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2025 DIGILAW 564 (CAL)

Sukumar Sarkar v. State of West Bengal

2025-09-09

SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, UDAY KUMAR

body2025
Judgment : Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. 1. The present appeal arises out of the dismissal of a writ petition filed by the appellants challenging the treatment of the subject-land as an acquired land by the State and for consequential reliefs. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellants purchased the subject-plot by several deeds between the years 2019 and 2023. The concerned plots of land have all along been recorded in the Records of Rights in the name of the vendor/predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, who is respondent no. 10 in the present appeal. The appellants allege that an office was set up unlawfully by the PWD at a corner of the said plot, apparently during construction of an adjacent road, and a hotel has also been constructed illegally in a portion of the subject-plot under a Government project. 3. Upon purchase, the appellants approached the concerned Block Land and Land Development Officer (BL & LRO), Shantipur, Nadia, as well as the SDL & LRO for deletion of the recording of “PWD Road” from the 'Remark's column of the Records of Rights. However, when the appellant no.1 approached the office of the concerned BL & LRO on February 11, 2025, the said appellant was informed that a suo motu proceeding had been initiated by the BL & LRO at the instance of the PWD bearing Miscellaneous Case No.02 of 2025/STB and by an order dated January 20, 2025, a direction was issued for deleting the names of the original owner from the Records of Rights as raiyats and, instead, to record the name of the PWD as raiyat. The appellants, upon obtaining a copy of the order of correction of the Records of Rights, found out that the apparent basis of the same was the publication of two Notifications, respectively under Sections 4 and 6 of the LAND ACQUISITION ACT (for short, “the LA Act”), in the years 1946 and 1949. 4. The learned Single Judge, proceeding on the premise that an appeal had already been preferred by the appellants under Section 51A (5) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1955 Act”), dismissed the writ petition by observing that the appellants would not be prevented from approaching the appropriate forum for ventilating their grievance with the self-same reliefs. 5. 5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants contends that the learned Single Judge proceeded on the fundamental misconception that an appeal had been preferred under Section 51A (5) of the 1955 Act, since no such appeal had at all been preferred at any point of time. 6. Secondly, it is argued that the reliefs sought in the writ petition attempt to hit at the very premise of the order of the BL & LRO, that is, the land had been acquired by the State. The factum of publication of the two Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the LA Act was disclosed for the first time before the BL & LRO, on the basis of which such direction was passed by the latter. However, it is argued that even if such Notifications were issued, the entire acquisition proceeding would have lapsed by operation of Section 11A of the LA Act. 7. Learned senior counsel further argues that no notice of the suo motu proceeding before the BL & LRO was ever served on the appellants or their vendor and, as such, the order of the BL & LRO is vitiated due to violation of the principle of Audi Alteram Partem. By placing reliance on Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai and others , reported at (1998) 8 SCC 1 , it is contended that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. 8. By placing further reliance on State Bank of India v. Rajesh Agarwal and others , reported at (2023) 6 SCC 1 , it is argued that Audi Alteram Partem has several facets, including the service of notice to any person against whom a prejudicial order may be passed and providing an opportunity to explain the evidence collected. Violation of such principle, it is argued, is amenable to judicial review by the Constitutional Courts. 9. Even Section 51A (4) of the 1955 Act, it is submitted, mandates a prior notice to be served on persons interested before any alteration or correction is effected in the Records of Rights. 10. Violation of such principle, it is argued, is amenable to judicial review by the Constitutional Courts. 9. Even Section 51A (4) of the 1955 Act, it is submitted, mandates a prior notice to be served on persons interested before any alteration or correction is effected in the Records of Rights. 10. It is contended that the appellants and/or their predecessor-in-interest had written to several authorities, including the BL & LRO as well as the SDL & LRO and the Special Land Acquisition Officer, seeking information under the Right to Information Act as to whether the land had been acquired. In reply thereto, all the said authorities had categorically given out that the plot-in-question was never acquired by the State. 11. As such, the appellants argue that the very premise of the order of the BL & LRO is bad. It is contended that the scope of the present challenge is to the treatment of the land as an acquired land under the LA Act, which is not a ,Specified Act' under the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred as “the 1997 Act”), and the order of the BL & LRO has not been directly assailed in the writ petition, since if it is declared that the land was never acquired, the very basis of the correction of the Records of Rights would be eliminated, rendering the same a nullity. Thus, the concept of availability of equally efficacious alternative remedy is not applicable to the present case. It is argued that thus, the impugned judgment ought to be set aside. 12. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no.10, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants/erstwhile owner, submits that several State authorities at various levels have all along stated that the land had not been acquired. Due search was conducted in that regard, which yielded a similar outcome. Hence, the State cannot now resile and claim that the land-in-question was acquired by it. 13. Learned senior counsel cites three unreported co-ordinate Bench judgments of this Court respectively in the matter of The State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Dilip Ghosh & Ors. [MAT 464 of 2018], The State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Bivash Chandra Sarkar & Ors. [MAT 358 of 2018], and The State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Mahadeb Khan & Ors. v. Dilip Ghosh & Ors. [MAT 464 of 2018], The State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Bivash Chandra Sarkar & Ors. [MAT 358 of 2018], and The State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Mahadeb Khan & Ors. [MAT 1181 of 2019] for the proposition that in event the timeline stipulated in Section 11A of the LA Act is not adhered to, the entire proceeding for acquisition of the land shall lapse. 14. Learned Additional Government Pleader (AGP), appearing on behalf of the State, argues that in an acquisition proceeding, the land vests in the State as soon as a Notification under Section 4 (1) of the LA Act is published. Land once vested cannot be divested. In support of such proposition, learned AGP cites Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. v. Deepak Aggarwal & Ors., reported at (2023) 6 SCC 512 . Learned AGP also relies on Indore Development Authority (LAPSE-5 J.) v. Manoharlal & Ors., reported at (2020) 8 SCC 129 for the proposition that any transfer of a land after issuance of a notification under Section 4 (1) of the LA Act is void. Thus, the transfers in favour of the appellants were void ab initio. 15. Learned AGP further argues that even if no appeal was preferred under Section 51A (5), the appropriate remedy for the appellants was such an appeal. In the garb of the present writ petition, the appellants have challenged the order of the BL & LRO, which is not permissible in law. Learned AGP cites L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., reported at (1997) 3 SCC 261 for the proposition that it is the Tribunal which has the power to adjudicate on disputes which it is empowered to adjudicate. The power of judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are excluded by operation of the 1997 Act. Even questions of vires of a statute, unless the statute pertains to the constitution of the Tribunal itself, are to be adjudicated by the Tribunal. A challenge against the same lies only before a Division Bench of this Court. Thus, in any event, the learned Single Judge before whom the writ petition was filed, did not have the jurisdiction to decide such disputes. Hence, the impugned order was justified. 16. A challenge against the same lies only before a Division Bench of this Court. Thus, in any event, the learned Single Judge before whom the writ petition was filed, did not have the jurisdiction to decide such disputes. Hence, the impugned order was justified. 16. Learned AGP next argues that the original owner of the property as well as the appellants kept silent for the prolonged period from 1949 onwards, when the Notification under Section 6 of the LA Act was published, without assailing the same before any competent forum. The publication of such Notification is deemed to be public notice of the acquisition process and, as such, knowledge of the same was attributable to the land-owner from the date of its publication. As such, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of such delay alone. 17. In the absence of any specific challenge to the order of the BL & LRO, it is argued, the relief sought in the writ petition could not be granted. 18. Learned AGP further points out that it is apparent from the orders of the BL & LRO in the proceeding under Section 51A (4) of the 1955 Act, that service had already been effected on all interested persons. Thus, it is argued that the present challenge is frivolous and ought to be turned down. 19. On the basis of the materials on record and the arguments advanced by the parties, the following questions fall for consideration before this court: (i) Whether Section 51A (5) of the 1955 Act operates as a bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction in the facts of the case; (ii) Whether the State can claim that the disputed plots of land were vested in it by dint of acquisition under the LA Act; (iii) Whether the delay in preferring a challenge to the acquisition defeats the writ petition; (iv) Whether the principle of Audi Alteram Partem was violated in the BL & LRO passing an order directing rectification of the Records of Rights in the name of the PWD. 20. The above issues are decided as follows: (i) Whether Section 51A (5) of the 1955 Act operates as a bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction in the facts of the case 21. 20. The above issues are decided as follows: (i) Whether Section 51A (5) of the 1955 Act operates as a bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction in the facts of the case 21. In Whirlpool Corporation (supra) 1 , the Supreme Court observed that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. Under Article 226, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. Although the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the alternative remedy has been consistently held by the Supreme Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. Despite the Tribunal being vested with almost similar powers, the Constitutional power of judicial review by High Courts are not absolutely barred. 22. In the present case, the writ petitioners/appellants allege the violation of the principle of Audi Alteram Partem inasmuch as the BL & LRO, before passing the order of rectification of the Records of Rights, did not issue any notice to the appellants. The appellants rely on State Bank of v. Rajesh Agarwal (supra) 2 to argue that in such cases, the aggrieved party is entitled to challenge a violation of the rule of natural justice by way of judicial review. 23. A careful perusal of the reliefs sought in the writ petition clearly shows that the same does not assail the order of the BL & LRO recording the disputed plot in the name of the PWD, although one of the components of the cause of action for the writ petition was the knowledge of the appellants of such order, wherefrom the State's claim of the disputed land having been acquired first came to light. If such an order was directly challenged, the provision of appeal under Section 51A (5) of the 1955 Act would have squarely been attracted. If such an order was directly challenged, the provision of appeal under Section 51A (5) of the 1955 Act would have squarely been attracted. The writ petition assails the very root of the premise of the order of the BL & LRO. If allowed, the reliefs sought in the writ petition would take away the very basis of the order of the BL & LRO and, consequentially, negate the same. 24. The writ petition does not per se challenge the order of the BL & LRO but is on a more fundamental premise - challenging the stand of the State that the disputed plot as an acquired land. Such relief, if granted, would not come within the purview of the 1955 Act but would enter into the domain of the LA Act, which is not one of the ,Specified Acts' enumerated in the 1997 Act. Hence, the hierarchy of appeals provided in the 1997 Act, read with the 1955 Act, would not apply. 25. This court is conscious of the fact that if an appeal was to be preferred against the order of the BL & LRO, the same would be under Section 51A (5) of the 1955 Act which would then be amenable to a challenge before the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal. An aggrieved party against an order passed by the Tribunal would then have to approach a Division Bench of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 26. Thus, if the order of the BL & LRO was challenged, the appellants would be jumping two forums – first, the Appellate Authority and secondly, the Tribunal. The learned Single Judge taking up the writ application would then have to usurp the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which, in turn would be amenable to a challenge before a Division Bench of this Court only. Thus, in such an event, a judicial anarchy might have resulted, thereby precluding the learned Single Judge from entertaining the writ petition. 27. However, such logic is not applicable to the writ petition, in its present form, for the reasons indicated above. Since it is not the order of the BL & LRO but the treatment of the land by the State as an acquired land has been assailed in the writ petition, the same does not come within the appellate regime under the 1997 Act. 28. Since it is not the order of the BL & LRO but the treatment of the land by the State as an acquired land has been assailed in the writ petition, the same does not come within the appellate regime under the 1997 Act. 28. Hence, in its present form, the writ petition was very much maintainable before the learned Single Judge, since Section 51A (5) of the 1955 Act would not operate as a bar to the writ jurisdiction being invoked. 29. This issue, thus, is decided in the negative and in favour of the appellants. (ii) Whether the State can claim that the disputed plots of land were vested in it by dint of acquisition under the LA Act 30. To decide the above issue, even proceeding on the premise that there were two previous Notifications, respectively under Section 4 and Section 6 of the LA Act in the years 1946 and 1949, the effect of such Notifications is required to be considered. Learned AGP has placed reliance on Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. (supra) 3 for the proposition that an acquired property vests in the State immediately upon publication of a Notification under Section 4 of the LA Act. however, the reliance on the aforesaid decision in that regard is entirely misplaced. 31. The Supreme Court, in Paragraph No. 31 of the said report, categorically observed that a Notification under Section 4 is a “foundation” for the acquisition of land. The very expression “foundation” unerringly indicates that such Notification does not conclusively vest the land in the State but is merely the initiation of the proceeding for acquisition. 32. In Paragraph No. 39 of the said judgment, the Supreme formulated the question as to whether a Notification under Section 4 of the LA Act would survive/continue even after the promulgation of the Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013 (for short, “the 2013 Act”) on and from January 1, 2014. Thus, it is the said question, in the context of the interplay between the LA Act and the 2013 Act, which was answered by the Supreme Court in the cited judgment. Thus, it is the said question, in the context of the interplay between the LA Act and the 2013 Act, which was answered by the Supreme Court in the cited judgment. Hence, in any event, the said judgment cannot be construed to be a precedent with regard to the question which have fallen for consideration in the present proceeding, that is, whether a Notification under Section 4 or Section 6 of the LA Act would conclusively vest the land in the State. 33. While considering the interplay of the LA Act and the 2013 Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the LA Act procedure would travel up to the determination of compensation, after which the operation of the 2013 Act would take over. Thus, the Supreme Court was considering a scenario where there is a valid subsisting acquisition proceeding pending under the LA Act at the juncture when the 2013 Act came into force. In such cases, it was observed, the proceeding under the LA Act would not automatically lapse due to the enactment of the 2013 Act but would continue up to the stage of determination of compensation. The determination of compensation, however, would be governed by the 2013 Act. 34. In fact, in Paragraph Nos. 43 to 45 of the said report, the Supreme Court poses a question as to whether a Notification under Section 4 or Section 6 of the LA Act would be the “initiation” of proceedings under the 2013 Act and answers it in the affirmative. Hence, the said judgment is a precedent on the above questions and does not have any bearing on the issues at hand in the present case. the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred as “the 1997 Act”). 35. Although, while considering previous judgments, it was remarked that no sale would be permitted after issuance of a Notification under Section 4 of the LA Act, the same was rendered in the context of an acquisition proceeding which duly culminated in vesting, in which case, such vesting would retrospectively preclude any transfer in the interregnum. However, such finding does not per se purport to mean that the land-in-question automatically vests in the State with the Notification under Section 4 . 36. Looking at the scheme of the LA Act, a Notification under Section 4 is merely the initiation of the acquisition proceeding. However, such finding does not per se purport to mean that the land-in-question automatically vests in the State with the Notification under Section 4 . 36. Looking at the scheme of the LA Act, a Notification under Section 4 is merely the initiation of the acquisition proceeding. Even the caption of the said Section terms the publication to be a “preliminary” notification, to be followed by a hearing of the objections raised by the interested parties under Section 5A of the LA Act, which is the first stage of hearing and determination. Only thereafter, a declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act would be published, which would merely indicate that the land is required for a public purpose. 37. As per Section 7 of the LA Act, the Collector is then to take an order for acquisition, whereupon, under Section 8, the land is to be marked out, measured and planned. Upon completion of the above formalities, a notice under Section 9 has to be issued to persons interested and a second round of hearing is conducted. 38. Thereafter, Section 11 of the Act contemplates an enquiry and award of compensation by the Collector. 39. The acquisition proceedings ultimately culminate only upon possession of the land being taken by the State after the Collector makes an award under Section 11. Section 16 of the LA Act stipulates that only upon such possession being taken, the land vests absolutely in the Government, free from all incumbrances. Thus, the vesting occurs not at the stage of initiation of the proceedings under Section 4 of the LA Act, but only upon culmination of the acquisition proceedings by possession being taken after publication of the award, within the contemplation of Section 16 of the LA Act. 40. Sub-section (1) of Section 11(a) provides that the Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within the period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration (under Section 6 ) and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings of the acquisition for land shall lapse (emphasis supplied). 40. Sub-section (1) of Section 11(a) provides that the Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within the period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration (under Section 6 ) and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings of the acquisition for land shall lapse (emphasis supplied). However, it is the proviso to the said sub-section which is applicable in the present case, which provides that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. 41. Section 11A was introduced by the 1984 Amendment to the LA Act with effect from September 24, 1984. Thus, the statutory outer limit of two years expired on or about September 23, 1986. Thus, the entire proceedings of the acquisition of land lapsed on that date by operation of law. 42. Another eventuality is envisaged under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (in brief, “the 1948 Act”). Section 3 of the 1948 Act provides for requisition of a land by the State Government if it is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas or for providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage, or for the creation of better living conditions in rural or urban areas, not being an industrial or other areas excluded by the State Government by a notification in this behalf, by the construction or reconstruction of dwelling places in such areas, or for purpose connected therewith or incidental thereto. 43. Section 4 (1a) of the 1948 Act stipulates that the State Government may acquire any land requisitioned under Section 3 by publishing a notice in the Official Gazette that such land is required for a public purpose referred to in sub-section (1) of . 44. 43. Section 4 (1a) of the 1948 Act stipulates that the State Government may acquire any land requisitioned under Section 3 by publishing a notice in the Official Gazette that such land is required for a public purpose referred to in sub-section (1) of . 44. Under sub-section (2) of Section 4 , where a notice as aforesaid is published in the Official Gazette, the requisitioned land shall, on and from the beginning of the day on which the notice is so published, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all incumbrances and the period of requisition of such land shall end. 45. By virtue of the West Bengal Amendment of 1997, with effect from May2, 1997, Section 9 of the LA Act was amended to introduce sub- sections (3A) and (3B), whereby notice is to be given to persons interested, to the effect that possession of the land has been taken and inviting claims for compensation for the purpose of passing an award, in cases where requisition and possession under Section 3 of the 1948 Act has already taken place. 46. The second proviso to Section 11A of the LA Act, also added by dint of the West Bengal Amendment Act of 1997, pertains to acquisition of land referred to sub-section (3A) and sub-section (3B) of Section 9 , in which case, the award shall be made within a period of two years from the date of the issue of public notice under Section 9 . 47. Thus, in a requisition scenario under the 1948 Act, the requisitioned land vests absolutely in the State Government simultaneously with the publication of a notice of acquisition in the Official Gazette under Section 4 (1a) of the 1948 Act, by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the said Act. Even if the subsequent timeline for passing the award lapses, an already vested land cannot be divested and reverted back to the original raiyat. 48. In the present case, however, the stage of Section 9 notice was never reached. The acquisition process was a still-born baby, being stultified at the stage of declaration under Section 6 itself in the year 1949. There is not an iota of evidence to show that the acquisition proceedings proceeded any further after declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act, 1949. 49. The acquisition process was a still-born baby, being stultified at the stage of declaration under Section 6 itself in the year 1949. There is not an iota of evidence to show that the acquisition proceedings proceeded any further after declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act, 1949. 49. Also, the State has not made out any case, at any stage and before any forum, that the land was requisitioned under Section 3 of the 1948 Act and possession thereof was taken or that any notice under Section 4 (1a) was published in the Official Gazette. Moreover, the names of the original owners were all through recorded in the Records of Rights as 'raiyats' in the appropriate column and only in the 'Remark's column, the PWD's occupation of a corner of the plot was mentioned. Neither the status of PWD vis-à-vis the land was mentioned, nor was the name of PWD recorded as a raiyat or joint raiyat. 50. Thus, by operation of the original (first) proviso to Section 11A LA Act, the entire proceeding for the acquisition of the disputed land stood lapsed in any event even if there was such a declaration under Section6. 51. Hence, the State's argument that the land has already vested in the State and could not be divested is not tenable in the eye of law. 52. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the appellants and against the respondent-Authorities. The disputed lands never vested in the State Government and/or were acquired at any point of time. (iii) Whether the delay in preferring a challenge to the acquisition defeats the writ petition 53. The State argues that in view of the delay in preferring the challenge against the acquisition process, counting the delay from 1949, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed. However, such argument is palpably contrary to the records. 54. The erstwhile owner and/or the appellants have repeatedly approached the concerned authorities seeking information regarding any purported acquisition. 55. The Records of Rights, before being unlawfully amended by the BL &LRO, all along showed the erstwhile owners as the raiyats in respect of the property. Only in the Remarks Column it was recorded that on the north-eastern corner of the land there is a PWD Office. 56. 55. The Records of Rights, before being unlawfully amended by the BL &LRO, all along showed the erstwhile owners as the raiyats in respect of the property. Only in the Remarks Column it was recorded that on the north-eastern corner of the land there is a PWD Office. 56. Coupled with the above recordings, we find that by a query under the Right to Information Act dated February 20, 2018, the erstwhile owners specifically enquired as to whether the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer had acquired any share or portion of the disputed plot. The written reply thereto, dated March 7, 2018, was categorical –that there was no such available case record pertaining to acquisition of the land-in-question was lying in the department of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Nadia. 57. Again, a similar query was made to the office of the BL & LRO, Shantipur itself on March 13, 2018. In no uncertain terms, by its written reply dated June 28, 2018, the BL & LRO informed the learned advocate of the erstwhile owners that the disputed plot is a raiyati land and the total land is “obviously a private land”. In fact, it was stated that the recording of “PWD Office” in the Remarks Column was related to BL & LRO godown No. 1910 and all the other plots contain the same remark due to the LR Software System. The BL & LRO went so far as to request the erstwhile owners to apply for the deletion of the words from the Remarks Column to the office of the undersigned, that is, the office of the BL & LRO itself. 58. Again, a similar query was made on August 13, 2019 to the Secretary of the Nadia Zilla Parishad, which has purportedly erected a hotel by the name “Pather Sathi” in a portion of the plots-in-question. 59. The Secretary, Nadia Zilla Parishad wrote to the Project Director, DRDC Nadia and the Executive Engineer, PWD, Government of West Bengal, Nadia Construction Division, enquiring about the construction of such hotel and asking for necessary action from the end of the addressee of the communication, with a request to submit a report to the Secretary. 59. The Secretary, Nadia Zilla Parishad wrote to the Project Director, DRDC Nadia and the Executive Engineer, PWD, Government of West Bengal, Nadia Construction Division, enquiring about the construction of such hotel and asking for necessary action from the end of the addressee of the communication, with a request to submit a report to the Secretary. In reply thereto, the Additional District Magistrate and DL & LRO, Nadia submitted a report which categorically recorded, upon enquiry, that on the north-eastern corner of the plot there is an office of the PWD and in another portion of the plot there is a pucca hotel by the name of “Pather Sathi”. It was further mentioned in the report that the said property was private and the present raiyat, that is the vendor of the present appellants, was the owner of the property. 60. On July 27, 2020, the DL & LRO wrote to the Executive Engineer, PWD, Government of West Bengal, indicating that the LR Plot information, the concerned plot is recorded in the Raiyati Khatian. 61. We find from the records that the DL & LRO wrote to the Secretary, Nadia Zilla Parishad on July 16, 2021, asserting for the first time that the PWD had produced some document regarding acquisition of some plots in the concerned Mouza for the construction of the old National Highway which remains in the sheet but failed to produce any document regarding acquisition of the plot-in-question and that the said plot is situated in the same alignment of the PWD road. 62. It was further stated therein that “since the recorded raiyats never raised any complaint prior to the petition”, steps be taken to correct the Records of Rights. Such communication ultimately prompted the BL & LRO to start a suo motu proceeding and alter the Records of Rights in the name of the PWD. 63. Thus, it is evident that the BL & LRO, that is, the self-same authority which altered the Records of Rights in the name of the PWD, thereby changing the long-standing recording in the name of the erstwhile owners as raiyats, himself had furnished information to the erstwhile owners that the land had not been acquired at any point of time. 64. 64. For the first time, when the appellants approached the appropriate authorities for recording their own names on the strength of their purchase of the plot-in-question, it was disclosed that the BL & LRO, at the behest of the PWD, had initiated suo motu proceedings and had altered the Records of Rights on the patently erroneous basis that the land was acquired by the State, which is belied even by the information furnished by the BL & LRO, even apart from several other authorities (including the appellate authority, that is, the DL & LRO), earlier to the contrary. 65. The Special Land Acquisition Officer has filed a report in the form of an affidavit in connection with the present appeal. Even in Clause (f) of Paragraph 3 thereof, it is categorically admitted that no record is available pertaining to the acquisition proceeding and it is difficult to get such records after a lapse of more than 17 years save and except the Gazette Notification [referring to the Notifications under Section 4 (1)and Section 6 of the LA Act of 1946 and 1949 respectively]. 66. Hence, we see that all along the disputed plots were recorded in the name of the erstwhile owner, that is, the vendor of the present appellants, and all concerned authorities, including the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the BL & LRO and the DL & LRO, that is the appellate authority, specifically furnished information in writing to the effect that the disputed plot had never been acquired. 67. In fact, the BL & LRO even advised the appellants to make an appropriate application for correction of the Records of Rights to itself, for the purpose of deletion of the name of the PWD from the records. Subsequently, however, the BL & LRO did a volte face and altered the Records of Rights by initiating suo motu proceedings. 68. In the above backdrop, there arose no occasion whatsoever for the appellants to apprehend any acquisition of the land at any point of time. Rather, the contrary was given out by all authorities, including the BL & LRO Office itself. Immediately upon coming to know from the authorities about the stand of the State, as disclosed in the order of the BL & LRO, that the land had been acquired, the appellants moved the writ petition. Hence, there does not arise any question of delay. 69. Immediately upon coming to know from the authorities about the stand of the State, as disclosed in the order of the BL & LRO, that the land had been acquired, the appellants moved the writ petition. Hence, there does not arise any question of delay. 69. The reliance of the State on Indore Development Authority (supra) 4 is utterly misplaced. In fact, in the said judgment, it was observed by the Supreme Court that vesting occurs only upon possession being taken under Section 16 of the LA Act (Paragraph No. 256). Again, in Paragraph No. 349 of the report, it was held that the High Court has power to set aside Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the LA Act, unless possession has been taken and the land has vested in the State. 70. Thus, the contention of the State that the writ petition ought to have dismissed on the ground of delay is hereby turned down. (iv) Whether the principle of Audi Alteram Partem was violated in the BL & LRO passing an order directing rectification of the Records of Rights in the name of the PWD 71. On the question of whether notice of the suo motu proceeding before the BL & LRO was served on the appellants, despite the appellants having categorically disputed the service of such notice in the writ petition, no rebuttal proof whatsoever has been produced by the respondents of such notice having actually been served. 72. The BL & LRO, in the order dated January 20, 2025, merely recorded as follows: “SR filed with CR”. From such cryptic observation, even construing “SR” to be “Service Return”, neither the names of the notices nor the outcome of such service is borne out. From the said order, it appears at best that notices were sent through registered post and the service returns were filed with the case records; however, there is no indication as to whether the owner (vendor of the appellants) or the appellants were served with notice. None appeared for the present appellants/respondents or the original owner in the proceedings, which also strengthens the apprehension of non-service. None appeared for the present appellants/respondents or the original owner in the proceedings, which also strengthens the apprehension of non-service. Thus, in the absence of any proof of notice or any conclusive recording by the BL & LRO as to service of notice having been effected on the appellants or their vendor, the allegation of the appellants that no service was effected has to be accepted by application of the doctrine of non- traverse, since the respondents have failed to produce any document to controvert such allegation either before the writ court or before this court in appeal. 73. Accordingly, we arrive at the finding that the order of the BL & LRO was vitiated due to violation of the doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem and, as such, going by the principles laid down in State Bank of v. Rajesh Agarwal (supra) 5 , this Court ought to have intervened under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, since the proceeding itself was vitiated and non est in the eye of law, being not in consonance with the governing provision of law, that is, Section 51A (4) of the 1955 Act. Thus, the order of the BL & LRO dated January 20, 2025, being based on a palpably erroneous premise that the land was acquired, and also being vitiated by non-service of notice, violates the provisions of Section 51A (4) itself which mandates opportunity of hearing being given to the persons interested before revising an entry in the Records of Rights. 74. In view of the violation of Section 51A (4), the order passed purportedly under the said provision cannot truly be said to be such an order at all. Thus, the remedy of appeal under Section 51A (5) would be illusory and would not furnish equally efficacious alternative relief as opposed to a writ petition, since no opportunity was given to the appellants or their vendor to place their case and their version would not be available in the records at all. 75. On such ground as well, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, holding the writ petition to be not maintainable and relegating the appellants to the “appropriate forum”, is erroneous in law. CONCLUSION 76. 75. On such ground as well, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, holding the writ petition to be not maintainable and relegating the appellants to the “appropriate forum”, is erroneous in law. CONCLUSION 76. Over and above our earlier findings on the relevant issues involved, in any event, it is palpable that the very premise of the impugned order was bad, since, contrary to the finding of the learned Single Judge, no appeal had admittedly been preferred by the appellants under Section 51A (5) of the 1955 Act against the order dated January 20, 2025 passed by the BL & LRO at all. 77. Even otherwise, since the relief sought in the writ petition could not be granted by any authority under the 1955 Act and hits at the very basis of the order passed by the BL & LRO, the provisions of the 1997 Act would not be applicable at all. The finding of availability of alternative remedy to the appellants, in the impugned order, is thus erroneous. 78. Accordingly, the impugned order cannot be sustained. The reliefs sought by the writ petitioners/appellants ought to have been granted in their favour, since no proof of acquisition of the plot-in-question by the State Government has come on record at any stage and even if any Notification under Section 4 and/or Section 6 of the LA Act were issued respectively in the years 1946 and 1949, the entire acquisition proceedings have lapsed by operation of the proviso to Section 11A of the LA Act. 79. As a necessary corollary, the order of the BL & LRO dated January 20, 2025 cannot also be sustained. 80. Thus, F.M.A. No. 1243 of 2025 is allowed on contest, thereby setting aside the impugned judgment dated May 23, 2025 passed in WPA No. 11125 of 2025 as well as the Order dated January 20, 2025 passed by the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer, Shantipur at Fulia, Nadia, in Miscellaneous Case No. 02 of 2025/STB. 81. It is hereby declared that the respondents cannot claim or proceed on the premise that the subject land was acquired and/or vested in the State at any point of time. Any consequential action taken on the premise that the said land was acquired is hereby automatically annulled and revoked. 82. As a consequence, CAN 1 of 2025 is also dismissed. 83. Any consequential action taken on the premise that the said land was acquired is hereby automatically annulled and revoked. 82. As a consequence, CAN 1 of 2025 is also dismissed. 83. There will be no order as costs. 84. Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of due formalities. I agree. (Uday Kumar, J.)