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2025 DIGILAW 565 (HP)

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ashok Kumar

2025-04-01

SUSHIL KUKREJA, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2025
JUDGMENT : Sushil Kukreja, J. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the impugned judgment dated 31.03.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., whereby the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 366, 376, 120B and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”). 2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the prosecution story, can be summarized as under: 2(a). The prosecutrix (name withheld) had only passed 3 rd standard and when she was three months old her mother had expired. The mother of the prosecutrix had expired and her father was admitted in a hospital, as both of his legs got fractured. The prosecutrix was brought up by her maternal grand-mother and her maternal grand-father had also expired. The grand-mother of the prosecutrix could not bear the expenses of her studies, therefore, she could not continue her studies, however, she used to reside with her maternal grand-mother. 2(b). It has come in the prosecution story that during the year 2009 one Bimla (wife of accused Vias Dev) visited the house of the maternal grand-mother of the prosecutrix and advised that the government had opened a stitching centre in her house and the prosecutrix might learn stitching. The prosecutrix was admitted in the stitching centre. It has further come in the prosecution story that Bimla’s daughter was married to the brother of accused Ashok Kumar, who also used to visit the stitching centre. Bimla and accused Vias Dev used to induce the prosecutrix to do the job of maid in the house of accused Ashok Kumar. When the prosecutrix used to attend the stitching centre, accused Thakari Devi alongwith her son accused Ashok Kumar came to the house of accused Vias Dev for taking the prosecutrix to her house, as maid. The prosecutrix accompanied accused Thakri and Ashok Kumar to their house to work as a maid. On the subsequent day, when she was asleep in a separate room, accused came there around 9/10 p.m. and committed forcible sexual intercourse with her against her consent. The prosecutrix raised hue and cry, but no one paid any heed. The prosecutrix accompanied accused Thakri and Ashok Kumar to their house to work as a maid. On the subsequent day, when she was asleep in a separate room, accused came there around 9/10 p.m. and committed forcible sexual intercourse with her against her consent. The prosecutrix raised hue and cry, but no one paid any heed. The prosecutrix narrated the incident to the parents of accused Ashok Kumar, who only consoled her, and accused Thakari and Jodha Ram told her that lodging of report with the police would be of no use. The parents of accused Ashok Kumar induced the prosecutrix by saying that she would be accepted as their daughter-in-law and soon marriage would be solemnized. Being swayed by the accused persons and considering her own circumstances, the prosecutrix started living in the house of Thakari Devi. Thus, the prosecutrix stayed there under the belief that she would be treated as the wife of accused Ashok Kumar who too continued to have sexual intercourse with her, representing himself as the husband of the prosecutrix. 2(c). The prosecutrix was made to believe by the accused that soon their marriage would be entered in the panchayat record and she was also allured by him that whenever she would conceive and give birth to a child, good education would be given to the child. Later on, the prosecutrix conceived and accused Ashok Kumar left for Baddi for the job. Whenever, accused Ashok Kumar used to visit his house, he used to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. Thereafter, accused Ashok Kumar started beating her and demanding dowry and Thakari Devi used to abuse her on the pretext that she had not brought enough dowry. Thereafter, a girl child was born and instead of accepting the child, the parents of accused Ashok Kumar started maltreating the prosecutrix and she was asked to leave their house with the new born child. The maternal grand-mother of the prosecutrix had also expired, therefore, with a new born child she had no other option, but to continue to live there. However, ultimately, due to the changed behavior of the parents of accused Ashok Kumar, the prosecutrix came to the house of her maternal grand-mother where one Devli also joined her. The parents of accused Ashok Kumar threatened her not to return to their house without dowry, failing which she would be killed with the child. 2(d). However, ultimately, due to the changed behavior of the parents of accused Ashok Kumar, the prosecutrix came to the house of her maternal grand-mother where one Devli also joined her. The parents of accused Ashok Kumar threatened her not to return to their house without dowry, failing which she would be killed with the child. 2(d). The prosecutrix was asked by the daughter of her maternal grand-mother qua the birth of child and she told her that she would not be accepted with the child, as she had no means to raise the child. Accused, Ashok Kumar, on being contacted by the prosecutrix, asked for dowry and flatly refused to take her along. 2(e). On the advice of the son-in-law of grand-mother, the prosecutrix came to Chamba and filed a complaint before Deputy Commissioner, Chamba, who, in turn advised her to file a complaint before Deputy Superintendent of Police, Salooni, Thereafter, the prosecutrix came to Salooni with her uncle and made a complaint before Deputy Superintendent of Police, Salooni, and she was assured that soon action would be taken. Thereafter, accused Ashok Kumar alongwith other persons came to the place of the prosecutrix and requested her to accompany them with the infant and not to lodge any report against them anywhere, but, she, having no trust on them, refused. Subsequently, on the asking of accused persons, the prosecutrix was called with her aunt by Shri Ami Chand, the then Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Bhadela and a compromise was arrived at whereby it was agreed that accused would not maltreat the prosecutrix and they would treat her with respect as their daughter- in-law and accused Ashok Kumar would also treat her as his wife and the infant would be accepted as new born daughter. However, after a week, accused Ashok Kumar and his parents again started maltreating the prosecutrix. After the fortnight, accused Ashok Kumar went to Baddi and he assured the prosecutrix that during his next visit he would take her along after making arrangements. Thereafter, the prosecutrix reported the matter to the police qua a quarrel with her and she also contacted accused Ashok Kumar and asked him to take her to Baddi. On the subsequent day, the prosecutrix was advised by the parents of accused Ashok Kumar to leave their house and stay with her aunt in the house of her maternal grand-mother for some time. On the subsequent day, the prosecutrix was advised by the parents of accused Ashok Kumar to leave their house and stay with her aunt in the house of her maternal grand-mother for some time. As accused Ashok Kumar assured the prosecutrix to take her to Baddi, she alongwith her infant left the house of the parents of accused Ashok Kumar. However, accused Ashok Kumar failed to take the prosecutrix to Baddi and she continued to live in the house of her maternal grand-mother for about three months. In the interregnum, the prosecurtrix contacted accused Ashok Kumar many times, but he threatened her and did not come to take her. Ultimately, the prosecurtrix approached Pradhan Ami Chand, who called both the parties and also requested accused Ashok Kumar to take the prosecutrix alongwith the infant, but he expressed displeasure. Thus, the matter was again reported to the police, whereupon FIR was registered. 2(f). Police, during the course of investigation, prepared the spot map, got medically examined the prosecutrix, got conducted DNA test of accused Ashok Kumar, wherein he was found to be biological father of the infant, and recorded the statements of the prosecution witnesses. After completion of the investigation, police presented the challan in the learned Trial Court. 3. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined eleven witnesses. Statements of the accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded, wherein they pleaded not guilty and claimed innocence. 4. The learned Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 31.03.2014 acquitted the all the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 366, 376, 120B and 506 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, hence the instant appeal preferred by the appellant/State. 5. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State contended that the impugned judgment is against the law and facts, based upon surmises and conjectures, thus liable to set-aside. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in its right and true perspective, as such the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set-aside by allowing the instant appeal and the accused persons be convicted. 6. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in its right and true perspective, as such the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set-aside by allowing the instant appeal and the accused persons be convicted. 6. Conversely, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/accused persons contended that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is the result of proper appreciation of the material on record and the same was passed after appreciating the evidence and law in its right and true perspective. He has further contended that the learned Trial Court has passed a well reasoned judgment, which does not require any interference, thus the instant appeal, which is devoid of any merit, be dismissed. 7. We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/accused persons and carefully examined the entire records. 8. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 9. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another Vs. State of Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730 , which reads as under: "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... State of Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730 , which reads as under: "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , observed as under: “31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352 ] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse; (a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs.Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the prosecutrix, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. vs.Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the prosecutrix, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased prosecutrix was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99 ] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445 ] 31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice; (a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502 ] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ].” 11. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under: “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 13. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 13. The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it is always the burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence. In fact, it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused. 14. Now adverting to the facts of the case on hand. The first question which arises for consideration is as to what was the age of the prosecutrix at the relevant time. As per the statement of the prosecutrix, her date of birth was 30.08.1995 and she was brought up by her maternal grand-mother. She also deposed that when she was three months old, her mother had expired and when she was six months old, both the legs of her father got fractured and thereafter he was unable to walk without the help of crutches, therefore, she was brought up by her maternal grand-mother, as her maternal grand-father was not alive. She started going to the school at the age of six years. 15. PW-9, the father of the prosecutrix could not recall the date of birth of the prosecutrix. He deposed that when the prosecutrix was only six months old, his wife expired and after her death the prosecutrix was brought up by her maternal grand- mother. Therefore, no credence can be attached to his testimony regarding the date of birth of the prosecutrix, as he could not recollect her date of birth. 16. The date of birth of the prosecutrix, as mentioned in the School Leaving Certificate, Ex. PW-3/B, is 30.10.1995. PW-3 the then Head Master, Government Primary School, deposed that the entry in School Leaving Certificate of the prosecutrix was made at the time of her admission on the basis of birth certificate issued from the Panchayat. In his cross-examination he feigned ignorance as to whether the birth entry in the certificate issued from the Panchayat was based on the pariwar register or birth and death register. 17. In his cross-examination he feigned ignorance as to whether the birth entry in the certificate issued from the Panchayat was based on the pariwar register or birth and death register. 17. The prosecutrix in her cross-examination admitted that her date of birth was disclosed in the school at the time of the admission by her maternal grand-mother. The father of the prosecutrix also admitted that at the time of the admission in the school the prosecutrix was accompanied by her maternal grand- mother. Since the prosecutrix was accompanied by her maternal grand-mother to the school at the time of her admission, as stated by her father, therefore, it can be concluded that the date of birth, i.e., 30.10.1995, as mentioned in the School Leaving Certificate, Ex. PW-3/B, had been disclosed by her maternal grand-mother at the time of her admission. It has come in the evidence on record that the maternal grand-mother of the prosecutrix was illiterate and an old lady. Therefore, it cannot be said with authenticity that she was aware about the date of birth of the prosecutrix. 18. The Investigating Officer, i.e. PW-11 ASI Jagdish Chand, stated in his cross-examination that in School Leaving Certificate, Ex.PW-3/B, there was no reference of birth and death register. As per his statement, birth and death register was not found in the office of CMO of the concerned Panchayat where the prosecutrix used to reside. Therefore, it has become clear that the School Leaving Certificate showing date of birth of the prosecutrix as 30.10.1995 is not based upon the birth and death register, as such the same is not conclusive evidence to establish the exact date of birth of the prosecutrix. 19. As observed earlier, PW-3 deposed that School Leaving Certificate was based upon the certificate issued from the Panchayat, but he feigned ignorance as to whether the birth entry in the certificate issued from the Panchayat was based upon the pariwar register or birth and death register. Therefore, no reliance can be placed upon the School Leaving Certificate, Ex. PW-3/B. 20. As per the prosecution story, radiological age of the prosecutrix was between 17 years and 19 years. PW-7 Dr. N.K. Surya, deposed that according to the ossification test, the age of the prosecutrix was found between 17 years and below 19 years, as per his opinion, Ex. PW-3/B. 20. As per the prosecution story, radiological age of the prosecutrix was between 17 years and 19 years. PW-7 Dr. N.K. Surya, deposed that according to the ossification test, the age of the prosecutrix was found between 17 years and below 19 years, as per his opinion, Ex. PW-7/B. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the ossification test is not conclusive proof for the determination of the age of the prosecutrix. He also admitted that the age of the prosecutrix, whose ossification test was conducted, might vary on the higher side as well as on the lower side. 21. It is well settled that ossification test though is a guiding factor for determining the age but it is not conclusive and leaves a margin of error of two years on either side. It is also a settled position that the benefit of doubt with regard to the age of the prosecutrix always goes in favour of the accused. In the instant case, the radiologist has assessed the age of the prosecutrix between 17 years and 19 years. Considering the margin of error in age even as one year, the victim would be 20 years of age during the relevant period. Even the prosecutrix, during her cross- examination, deposed that she had entered her age to be of 20 years in the OPD Card prepared at PHC, Salooni. 22. Therefore, in the absence of any conclusive proof about the age of the prosecutrix, it cannot be said that the she was below 18 years of age at the time of the alleged incident in the year 2009. The prosecution has, therefore, failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was below 18 years of age at the relevant time. 23. Now the next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. There is a catena of judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court wherein it has been held that only the deposition of the prosecutrix by itself is sufficient to record conviction for the offence of rape if that testimony inspires confidence and has complete link of truth. The prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice of the crime and there is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration on material particulars. 24. In Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State (2011) 7 SCC 130 Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: "31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, have already been projected hereinabove, would go to show that her evidence does not fall in that category and cannot be relied upon to hold the Appellant guilty of the said offences. 32. Indeed there are several significant variations in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section161 statement (Cr PC), FIR and deposition in Court. Thus, it was necessary to get her evidence corroborated independently, which they could have done either by examination of Ritu, her sister or Bimla Devi, who were present in the house at the time of her alleged abduction. Record shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a witness was not examined and later given up by the public prosecutor on the ground that she has been won over by the Appellant." 25. In Narender Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2012 (7) SCC 171 , it has been observed as under: “20. Record shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a witness was not examined and later given up by the public prosecutor on the ground that she has been won over by the Appellant." 25. In Narender Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2012 (7) SCC 171 , it has been observed as under: “20. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the Court as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix is a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.” 26. Similarly in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Babu Meena, (2013) 4 SCC 206 , it has been held as follows: "9. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr. Jain that the conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable and for that no corroboration is required. It has often been said that oral testimony can be classified into three categories, namely (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In case of wholly reliable testimony of a single witness, the conviction can be founded without corroboration. This principle applies with greater vigour in case the nature of offence is such that it is committed in seclusion. In case prosecution is based on wholly unreliable testimony of a single witness, the court has no option than to acquit the accused.”… … … 27. Keeping in mind the judgments as cited above, the testimony of prosecutrix has to be consistent and natural in line with the case of the prosecution and free from infirmities which inspire confidence in the Court. It cannot be presumed that the statement of the prosecutrix is always true or without any embellishment. 28. In the background of the aforesaid legal position, when we consider the case in hand, we are of the opinion that the statement of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence. It cannot be presumed that the statement of the prosecutrix is always true or without any embellishment. 28. In the background of the aforesaid legal position, when we consider the case in hand, we are of the opinion that the statement of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence. In her cross-examination she could not recall the date and month when accused Ashok met her for the first time and when for the first time she visited the house of accused Ashok. She admitted that there were many houses situated around the house of accused Ashok and Ward Member of the Panchayat also resided near the house of the accused persons. She further admitted that she stayed in the house of accused Ashok for a total period of one and a half year and she became pregnant at his house. She also admitted that she used to visit PHC Salooni for medical checkup during her pregnancy. She further admitted that she got recorded the name of accused Ashok as her husband and son of Jodha Ram and had entered her age to be 20 years in the OPD Card prepared at PHC, Salooni. She also stated that she had not complained to anyone against accused Ashok during her checkup at PHC, Salooni. She also admitted that she had given birth to a daughter at the house of accused Ashok. She further admitted that during the period of one and a half years’ stay at the place of accused Ashok, she never visited the place of her maternal grand-mother. She further stated that when accused Ashok had left for Baddi to do a job, she used to call him on phone from the phone of her mother-in-law and used to do usual domestic chores at the place of accused Ashok. The prosecutrix also admitted in her cross-examination that she stayed in the house of accused Ashok as his wife and accused Ashok used to live as her husband and during the period of one and a half year of her stay, she did not visit the place of her aunt. She stated that during the period of one and half years’ stay, she had entered into compromise with accused twice, i.e., once before Pradhan Shri Amin Chand and on second occasion she entered into compromise as per her own. She stated that during the period of one and half years’ stay, she had entered into compromise with accused twice, i.e., once before Pradhan Shri Amin Chand and on second occasion she entered into compromise as per her own. She also admitted that before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, she had voluntarily stated that she was living in the house of accused Ashok as his wife. She further admitted that she used to vermilion ( sindoor ) in the partition of her hair, since she had given birth to a daughter and she was married. 29. Thus, the entire cross-examination of the prosecutrix reveals that she stayed in the house of accused Ashok as his wife and had accepted accused Ashok as her husband. She had entered into compromise with accused Ashok on two occasions, i.e., once before Pradhan Shri Amin Chand (PW-2) and on the second occasion she had entered into compromise as per her own. PW-2 Shri Amin Chand, the then Pradhan Gram Panchayat, Bhadela, also stated that he called the prosecutrix, who was accompanied by her uncle, aunt, her brother-in-law ( jija ) and her father also came there and the compromise was effected at his place on 12.04.2011, in presence of witnesses namely Tek Chand, Vias, Bimla, Rajinder Kumar, Dhano Kumar and Prem Lal. He further deposed that compromise, Ex. PW-1/B, was signed by him and all the witnesses present there. He also deposed that as per compromise, Ex. PW-1/B, accused Ashok and the prosecutrix were husband and wife and accused Ashok accepted that he had a daughter of three months. 30. Hence, in view of the entire evidence on record, particularly, the statement of the prosecutrix, it has become clear that it was the prosecutrix alone who had chosen the company of accused Ashok at his place of residence and she lived with him as his wife. She was of the age of the discretion and was aware of what she was doing. She never put up any struggle or raised any alarm while she was being sexually assaulted by accused Ashok as alleged at his residence. She had remained in the company of accused Ashok for a quite long period of one and half year without any protest and also came in physical contact with him several times and gave birth to a child. She had remained in the company of accused Ashok for a quite long period of one and half year without any protest and also came in physical contact with him several times and gave birth to a child. The evidence on record indicates that the physical relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix was consensual. The prosecutrix, being a willing party to go and stay with the accused as per her own wish, in such a situation culpability of the accused persons has not been established. In the absence of any evidence to prove that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age, it cannot be said to be a case of either kidnapping or rape as the consensual relationship would not constitute an offence of rape within the meaning of Section 375 of the IPC. 31. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no interference in the judgment of acquittal, dated 31.03.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 51/12 (Regd. No. 63/2013), is required. The view taken by the learned Trial Court was the only possible view, as such the appeal, which sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed of.