Judgment : (Arvind Kumar Verma, J.) This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.11.2020 passed by the learned Sessions Judge (FTC), Balod, District Balod (CG) in Special Criminal Case POCSO No. 67/2019 whereby and whereunder the appellant has been held guilty for the commission of offence as described below : Conviction Sentence U/s. 363 IPC RI for 6 months and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one month U/s. 376(2)(I) of IPC and Section 5 ( M )/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act RI for 10 years and fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 1 month Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution in brief is that on 13.07.2019, at about 5.00 pm. when the prosecutrix/victim was playing with her friends, at that point of time, the appellant came there and caught her hand and forcefully took her to his house and sent her friends by giving 10/- each to buy some eatable. It is alleged that the appellant tried to commit aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim and when she raised cries he left her. When her grandmother returned from the market, her friends narrated about the incident and the report was lodged against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363 ,376 IPC and Section 5 (m) and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. The prosecutrix was medically examined and statement was recorded at the Child Welfare Committee, Balod. Spot map was prepared and the date of birth certificate and clothes worn by the prosecutrix and the school admission and discharge register were seized. Appellant was arrested and he was also medically examined and his underwear was seized and the seized clothes were sent for chemical examination and after investigation, the trial court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 363 , 376 (2)(I) IPC and Sections 5 (M)/6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded innocence. 3. Statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he denied all the circumstances appearing against him and stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses to bring home the charges. The appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded innocence. 3. Statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he denied all the circumstances appearing against him and stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses to bring home the charges. 4. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record and considering that it is the appellant who have committed aforesaid offence, convicted and sentenced him in the aforementioned manner, against which the appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C has been preferred by the appellant. 5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the accused/appellant that as per case of the prosecution, victim was minor on the date of incident, but this fact has not been proved by adducing lawful evidence. In this regard, the school admission and discharge register (Ex. P-13C) of the victim has been seized, which shows that date of birth of victim is 20.11.2011 but it has not been proved by any of the witnesses that, on what basis aforesaid date of birth was recorded in the school. It has been argued that the MLC report Ex.P-15, the doctor has not found any external injury on the private parts of the victim. He further submits that except victim, there is no credible evidence in support of her statement and therefore, only on the basis of deposition of victim holding the appellant guilty by the learned trial Court is not sustainable and the alleged offence of the IPC and the POCSO Act are not made out against the appellant, hence, he is entitled for acquittal. 6. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the victim was minor and there is no reason to disbelieve her testimony since there was no reason for her to falsely implicate the appellant. She submits that when her grandmother came and opened the door and found the victim and the appellant. She further submits that the law enunciated with regard to the conviction of the accused for the offence as mentioned above on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim is a well settled proposition in view of the various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. She further submits that the law enunciated with regard to the conviction of the accused for the offence as mentioned above on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim is a well settled proposition in view of the various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Lastly, he submits that the clear creditworthy and unshattered testimony of the victim/prosecutrix is sufficient to establish the case of the prosecution and the same is reliable. The contradictions pointed out on behalf of the appellant are stated to be immaterial to discredit the testimony of witnesses. Therefore, the judgment passed by the learned trial court was sound and did not warrant any interference. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 8. From the statements of (PW-2) the grandmother of the victim, who has stated that on the date of incident ie. 13.07.2019, at about 5.30 p.m. when she was returning fro the market, the children playing in the street informed that the appellant had given Rs.10/- and took along with him. When she went to the house of the appellant and pushed the door shouting and when she did not find the victim, she again shouted at the point of time, the appellant brought her granddaughter outside. She saw that the straw was stuck in the whole body of the victim and took her home. Thereafter she informed about the incident to the parents of the victim and lodged the report Ex.P-2 against the appellant. Smt. Chameli Sahu (PW-5) Assistant Teacher of the school from where the school admission and discharge register was seized in which it was mentioned as 20.11.2011. The doctor (PW-6) Dr. Renuka Prasanno has given her report Ex.P-15 wherein she has stated that the hymen was totally ruptured, redness on vulva and vagina, white semen like substance present on lower half of vagina, the child was minor, aged about 7 years and has incompletely developed secondary sexual characters. She has further referred to the radiologist for age determination. Renuka Prasanno has given her report Ex.P-15 wherein she has stated that the hymen was totally ruptured, redness on vulva and vagina, white semen like substance present on lower half of vagina, the child was minor, aged about 7 years and has incompletely developed secondary sexual characters. She has further referred to the radiologist for age determination. On perusal of impugned judgment and the statements of the above witnesses, it reflects that there is no dispute as to the age of the victim which has been duly proved on record and, as such, the findings of the learned Trial Court that victim was aged about 7 years on the basis of school records, requires no interference. 9. The principle is well settled that the Court can base conviction on the testimony of a child victim, if the same is credible and truthful. Corroboration is not a must on record but is a rule of prudence. The precaution which the Court should bear in mind while relying upon the testimony of a child victim is that the witness must be reliable, consistent and there is no likelihood of being tutored or under an influence. The version put forth has to be unassailable, trustworthy and of sterling quality, capable of holding appellant guilty on the basis of solitary evidence. 10. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code , the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredients to prove such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 11. Section 29 of POCSO Act provides that Court shall presume that the accused has committed the offence for which he is charged with, until contrary is proved. However, the presumption would operate only when the prosecution proves the foundational facts in the context of allegation against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. After the prosecution establishes the foundational facts, the presumption raised against the accused can be rebutted by discrediting the prosecution witnesses through cross-examination and demonstrating the gaps in prosecution version or improbability of the incident or lead defence evidence in order to rebut the presumption by way of preponderance of probability. 12. After the prosecution establishes the foundational facts, the presumption raised against the accused can be rebutted by discrediting the prosecution witnesses through cross-examination and demonstrating the gaps in prosecution version or improbability of the incident or lead defence evidence in order to rebut the presumption by way of preponderance of probability. 12. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana , reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows : “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age ofsuch juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school(other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or(iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i),(ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3)of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3),matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 13. With regard to the age of the prosecutrix, the prosecution has mainly relied upon the School admission and discharge register (Ex.P- 13C) of the prosecutrix which is seized by the police from the school and proved by the Smt. Chameli Sahu (PW-5) Assistant Teacher of the school in which the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 20.11.2011 and as per the school admission and discharge register, the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 20.11.2011. Dakhil Kharij Register is a public document maintained by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. The entry made in the filing/dismissal register has been made by a public servant, which has been given in proper custody by one public servant to another public servant. Dakhil Kharij Register is a public document maintained by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. The entry made in the filing/dismissal register has been made by a public servant, which has been given in proper custody by one public servant to another public servant. As per Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, the Dakhil Kharij Register is a document issued by the school, which comes under first class documents. The defence has not presented any oral or documentary evidence to refuse the said date of birth, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the date of birth of the victim, as 20.11.2011 hence, the trial Court has rightly held that the date of birth of the victim as 20.11.2011 and on the date of incident, she was minor below the age of 12 years and her age was around 7 years. 14. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is - whether the testimony of the victim/prosecutrix deserves acceptance and whether the prosecution has established the case of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 15. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments and has held that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if found reliable can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and that the creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such nature deserves acceptance. 16. Insofar as, age of the victim on the date of the commission of the offence is concerned, she was admittedly 7 years old at the time of the unsavory incident. The prosecution has subsequently proved that the victim was a minor at the time of alleged sexual assault and that victim was less than 7 years of age, when she was sexually assaulted by the accused. 17. Further, upon perusal of the testimony made by the victim, in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C it is observed that she has clearly stated that she was ravished by the appellant with his devilish act. 17. Further, upon perusal of the testimony made by the victim, in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C it is observed that she has clearly stated that she was ravished by the appellant with his devilish act. In her deposition before the court too, she has been consistent and stated that the appellant said that he will give her money and took her to his house where the straw was kept and after unclothing her, undressed himself and thereafter committed rape on her. There is, therefore, no reason to disbelieve the testimony of victim which is consistent and reliable and has a ring of truth in it. The victim was minor, only 7 years old when she was examined and the subtle variation that exists is understandable in the testimony of a 7 year old child, who is grappling to comprehend the complexity and enormity of what has actually happened with her. 18. From perusal of the testimony made by the prosecutrix which has remained unshattered in cross-examination unequivocally reveals that the commission of the offence by the appellant is described in clear and unambiguous words and her testimony has remained consistent during cross examination. Further, upon a plain appraisal of the testimony of the victim/prosecutrix, the contention raised on behalf of the appellant to the effect that the prosecutrix is a tutored witness, cannot be accepted and is dehors any merit. The appellant has failed to controvert the testimony of the prosecutrix, which has remained unchallenged despite being subjected to thorough cross examination. Now if we peruse the statements of the witnesses, it would be clear that the offence as alleged against the appellant establishes that the appellant has committed the offence. 19. Victim (PW-1) has stated that on the date of incident ie. 13.07.2019, appellant took her to his house stating that he will give money and after unclothing her forcefully committed rape on her and when her grandmother came shouting for the victim, he brought her outside his house. Grandmother of the victim (PW-2) has stated that the victim is aged about 7 years and studying in class 3. On the date of incident, at about 5.30 p.m. when she was returning from the market, the children playing near her house informed that the appellant gave her Rs.10/- and took the victim along with her. Grandmother of the victim (PW-2) has stated that the victim is aged about 7 years and studying in class 3. On the date of incident, at about 5.30 p.m. when she was returning from the market, the children playing near her house informed that the appellant gave her Rs.10/- and took the victim along with her. Thereafter she went to the house of the appellant shouting/calling her and when she did not get any response, he pushed the door and the appellant brought the victim outside. She informed about the incident to the parents of the victim and lodged a report at police station. Dr. Pushpendra Agrawal (PW-7) is the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Gunderdehi who had medically examined the appellant and gave the report Ex.P-18. He has opined that the appellant is capable of performing sexual intercourse. Dr. Renuka Prasanno (PW-6) is the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Gunderdehi who has medically examined the victim and gave the report vide Ex.P-13C. She has opined that the victim/minor has suffered the sexual assault/rape and the hymen was found ruptured, there was redness on vulva and vagina, white semen like substance present on lower half of vagina, the child was minor, aged about 7 years and has incompletely developed secondary sexual characters The stained area was marked, sealed, packed and handed over to FSL. 20. The position of law on the question, whether absence of injuries found on the person of the prosecutrix, in a case of rape, would result in a finding of acquittal, is well settled. Dealing with this issue in a case of a child rape, and relying on earlier decisions of the Apex Court, while upholding the conviction under Section 376 IPC , made the following observations: "38. ...In the case of Ranjit Hazarika Vs. State of Assam, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 635 , the opinion of the doctor was that no rape appeared to have committed because of the absence of rupture of hymen and injuries on the private part of the prosecutrix, the Apex Court took a view that the medical opinion cannot throw overboard an otherwise cogent and trustworthy evidence of the prosecutrix.” 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Rajasthan Vs. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Rajasthan Vs. Om Prakash , reported in (2002) 5 SCC 745 , dealt with a similar question in the case of a child rape, while upholding the conviction of the appellant therein and reversing the decision of the High Court in that behalf, relied upon earlier decisions and made the following observations: "13. The conviction for offence under Section 376 IPC can be based on the sole testimony of a rape victim is a well-settled proposition. In State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC384], referring to State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain [ (1990) 1 SCC 550 ] this Court held that it must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. It has also been observed in the said decision by Dr Justice A.S. Anand (as His Lordship then was), speaking for the Court that the inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. 14. In State of H.P. Vs. Gian Chand[(2001) 6 SCC] Justice Lahoti speaking for the Bench observed that the court has first to assess the trustworthy intention of the evidence adduced and available on record. If the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being relied on, then the testimony has to be accepted and acted on though there may be other witnesses available who could have been examined but were not examined." 22. If the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being relied on, then the testimony has to be accepted and acted on though there may be other witnesses available who could have been examined but were not examined." 22. Thus, it is needless to state that, corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix, is not an essential requirement in a case of rape, and the same is not a sine qua non to bring home the guilt of the accused. The testimony of the prosecutrix, if well founded &trustworthy, is by itself sufficient to convict the accused. 23. It is trite to state that it is necessary for the Courts to have a sensitive approach when dealing with cases of child rape. The prosecution meticulously laid out the charges against the man, invoking the stringent provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 for aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Additionally, he was also charged under the penal laws for rape, reflecting the severity and gravity of his actions. 24. In the case of Alakh Alok Srivastava Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2018) 17 SCC 291 , in para 14 and 20, it is observed as under: “14. At the very outset, it has to be stated with authority that the Pocso Act is a gender neutral legislation. This Act has been divided into various chapters and parts therein. Chapter II of the Act titled “Sexual Offences Against Children” is segregated into five parts. Part A of the said Chapter contains two sections, namely, Section 3 and Section 4. Section 3 defines the offence of “Penetrative Sexual Assault” whereas Section 4 lays down the punishment for the said offence. Likewise, Part B of the said Chapter titled “Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault and Punishment therefor” contains two sections, namely, Section 5 and Section 6. The various subsections of Section 5 copiously deal with various situations, circumstances and categories of persons where the offence of penetrative sexual assault would take the character of the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Section 5(k), in particular, while laying emphasis on the mental stability of a child stipulates that where an offender commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, by taking advantage of the child's mental or physical disability, it shall amount to an offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault.” “20. Section 5(k), in particular, while laying emphasis on the mental stability of a child stipulates that where an offender commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, by taking advantage of the child's mental or physical disability, it shall amount to an offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault.” “20. Speaking about the child, a three Judge Bench in M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 756 “1. … “child is the father of man”. To enable fathering of a valiant and vibrant man, the child must be groomed well in the formative years of his life. He must receive education, acquire knowledge of man and materials and blossom in such an atmosphere that on reaching age, he is found to be a man with a mission, a man who matters so far as the society is concerned.” 25. It has been further held that “Children are precious human resources of our country; they are the country’s future. The hope of tomorrow rests on them. But unfortunately, in our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position. There are different modes of her exploitation, including sexual assault and/or sexual abuse. In our view, exploitation of children in such a manner is a crime against humanity and the society.” 26. Therefore, the children and more particularly the girl child deserve full protection and need greater care and protection whether in the urban or rural areas. As observed and held by this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Om Prakash , (2002) 5 SCC 745 children need special care and protection and, in such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the Courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. In the case of Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703 , it is observed by this Court that a minor who is subjected to sexual abuse needs to be protected even more than a major victim because a major victim being an adult may still be able to withstand the social ostracization and mental harassment meted out by society, but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so. Most crimes against minor victims are not even reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a member of the family of the victim or a close friend. Therefore, the child needs extra protection. Most crimes against minor victims are not even reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a member of the family of the victim or a close friend. Therefore, the child needs extra protection. Therefore, no leniency can be shown to an accused who has committed the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 and particularly when the same is proved by adequate evidence before a court of law. 27. In the present case it is to be noted that the accused who was ravished a minor who was aged about 12 years which demonstrates the mental state or mindset of the accused. Therefore, the accused as such does not deserve any sympathy and/or any leniency. 28. Further it has laid down that although the victim's solitary evidence in matters related to sexual offences is generally deemed sufficient to hold an accused guilty, the conviction cannot be sustained if the prosecutrix's testimony is found unreliable and insufficient due to identified flaws and lacunae. It was held thus: “31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, which have already been projected hereinabove, would go to show that her evidence does not fall in that category and cannot be relied upon to hold the appellant guilty of the said offences. 32. Indeed there are several significant variations in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section 161 statement (CrPC), FIR and deposition in court. Thus, it was necessary to get her evidence corroborated independently, which they could have done either by examination of Ritu, her sister or Bimla Devi, who were present in the house at the time of her alleged abduction. The record shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a witness was not examined and later given up by the public prosecutor on the ground that she has been won over by the appellant.” 29. The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP Vs. Sonu Kushwaha (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under : 12. The record shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a witness was not examined and later given up by the public prosecutor on the ground that she has been won over by the appellant.” 29. The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP Vs. Sonu Kushwaha (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under : 12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain language, leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child will be lifelong. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court’. 30. When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on allowing the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. 35. Instead, the emphasis is on allowing the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. 35. On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705 observed as follows: ““17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Needless to say as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child witness who is competent and whose version is reliable.” 31. In the instant case, the victim was consistent in her statement and has asserted that the appellant after taking her on a ride, finding her alone, committed sexual assault on her. The statement of the prosecutrix has been consistent from the beginning to the end, from the initial statement to the oral testimony, without creating any doubt qua the prosecution’s case. Thus, in the case in hand, there was no doubt that being in a position of authority and trust, the accused had committed rape on the victim who is a minor aged about 7 years. The oral testimonies of the victim and her grandmother on the culpability of the convict got credence unerringly pointing to his guilt. On appreciating the evidence on record and coming to the conclusion that the guilt of the appellant under Sections 363 IPC and Section 376 (2)(I) IPC and Section 5(M)/6 of the POCSO has been conclusively proved. 37. In view of the foregoing discussion, in our considered view, the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. On appreciating the evidence on record and coming to the conclusion that the guilt of the appellant under Sections 363 IPC and Section 376 (2)(I) IPC and Section 5(M)/6 of the POCSO has been conclusively proved. 37. In view of the foregoing discussion, in our considered view, the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. There is no contravention in the position of law and there can be no dispute with the proposition that when the testimony of the prosecutrix is creditworthy, trustworthy, unimpeached and inspires confidence; the conviction of the appellant can be sustained based solely on it. 38. Considering the evidence of the victim, who had to bear the brunt of the depravity POCSO Act is a Special Act where the legislature has made stringent provisions to protect the interests of victims who are minors. 39. The prosecution presented compelling evidence to establish beyond doubt the culpability of the accused, leaving no room for ambiguity regarding his guilt. Consequently, the sentence awarded to the appellant by the Learned Trial Court also does not warrant any interference. Therefore, the judgment and order of conviction dated 28.11.2020 is hereby upheld. The trial court has awarded minimum sentence to the appellant, ie. 10 years therefore no interference is called. The appeal accordingly, stands dismissed 40. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 14.07.2019 being the date of arrest. He is directed to serve out the sentence as awarded to him by the trial court. 41. Let the trial court record and copy of this judgment be sent to the trial court forthwith for necessary information and its compliance.