ORDER : SUREPALLI NANDA, J. Heard Sri K.S.Rahul, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, M/s. Pearl Law Associates, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 and learned Government Pleader for Women Development and Child Welfare appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2. 2. The petitioners approached the Court seeking prayer as under: “To issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate order or direction in the nature of a writ declaring the DVC No.3 of 2024 on the file of the principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-IV Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Medchal-Malkajgiri District at L.B.Nagar is not maintainable in law insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned and consequently quash the proceedings in DVC No. 3 of 2024 on the file of the principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-IV additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Medchal-malkajgiri District at L.B.Nagar as against the petitioners herein in the interest of justice and pass....” 3. The case of the petitioners, in brief, as per the averments made by the petitioners in the affidavit by the petitioners in support of the present w rit petition, is as under: The first petitioner is the father in law of the first respondent who is married to the son of petitioners no 1 and 2, by name Racha Srikanth and the 2 nd petitioner is the legally wedded wife of the 1 st petitioner and the 3 rd petitioner is the daughter of the petitioners no 1 and 2. The marriage between the son of petitioners no 1 and 2 and the 1 st respondent was performed as per Hindu rites and customs on 11-12-2022. The 1 st respondent herein lodged a false complaint dated 11-11-2023 before the 2 nd respondent herein consequent to which DVC No. 3 of 2024,was registered on the file of the principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-IV additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Medchal-malkajgiri District at L.B.Nagar against the son of petitioners no 1 and 2 and the 3 rd petitioner as well. In the said complaint lodged by the 1st respondent before the 2 nd respondent, the 1 st respondent prayed as under:- “a) to direcr my husband to pay an amount of Rs. In the said complaint lodged by the 1st respondent before the 2 nd respondent, the 1 st respondent prayed as under:- “a) to direcr my husband to pay an amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- per month to me from the day of filing this complaint till my lifetime towards maintenance food and boarding, clothing and hospital expenses and other unforeseen expenses; b) to direct my husband to provide shared accommodation to me with all amenities under section 19 of D.V.C Avt at his house R/o H.No. 13- 13-174, street No. 17, Tarnaka, secunderabad-500017; c) to directing the respondent No. 1 not to stay away from me, an order entitle to me to have continued access to my personal needs U/Sec 17 of DVC Act; d) to grant police protection for protect me from the hands of my husband and his family members Under section 18 of D.V.C. Act; and e) Pass such other or further ordersed the Hon'ble court deems fit and proper.” It is further the specific case of the petitioner that since no relief is claimed against the petitioner no 1, 2 and 3 in the subject complaint and further the marriage of the petitioner no 3 herein was performed on 31-10-2018 and after marriage, 1 st respondent shifted to her in laws house in Hanuma Konda in 2019 and has been working as a doctor at Hanumakonda since then and hence the subject DVC No 3 of 2024 to the extent of the petitioners hereinis not maintainable and is liable to be quashed. 4. PERUSED THE RECORD: A. The counter affidavit filed by the 1 st respondent and in particular para Nos.4 and 5 are extracted hereunder;- “4. It is respectfully submitted, in reply to the averments made vide para’s 2 & 3 of the affidavit under reply, it would suffice to state that since they relate to the factual position on record, no specific rebuttal is warranted in this regard. It is respectfully submitted, in reply to the averments made vide para’s 2 & 3 of the affidavit under reply, it would suffice to state that since they relate to the factual position on record, no specific rebuttal is warranted in this regard. However, it is pertinent to state that the petitioners have while seeking quashing of the proceedings as against them in DVC No. 3 of 2024, did not make out any reasonable much less substantial grounds to prove the untenability of the DVC case which this Respondent constrained to initiate as against her parents in law and the sister in law who have admittedly committed the offences set out under THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005, hence the present petition is untenable both on facts and under law. 5. It is respectfully submitted, in reply to the averments made vide para’s 4, 5 & 6 it would suffice to state that in view of what has been explained in the aforementioned paragraphs, the contention of the petitioners that they have not the mandate the dowry nor did they harass and torture this Respondent etc are totally false, misconceived and farfetched and hence is liable to rejected. Further, the contention that since the marriage of petitioner no 3 was performed on 31-10-2018 and that she has shifted he residence to hanmakonda does not perse disprove that she had not induced or instigated her parents and brother to resort to the physical harassment and torture of this Respondent. Hence, the contentions are baseless and ill-logical. There is no balance of convenience in favour of the petitioners. The prayers are totally misconceived and untenable. Further, this Respondent is taking necessary steps to move an appropriate application for amendment of the Prayers in the DVC NO 3 of 2024 basing on the attendant factual position vis-à- vis the apparent acts and omissions, constituting offences under the provisions of DVC Act, on the part of all the Petitioners including the Petitioner No 3. Hence, the present WRIT Petition is liable to be rejected and dismissed in limine.” B. The interim order, dated 26.03.2024 passed in I.A.No.01 of 2024 in the present Writ Petition observed as under:- “There shall be interim stay of appearance of petitioner No.3 is concerned in D.V.C.No.3 of 2024 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-IV, Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Medchal-Malkajgiri District at L.B.Nagar. So far as petitioner Nos. 1 to 2 are concerned the proceedings may going on. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION:- 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners mainly contends that since no relief is claimed against the petitioners in the subject complaint and since the 3 rd petitioner after her marriage had shifted to Hanumakonda in the year 2019 as such the subject DVC No 3 of 2024 to the extent of the petitioners herein is not maintainable and is liable to be quashed. 6. In support of the case of the petitioners learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners relies on the judgement of the Apex court dated 28.07.2022 reported in 2022 Law suit [SC] 877 passed in Akella Lalitha vs Konda Hanumantha Rao and another and in particular paras 15, 16 and 17 extracted hereunder:- “[15] Coming to address the second issue, while this Court is not apathetic to the predicament of the Respondent grandparents, it is a fact that absolutely no relief was ever sought by them for the change of surname of the child to that of first husband/son of respondents. It is settled law that relief not found on pleadings should not be granted. If a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer or pleading was made depriving the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such relief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice. [16] In the case of Messrs. Trojan & Co. Ltd. Vs. Rm.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar 1953 AIR(SC) 235, this Court considered the issue as to whether relief not asked for by a party could be granted and that too without having proper pleadings. The Court held as under:- "It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case." [17] In the case of Bharat Amratlal Kothari & Anr. Vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & Ors., 2010 AIR(SC) 475 held: "Though the Court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the Court. Vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & Ors., 2010 AIR(SC) 475 held: "Though the Court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the Court. however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner."” 7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 1 st respondent placing reliance on the averments made in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 dispute the averments made by the petitioners in the affidavit filed by the petitioners in support of the present writ petition and contend that as explained in detail in all the paragraphs of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 1 st respondent the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 had tortured the 1 st respondent and therefore since petitioners admittedly committed the offence set out under the “ THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005” hence the present writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 8. A bare perusal of the prayer sought for by the 1 st respondent before the 2 nd respondent against the petitioners in particular clause (d) reads as under:- “d) to grant police protection for protect me from the hands of my husband and his family members Under section 18 of D.V.C. Act; and” 9. Hence this court opines that the specific plea of the petitioners that no relief is claimed against the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 in the subject complaint of the 1 st respondent filed against the petitioners before the 2 nd respondent and numbered as DVC No. 3 of 2024 is untenable and rejected. This court opines that the judgement relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner does not apply the facts of the present case. 10. A bare perusal of the contents of the complaint dated 11.11.2023 of the 1 st respondent against the petitioners herein before the 2 nd respondent indicate, allegations against the petitioners of having committed the offences set out under “ THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005” . The allegations of harassment meted out to the first respondent by the petitioners and the demand for dowry by the petitioners, how ever is denied specifically at para No.‘4’ of the petitioners affidavit. 11. The allegations of harassment meted out to the first respondent by the petitioners and the demand for dowry by the petitioners, how ever is denied specifically at para No.‘4’ of the petitioners affidavit. 11. This court opines that this court under article 226 cannot determine and adjudicate issues w hich can be enquired into through a full-fledged trial to be conducted by the 2 nd respondent and the plea put forth by the petitioners herein seeking relief in the present w rit petition are untenable. 12. Few Relevant provisions under the DVC Act-2005 are extracted hereunder: “Section 2 (a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent, Section 3: The act, whether committed or omitted, constitutes domestic violence when it harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse or coerces the aggrieved party or any other person related to them to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security. Section 9. Section 9. Duties and functions of Protection Officers.-(1) It shall be the duty of the Protection Officer- (a) to assist the Magistrate in the discharge of his functions under this Act; (b) to make a domestic incident report to the Magistrate, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, upon receipt of a complaint of domestic violence and forward copies thereof to the police officer in charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction domestic violence is alleged to have been committed and to the service providers in that area; (c) to make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed to the Magistrate, if the aggrieved person so desires, claiming relief for issuance of a protection order; (d) to ensure that the aggrieved person is provided legal aid under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987) and make available free of cost the prescribed form in which a complaint is to be made; (e) to maintain a list of all service providers providing legal aid or counselling, shelter homes and medical facilities in a local area within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate (f) to make available a safe shelter home, if the aggrieved person so requires and forward a copy of his report of having lodged the aggrieved person in a shelter home to the police station and the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area where the shelter home is situated; (g) to get the aggrieved person medically examined, if she has sustained bodily injuries and forward a copy of the medical report to the police station and the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area where the domestic violence is alleged to have been taken place; (h) to ensure that the order for monetary relief under section 20 is complied with and executed, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); (i) to perform such other duties as may be prescribed. (2) The Protection Officer shall be under the control and supervision of the Magistrate, and shall perform the duties imposed on him by the Magistrate and the Government by, or under, this Act.” 13. (2) The Protection Officer shall be under the control and supervision of the Magistrate, and shall perform the duties imposed on him by the Magistrate and the Government by, or under, this Act.” 13. A bare perusal of the above referred provisions indicate, that the 1 st respondent w ho falls under the definition section 2(a) admittedly being the w ife of the son of the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 herein had addressed a complaint dated 11.11.2023 to the 2 nd respondent herein alleging domestic violence being meted out to the 1 st respondent by the petitioners and also the son of the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 as defined under section 3 of the DVC Act 2005 and the 2 nd respondent forwarded the same to the concerned metropolitan magistrate at L.B.Nagar, discharging 2 nd respondent’s duty as mandated under section 9(1)(a) and (b) of the DVC Act, 2005, the said complaint dated 11.11.2023 of the 1 st respondent thereafter having been numbered as DVC No 3 of 2024. 14. This court duly considering the above referred provisions of the act opines that there is no illegality in the 2 nd respondent forwarding the complaint of the 1 st respondent dated 11-11-2023 to the concerned metropolitan magistrate discharging the 2 nd respondent’s duty as per section 9 of the DVC, 2005. 15. This court opines that the present writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the constitution of India is not maintainable since the petitioner herein failed to convince this court that the subject DVC proceedings initiated by the 1 st respondent against the petitioners before the concerned magistrate suffer from a patent lack of jurisdiction. 16. This court relying on the judgment of this Court in W.P.No.2864 of 2024, dated 30.09.2024 and in particular para No’s 12, 13 and 15 which are extracted hereunder opines that the present writ petition is devoid of merits:- “ 12. The Apex Court Judgment reported in 1972 (3) SCC 424 in "D.N. Bhattacharjee v. State of W.B., in particular, at para 55, observed as under: 55. The Apex Court Judgment reported in 1972 (3) SCC 424 in "D.N. Bhattacharjee v. State of W.B., in particular, at para 55, observed as under: 55. For the reasons stated above let me summarize the findings herein below:- (i) Respondent(s) can challenge maintainability of an application under Section 12 of the said Act filed by the aggrieved person before the Court of the learned Magistrate immediately after appearance in the proceeding by filing appropriate petition (ii) The Learned Magistrate shall dispose of such application challenging maintainability of the proceeding under Section 12 of the said Act after giving the opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved person. An aggrieved party may file an appeal under Section 29 of the said Act against the order passed by the learned Magistrate under the provision of Section 29 of the said Act before the learned sessions judge. (iii) Against the order passed by the court of appeal, a revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code shall lie. (iv) Alternatively, a respondent may file an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging maintainability of a proceeding under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the proceedings Immediately on receipt of notice before the High Court. (v) An order upon an application challenging maintainability under Section 12 of the said Act shall not be assailed under Article 227 of the constitution." 13. The Full Bench of Madras High Court in its recent Judgment dated 17.11.2022 in Crl.O.P.SR.Nos.31852, 28394 of 2022 and batch (in total 32 cases) held that a petition under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act can be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of I ndia praying the Court to exercise the pow er of Superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of I ndia only on a limited ground of patent lack of jurisdiction and not otherwise. Paras 40 and 41 of the said Judgment is extracted hereunder: "40. The next question is whether the proceedings under Chapter IV of the D.V. Act can be assailed by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, Indubitably, the power of judicial review under the said provision is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Paras 40 and 41 of the said Judgment is extracted hereunder: "40. The next question is whether the proceedings under Chapter IV of the D.V. Act can be assailed by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, Indubitably, the power of judicial review under the said provision is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. After the decision of the Constitution Bench in L.Chandra Kumar v Union of India, it is no longer open to doubt that the power of judicial review under Articles 226/227 cannot be taken away even by a constitutional amendment, let alone by a statute Nevertheless, the existence of power is one thing and the exercise of power is quite another. Though the power of superintendence under Article 227 over the proceedings of the Magistrate under the D.V. Act exists, its exercise would, no doubt, be conditioned on certain very salutary principles one of which is that a High Court will not exercise its power of superintendence if there exists an efficacious alternative remedy. 41. As has been adverted to, supra, the legislature has very thoughtfully provided an appellate remedy, under Section 31 of the D.V. Act, before the Court of Session against an order of the Magistrate. The existence of an appellate remedy would almost always be a "near total bar" for exercising power under Article 227, as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society. An exception to the aforesaid rule is where the proceedings before the Court below are patently lacking in jurisdiction. An illustrative instance of such a case is where a Magistrate, who does not possess jurisdiction under Section 27, entertains an application under the D.V. Act or where the reliefs sought are outside the scope of the Act, etc. Such instances would, no doubt, be few and far between. We only reiterate that the policy of the D.V. Act is expedition, which cannot be achieved if all and sundry orders are called into question before the High Court. This aspect must necessarily weigh with the learned single judges while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 in a challenge to proceedings under the D.V.Act 15. We only reiterate that the policy of the D.V. Act is expedition, which cannot be achieved if all and sundry orders are called into question before the High Court. This aspect must necessarily weigh with the learned single judges while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 in a challenge to proceedings under the D.V.Act 15. This Court opines that the petitioner herein can challenge the maintainability of an application under Section 12 of the said Act filed by the petitioner/aggrieved person before the Court of the learned Magistrate immediately after appearance in the proceedings by filing appropriate petition. "The Learned Magistrate shall dispose of such application challenging maintainability of the proceeding under Section 12 of the said Act after giving the opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved person. An aggrieved party may file an appeal under Section 29 of the said Act against the order passed by the learned Magistrate under the provision of Section 29 of the said Act before the learned sessions judge. Against the order passed by the court of appeal, a revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code shall lie. Alternatively, a respondent may file an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging maintainability of a proceeding under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the proceedings immediately on receipt of notice before the High Court."” 17. Taking into consideration:- (a) The aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case; (b) The submissions made by the learned counsel for petitioners and also learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 1 st respondent; (c) The averments made in the counter affidavit filed by the 1 st respondent(referred to and extracted above); (d) The relevant provisions of the DVC Act, 2005 (referred to and extracted above); (e) The view of the Apex court judgment dated 28.07.2022 reported in 2022 Law suit [ SC] 877 (f) The judgment of this Court in W.P.No.2864 of 2024, dated 30.09.2024 (referred to and extracted above) (g) The view of the full bench of Madras High court in its recent judgement dated 17.11.2022 in Crl.O.P.SR.Nos 31852, 28394 of 2022 and batch (in total 32 cases)(referred to and extracted above); (h) In the light of the discussion and conclusion arrived at para Nos.5 to 16 of the present judgement. The writ petition stands dismissed and the interim order granted by this court on 26-03-2024 stands vacated. The writ petition stands dismissed and the interim order granted by this court on 26-03-2024 stands vacated. How ever, there shall be no order as to costs and miscellaneous petitions stand dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Writ Petition, shall stand closed.