JUDG MENT : N. Tukaramji, J. This appeal has been preferred assailing the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 03.03.2016 in Sessions Case No.23 of 2014 passed by the VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Medak. 2. By the impugned judgment the appellant/convict/accused (hereinafter ‘the accused’) was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code , 1860 (for short ‘the IPC ’) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and also pay fine of Rs.200/- in default simple imprisonment for six months. 3. We have heard Mr.Chitneni Vidyasagar Rao, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of Mr. Palle Sriharinath, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Syed. Yasar Mamoon, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State. The prosecution case: 4. On 16.09.2013, the police received a written report (Ex.P-1) from the mother of the deceased (PW-1), stating the following facts: Eight years ago, the accused, who was already married and had a daughter, eloped with her daughter (the deceased) and married her at Lord Sri Laxmi Narasimha Swamy Temple, Yadagirigutta. Later, in the presence of caste elders and with the consent of his first wife, he remarried her daughter (the deceased), and they begot a son. After five years of marriage, the accused began to suspect the fidelity of her daughter and subjected her to both physical and mental harassment. On three or four occasions, the matter was brought before caste elders. Subsequently, after the accused beat his first wife, she left for her parents’ house. The deceased used to visit nearby villages to sell dolls and toys. The accused, suspecting her fidelity due to these visits, would beat her. Later, the accused took a room in Medak for business purposes and pledged 15 tolas of silver ornaments, a 3.5 tola silver chain, and 4.2½ grams of gold ornaments belonging to the deceased and used that money for his own purposes. He later redeemed these ornaments and gave them to his first wife without informing the deceased. One month prior to the incident, in Medak, the accused, acting on suspicion, attempted to kill the deceased by causing a head injury, but she was rescued by Shivkumar and neighbors. In another incident, the accused took the deceased and their son to Yedupayala dam. While the deceased was bathing, he pushed her into the water, telling her to die. One month prior to the incident, in Medak, the accused, acting on suspicion, attempted to kill the deceased by causing a head injury, but she was rescued by Shivkumar and neighbors. In another incident, the accused took the deceased and their son to Yedupayala dam. While the deceased was bathing, he pushed her into the water, telling her to die. However, when their son began to cry, the accused pulled her back. The accused also proclaimed that he would kill the deceased and go to prison. On 14.09.2013, as usual, the accused took the deceased to villages for their doll/toy business but did not return. At about 9 p.m., the accused called T. Balaraju (PW-4) and asked whether his wife (the deceased) had returned home, stating that she had left him and returned to the village. PW-4 informed him that she had not returned. The accused returned to the village a day later, on 16.09.2013, at about 6 p.m. When PW-1 and other caste members questioned him, the accused revealed that on 14.09.2013, he had taken the deceased on his moped to sell dolls/toys. At about 3:30 p.m., he took her to a forest area beside the Ablapur to Gajulagudem road and, as per his plan, strangled her with a towel. After she fell, he smashed her head with a stone and killed her. Immediately, they rushed to the place and found the deceased’s body with a head injury, lying in a pool of blood. Thus, PW-1 prayed for appropriate action. Proceedings before the trial Court: 5. Upon the police report/Ex.P-1 the crime was registered and after due investigation charge sheet was laid against the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC . Learned Magistrate took cognizance and after the proceedings committed the matter to the Sessions Division and upon numbering the Sessions Case the file was made over to the trial Court for adjudication. Learned Sessions Judge after examining the accused framed the charge under Section 302 IPC and proceeded with trial. In trial the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 12 and got marked Exs:P-1 to P-17 and M.Os.1 to 11 and the defence got marked certain portions of 161 Cr.P.C. statements of PWs.3 and 4 as Exs:D-1 to D-3. The incriminating materials were denied by the accused in Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination. However no defence evidence was placed. In trial the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 12 and got marked Exs:P-1 to P-17 and M.Os.1 to 11 and the defence got marked certain portions of 161 Cr.P.C. statements of PWs.3 and 4 as Exs:D-1 to D-3. The incriminating materials were denied by the accused in Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination. However no defence evidence was placed. Learned Sessions Judge after considering the materials held that the prosecution has proved the charge under Section 302 IPC beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly recorded conviction and sentenced as mentioned above. Contentions of the Learned Counsel for the Accused: 6. The learned counsel for the accused, in appeal, contended that there is no direct evidence linking the accused to the incident, and that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to establish the accused’s involvement in the offence. It was argued that the trial court erred in relying solely on the testimonies of PWs 1 to 4 without corroboration, and failed to properly consider the discrepancies present in their accounts. Additionally, the counsel pointed out that there was no explanation provided for the three-day delay in filing the First Information Report (FIR). Further submitted that the deceased was a divorcee who later married her sister’s husband and subsequently had other relationships; therefore, concluding the guilt of the accused on such evidence would be unreasonable. It was also argued that the time of death recorded in the autopsy report (Ex.P-13) does not align with the evidence of the witnesses. Considering these inconsistencies, the trial court should have acquitted the accused. The counsel thus prayed for reconsideration of the case and for the acquittal of the accused. Submissions of the Additional Public Prosecutor: 7. The Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the accused was last seen together with the deceased, and that the trial court, after observing the absence of a satisfactory explanation from the accused and considering the statements of witnesses regarding his ill feelings towards the deceased, rightly concluded that the accused committed the offence. It was argued that there is no valid ground for interference with the trial court’s findings and that the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel and perused the materials on record. Analysis of the evidence 9. It was argued that there is no valid ground for interference with the trial court’s findings and that the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel and perused the materials on record. Analysis of the evidence 9. The de facto complainant (PW-1), the sister of the deceased (PW- 2), and villagers/relatives (PWs 3 and 4) testified to discovering the dead body of Prameela (the deceased) in the forest near Annaram village. The mediator (PW-7), who participated in the scene observation (Ex.P-7) and inquest report (Ex.P-9), along with PW-9, deposed that they found the deceased's body with injuries and a towel around her neck in the forest area on the outskirts of Annaram village. The doctor (PW-10), who conducted the autopsy, detailed the ante-mortem injuries on the body and opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to throttling. The above evidence clearly establishes that Prameela’s death was homicidal. 10. With regard to the involvement of the accused and to prove the charge, the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence. It is a settled legal principle that, in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstances without any gaps, and a cumulative reading of the evidence must point solely to the guilt of the accused, excluding any other hypothesis or possibility consistent with innocence. 11. In this context, it is worth mentioning the landmark dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the guiding factors enumerated in the evaluation of the circumstantial evidence in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra - (1984) 4 SCC 116 in para No. 153, it has been held as under: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 12. In the light of the above guidelines the evidence on record is evaluated, as per the testimony of PW-1, on the date of the incident, the accused took his wife, Prameela (the deceased), on his moped to Ablapur village, after that she never returned and was later found dead. PW-2, the sister of the deceased, deposed that the accused and the deceased were residing together in one room and used to travel together on a moped to sell toys. On the day of the incident, both the accused and her sister left home together for this purpose. PWs 3 and 4, who are villagers and relatives of the deceased, also confirmed that the accused had taken the deceased with him on his moped to sell toys. PW-1 further stated that on the night of the same day, the accused called PW-4 to ask whether the deceased had returned home. PWs 3 and 4, who are villagers and relatives of the deceased, also confirmed that the accused had taken the deceased with him on his moped to sell toys. PW-1 further stated that on the night of the same day, the accused called PW-4 to ask whether the deceased had returned home. PW-4 corroborated this, stating that at about 9 p.m., the accused telephoned him to inquire if his wife had come back to the village, to which he replied that she had not. PW-2 also gave similar testimony. Additionally, PWs 1 and 2 stated that the accused returned to the village only on the following day, a fact supported by PWs 3 and 4. 13. These statements are consistent and in corroboration establishing that the deceased left home with the accused on his moped and did not return. Despite being informed that his wife had not returned, the accused came back to the village only in the evening of the next day. 14. What transpired after the accused and the deceased left home would be within the specific knowledge of the accused. The accused claimed that the deceased left him midway; if that were true, the details up to that point would still be within his knowledge, especially as she was his wife and he had taken her along for selling toys. However, the accused remained completely silent and failed to explain any of these aspects. Thus, the burden to explain these facts under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act remained unfulfilled. 15. It is a settled proposition, reiterated in several Supreme Court decisions, that when the facts proved show the accused was last seen with the deceased, and in the absence of any other explanation, a negative inference can be drawn against the accused. 16. Furthermore, the first information statement (Ex.P-1) and the evidence of PWs. 1 to 4 clearly and consistently state that the accused informed them, in the presence of caste elders, about the commission of the offence, after which they went to the location, searched, and found the dead body. This version remained uncontroverted except for denial suggestions. The discovery of the dead body based on the accused's statement is another material circumstance. 17. Regarding motive, while proof of motive alone does not establish guilt, it supports the possibility of the accused’s involvement. PWs. This version remained uncontroverted except for denial suggestions. The discovery of the dead body based on the accused's statement is another material circumstance. 17. Regarding motive, while proof of motive alone does not establish guilt, it supports the possibility of the accused’s involvement. PWs. 1 to 3 testified that the accused used to suspect the deceased’s fidelity and referred to two specific incidents at Medak and Yedupayala Dam. Although there are minor variations in the details, the core facts remain consistent. While the failure to take prompt legal action may favour the accused, the evidence collectively establishes the accused’s ill feelings towards the deceased. 18. The circumstances specifically, the accused taking his wife with him on the relevant day, remaining absent even after knowing she had not returned, the discovery of the dead body based on his information, the established ill feelings, and his silence regarding facts within his specific knowledge point solely to the accused’s guilt. 19. The accused’s contention regarding the delay in filing the first information report was explained by PW-1, who stated that there was a search for the deceased after she went missing and before receiving information from the accused. Moreover, delay in filing the FIR cannot, by itself, be a ground to discard the material evidence and the prosecution’s case. It is well settled that in cases of delay, the relevant consideration is whether there was any deliberation for falsely implicating the accused. In this case, the allegations in the first information statement were specific and directed only against the accused, and cross-examination did not reveal any reason for false implication. Thus, this ground of defence is without merit. 20. For the aforementioned reasons, it is our considered view that the prosecution has established all relevant circumstances and proved the charge against the accused, beyond reasonable doubt. Thus it shall be held that the trial Court had assessed the materials and evidence on record in a proper perspective and arrived at just conclusion including the sentence. In the absence of merit in the appeal the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence deserves affirmation. 21. In the result, the criminal appeal is dismissed. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions if any pending stands closed.