JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. The appellants, a mother and her son, were the 1st and 2nd accused in S.C. No. 520 of 2013 before the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kasaragod. They were charged with the murder of the 1st appellant’s husband’s brother. By the impugned judgment, they were found guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment, along with a fine of ?50,000 each, with a default clause. Brief Statement of Facts: 2. The 1st appellant is the wife of Chandrashekhara Gowda, and the deceased, Mudhappa Gowda, is the brother of Chandrashekhara Gowda. It appears that there was a dispute between the deceased and the appellant regarding the drawing of water from a pond situated near the house of the deceased. As per the charge, on 04.03.2011 at 6:15 p.m., the appellants proceeded to the property of the deceased to draw water from the pond. The prosecution alleges that a dispute occurred between the parties and the 1st appellant, who was allegedly armed with a chopper, inflicted a cut injury on the head and other parts of the body of the deceased, while the 2nd appellant attacked the deceased with a rafter, causing injuries. 3. Hearing the cries of the deceased, his son Vishwanath, who was examined as PW2, rushed to the spot. He is alleged to have seen the last phase of the incident. On hearing his cries, the appellants retreated to their home which was situated nearby. PW2 found his father lying on the ground with injuries. Shortly thereafter, his mother, Meenakshi, arrived at the scene. PW1, a Panchayat Member, and one Ananda Gowda arrived immediately thereafter. However, PW2 did not deem it necessary to rush the injured to the hospital, as according to him, his father had by then succumbed to the injuries sustained. Registration of Crime and Investigation 4. On 4.03.2011, at around 10:00 p.m., PW2, along with Ramachandran (PW11), went to the Police Station and furnished Ext.P2 FI Statement, wherein he disclosed the names of the assailants. On the strength of the said statement, Ext.P9 FIR in Crime No. 91 of 2011 was registered at the Rajapuram Police Station by PW9, the ASI of Police. On 4.03.2011, at around 10:00 p.m., PW2, along with Ramachandran (PW11), went to the Police Station and furnished Ext.P2 FI Statement, wherein he disclosed the names of the assailants. On the strength of the said statement, Ext.P9 FIR in Crime No. 91 of 2011 was registered at the Rajapuram Police Station by PW9, the ASI of Police. The Circle Inspector of Police, Nileshwar Police Station, took over the investigation on 05.03.2011 at 9:00 a.m. He prepared Ext.P1 inquest and the clothes found on the body of the deceased, his sandals and a wooden rafter found at the scene were seized. On the same day, at 4:30 p.m., the 1st accused was arrested as per Ext.P10 Arrest Memo. Later, as per Ext.P12 Arrest Memo, the 2nd accused was also arrested. The accused were produced before the Court, along with Ext.P14 Remand Report. Based on the disclosure statement furnished by the 1st accused, MO2 Chopper, allegedly used by her to inflict the injury, was seized from her residence. The clothes worn by the accused at the time of the commission of the offence were also seized and forwarded to the Court. After completing the investigation, the final report was submitted to the jurisdictional Magistrate. 5. Committal proceedings were initiated by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the law, and the case was committed to the Court of Session. The case was finally made over to the Additional Sessions Judge -III, Kasargod for trial and disposal. After hearing the prosecution and the accused, charges were framed under Section 302 r/w. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. When the same was read over, the accused pleaded not guilty and prayed that they be tried in accordance with the law. Evidence Tendered 6. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses as PWs 1 to 12 to prove the charge and through them, Exts.P1 to P23 were exhibited and marked. MOs 1 to 3 were produced and identified. After the close of prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials arising from the prosecution evidence were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The accused denied the incriminating circumstances and maintained that they were innocent. No evidence was adduced by the defence. Findings of the learned Sessions Court 7. MOs 1 to 3 were produced and identified. After the close of prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials arising from the prosecution evidence were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The accused denied the incriminating circumstances and maintained that they were innocent. No evidence was adduced by the defence. Findings of the learned Sessions Court 7. The learned Sessions Judge, after evaluating the evidence, came to the finding that PW2, the son of the deceased is a credible witness and that his version could be believed to conclude that it was the appellants herein who had inflicted the injuries on the deceased at about 6.15 pm. on 04.03.2011. In addition, the Court was of the view that, the recovery of the chopper with which the injuries were allegedly inflicted was on the basis of the confession statement made by the 1st accused and the detection of blood on the same was taken as another piece of incriminating evidence which could be used to link the accused with the murder. Holding so, the accused were found guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and were sentenced accordingly. Contentions of the appellants: 8. Sri. Rohith R., the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has seriously erred in relying upon the evidence of PW2 to arrive at the finding of guilt. It is contended by the learned counsel that an evaluation of the evidence of the said witness would reveal that the deceased had sustained the injuries at some other place and at a different time. It is urged that the genuineness of the FIS is itself in doubt since admittedly the police had come to the scene of the crime and had recorded the statement of PW2 at 7.30 pm, whereas it is seen from the FIR that the same was furnished only at 10 p.m. on the same day. Furthermore, his version that his father was not rushed to the hospital despite the fact that the incident happened in front of him is incredulous. It is further submitted that the version of PW1 is totally at variance with the version of PW2. Her case was that she was informed about the death of PW1’s father at 5.00 - 5.30 pm on the same day and that she had reached the house in 10 minutes. It is further submitted that the version of PW1 is totally at variance with the version of PW2. Her case was that she was informed about the death of PW1’s father at 5.00 - 5.30 pm on the same day and that she had reached the house in 10 minutes. It is further submitted that serious error has been committed by the learned Sessions Judge in concluding that the death of Mudhappa Gowda was a case of homicide as the post-mortem certificate was not properly proved by the prosecution. Referring to the postmortem certificate, it is submitted that the prosecution has no case that any injuries were inflicted on the body of the deceased by MO3. Insofar as the recovery of the knife at the instance of accused No.1 is concerned, the learned counsel points out that no reliance can be placed as even the said witness had stated before the Court that the weapon was handed over to the police by one lady named ‘Praseetha’. It is further submitted that in view of the law laid down in Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti v. The State of Uttar Pradesh , [2022 INSC 1073] , no reliance can be placed on the same. It is urged by the learned counsel that the prosecution evidence would not reveal that the incident had happened in the place as alleged by the prosecution as the investigating officer has not fixed the place of crime based on any conclusive signs such as the presence of blood. It is urged that the deceased lay on the same spot till 9 p.m. on the next day when the inquest was conducted. Finally, it is submitted by Sri Rohit that the injuries and the findings and opinion of the doctor have not been proven in accordance with law and therefore it cannot even be said that the death of the deceased was homicidal. Submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor: 9. Smt. Neema K.V., the learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, opposed the submissions. She submits that PW2 is a wholly reliable witness who had seen his father being attacked by the appellants who were his near relatives. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the conduct of PW2 cannot be doubted. It is further submitted that PW2 has corroborated the version of PW1. She submits that PW2 is a wholly reliable witness who had seen his father being attacked by the appellants who were his near relatives. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the conduct of PW2 cannot be doubted. It is further submitted that PW2 has corroborated the version of PW1. It is also submitted that there is no reason to doubt the recovery of the weapons at the instance of the accused. Finally, it is submitted that the material objects were sent for analysis and blood was detected on the clothes. The learned Public Prosecutor would refer to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Rameshwar Dayal and Others v. State of U.P , [ 1978 (2) SCC 518 ] and it is submitted that in Ext.P1 Inquest Report, the place of occurrence has been correctly noted by the Investigating Officer and that would suffice. The learned Public Prosecutor would also submit that there is absolutely no reason to doubt the version of PW2. Whether the death of Mudhappa Gowda was homicidal? 10. In order to prove that the death of Mudhappa Gowda was a case of homicide, the prosecution has primarily relied upon the evidence of PW2, the son of the deceased, who is alleged to have witnessed the infliction of injuries and PW6, the Doctor who conducted the autopsy. PW6 was examined to prove Ext.P6 Postmortem Certificate. We notice a practice which has time again been deprecated by this Court. While deposing before the Court, the antemortem injuries noted by the Doctor while conducting the postmortem, other findings, and the opinion as to the cause of death were not spoken to by the Doctor. Instead, what has been done is that after marking the postmortem as Ext.P6, the weapon of offence was shown to the Doctor and he was asked whether the said weapons could cause the injuries noted. This was without even requiring the Doctor to depose the injuries noted by him. The Doctor responded to the queries put by the Prosecutor and he was cross-examined. After the re-examination was concluded and the Doctor's signature was obtained, the entire postmortem report was copied down in its entirety in a different handwriting. Of course, the signature of the Doctor was obtained at the end. The Postmortem Certificate is only a previous statement in writing of the Doctor who prepared it. It is not a substantive piece of evidence. Of course, the signature of the Doctor was obtained at the end. The Postmortem Certificate is only a previous statement in writing of the Doctor who prepared it. It is not a substantive piece of evidence. Ideally, the Doctor should have been asked to depose the injuries noted by him, his findings, as well as his opinion as to the cause of death and only thereafter, the postmortem certificate issued by him should have been allowed to be marked in evidence. Thus, there is merit in the submission of Sri. Rohit that there is no substantive evidence as to the injuries sustained and the opinion as to cause of death, though the Doctor who conducted the autopsy was examined. It is quite unfortunate that such a vital aspect was ignored by the learned Sessions Judge while recording the evidence. These aspects have been reiterated by the Apex Court as well as this Court in a catena of precedents some of which are Munshi Prasad and Others v. State of Bihar , [[ (2002) 1 SCC 351 ]] , Krishnankutty v State of Kerala , [[ 2015(2) KHC 322 ]] and Pradeep @ Kannan v. State of Kerala , [(2024 KHC OnLine 427)] . However, the fact that Mudhappa Gowda is no more and he was done to death by the infliction of injuries is borne out by the substantive evidence tendered by PWs1, 2 and Ext.P1 inquest and we shall proceed on the basis that the death was homicidal. Evidence of prosecution witnesses: 11. In his evidence PW2 (Vishwanath) stated that on 04.03.2011, at about 6.15 p.m., while he was returning back home after purchasing milk, he heard the cries of his father from near the cowshed attached to his house. He rushed to the spot and saw the 1st appellant inflicting a stab injury on the back of the neck of his father. The 2nd appellant was standing next to her and he was found hitting his father on his leg with a stick. When the accused saw him, they took to their heels and went to their home, which is on the adjacent side of his own house. He found his father lying on the ground with injuries. He raised his voice and hearing his cries, his mother, Meenakshi, came to the spot. When the accused saw him, they took to their heels and went to their home, which is on the adjacent side of his own house. He found his father lying on the ground with injuries. He raised his voice and hearing his cries, his mother, Meenakshi, came to the spot. In order to take his father to the hospital, he made some phone calls and one Ananda Gowda as well as PW1 came to the scene. Since he noticed that his father was no more, he did not make any attempt to shift his father to the hospital. He went to the police station and gave a statement in Kannada which was translated to Malayalam by one Ramachandran (PW11). This was at 10 pm on the same day. He stated that the accused had certain disputes with his family regarding the drawing of water from the pond situated near his father’s property. He identified the accused persons who were standing in the dock and also the weapons allegedly used by the accused when the same was shown to him. In cross-examination, he stated that his father has four brothers and Sri. Vasudevan, one of the brothers is residing very near to his house. He said that the husband of the 1st accused was not on good terms with his father. It was brought out that he had gone out to purchase milk at about 5.30 p.m. He admitted that Rajapuram Police Station is about 1 ½ hours away from his home. However, it was brought out that police had come to the spot where his father was lying dead at about 7 - 7.30 p.m. He stated that he gave a statement to the police and the same was taken down in writing and signed by him. Immediately thereafter, he turned around and said that when the police reached the spot at 7-7.30 p.m., he was not present. He added that there was a pool of blood in the area where the body was lying. He denied the suggestion that his father was found dead in a far-off deserted place and that the appellants had nothing to do with the injuries found on his body and they were falsely implicated purely on the basis of suspicion. In re-examination, he stated that he had signed the statement at about 10 p.m. while at the Rajapuram Police Station. In re-examination, he stated that he had signed the statement at about 10 p.m. while at the Rajapuram Police Station. A specific question was put by the Prosecutor as to whether he had signed the statement recorded by the police at 7.30 p.m. which he denied. 12. Several inconsistencies and improbabilities in the evidence tendered by PW2 were highlighted by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. We feel it would be proper to evaluate the contentions raised after referring to the evidence of PW1, the Panchayat member, who arrived at the scene after being informed about the incident by PW2 and PW9, the ASI of Police who registered the FIR. PW1 stated that Vishwanath (PW2) called her over the phone and informed her about the incident and the names of the appellants. She was specific that she received the call between 5 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. As her home was situated just about 500 meters away, she rushed to the house of the deceased and reached the spot in 10 minutes. She said that the deceased was found lying in a pool of blood. PW2, his mother, and some others were present. After some time, the police reached the spot. She stated that after spending some time there, she went back to her house and returned only on the next day to sign as an attestor to Ext.P1 inquest. In cross-examination, it was brought out that as a Panchayat member, it was quite routine for her to go to the Police Station. However, even after reaching the spot and seeing that a person she knew had been murdered, she did not deem it necessary to inform the police. She stated that police had come to the spot between 9.30 p.m. and 10 p.m. on the same day. She added that PW1 gave a statement to the police and the same was signed in her presence. 13. PW9, the ASI of Police deposed that PW2 appeared before him at the Rajapuram Police Station on 4.3.2011 at 10 pm and gave a statement which was recorded and on its basis Ext.P9 was registered. In cross-examination, it was brought out that the FIR was forwarded to the court at 10.30 pm on 4.3.2011 and the records reveal that the same reached the court on the next day at 3.15 pm. In cross-examination, it was brought out that the FIR was forwarded to the court at 10.30 pm on 4.3.2011 and the records reveal that the same reached the court on the next day at 3.15 pm. He stated that he was in charge of the Station on the relevant day. He however admitted that information about the incident was received at the police station at 8 pm and immediately thereafter he along with the police party went to the scene of the crime. 14. Now, we shall evaluate the evidence of these three witnesses. As per the case of the prosecution, PW2 allegedly witnessed the deceased being attacked at 6:15 p.m. However, PW1 states that PW2 informed her about his father’s death between 5:00 PM and 5:30 PM and that she reached the house within ten minutes. This directly contradicts the prosecution version that the incident occurred at 6:15 PM. This discrepancy in the timing of the incident assumes significance, particularly in light of the defence contention that Mudhappa Gowda was found dead much earlier, and that facts were subsequently manipulated to create an impression that the appellants inflicted injuries at 6:15 PM. Furthermore, PW2’s claim that he witnessed injuries being inflicted on his father appears highly unnatural. At the time of the incident, PW2 was 20 years old, while the first appellant was a 45-year-old woman. It is also pertinent to note that it is an admitted fact that PW2’s relatives were residents of the same locality. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination deposed that Injury No. 9 would not cause imminent death. He also deposed in cross-examination that the body was refrigerated at 3.50 pm on 5.3.2011 and according to him, death would have happened between 18 hours prior and less than 36 hours from the time of refrigeration. If that be the case, the earliest possible time of death would be 3:50 AM on 4.3.2011 and the latest possible time of death would be 9.50 PM on 4.3.2011. During re-examination, the doctor clarified that a person suffering the injuries noted in the postmortem could survive for at least an hour. If PW2 was indeed an eyewitness, he would have seen his father gasping for breath and would have made some effort to assist him or seek medical aid. Moreover, PW1, a Panchayat member, who is a nearby resident, had also arrived at the scene. If PW2 was indeed an eyewitness, he would have seen his father gasping for breath and would have made some effort to assist him or seek medical aid. Moreover, PW1, a Panchayat member, who is a nearby resident, had also arrived at the scene. Inexplicably, PW2 claims that after witnessing his father being attacked, he merely noticed that he had passed away and did not even attempt to provide medical assistance. The Panchayath member who has good connections with the police just leaves the spot without intimating the police. Strikingly, not a single speck of blood was found on PW2, his mother, or any other person present at the scene. This abnormal conduct is in tune with the defence case that PW1 was not present at the time of the incident and that someone with a personal vendetta against the deceased might have attacked him. It was also brought out through the witnesses that his father was not on good terms with his other brothers as well, who were all residing in the near vicinity. The inconsistencies in PW2’s testimony strongly suggest that he has not disclosed the true facts while deposing before the court. Even otherwise the conduct of PW2 is wholly unnatural and raises serious doubts about the prosecution case. 15. We also have serious doubts with regard to Exhibit P9 FIR which is registered at 10.30 pm on 4.3.2011. In his evidence, PW2 initially stated that he went to the Police Station and gave a statement at 10 p.m. PW11, Ramachandran, was with him and it was he who had translated what PW2 had stated in Malayalam. However, during cross-examination, it was brought out that the police had reached the spot at 7.00 - 7.30 p.m. and that he had stated what had transpired to the police. He further stated that his statement was recorded and he had also signed the statement. However, he retracted the afore statement immediately thereafter and went on to state that when police came to the spot at 7-7.30 p.m., he was not present. In other words, he does not deny that the police did not reach the spot but only stated that he was not present when the police arrived. However, in re-examination, it was brought out that he did not affix his signature in the statement prepared by the police based on his version at 7.30 pm. In other words, he does not deny that the police did not reach the spot but only stated that he was not present when the police arrived. However, in re-examination, it was brought out that he did not affix his signature in the statement prepared by the police based on his version at 7.30 pm. In other words, the prosecution admits that the police had come to the spot at 7.30 pm and had recorded his statement. This creates serious doubts about the genuinity of Ext.P2 FI statement and Ext.P9 FIR which is the document based on which the law was set in motion. Though from Ext.P9, it is seen that the FIR is seen forwarded to the court at 10.30 p.m., on 4.3.2011, the same reaches the court only at 3.15 p.m. on 5.3.2011. 16. It is a well-settled principle of law that the First Information Report in a criminal case in general and in a murder case in particular, is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence, primarily for corroborating the oral evidence adduced at trial. The significance of such a report cannot be overstated, particularly from the standpoint of the accused. The primary objective of insisting upon the prompt lodging of an FIR is to ensure early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the identity of the actual culprits, their role in the offence, and the presence of eyewitnesses at the scene of occurrence. In the instant case, neither the prosecution nor PW2 disputes that the police reached the crime scene at 7:30 PM and that a statement of PW2 was recorded. However, this statement has never been produced before the Court. Even PW9, the officer concerned, deposed that he received the information at 8:00 PM and rushed to the scene of the crime. If a statement was indeed recorded, it was the duty of the prosecution to place it before the Court. The sanctity of Exhibit P9, presented as the FIR, is thereby seriously undermined. The defence contention that the original statement was deliberately suppressed and that a fresh statement containing false allegations against the appellants was subsequently fabricated cannot be ignored. This suspicion is further compounded by the fact that the FIR reached the Court only at 3:15 PM on 5.3.2011, despite having been purportedly forwarded the previous day. The defence contention that the original statement was deliberately suppressed and that a fresh statement containing false allegations against the appellants was subsequently fabricated cannot be ignored. This suspicion is further compounded by the fact that the FIR reached the Court only at 3:15 PM on 5.3.2011, despite having been purportedly forwarded the previous day. Such an unexplained delay casts serious doubt on the authenticity and credibility of Exhibit P9 FIR when considered along with the attendant facts. Moreover, PW9, the officer who registered the FIR, was the same officer who had earlier visited the crime scene. Once it is established that the investigating officer deliberately failed to record the FIR upon receiving information about a cognizable offence of such gravity, and instead chose to prepare the FIR after several hours that too after returning to the police station and engaging in deliberations, consultations, and discussions, the conclusion can only be that the investigation is tainted. In such circumstances, it would be unsafe to rely upon an investigation that is marred by procedural irregularities, as it remains uncertain to what extent the police manipulated evidence, fabricated clues, or tailored the investigation to suit a particular narrative. 17. This case primarily hinges on the testimony of a PW2. Indeed, conviction can be based on the testimony of a single eyewitness and there is no rule of law or evidence which says to the contrary, provided the sole witness passes the test of reliability. So long as the single eyewitness is a wholly reliable witness, the courts have no difficulty in basing conviction on his testimony alone. However, where the single eyewitness is not found to be a wholly reliable witness, in the sense that there are serious inconsistencies in his evidence, we are required to insist upon some independent corroboration of his testimony, in material particulars, before recording a conviction. 18. The only remaining aspect to be considered is the recovery of MO2 chopper, purportedly based on the confession statement of the 1st accused. PW10 deposed that, on the basis of the disclosure statement given by the 1st accused, the MO2 weapon was allegedly seized from the rear side of his house. The prosecution examined PW3 as a witness to prove the recovery. However, in his evidence, PW3 categorically stated that MO2 weapon was handed over to the police by one Praseetha. PW10 deposed that, on the basis of the disclosure statement given by the 1st accused, the MO2 weapon was allegedly seized from the rear side of his house. The prosecution examined PW3 as a witness to prove the recovery. However, in his evidence, PW3 categorically stated that MO2 weapon was handed over to the police by one Praseetha. Furthermore, PW3 was neither present when the alleged confession statement was made by the accused, nor did he speak about the presence of the accused at the time of the recovery of the weapon. The house of the appellants is situated adjacent to the house of the deceased, and they are near relatives. Immediately after the incident, neighbours, including the Panchayat member, had gathered at the scene. In that view of the matter, it is highly improbable that the accused would have left the weapon used in the commission of the offence in an accessible location on the back side of their house. The likelihood of such conduct defies logic and raises significant doubts regarding the authenticity of the alleged recovery. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the recovery of the offending weapon create serious suspicions, further weakening the case of the prosecution. 19. We notice with deference the observations of the Apex Court in Rang Bahadur Singh And Others v. State Of U.P , [ AIR 2000 SC 1209 ] . We are of the view that the amount of doubt that this Court would entertain regarding the complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of reasonable doubt. We are conscious that acquitting the accused in a case of this nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time, we are mindful of the time-honoured legal principle that the acquittal of a guilty person is preferable to the wrongful conviction of an innocent individual. It is a fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence that unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, no conviction can be sustained. A criminal court cannot and must not deprive an individual of their fundamental right to liberty, let alone subject the appellants to a lifetime of incarceration, without at least a reasonable degree of certainty that they are the actual perpetrators of the crime. A criminal court cannot and must not deprive an individual of their fundamental right to liberty, let alone subject the appellants to a lifetime of incarceration, without at least a reasonable degree of certainty that they are the actual perpetrators of the crime. In the present case, we find ourselves compelled to entertain serious doubt regarding the involvement of the appellants in the alleged offence. The appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. This appeal is allowed. The finding of guilt, conviction and sentence passed against the appellants in S.C.No. 520 of 2013 on the file of Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kasaragod, will stand set aside and the appellants/accused Nos. 1 and 2 are acquitted of all charges. The appellants/accused Nos. 1 and 2 be set at liberty forthwith if their continued incarceration is not required in connection with any other case.