ORDER 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant is the victim-complainant in FIR No.36/2020 dated 02.02.2020, under Sections 376-D, 418, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, the "IPC"), registered at Police Station Mahila Thana, District Alwar. It seems that the appellant was residing in Jaipur for preparation and coaching for competitive exams when she was introduced to respondent no.2 (Radhakrishan Meena), namely, the main accused, somewhere between January and March 2018. They exchanged phone numbers and have been in contact with each other since. While the appellant claims that respondent no.2 proposed marriage, to which she had consented, respondent no.2 denied expressing any such desire. As per the allegations contained in the FIR, the appellant and respondent no.2 developed a physical relationship in January 2018 itself. They travelled together to other places like Hanumangarh, etc. The appellant claims that respondent no.2 was actively assisted by his co-accused, namely, respondent nos.3 to 7 in duping the appellant on the pretext that respondent no.2 would marry her, thus, forcing her to continue with the physical relationship. As the marriage did not materialize between the parties, the appellant lodged the subject-FIR with specific allegations of committing rape on her, by respondent no.2, under the false pretext of marriage. She also made various allegations against respondent nos.3 to 7, but none of them had been attributed commission of rape on her. The appellant's statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the "Cr.P.C.") was recorded in which she reiterated the allegations made by her in the complaint. 3. It seems that upon investigation, the police initially found that a prima facie case under the above-mentioned provisions of IPC was made out, though later on, the Investigating Agency resiled from its stand and supported respondent no.2 (Radhakrishan Meena) and his co-accused. 4. Eventually, the main accused, namely, respondent no.2 (Radhakrishan Meena) and his co-accused approached the High Court, seeking quashing of the FIR and all the proceedings arising therefrom. In this regard, powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C were invoked. Vide the impugned judgment, the High Court accepted that petition and has quashed the proceedings, with a direction to the Investigating Agency to submit a closure report. 5. In this regard, powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C were invoked. Vide the impugned judgment, the High Court accepted that petition and has quashed the proceedings, with a direction to the Investigating Agency to submit a closure report. 5. At this stage, it may also be noted that while the appellant - victim is employed as a Guard in the Jail Department, the main accused - respondent no.2 (Radhakrishan Meena) is serving in the Customs Department and is presently posted in the State of Gujarat. 6. We have heard learned senior counsel for the parties and perused the material placed by them on record. 7. This Court has, from time to time, evolved the outer limits and contours within which powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be safely exercised by a High Court with a view to prevent the abuse of process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. Such parameters ordinarily dissuade a High Court from travelling into the realm of factual issues. The High Court, therefore, while invoking its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings at the threshold would generally consider and rely upon the contents of an FIR. Further, the High Court will proceed on the premise of whether such contents, even if taken as gospel truth, would constitute a prima facie offence or not. We find that the High Court, in the instant case, had to take external aid to form a definite opinion that no offence under Section 376 or other related provisions of IPC was made out against the respondents. 8. Such recourse may not be well advised at the preliminary stage, especially when no irreversible damage will be caused to the accused person, who will get a fair opportunity to seek his discharge at an appropriate stage, or alternatively, can establish his innocence at a later stage of the trial. All this depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and may vary on a case-to-case basis. Illustratively, if the complainant-victim or any other material witness enters the witness box and rips apart the prosecution case at the very beginning of the trial, the Court may not deem it prudent to continue with the vexatious proceedings and may accept the accused's prayer to discharge at that very stage. Illustratively, if the complainant-victim or any other material witness enters the witness box and rips apart the prosecution case at the very beginning of the trial, the Court may not deem it prudent to continue with the vexatious proceedings and may accept the accused's prayer to discharge at that very stage. There can be numerous other instances where such a recourse might be permissible in law. 9. As noticed earlier, the High Court in the instant case has taken external aid, comprising of material, the veracity whereof is yet to be determined. It, thus, seems to us that the opinion formed by the High Court in the instant case, at such an early stage, is apparently premature so far as the main accused - respondent no.2 (Radhakrishan Meena) is concerned. Conversely, we see no cogent basis, even on acceptance of what the FIR alleges, as to how respondent no.7 (Budi Devi), in the very nature of things, can be said to have abetted the commission of the alleged crime. The High Court, therefore, seems to be justified in protecting her against the harassment of facing trial, as there is no convincing attribution made to connect her with the crime reported. 10. As far as the co-accused Kamlesh Kumar, Lekhraj and Radhakrishan @ Rajya are concerned, we are not inclined to express any opinion about their innocence or involvement, at this stage. Qua them, the matter is remanded to the High Court, where the parties will be at liberty to raise their respective contentions and the High Court, regardless of the observations made hereinabove qua respondent no.2 (Radhakrishan Meena) or respondent no.7 (Budi Devi), will be at liberty to form an appropriate opinion about the continuation of proceedings against them. 11. For the reasons aforestated and without touching the merits of the case, we allow these appeals in part to the extent that the investigation qua respondent no.2 (Radhakrishan Meena), the main accused, is restored. The closure report is set aside and the police authorities are directed to take the investigation to a logical conclusion. The law will take its own course thereafter. So far as respondent no.7 (Budi Devi) is concerned, the impugned judgment of the High Court, quashing the proceedings against her, is upheld. She will not be subjected to any trial in the instant case. The law will take its own course thereafter. So far as respondent no.7 (Budi Devi) is concerned, the impugned judgment of the High Court, quashing the proceedings against her, is upheld. She will not be subjected to any trial in the instant case. As regards the renaming four accused, namely, Dinesh Chand Meena, Kamlesh Kumar, Lekhraj, and Radhakrishan @ Rajya, the matter is remitted to the High Court to take a fresh call after giving an opportunity of being heard to the parties. 12. It is directed that respondent no.2 (Radhakrishan Meena) shall be admitted to bail during the investigation and even thereafter, if any chargesheet is filed against him. Similarly, Dinesh Chand Meena, Kamlesh Kumar, Lekhraj, and Radhakrishan @ Rajya will also remain on bail till an appropriate decision is taken by the High Court with respect to the continuation of proceedings qua them. 13. It goes without saying that respondent no.2 (Radhakrishan Meena) will extend full cooperation to the ongoing investigation. 14. The investigation shall be conducted by the ASP Crime and Vigilance, Jaipur. He will endeavour to conclude the same expeditiously.