JUDGMENT : Kaushik Goswami, J. Heard Mr. N. Chaudhury, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. A. Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, 1973 seeking quashing of complaint filed by the respondent on 22.08.2019 being CR Case No.251/2019 under Sections 406/506/34 of IPC and the order of cognizance taken by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Goalpara by order dated 17.02.2020 under Sections 406/506/34 of IPC against the accused/petitioners. 3. The brief facts of the case is that the complainant filed a complaint on 22.08.2019 against the petitioner No.1 i.e. wife, petitioner No.2 i.e. mother-in-law and petitioner No.3 i.e. father-in-law before the Magistrate Court alleging, inter-alia, that the petitioner No.1 at the instance of the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 demanded certain articles from the respondent and the respondent for the sake of upholding peace had brought the same through his hard earned money. 4. It is the further alleged in the complaint that the petitioner No.1 after a few days started to threaten the respondent to end their marriage and all of a sudden on 19.07.2019 ousted him from the house of the petitioners. It is further alleged that when the respondent went to the house of the petitioners to try to reconcile the matter, the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 verbally abused the respondent. 5. Accordingly, the statement of the complainant as well as the witnesses were recorded. After perusing the complaint petition as well as the statement of the complainant and the statement of the witnesses, the Magistrate Court on 17.02.2020 took cognizance under Section 406/506/34 of IPC against the accused/petitioners. Situated thus, the present criminal petition has been filed seeking quashing of the complaint as well as the cognizance taken by the Magistrate Court. 6. Mr. N. Chaudhury, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that it is amply evident on the reading of the allegations set out in the FIR that no ingredients of Section 406 of IPC is made out even if the allegations are taken to be correct at their face value. 7. He further submits that similarly the allegations as regards alleged threat as set out in the complaint is also not sufficient enough to constitute the offence under Section 506 of IPC. 7. He further submits that similarly the allegations as regards alleged threat as set out in the complaint is also not sufficient enough to constitute the offence under Section 506 of IPC. He further submits that from the complaint as well as the material collected by the prosecution, it is apparent that the respondent has lodged the complaint after receiving the talaknama from the petitioner No.1. He accordingly submits that in the backdrop of such facts, it is amply evident that the complaint has been lodged with mala-fide intention and personal grudge solely to harass the petitioner No.1 and her parents. 8. In support of the aforesaid submissions he relies upon the principle Nos. 5 and 7 enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and also upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Deepak Gaba & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in 2023 3 SCC 423 9. He accordingly submits that the instant complaint is a total abuse of the Court process and the order of the Magistrate Court taking cognizance under Section 406/506/34 of IPC is totally mechanical and without any application of mind whatsoever and therefore, the impugned order of the Magistrate Court is liable to be set aside and quashed. 10. Per contra, Mr. A. Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that it is apparent from the averments set out in the FIR that the respondent with his hard earned money has procured the household items including mobile phone and gold ornaments which the wife after throwing him out from the house and issuing a talaqnama has refused to return the same to him and therefore the ingredients of Section 406 are clearly being made out against the accused/petitioners. 11. He further submits that wife being the custodial of those articles, the entrustment is constituted. He further submits that the averments in the complaint as regards threatening to the effect that if the respondent makes any future attempt of retrieving the articles, it would result in his death is sufficient enough to constitute an offence under Section 506 of IPC. He further submits that it is specifically averred in the complaint that the petitioner Nos. He further submits that the averments in the complaint as regards threatening to the effect that if the respondent makes any future attempt of retrieving the articles, it would result in his death is sufficient enough to constitute an offence under Section 506 of IPC. He further submits that it is specifically averred in the complaint that the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 has verbally abused the complainant and therefore a criminal offence is clearly made out and hence the order of the Magistrate Court taking cognizance of the said offences warrants no interference from this Court. 12. I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by both the learned counsels appearing for the contending parties and have perused the material available on record. I have also considered the case laws cited at the bar. 13. Apt at the outset to refer to the complaint, which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “TRANSLATED COPY OF THE COMPLAINT Sl. No. 248 CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, GOALPARA Memo No : CR 251/19 complainant: Rejabuddin Ahmed S/o : Late Kandura Sheikh Resident of: Khamar Manikpur Police Station:Krishnai District: Goalpara Name of Accused: (1) Rojibon Nessa D/o Rahim Ali W/o Rejabuddin Ahmed (2) Rohima Bibi W/o Rohim Ali (3) Rohim Ali S/o Unknown All are residents of Dhupdhara, P.O. & P.S. -Dhupdhara, District: Goalpara Date of Occurrence: 3/8/2019 Place of Occurrence: House of the accused. Sections: 406/506/34 IPC Name of witness(es): 1. Tahidul Ali S/o Late Phuluddin Ali 2. Azirul Ali S/o Isab Ali 3. Rana Ahmed S/o Late Alimuddin All are residents of Khamar Manikpur, P.S. Krishnai, District - Goalpara. It is the submission of the Complainant that Accused No.1 is the wife of the Complainant. Accused No.2 is the mother-in-law and Accused No.3 is the father-in- law of the Complainant. On 7-10-18, the Complainant married the Accused No.1 and moved into the house of his in-laws in order to stay with them. After their marriage, the couple lived peacefully for approximately 2 (two) months, however, the Accused No.1 thereafter started demanding the below-mentioned articles from the Complainant as per the ill advice of her mother and father, i.e., Accused No.2 and 3. The Accused No.1 threatened the complainant to withdraw from his company as a wife if he failed to procure the demanded articles. The Accused No.1 threatened the complainant to withdraw from his company as a wife if he failed to procure the demanded articles. The Complainant for the sake of maintaining the marriage procured the demanded articles one by one by means of his hard-earned money. The household remained peaceful for 2-3 days after receipt of the articled which were demanded. Thereafter, the Accused No. 1 again started to threaten the Complainant of ending their marriage through various means. With no intent to continue with the marriage the Accused No.1 on 19/07/2019 ousted the Complainant of their house and also threw clothes and other belongings out of the house. The Complainant was forced to leave after he was thrown out of the house. The Complainant with the intention of reconciling his marital ties on 3/8/19 went to the house of the father of the Accused No.1 along with the witnesses and asked the Accused No.1 to reconcile and continue as a family. But the Accused Nos. 2 and 3 upon hearing such pleas of the Complainant became furious and verbally abused the Complainant. The Complainant asked to take back the aforementioned articles acquired by as the Accused No.1 did not want to continue with the marriage but the Accused No.1 did not allow him to do so and further obstructs any future attempt of the Complainant to retrieve the articles. The Complainant is further threatened that any attempt to act otherwise would result in his death and saying so made him leave the place along with the witnesses. The articles given by the Complainant are precious and essential. The articles will be misappropriated if left in the possession of the Accused persons. Hence, it has become important to recover the articles from the possession of the Accused persons. Accused No.1 has prepared a Notarised Talaqnama (divorce deed).Photocopy of the same has been annexed herewith. It is therefore prayed that Your Honour after perusing the records and through necessary witnesses and inspections may be graciously pleased to pass an order directing the recovery of the articles from the possession of the Accused persons. 22-8-19 The articles under the possession of the Accused persons: Item Price (Rs.) Godrej (made of steel) 9,000 Showcase (made of steel) 7,000 Sofa set 15,000 Ulna 2,000 Centre table (made of steel) 4,000 Almirah (made of steel) 7,000 Mobile handset (Model No. OPPOA83) 9,500 Gold Ornaments (advance) 6,000 14. 22-8-19 The articles under the possession of the Accused persons: Item Price (Rs.) Godrej (made of steel) 9,000 Showcase (made of steel) 7,000 Sofa set 15,000 Ulna 2,000 Centre table (made of steel) 4,000 Almirah (made of steel) 7,000 Mobile handset (Model No. OPPOA83) 9,500 Gold Ornaments (advance) 6,000 14. Apparent reading of the aforesaid complaint that it is alleged by the complainant that after his marriage with the petitioner No.1, he stayed in her house with her parents, i.e petitioner No. 2 and 3 and during the time of the marriage she demanded few articles. It appears that he accordingly purchased the such articles being steel godrej, steel showcase, sofa set, ulna, steel centre table, steel almirah, mobile handset and gold ornaments worth Rs. 6,000/- from his hard earned money. It appears that later on the petitioner No.1 expressed her desire not to continue with the marriage and throw him out from their house on 19.07.2019. It further appears that after being thrown out from the house, on 03.08.2019 he went to their house and asked the petitioner No.1 to reconcile their marriage and continue living as a family, but the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 verbally abused him. It appears that since the petitioner No.1 expressed her desire not to continue with the marriage, he asked her to return the articles which he had bought, however, the petitioner No.1 refused to allow him to take these articles and further threatened him that in case he makes any future attempt to take these articles, it would result in his death. It further appears that the petitioner No.1 has served a talaqnama (divorced deed) to him. It appears that accordingly, he filed the complaint for direction for recovery of the articles from the possession of the accused/petitioners. 15. It appears that the Magistrate Court after perusing the said complaint as well as the deposition of the witnesses took cognizance of the complaint under Section406/506/34 of IPC against the accused/petitioners. 16. Apt to reproduce the order dated 17.02.2020 hereunder for ready reference:- “ORDER-SHEET C.R. Case No.251/2019 17-02-2020 Complainant Rejabuddin Ahmed is present. Today is fixed for necessary order on complaint petition. Perused the C/R including the complaint petition, statement of the complainant recorded under section 200 CrPC and the statement of witnesses under section 202 CrPC. Heard learned counsel for the complainant. Today is fixed for necessary order on complaint petition. Perused the C/R including the complaint petition, statement of the complainant recorded under section 200 CrPC and the statement of witnesses under section 202 CrPC. Heard learned counsel for the complainant. On such perusal and hearing I find prima-facie materials of offence under section 406/506/34 of IPC against the accused persons Rojibon Nessa, Rahima Bibi, Rohim All. Accordingly, cognizance is taken against the accused persons under section 406/506/34 of IPC. Issue summons to accused persons Complainant to take steps. Fix 26-03-2020 for appearance. Addl Chief Judicial Magistrate, Goalpara” 17. In order to constitute an offence under Section 405 of IPC, the word ‘entrusted’ in 405 of IPC is relevant and unless there is entrustment, there can be no offence under Section 405 of IPC. 18. Apt to reproduce Section 405 and 406 of IPC is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “ 405. Criminal breach of trust.- Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits ‘criminal breach of trust’. [Explanation [1].-A person, being an employer [of an establishment whether exempted under section 17 of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or not] who deducts the employee’s contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family Pension Fund established by any law for the time being in force, shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.] [Explanation 2.-A person, being an employer, who deducts the employees’ contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to the Employees’ State Insurance Fund held and administered by the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation established under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said Act, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.] 406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust. Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” 19. The basic requirements to bring home the accusation under Section 405 of IPC are the requirements to prove conjointly (i) entrustment and (ii) whether the accused was actuated by dishonest intention or not, misappropriated it or converted it to his own use to the detriment of the persons who entrusted it. Thus, unless such averments showing entrustment and fraudulent misappropriation is set out in the complaint, no offence under Section 406 can be made out. 20. Reading of the aforesaid averments made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value to be true, the same does not disclose entrustment and or fraudulent misappropriation by the accused/petitioners. Mere use of the word ‘misappropriation’ in the FIR is not sufficient to constitute such an offence. 20. Reading of the aforesaid averments made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value to be true, the same does not disclose entrustment and or fraudulent misappropriation by the accused/petitioners. Mere use of the word ‘misappropriation’ in the FIR is not sufficient to constitute such an offence. It is apparent reading of the articles alleged to have been not returned by the accused/petitioners are mere household items which a husband purchases during the continuance of the marriage for living comfortably together as husband and wife. It further appears that the complainant has given a mobile phone and gold ornaments worth Rs. 6,000/- to the petitioner No.1 during their marriage. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that if the wife gives divorce to the husband, without returning such items upon the husband demanding the same, a case of criminal breach of trust is constituted against the wife. In fact, it is clear that such allegations are made in the complaint purely with the intention to harass the accused/petitioners for throwing the respondent out of her house and for divorcing him. Therefore, no case under Section 406 is made out. 21. This brings me to the offence under Section 506 of IPC. Apt to refer to the definition of criminal intimidation as provided in Section 503 of IPC and the punishment for criminal intimidation as provided in Section 506 of IPC for ready reference:- “ 503. Criminal intimidation. -Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation. A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. - Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. - Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. -And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 22. Reading of the aforesaid provisions, it appears that the basic ingredient to constitute an offence of criminal intimidation is the intention to cause alarm to the complainant by threatening with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested and or with intent to cause alarm to that person and or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do and or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do. 23. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court Madhushree Dutta (supra) reported in 2025 0 SSC 172 , which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “34. This Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506 of the IPC in Manik Taneja and Another v. State of Karnataka & Anr., (2015) 7 SCC 423 , where it was observed as follows: ‘11. xxxxxxxxxxxx A reading of the definition of ’criminal intimidation’ would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.’ 35. In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute any threats or intimidation to the second accused. In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute any threats or intimidation to the second accused. Therefore, ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie, are not made out against him. The argument that the first accused acted at the behest of the second accused is untenable, as Section 34 of the IPC, which imposes vicarious liability in criminal matters, has not been applied in this case. 37. Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against the first accused, it must be established that she had the intention to cause alarm to the complainant. A review of the alleged threat reveals that the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination, which constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation. It is also the appellants’ case, which has not been disputed by the complainant, that the complainant has filed a reference before the labour court challenging her termination and seeking reinstatement along with back wages. Given these circumstances and the materials on record, the ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie, are not disclosed against the first accused too. 24. Turning back to the facts of the present case, apt to reproduce the initial deposition of the respondent made under Section 200 Cr.P.C. “On Oath, On 07.102018, my marriage was solemnized with Rojibon Nessa. I started residing at the house of my father-in-law, Rahim Ali. While residing there, I bought household articles namely Godrej, showcase, Dunlop, "Ulna", bed, mattress and blanket, one table fan, one ceiling fan, gas cylinder set. On 22.07.2019, my wife gave me divorce through Court proceedings. On 03.05.2019, I along with Tahidul Ali. Azirul Ali, Rana Ahmed and a few others went to the house of the Accused and asked them to return the articles. They did not return the articles and issued life threats to me. The Accused, Rahima Bibi is my mother-in-law.My witnesses: Tahidul Ali, Azirul Ali, Rana Ahmed” 25. On 03.05.2019, I along with Tahidul Ali. Azirul Ali, Rana Ahmed and a few others went to the house of the Accused and asked them to return the articles. They did not return the articles and issued life threats to me. The Accused, Rahima Bibi is my mother-in-law.My witnesses: Tahidul Ali, Azirul Ali, Rana Ahmed” 25. Reading of the aforesaid deposition, it appears that the respondent has deposed that while he was residing in the house of his in-laws with his wife, i.e petitioner No.1, he bought household articles namely godrej, showcase, dunlop, ulna, bed, mattress and blanket, one table fan, one ceiling fan, gas cylinder set and after his wife divorced him through Court proceeding on 22.07.2019, he along with one Tahidul Ali and few others went to the house of the accused/petitioners and asked them to return the articles, but they refused to return the articles and issued life threat to him. 26. Initial deposition of Tahidul Ali made under Section 200 of Cr.P.C, which is also reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “On oath. I know the complainant Rejabuddin Ahmed. I know the accused persons. About one year ago the complainant got married with accused No.1 as per social customs. Thereafter, the complainant started residing at the house of the accused persons as Ghar Juwal. As per the demand of the accused No.1 the complainant purchased a lot of household articles such as Showcase, Almirah, Bed etc. Few days after purchasing this articles Rejabuddin Ahmed was divorced by his wife. Rejabuddin returned to his own house. On 03-08-2019 Rejabuddin along with me and Rana visited the house of the accused persons to bring back the articles purchased by him but, they refused to return the articles.” 27. Apparent reading of the aforesaid deposition that the said witness has not mentioned the allegation of threat as stated to have been given by the accused/petitioner to the respondent when they visited their house to bring back the articles. He simply deposed that the accused/petitioners refused to return the articles. 28. Be that as it may, this Court at this stage cannot go into the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR. He simply deposed that the accused/petitioners refused to return the articles. 28. Be that as it may, this Court at this stage cannot go into the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR. The test is to take the allegation made in the FIR at their face value and accepting the same and in its entirety, whether a prima- facie offence is made out or not against the accused/petitioners. The principles for quashing of complaint/FIR is well settled. Apt to reproduce the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (Supra) , which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and suffi-ciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or com-plaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or com-plaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cog-nizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no pru-dent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is suffi-cient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and con-tinuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing effica-cious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 29. Apparent reading of the aforesaid principle No.1 that in the event, the allegation made in the FIR or the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused/petitioners, the Court is entitled to quash such complaint/FIR. That apart, under principal No.5 even in a given case, where the allegation made in the complaint/FIR are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused/petitioner, the Court is entitled to quash such complaint/FIR. Further, under principal No.7, where a criminal proceeding appears to have been manifestly attended with mala-fide and or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and in the view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the Court is entitled to quash the complaint/FIR. 30. Further, under principal No.7, where a criminal proceeding appears to have been manifestly attended with mala-fide and or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and in the view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the Court is entitled to quash the complaint/FIR. 30. It be worthwhile to mention that whenever an accused person comes before the Court invoking the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C to get the complaint/FIR or the criminal proceedings quash essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, the Court owes a duty to look into the complaint/FIR with little more closely. 31. In fact, while looking into the averments made in such complaint/FIR, it is imperative to also look into the material collected in the course of investigation and the other attending circumstances emerging from such material over and above the averments made in the complaint/FIR. 32. In the instant case, the case made out by the complainant against the accused/petitioner No.1 and her parents, i.e petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 is for non-returning the articles which he had purchased while living as husband and wife at her house after being thrown out from the house and being divorced. 33. In the context of an Indian Society, it is imperative for a husband to maintain his wife during the time of marriage. Thus, during the course of such marriage, a husband purchases various household items etc. and also gives gift to his wife. As such, in the event, if such marriage is over, non-returning of such items cannot give rise to criminal prosecution. 34. Reference is made to paragraph 5 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Golconda Linga Swamy reported in (2004) 6 SCC 522 , which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- "5. ...Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. ...Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto .” 35. Reading of the aforesaid decision, it appears that when the Court is considering the prayer for quashing a complaint, it is permissible to look into the materials collected by the prosecution to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offences is made out, even if the allegations are accepted to be true. 36. Reference is also made to paragraph 6 and 7 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R P Kapur vs State of Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 , which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings: (AIR p. 869, para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction: (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge . Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.....” 37. Reading of the aforesaid decision, it appears that the Apex Court has held that judicial process should not be an instrument of operation or needless harassment. In other words, the Magistrate Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before taking cognizance of a criminal offence, otherwise, it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complaint to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. It is obvious that at the same time, quashing petition cannot be used as an instrument to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. In other words, the Court must cautiously examine the facts to ascertain whether a criminal offence is made out or not. 38. In the instant case, it is apparent from the above that the allegation made in the complaint is totally absurd and inherently improbable and is manifestly attended with mala-fide intention. Hence, I am of the unhesitant view that the instant case clearly falls within principle nos. 1, 5 and 7 as laid down by the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (Supra) 39. Hence, I am of the unhesitant view that the instant case clearly falls within principle nos. 1, 5 and 7 as laid down by the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (Supra) 39. The order of the Magistrate Court taking cognizance under Section 406 & 506 of IPC on the basis of such averments where the basic ingredients of 406 are lacking on the face value appears to be a mechanical approach without any application of mind. Undoubtedly, the Magistrate Court is not required to go into the genuineness of the allegation made in the complaint/FIR, but none the same a Magistrate Court is required to apply its mind to the averments set out in the complaint/FIR as well as the initial deposition submitted by the prosecution in order to initiate criminal proceeding against the accused/petitioners. 40. Therefore, I have no hesitation that the order of the Magistrate Court taking cognizance under Section 406 & 506 of IPC is totally erroneous. 41. In the backdrop of the aforesaid, I am of the unhesitant view that the instant complaint is a gross abuse of the Court’s process. Hence, the criminal petition succeeds. 42. Accordingly, the impugned order of the Magistrate Court dated 17.02.2020 is hereby set aside. Resultantly, the criminal proceeding arising from the CR Case No.251/2019 is also hereby quashed. Ordered accordingly. 43. It is needless to be clarified that the observation made in this judgment is only in the context of the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 44. Resultantly, the criminal petition stands allowed. 45. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.