JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna, J. This writ appeal is filed under Section 5 (i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 , by the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.34954 of 2024, being dissatisfied by the judgment dated 14.01.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of Certiorari to quash Ext.P5 order of transfer dated 01.10.2024 issued by the 4 th respondent Deputy Chief Engineer (General), Kerala Water Authority transferring the appellant to PH Section, Kozhinjampara from Palakkad Water Supply Scheme Section (‘PWSS Section’ in short), Malampuzha and permit him to continue in the present station was dismissed. 2. According to the appellant, he is a differently abled person with 60% locomotor disability, presently working as Head Operator in the 1 st respondent Water Authority in the PWSS Section, Malampuzha since 20.03.2010. As per the Government orders, differently abled persons having disability of 60% and above are given protection from transfer. Apart from protecting such persons from transfer for 5 years, the protection in the post has been extended until any other person with disability of 60% and above makes a claim for the very same post. It was in violation of such norms, Ext.P5 transfer order was issued by the 4 th respondent transferring the appellant to a distance of 15 kilometers away from his house. Hence, the appellant filed the writ petition. 3. By noting that as per the order dated 16.05.2024, the Government has granted permission to transfer differently disabled persons on completion of 5 years in a station, to the next station or if no vacancy is available in the next station to the immediate next district and also noting that the place to which the appellant was transferred is only 15/17 kilometers away from his residence which is not in violation of service conditions or malafide or arbitrary, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant is a person suffering from 60% locomotor disability which is evident from Ext.P1 certificate of disability as well as the unique disability ID card issued to him. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant is a person suffering from 60% locomotor disability which is evident from Ext.P1 certificate of disability as well as the unique disability ID card issued to him. As per Ext.P6 order dated 29.08.2017 issued by the Government, the persons having disability of more than 60% are given protection from transfer for 5 years. In that order it is further clarified that after the aforesaid 5 years, if no other persons suffering from disability raises a claim for transfer to his post, he need not be transferred from the present station. Though the appellant submitted representation prior to the general transfer of the year 2024 to the 4 th respondent Deputy Chief Engineer (General) through proper channel requesting to exclude him from the general transfer pointing out his physical disability and family circumstance, as per Ext. P2 draft list of transfer dated 25.06.2024 issued by the 4 th respondent the appellant was proposed to transfer to a distance of 70 kilometers away from his residence. Immediately thereafter the appellant filed Ext.P3 appeal dated 27.06.2024 before the 4 th respondent and then as per Ext.P4 order dated 01.10.2024 he was included in the final transfer list to a place situated at a distance of 75 kilometers from his place of residence. After the issuance of Ext.P4, the present Ext.P5 transfer order was issued by the 4 th respondent transferring him to PH Section, Kozhinjampara, which is 15 kilometers away from his residence. With his present disability, the appellant has to catch 3 buses to reach the transferred station and hence interference of this Court is highly necessary. 6. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents pointed out that after Ext.P6 order by the Government, the Union of differently abled persons approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.43815 of 2023 raising a grievance that by Ext.P6, the benchmark disabilities are denied to the persons who have above 40% disability to 60% disability by introducing a sub-categorization in persons with benchmark disability. As per the judgment dated 08.01.2024, the learned Single Judge disposed of that writ petition directing the State of Kerala to take up the representation submitted by the petitioners therein and pass orders within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of that judgment. Pursuant to that direction, the Government issued the order dated 16.05.2024 modifying the norms of transfer of differently abled persons which was reproduced in the impugned judgment. Now there is no restriction to transfer a disabled person and in fact, it is mandatory to transfer such persons to the nearest station after completion of 5 years in a particular station. Hence no interference is needed in the impugned judgment. 7. The appellant is a person suffering from 60% locomotor disability. He has been working in the PWSS Section, Malampuzha since 20.03.2010. It is true that as per Ext.P6 order dated 29.08.2017, the Government protected the persons suffering from disability from transfer for a period of 5 years and further directed that after 5 years they need be transferred only if another disabled person applies for transfer to his place. But this order was modified as per the order dated 16.05.2024 produced with Ext.P1 in the writ petition whereby it is clarified that after 5 years such persons can be transferred to the immediate next station or if no vacancy is available in such station to the immediate next district. 8. In Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani [ (1989) 2 SCC 602 ] the Apex Court held thus: “Transfer of a Government servant appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to the other is an incident of service. No Government servant or employee of Public Undertaking has legal right for being posted at any particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condition of service and the employee has no choice in the matter. Transfer from one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the Public administration. Whenever, a public servant is transferred he must comply with the order but if there be any genuine difficulty in proceeding on transfer it is open to him to make representation to the competent authority for stay, modification or cancellation of the transfer order. Whenever, a public servant is transferred he must comply with the order but if there be any genuine difficulty in proceeding on transfer it is open to him to make representation to the competent authority for stay, modification or cancellation of the transfer order. If the order of transfer is not stayed, modified or cancelled the concerned public servant must carry out the order of transfer. In the absence of any stay of the transfer order a public servant has no justification to avoid or evade the transfer order merely on the ground of having made a representation, or on the ground of his difficulty in moving from one place to the other. If he fails to proceed on transfer in compliance to the transfer order, he would expose himself to disciplinary action under the relevant Rules, as has happened in the instant case. The respondent lost his service as he refused to comply with the order of his transfer from one place to the other”. (emphasis supplied) 9. In Union of India v. S.L Abbas [ (1993) 4 SCC 357 ] the Apex Court held thus: “Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration.” (emphasis supplied) 10. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd v. Shri Bhagwan [ (2001) 8 SCC 574 ] the Apex Court held thus: “It is by now well-settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of public Undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the Management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.” (emphasis supplied) 11. In State of U.P v. Gobardhan Lal [(2004) 11 SCC 402] the Apex Court held thus: “It is too late in the day for any Government Servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or Rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision”. (emphasis supplied) 12. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision”. (emphasis supplied) 12. In Deepak Niranjan Nath Pandit [AIR 2020 SC 1492] the Apex Court while considering the transfer of an Assistant Commissioner of Customs, GST and Central Excise from Mumbai to Bhubaneswar held thus: “The High Court, in interfering with the order of transfer, has relied on two circumstances. Firstly, the High Court has noted that as a result of the stay on the order of transfer, the headquarters of the respondent will remain at Mumbai and even if he is to be suspended, his headquarters will continue to remain at Mumbai. The second reason, which has weighed with the High Court, is that the spouse of the respondent suffers from a cardiac ailment and is obtaining medical treatment in Mumbai. In our view, neither of these reasons can furnish a valid justification for the High Court to take recourse to its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in passing an order of injunction of this nature. Significantly, the High Court has not even found a prima facie case to the effect that the order of transfer was either mala fide or in breach of law. The High Court could not have dictated to the employer as to where the respondent should be posted during the period of suspension. Individual hardships are matters for the Union of India, as an employer, to take a dispassionate view. However, we are categorically of the view that the impugned order of the High Court interfering with the order of transfer was in excess of jurisdiction and an improper exercise of judicial power. We are constrained to observe that the impugned order has been passed in breach of the settled principles and precedents which have consistently been enunciated and followed by this Court. The manner in which judicial power has been exercised by the High Court to stall a lawful order of transfer is disquieting. We express our disapproval”. 13. We are constrained to observe that the impugned order has been passed in breach of the settled principles and precedents which have consistently been enunciated and followed by this Court. The manner in which judicial power has been exercised by the High Court to stall a lawful order of transfer is disquieting. We express our disapproval”. 13. In Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and others [ 2024 SCC Online SC 279 ] the Apex Court held thus: “In view of the foregoing enunciation of law by judicial decisions of this Court, it is clear that in absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegations are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. In the sequel of the said settled norms, the scope of judicial review is not permissible by the Courts in exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” (emphasis supplied) 14. This Court in Mayadevi M.P and another v. Canara Bank and others [ 2015 (4) KHC 874 ] held that an order of transfer cannot be interfered with in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the absence of any specific allegation of mala fides or at least a prima facie proof of vitiating circumstances influencing that order of transfer. It is far too late in the day to assert that, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with an order of transfer of an employee as if it is sitting in appeal over such an order issued by the employer. The scope of judicial review in this area is very limited. Unless mala fides or oblique motives are specifically pleaded or can necessarily be inferred from the proof of facts, this Court cannot interfere with an order of transfer of an employee. Therefore, a mere assertion in the writ petition that the orders of transfer are 'vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides', cannot therefore sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives. Therefore, a mere assertion in the writ petition that the orders of transfer are 'vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides', cannot therefore sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives. The concept being basically different, this Court cannot even draw an inference that the order of transfer issued by the employer is vitiated by mala fides or on extraneous considerations or with oblique motives unless it is specifically pleaded in the writ petition with reliable materials, which are sufficient to draw an inference of any vitiating circumstances influencing such an order of transfer. 15. Again, in Nixy James v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [ 2023 (3) KLT 893 ] , this Court held that the law is too well settled that transfer is an incidence of service and the employee has no legal right in this regard. It is also well settled that, unless the orders of transfer are vitiated by statutory violations or mala fides, Courts should loathe to interfere with them. 16. As per Ext.P5 order the appellant is transferred to a distance of only 15 kilometers away from his residence. After the issuance of the order dated 16.05.2024 by the Government, there is no statutory violation in transferring the appellant to the next station wherein vacancy is available. The appellant has no case that Ext.P5 transfer order is vitiated by malafides. In such circumstances, the appellant could not make out any sufficient ground to interfere with Ext.P5 order of transfer. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submission made at the Bar, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. In the result, the writ appeal stands dismissed.