesh and for the matters connected therewith or incidental therewith. 15. Thus, on one hand, whereas the 2006 Act deals only with private Medical Educational Institutions in the State of Himachal Pradesh and Regulation of Admission and Fixation of Fee therein, the 2010 Act is General in nature as it takes into its ambit, all private Educational Institutions and does not confines itself to certain private Educational Institutions imparting education in particular stream. 16. Not only this, the 2006 Act, expressly lays down the mechanism of regulation of admission, fixation of fee etc. in private Medical Educational Institutions in the State of Himachal Pradesh. 16. Not only this, the 2006 Act, expressly lays down the mechanism of regulation of admission, fixation of fee etc. in private Medical Educational Institutions in the State of Himachal Pradesh. In the case of the private respondents also, the fee was fixed in terms of the provisions of Section 3 of the 2006 Act and not under any other Act including 2010 Act. The fee was not fixed or monitored or regulated under the provisions of the 2010 Act. 17. That being the case, when the penalties for violating the provisions of the 2006 Act are provided in Section 9 of the said Act and for which an aggrieved party has to approach the State Government, by no stretch of imagination, a complaint with regard to the alleged over charge of fee, which was to be regulated and fixed as per Section 3 of the 2006 Act could have been either entertained or adjudicated upon by respondent No.1-Commission under the 2010 Act. 18. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that the question of fee fixation with respect to Private Medical Institutions was subject matter of various adjudications made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. A five-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education and another Vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases 697 framed the following questions on the basis of rival submissions made before the Hon’ble Supreme Court:- “6. In view of the rival submissions the following questions arise for consideration: (I) whether the educational institutions are entitled to fix their own fee structure; (2) whether minority and non minority educational institutions stand on the same footing and have the same rights; (3) whether private unaided professional colleges are entitled to fill in their seats, to the extent of l00%, and if not to what extent; and (4) whether private unaided professional colleges are entitled to admit students by evolving their own method of admission.” 20. While answering questions No. 3 and 4, Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to pass the following directions:- “19. We now direct that the respective State Government do appoint a permanent Committee which will ensure that the tests conducted by the association of colleges is fair and transparent. For each State a separate Committee shall be formed. The Committee would be headed by a retired Judge of the High Court. We now direct that the respective State Government do appoint a permanent Committee which will ensure that the tests conducted by the association of colleges is fair and transparent. For each State a separate Committee shall be formed. The Committee would be headed by a retired Judge of the High Court. The Judge to be nominated by the Chief Justice of that State. The other member, to be nominated by the Judge, would be a doctor or an engineer of eminence (depending on whether the institution is medical or engineering/technical). The Secretary of the State in charge of Medical or Technical Education, as the case may be, shall also be a member and act as Secretary of the Committee. The Committee will be free to nominate/ co-opt an independent person of repute in the field of education as well as one of the Vice Chancellors of University in that State so that the total number of persons on the Committee do not exceed five. The Committee shall have powers to oversee the tests to be conducted by the association. This would include the power to call for the proposed question paper/s, to know the names of the paper setters and examiners and to check the method adopted to ensure papers are not leaked. The Committee shall supervise and ensure that the test is conducted in a fair and transparent manner. The Committee shall have power to permit an institution, which has been established and · which has been permitted to adopt its own admission procedure for the last, at lellst, 25 years, to adopt its own admission procedure and ifthe Committee feels that the needs of such an. institute are genuine, to admit, students of their community, in excess of the quota allotted to them by the State Government. Before exempting any institute or varying in percentage of quota fixed by the State, the State Government must be heard before the Committee. It is clarified that different percentage of quota for students to be admitted by the management in each minority or non- minority unaided professional college/s shall be separately fixed on the basis of their need by the respective State Governments and in case of any dispute as regards fixation of percentage of quota, it will be open to the management to approach the Committee. It is also clarified that no institute, which has not been established and which has not followed its own admission procedure for the last, at least, 25 years, shall be permitted to apply for or be granted exemption from admitting students in the manner set out hereinabove. 20. Our direction for setting up two sets of Committees in the States has been passed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which shall remain in force till appropriate legislation.is enacted by the Parliament. The expenses incurred on the setting up of such Committees shall be borne by each State. The infrastructural needs and provision for allowance and remuneration of the Chairman and other members of the Committee shall also be borne by the respective State Government.” 21. It is in the light of the directions passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para-20 of the said judgment that 2006 Act was brought into force. As already observed hereinabove, the 2006 Act happens to be a Special Act and the same is applicable only to the Private Medical Educational Institutions as compared to the 2010 Act, which is applicable to all Private Medical Educational Institutions and, thus, is a General Law. The 2006 Act was framed by the Legislature in compliance to the directions that were passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education case (supra). That being the case, as far as the issues relating to Private Medical Educational Institutions which are covered by the provisions of 2006 Act are concerned, the same could have been agitated only under the provisions of 2006 Act and the 2010 Act has no application in this regard. 22. The Regulatory Commission erred in not appreciating this extremely important aspect of the matter and erred in not only entertaining the complaints filed by the medical students before it, but also by adjudicating them without appreciating and realizing that the Commission was not having any jurisdiction either to entertain or adjudicate upon the complaints. 23. Herein, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pharmacy Council of India Vs. Dr. 23. Herein, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pharmacy Council of India Vs. Dr. S.K. Toshniwal Educational Trusts Vidarbha Institute of Pharmacy and others (2021) 10 Supreme Court Cases 657, in which case, Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of the Pharmacy Act vis-à-vis AICTE Act, after referring to the relevant provisions of the Statute, held that whereas AICTE Act was general law with regard to the technical institutions, which also included Pharmacy, yet Pharmacy Act was Special Act dealing with the special subjects of Pharmacy and said Act being Special Act, shall prevail over the AICTE Act. Relevant portion of the judgment is quoted hereinbelow:- “14. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and as observed hereinabove, the Pharmacy Act is a Special Act in the field of pharmacy and it is a complete code in itself in the field of pharmacy, the Pharmacy Act shall prevail over the AICTE Act which, as observed hereinabove, is a general statute dealing with technical education/institutions. Therefore, the submission on behalf of AICTE and/or concerned educational institutions that the AICTE Act is a subsequent law and in the definition of “technical education” it includes the “pharmacy” and therefore it can be said to be an “implied repeal”, cannot be accepted. At his stage, it is required to be noted that as such in the AICTE Act there is no specific repeal of the Pharmacy Act, more particularly when, as observed hereinabove, the Pharmacy Act is a Special Act and the subsequent enactment of AICTE Act is general and therefore the Pharmacy Act being a Special Act must prevail. Apart from that, with regard to several aspects, there is no provision made in AICTE Act which are exclusively within the domain of PCI. Thus, it cannot be accepted that there is ‘implied repeal’ of the Pharmacy Act. 24. It is also pertinent to mention that when the 2010 Act was enacted by the Legislature, it was aware of the fact that there already was in force the 2006 Act, which exclusively dealt with the Private Medical Educational Institutions. Evidently, as the Legislature was aware of the fact that the matter relating to admission and fee fixation etc. 24. It is also pertinent to mention that when the 2010 Act was enacted by the Legislature, it was aware of the fact that there already was in force the 2006 Act, which exclusively dealt with the Private Medical Educational Institutions. Evidently, as the Legislature was aware of the fact that the matter relating to admission and fee fixation etc. qua Private Medical Educational Institutions and issues relating thereto were already a covered field under the provisions of the 2006 Act, therefore, there was no intent on the part of the Legislature to include the same under the 2010 Act. No mention was made in the 2010 Act to the effect that 2010 Act shall be having an overriding effect on the 2006 Act, nor the 2006 Act was abrogated by the State. Therefore, the situation as exists in the State is crystal clear that as far as the issues covered under the provisions of 2006 Act are concerned, the same are outside the purview and domain of the 2010 Act and the remaining issues are in the domain of the 2010 Act. 25. Therefore, as the issue raised by the complainants before the Regulatory Commission was outside the domain of the 2010 Act being squarely covered by the 2006 Act, Regulatory Commission was not having jurisdiction either to entertain the complaints or to decide the same. 26. Now, I will refer to certain judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the private respondents. 27. Learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited Vs. Girnar Corrugators Private Limited and others (2023) 3 Supreme Court Cases 210 to substantiate his arguments. Paras 28 to 30 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:- “28. While appreciating the above submissions, it is required to be appreciated that Sections 15 to 23 of the MSMED Act only provide for special mechanism for adjudication of the dispute along with enforcing certain other contractual and business terms on the parties such as time limit for payments and interest in case of delayed payments. In the entire MSMED Act, there is no specific express provision giving 'priority' for payments under the MSMED Act over the dues of the secured creditors or over any taxes or cesses payable to Central Government or State Government or Local Authority as the case may be. 29. In the entire MSMED Act, there is no specific express provision giving 'priority' for payments under the MSMED Act over the dues of the secured creditors or over any taxes or cesses payable to Central Government or State Government or Local Authority as the case may be. 29. In sharp contrast to this, Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act which has been inserted vide Amendment in 2016, it provides that notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, after the registration of security interest, the debts due to any secured creditor shall be paid in ‘priority’ over all other debts and all revenue taxes and cesses and other rates payable to the Central Government or State Government or Local Authority. However, the priority to secured creditors in payment of debt as per Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act shall be subject to the provisions of the IBC. Therefore, such dues vis- a-vis dues under the MSMED Act, as per the decree or order passed by the Facilitation Council debts due to the secured creditor shall have a priority in view of Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act which is later enactment in point of time than the MSMED Act. 30. At this stage, it is required to be noted Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act which is inserted in 2016 is also having a non-obstante clause. Even as per the submission on behalf of respondent No.1, two enactments have competing non-obstante provision and nothing repugnant, then the non-obstante clause of the subsequent statute would prevail over the earlier enactments. As per the settle position of law, if the legislature confers the later enactment with a non-obstante clause, it means the legislature wanted the subsequent / later enactment to prevail. Thus, a ‘priority’ conferred / provided under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act would prevail over the recovery mechanism of the MSMED Act. The aforesaid is to be considered along with the fact that under provisions of the MSMED Act, more particularly Sections 15 to 23, no 'priority' is provided with respect to the dues under the MSMED Act, like Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act.” 28. The aforesaid is to be considered along with the fact that under provisions of the MSMED Act, more particularly Sections 15 to 23, no 'priority' is provided with respect to the dues under the MSMED Act, like Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act.” 28. This Court is of the considered view that in the light of the discussions made hereinabove, the judgment being relied upon by learned counsel for the private respondents does not helps their cause, as the 2006 Act being a Special Act as compared to the 2010 Act, provisions contained in the 2010 Act cannot abrogate the provisions of the 2006 Act impliedly or otherwise per se, as was contended on behalf of the private respondents. 29. In State of Bihar Vs. Murad Ali Khan and others (1988) 4 Supreme Court Cases 655 what was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was that the same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. However, in the present case, as the fee in issue relating to Private Medical Educational Institutions was fixed as per the 2006 Act and the same was neither fixed nor regulated by the provisions under the 2010 Act, grievance against over charge of fee, if any, could have been raised under the 2006 Act and not under the 2010 Act and it could not be said that this alleged offence should be construed as an offence under both the 2006 Act and the 2010 Act. 30. Learned counsel for the private respondents has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru (2005) 11 Supreme Court Cases 600 to substantiate his arguments. Para- 255 of the said judgment relied upon by the learned counsel is quoted hereinbelow:- “255. The learned counsel, apart from placing reliance on Section 56 of POTA, has also drawn our attention to Section 26 of General Clauses Act and Section 71 of IPC. His contention, though plausible it is, has no legal basis. We do not think that there is anything in Section 56 of POTA which supports his contention. That provision only ensures that the conspiracy to commit the terrorist act shall be punishable under POTA. His contention, though plausible it is, has no legal basis. We do not think that there is anything in Section 56 of POTA which supports his contention. That provision only ensures that the conspiracy to commit the terrorist act shall be punishable under POTA. As the appellant is being punished under that Section, irrespective of the liability to be punished under the other laws, Section 56 ceases to play its role. Then, we shall turn to Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, which lays down: “26. Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” It becomes at once clear that the emphasis is on the words ’same offence’. It is now well settled that where there are two distinct offences made up of different ingredients, the bar under Section 26 of the General Clauses Act or for that matter, the embargo under Article 20 of the Constitution, has no application, though the offences may have some overlapping features. The crucial requirement of either Article 20 of the Constitution or Section 26 of the General Clauses Act is that the offences are the same or identical in all respects. It was clarified in State of Bihar Vs. Murad Ali Khan [(1988) 4 SCC 655]. "Though Section 26 in its opening words refers to ’the act or omission constituting an offence under two or more enactments’, the emphasis is not on the facts alleged in the two complaints but rather on the ingredients which constitute the two offences with which a person is charged. This is made clear by the concluding portion of the section which refers to ’shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence’. If the offences are not the same but are distinct, the ban imposed by this provision also cannot be invoked. The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time constitute an offence under any other law.” We accept the argument of the learned counsel for the State Mr. The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time constitute an offence under any other law.” We accept the argument of the learned counsel for the State Mr. Gopal Subramanium that offences under Section 302 IPC, Section 3(2) and Section 3(3) of POTA are all distinct offences and a person can be charged, tried, convicted and punished for each of them severally. The analysis of these provisions show that the ingredients of these offences are substantially different and that an offence falling within the ambit of Section 3(1) may not be squarely covered by the offence under Section 300 IPC. The same set of facts may constitute different offences. The case of State of M.P. Vs. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri [ 1957 SCR 868 ] is illustrative of this principle. In that case, it was held that the offence of criminal misconduct punishable under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not identical in essence, import and content with an offence under Section 409 IPC. The bar to the punishment of the offender twice over for the same offence would arise only where the ingredients of both the offences are the same. 31. This judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court also does not helps the cause of the private respondents because the issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as adjudicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court had no relation with the issue that has been raised by the petitioners in this case. 32. Accordingly, in the light of the above discussion, this writ petition is allowed, as prayed for. Impugned annexures are quashed and set aside by holding that respondent No.1-Regulatory Commission was not having jurisdiction to either entertain the complaints filed before it by the private respondents or to decide the same. No order as to cost. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, stand disposed of.