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2025 DIGILAW 576 (CAL)

Gopal Chandra Niyogi v. State of West Bengal

2025-09-10

PARTHA SARATHI SEN

body2025
JUDGMENT : Partha Sarathi Sen, J. 1. By filing the instant writ petition, the writ petitioner has prayed for issuance of appropriate writ/writs against the respondent/authorities commanding them to cancel/rescind/withdraw the following:- i. The office order no.3 dated 06.01.2003 whereby and whereunder the writ petitioner was placed in suspension; ii. The charge sheet dated 31.03.2003 issued by the disciplinary authority; iii. The enquiry report dated 22.03.2006 as prepared by the enquiry officer being respondent no.6 herein; iv. The second show cause notice dated 25.09.2006 as issued by the respondent no.4/authority; v. The final order of punishment dated 11.01.2007 as passed by the respondent no.4/authority; vi. The order of the appellate authority dated 28.03.2007 as communicated by the respondent no.5 along with other ancillary reliefs. 2. At the time of hearing Mr. Banerjee, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner at the very outset draws attention of this Court to page nos.64 to 66 of the instant writ petition being a copy of the memorandum of charge sheet dated 31.03.2003 together with articles of charges as lebelled against the writ petitioner being the delinquent on account of alleged violation of the Regulation nos. 38 and 59 of WBSEBESR which according to the disciplinary authority of the writ petitioner tantamouns to the act of misconduct in terms of Regulations 61(d), 61(e) and 61(p) of WBSEB Employees Service Regulations. 3. Mr. Banerjee in course of his argument took me to page nos. 196 to 235 of the instant writ petition being a copy of the enquiry report dated 22.03.2006 as prepared by the respondent no.6/authority. 4. It is submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the materials as placed before this Court it would reveal that the said disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the delinquent who is the writ petitioner herein since the disciplinary authority was not satisfied with regard to the reply as given by the writ petitioner in terms of the memorandum of charge sheet dated 31.03.2003. 5. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the materials as placed before this Court it would reveal further that in the said disciplinary proceeding ten witnesses have been tendered on behalf of the prosecution and on behalf of the defence i.e. on behalf of the writ petitioner four witnesses have been examined. 6. It is further contended by Mr. Banerjee that from the materials as placed before this Court it would reveal further that in the said disciplinary proceeding ten witnesses have been tendered on behalf of the prosecution and on behalf of the defence i.e. on behalf of the writ petitioner four witnesses have been examined. 6. It is further contended by Mr. Banerjee that on careful perusal of the said enquiry report dated 23.02.2006 it would reveal that most surprisingly the complainant from whom the writ petitioner has allegedly demanded bribe has not adduced evidence. It is further contended that despite absence of the complainant the enquiry authority most surprisingly marked the written complaint of the complainant as an exhibit and while coming to the finding of the said enquiry, the enquiry officer being the respondent no.6/authority herein placed his reliance upon the said exhibited written complaint i.e. Exhibit 1 which causes a serious miscarriage of justice in view of the fact that marking of a document in absence of the author is absolutely unknown to the prescribed procedure for a disciplinary proceeding. 7. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the enquiry officer being the respondent no.6/authority while preparing his enquiry report dated 23.02.2006 has failed to visualize the serious prejudice caused to the writ petitioner inasmuch as on account of absence of the complainant and on account of admitting the written complaint in evidence even in his absence the writ petitioner being a delinquent was deprived of his valuable right of cross examination of the complainant which tantamounts to violation of principle of natural justice as well as violation of the procedure established and recognized by law. 8. Drawing attention to the various portion of the said enquiry report dated 22.03.2006 it is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the said enquiry officer while preparing the said enquiry report has also miserably failed to visualize the discrepancies in the versions of the PWs and thus for non-consideration of such discrepancies in the evidence of the PWs the decision making process of PW6 was vitiated like anything causing prejudice to the writ petitioner. 9. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the enquiry officer while preparing his report dated 22.03.2006 has failed to consider the evidence of some of the PWs that on the alleged day and hour the alleged bribe was not touched by the delinquent. 9. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the enquiry officer while preparing his report dated 22.03.2006 has failed to consider the evidence of some of the PWs that on the alleged day and hour the alleged bribe was not touched by the delinquent. It is further contended on behalf of the writ petitioners that in the said disciplinary proceeding neither any report from any hand writing expert nor any chemical examiner’s report was called for, which are practically mandatory in a case based on trap programme. 10. It is thus submitted by Mr. Banerjee that for non-consideration of the relevant evidence and/or material, there cannot be any hesitation to hold that the decision of the enquiry authority is vitiated by circumstances extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case and that the conclusion as arrived at by the respondent no.6/authority while preparing his enquiry report dated 22.03.2006 is wholly arbitrary and capricious. 11. it is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the materials as placed before this Court it would reveal further that the presenting officer of the aforementioned enquiry proceeding though practically did not press for the charges under Regulations 38 and 59 however, the enquiry authority being the respondent no.6 in complete disregard of the same found the present writ petitioner guilty under those two regulations along with Regulation 61(e) and thus wrongly held that the charges under those regulations have been proved. 12. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the enquiry officer while submitting his enquiry report dated 22.03.2006 has also failed to consider that on behalf of the prosecution no independent witnesses have been examined and at the same time the self same enquiry officer for the reason best known to him and without assigning any reason therefor did not place any reliance upon the evidence of DW1 who is an independent witness. 13. It is thus submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the enquiry conducted by the respondent no.6/authority is perfunctory one and therefore the disciplinary authority ought not to place his reliance upon such enquiry report while awarding punishment to the writ petitioner. 14. Placing his reliance upon the reported decision of Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and Ors. reported in (1990) 2 SCC 10 it is submitted by Mr. 14. Placing his reliance upon the reported decision of Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and Ors. reported in (1990) 2 SCC 10 it is submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the materials as placed before this Court as well as on account of contradictory evidence as led by the PWs and for non-consideration of the material evidences by DW1 it can be safely held that the said enquiry officer while submitting his report dated 22.03.2006 has failed to visualize that while holding the disciplinary proceeding he was discharging his duty as a quasi-judicial nature and thus his conclusion must be based on some evidence with the same degree of definiteness without leaving any matter in a suspicious state. 15. In course of his argument Mr. Banerjee also places his reliance upon the reported decision of State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow vs. Ram Prakash Singh reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 891. It is submitted by Mr. Banerjee that in the said reported decision of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly held that even in a disciplinary proceeding the contents of a document which have been relied upon by the enquiry officer shall have to be proved by the examining witness having knowledge of the contents of such document and who can depose as regards its authenticity. At this juncture Mr. Banerjee took me to page nos.198 and 216 of the instant writ petition being internal page nos.3 and 27 of the enquiry report dated 22.03.2016 as submitted by the enquiry officer. It is submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the said enquiry report it would reveal that the written complaint of the complainant Mr. Dinabandhu Gorai was not proved by the complainant himself but by PW1 who is the Senior Manager (P and A) attached to the Corporate Vigilance Cell of the respondent/authority. 16. It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the said enquiry report it would also reveal that the cassette reportedly containing the conversation between the complainant and the writ petitioner herein was also exhibited by PW4 by way of recall who is none but an Assistant Manager (P and A) attached to the respondent/company. 17. It is thus submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the said enquiry report it would also reveal that the cassette reportedly containing the conversation between the complainant and the writ petitioner herein was also exhibited by PW4 by way of recall who is none but an Assistant Manager (P and A) attached to the respondent/company. 17. It is thus submitted by Mr. Banerjee that in exhibiting the said written complaint and the cassette and in placing reliance upon the contents of the same the enquiry authority has violated the established procedure for conducting a disciplinary proceeding which may be reviewed in the instant writ petition. 18. Placing his reliance upon the reported decision of Bharti Airtel Ltd. vs. A.S Raghavendra reported in (2024) 6 SCC 418 Mr. Banerjee further contended that though it is settled position of law that in a judicial review, re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible however, the High Court can reappraise the facts in the event an infirmity is detected in the order which is challenged before it, is found to be greater than ordinary. 19. In his next limb of submission Mr. Banerjee draws attention of this Court to the supplementary affidavit as affirmed on 21.03.2025 by the writ petitioner annexing therewith the copies of the deposition and the judgement dated 07.12.2024 as passed in Special Court Case no. 02 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special), 3rd Court, Bankura. 20. In course of his argument Mr. Banerjee contended that on comparative study of the judgement as passed in the aforementioned criminal case and the enquiry report which is under challenge it would reveal that most of the witnesses in both the criminal proceeding as well as in the departmental proceeding are identical. It is further argued by Mr. Banerjee that the charges as framed against the delinquent in the disciplinary proceeding are also akin to the charge as framed in the said criminal trial i.e. under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 21. It is submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the judgment of the said criminal case it would reveal further that it is the finding of the learned trial court that the PW1 in his cross-examination dated 02.06.2016 categorically testified the following:- “There is a cot kept on the left side of the said room being No.11 immediately after entrance door. It is submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the judgment of the said criminal case it would reveal further that it is the finding of the learned trial court that the PW1 in his cross-examination dated 02.06.2016 categorically testified the following:- “There is a cot kept on the left side of the said room being No.11 immediately after entrance door. Immediately after entering into the Room No.11, I kept the said packet in one corner of the cot which was nearest to the entrance door”. 22. It is submitted by Mr. Banerjee that from the judgement as passed in Special Court Case no. 02/2005 it would reveal further that the learned trial court noticing the contradictions in the evidence of PWs came to a finding that the present writ petitioner who is the accused before him is entitled to honourable acquittal in view of the reported decision of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Anr. vs. S. Samuthiram reported in AIR 2013 SC 14 . It is further submitted that with such finding the writ petitioner who is the accused before the learned trial court in the said criminal case was acquitted from the charge as framed against him and being not found guilty under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 23. Placing his reliance upon the reported decision of Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat gold Mines Ltd. and Anr. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 , G.M Tank vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 and Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan And Ors. reported in (2024) 1SCC 175 it is argued by Mr. Banerjee that in the aforementioned three reported decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed the view that when the departmental proceeding and criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and same and the nature of evidence both oral and documentary are one and same and further on conclusion of the criminal trial the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt and if the delinquent is honourably acquitted by a judicial pronouncement it would be highly unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 24. Mr. 24. Mr. Banerjee thus submits that in view of the proposition of law as decided in the case of G.M Tank (supra), M. Paul Anthony (supra) and Ram Lal (supra) there cannot be any hesitation to hold that the writ petitioners are successful in making out a case for obtaining the relief(s) as prayed for in the instant writ petition. 25. It is thus submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the instant writ petition may be allowed and the punishments as imposed upon the writ petitioner vide memo dated 11.01.2007 and the order of the appellate authority dated 28.03.2007 may be set aside. 26. Per contra, Mr. Koley, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent/authorities contended that before the enquiry officer the PWs to the said enquiry proceeding had adduced clenching evidence regarding the acceptance of bribe by the delinquent who is the writ petitioner herein. 27. It is thus submitted that the alleged non-examination of the complainant or marking of exhibits of the written complaint as well as cassette by the other PWs cannot be the subject matter of review in the instant writ petition since in a judicial review this writ court does not act as an appellate court. 28. Placing his reliance upon the reported decision of Airport Authority of India vs. Pradip Kumar Banerjee reported in (2025) 4 SCC 111 and Pravin Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471 it is argued by Mr. Koley that in the aforementioned two reported decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly defined the scope of judicial review by holding that where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on such materials. 29. It is thus submitted by Mr. Koley that in absence of any glaring perversity and/or violation of principle of natural justice and/or any material for not following the established procedure of law for holding an enquiry proceeding there cannot be any justification to grant relief to the writ petitioner as prayed for. 30. In course of his argument Mr. 29. It is thus submitted by Mr. Koley that in absence of any glaring perversity and/or violation of principle of natural justice and/or any material for not following the established procedure of law for holding an enquiry proceeding there cannot be any justification to grant relief to the writ petitioner as prayed for. 30. In course of his argument Mr. Koley, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents draws attention of this Court to page nos.65 and 66 of the instant writ petition being a copy of the article of charges as lebelled against the writ petitioner in the said disciplinary proceeding. Attention of this Court is also drawn to the page nos. 89 to 125 of the supplementary affidavit as filed on behalf of the writ petitioner and as affirmed on 21.03.2025. 31. It is submitted by Mr. Koley that on comparative study of the said articles of charges and the copies of the judgment and order dated 07.12.2024 as passed in Special Court case no. 02 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special), 3rd Court, District Bankura it would reveal that in the said disciplinary proceeding charges were framed against the delinquent for violation of Regulations 38 and 59 of the West Bengal State Electricity Board Employees’ Service Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Regulations’ in short) which tantamoutns to misconduct in terms of Regulations 61(d), 61(c) and 61(b) of the said Regulations. It is further submitted by Mr. Koley that however, from the judgement and order dated 07.12.2024 as passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special), 3rd Court, District Bankura, in the aforementioned Special Case no.02 of 2005 it would reveal that in the said criminal trial charge under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act was framed against the accused. 32. Drawing attention to Chapter IV of the said Regulations which deals with the subject ‘conduct, discipline, punishment and appeal” it is submitted by Mr. 32. Drawing attention to Chapter IV of the said Regulations which deals with the subject ‘conduct, discipline, punishment and appeal” it is submitted by Mr. Koley that Regulation 38 of the said Regulations envisages that all employees of the Board shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty whereas Regulation 59 of the self same Regulations envisages that all employees of the said Board would observe rules and procedure in all matters and also abide by rules, regulations, orders and circulars that may be issued from time to time by Board or by any appropriate officer of the Board. 33. It is further submitted by Mr. Koley that Regulation 61 of the self same Regulations deals with subject of misconduct or breach of discipline which shall be punishable to the extent provided under the said Regulations and under Regulation 61 same illustrations of misconduct or breach of discipline have been envisaged. 34. It is thus submitted by Mr. Koley that charges as framed under the said Regulations are quite distinguishable from the contents of the provisions of Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act of 1988’ in short ) and therefore by no stretch of imagination it may be held that the charges as framed in the disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent and the charge as framed by the said Additional Sessions Judge in a criminal proceeding are identical as wrongly contended on behalf of the writ petitioner. 35. At this juncture Mr. Koley took me to page no. 68 of the instant writ petition vis-à-vis page no. 91 of the supplementary affidavit as filed by the writ petitioner. It is submitted by Mr. Koley that on comparative study of the list of prosecution witnesses in the departmental proceeding and the said criminal case it would reveal that the said prosecution witnesses are not exactly identical. 36. In course of his argument Mr. Koley also places his reliance upon the reported decision of G. M Tank (supra). It is submitted on behalf of Mr. Koley that on comparative study of the list of prosecution witnesses in the departmental proceeding and the said criminal case it would reveal that the said prosecution witnesses are not exactly identical. 36. In course of his argument Mr. Koley also places his reliance upon the reported decision of G. M Tank (supra). It is submitted on behalf of Mr. Koley that the reported decision of G.M Tank (supra) as cited from the side of the writ petitioner is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case inasmuch as in the said reported decision the Hon’ble Supreme Court came to a finding that the order passed by the learned Special Judge (Special) acquitting the appellant has reached finality since the said order was not challenged in appeal, however, the judgment and order dated 07.12.2024 as passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special), 3rd Court, Bankura in Special Case no. 02 of 2005 is subject matter of challenge in a criminal appeal before this Court and the same is still pending. It is thus submitted by Mr. Koley that the aforementioned judgement dated 07.12.2024 as passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special), 3rd Court, Bankura has not yet reached finality which is however disputed by Mr. Banerjee by sayig that no material is forthcoming that an appeal has been preferred challenging the said judgement of acquittal. 37. In his next limb of submission Mr. Koley places his reliance upon the order dated 08.06.2005 as passed in WP no.9481 (W) of 2005 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court as has been annexed at page nos. 193 to 195 of the instant writ petition. It is submitted by Mr. Koley that on perusal of the said order dated 08.06.2005 it would reveal that one of the subject matters of challenge in the said writ petition was the maintainability of the disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent during the pendency of the criminal proceeding. It is further submitted by Mr. Koley that by the said order dated 08.06.2005 a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court held that the disciplinary proceeding would continue even during the pendency of the criminal proceeding. It is thus submitted by Mr. It is further submitted by Mr. Koley that by the said order dated 08.06.2005 a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court held that the disciplinary proceeding would continue even during the pendency of the criminal proceeding. It is thus submitted by Mr. Koley that in view of such chronology of events the writ petitioner cannot be permitted to claim benefit of the judgment of acquittal as passed in the said criminal proceeding especially when the disciplinary proceeding was concluded much before the conclusion of the criminal trial. 38. Placing reliance upon the reported decision of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in AIR 2011 SC 1931 it is submitted by Mr. Koley that in the said reported decision the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly held that subsequent acquittal by a criminal court will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor does it affect the validity of finding of guilt or consequential punishment. 39. In course of his submission Mr. Koley also places his reliance upon the reported decision of State of Karnataka and Anr. vs. Umesh reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563 . It is submitted that in the case of Umesh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has occasion to consider the issue as to whether the order of the disciplinary authority in holding the writ petitioner guilty of charges despite a finding by a criminal court acquitting him of similar charges on the basis of similar set of evidence was at all justified. 40. It is submitted by Mr. Koley that in the said reported decision of Umesh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the issue came to a finding that i. A writ court in exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether rules of natural justice has been complied with; ii. The findings of misconduct is based on some evidence; iii. The statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and iv. Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and v. The penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct. 41. It is thus submitted by Mr. The findings of misconduct is based on some evidence; iii. The statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and iv. Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and v. The penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct. 41. It is thus submitted by Mr. Koley that if the proposition of law as decided in the case of Umesh (supra) is applied to the facts and circumstances of the instant writ petition there is hardly any scope to interfere with such findings of the enquiry authority, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority which are impugned in this writ petition. 42. It is further submitted by Mr. Koley that similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the reported decision of Union of India and Ors. vs. Sitaram Mishra and Anr. reported in (2019) 20 SCC 588 ; Commissioner of Police, New Delhi vs. Narender Singh reported in (2006) 4 SCC 265 ; State of Rajasthan and Ors. vs. Heem Singh reported in (2021) 12 SCC 569 ; Union of India and Ors. vs. Subrata Nath reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1617. 43. Mr. Koley thus submits that it is a fit case for dismissal of the instant writ petition. 44. This Court has perused the entire materials as placed before this Court. This Court has given its anxious consideration over the submissions made the Learned Advocates for the contending parties. 45. For effective adjudication of the instant writ petition, this Court at the very outset proposes to look to the regulation nos. 38, 59, 61(d), 61(e) and 61(p) of the said regulations since the delinquent being the writ petitioner herein faced disciplinary proceeding on the Articles of Charges under the aforementioned regulations. 46. Regulation nos. 38, 59, 61(d), 61(e) and 61(p) of the said regulations are quoted herein below in verbatim : “38. All employees of the Board shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty.” *************************************************************************** “59. All employees shall observe rules or procedure in all matters and also abide by rules, regulations, orders and circulars that may be issued from time to time by the Board or by any appropriate officer of the Board.” *************************************************************************** “61. Any act of misconduct or breach of discipline shall be punishable to the extent provided under these Regulations. All employees shall observe rules or procedure in all matters and also abide by rules, regulations, orders and circulars that may be issued from time to time by the Board or by any appropriate officer of the Board.” *************************************************************************** “61. Any act of misconduct or breach of discipline shall be punishable to the extent provided under these Regulations. A few such acts of misconduct or breaches of discipline are mentioned below as illustrative of the nature of such acts and breaches. Note: This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. a.. b.. c.. d. Neglect of allotted work and careless or inefficient performance of duty; e. Causing loss to the Board by any act of the employee or by the failure on the part of the employee to act in the manner he should have done; f.. g.. h.. i.. j… h.. i… j…. k… l… m.. n… o… Any other acts which are commonly and generally known or understood to be against the canons of good behavior and discipline.” 47. This Court also proposes to look to Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’ which is as under : “7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed. - Any public servant who,- (a)obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or (b)obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or (c)performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1. Explanation 1. - For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. A public servant, ‘S’; asks a person, ‘P’; to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time ’S’; is guilty of an offence under this section. Explanation 2. - For the purpose of this section,- (i)the expressions “obtains”; or “accepts”; or “attempts to obtain” shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or “accepts”; or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means; (ii)it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party.” 48. Keeping in mind the contents of the aforementioned regulations and the legislative provision of Section 7 of the said Act, if I look to the factual aspects of this case, it reveals from the materials as placed before this Court that by the impugned memo dated 31.03.2003 the writ petitioner was served with the chargesheet together with the Articles of charges levelled against him under the aforementioned regulations. 49. The disciplinary authority of the delinquent was not satisfied with the answers given by him and thus enquiry proceeding against the writ petitioner was initiated. 50. From the materials as placed before this Court it reveals further that in the said disciplinary proceedings on behalf of the prosecution/respondent authorities herein 10 witnesses have been examined and on behalf of the delinquent 4 witnesses have adduced evidence. On conclusion of the said disciplinary proceeding the enquiry officer found the delinquent guilty under regulations 38, 59 and 61(e) of the said regulations under cover of his report dated 22.03.2006 which is also impugned in the instant writ petition. 51. Sufficient materials have been placed before this Court that the writ petitioner was served with the copy of the said enquiry report dated 22.03.2006 by the disciplinary authority. From the impugned order dated 11.01.2007 as passed by the disciplinary authority as has annexed at page nos. 51. Sufficient materials have been placed before this Court that the writ petitioner was served with the copy of the said enquiry report dated 22.03.2006 by the disciplinary authority. From the impugned order dated 11.01.2007 as passed by the disciplinary authority as has annexed at page nos. 307 to 317 of the instant writ petition it reveals that the said disciplinary authority was not satisfied with the answers as given the delinquent and thus imposed the punishment of dismissal from service and forfeiture of gratuity by his aforementioned order dated 11.01.2007 which is also impugned in this writ petition. 52. It is pertinent to mention herein that the appeal as preferred by the writ petitioner was also dismissed by the appellate authority’s order dated 28.03.2007 which is also under challenge in this writ petition, a copy of which is annexed at page nos. 359 and 360 of the instant writ petition. 53. Since in course of his argument Mr. Banerjee was very vocal with regard to the alleged discrepancies of the evidence of the PWs in the said disciplinary proceeding as has been allegedly overlooked by the enquiry officer, this Court at the very outset proposes to look to the settled positions of Law with regard to the scope of judicial review as has been enunciated time and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by the different High Courts. 54. In the reported judgement of ‘Airport Authority of India -vs- Pradip Kumar Banerjee’ (supra) as cited by Mr. Koley, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while examining the standard of proof in a domestic enquiry and the scope of judicial review by a writ Court expressed the following : “31. Further, we are unable to sustain the finding of the Division Bench that the non-examination of the complainant is fatal to the case of the appellant authority. It is well-settled principle of law that even in a criminal case pertaining to demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the courts are empowered to record conviction, where the decoy turns hostile, and the prosecution case is based purely on the evidence of the Trap Laying Officer and the trap witnesses. It is well-settled principle of law that even in a criminal case pertaining to demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the courts are empowered to record conviction, where the decoy turns hostile, and the prosecution case is based purely on the evidence of the Trap Laying Officer and the trap witnesses. In this regard, we are benefitted by the judgment of this Court in Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of Gujarat [Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of Gujarat, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 81] , wherein it was held thus : (SCC OnLine SC para 7) “7. … It is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that whilein the case of evidence of an accomplice, no conviction can be based on his evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars but as regards the evidence of a partisan witness it is open to a court to convict an accused person solely on the basis of that evidence, if it is satisfied that that evidenceis reliable.” 32. In the case at hand, the subject-matter concerns a domestic enquiry, where the strict rules of evidence prohibiting admissibility of confessional statements recorded by the police officials do not apply. Likewise, non- examination of the decoy cannot be treated to be fatal in the domestic enquiry where other evidence indicts the delinquent officer. As has been held by this Court in Narender Singh [Delhi Police v. Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 686] , even a confession of the delinquent employee recorded by the Trap Laying Officer during the criminal investigation can be relied upon by the disciplinary authority. 33. It is pertinent to note that the Trap Laying Officer i.e. D.N. Biswas was examined during the course of disciplinary proceedings as PW 2, and he supported the case of the appellant authority to the hilt. The evidence of PW 2 was substantially corroborated by the other departmental witnesses including PW 1 i.e. Mr S.K. Dasgupta (Assistant Commissioner of Police, Economic Offences Wing and Detective Department) and PW 3 i.e. Mr M.K. Bagchi (Executive Engineer). Thus, the Division Bench clearly erred in holding that non- examination of the complainant was fatal to the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the appellant authority. 34. Thus, the Division Bench clearly erred in holding that non- examination of the complainant was fatal to the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the appellant authority. 34. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment [Pradip Kumar Banerjee v. AAI, 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 2248], further observed that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority did not consider the representation of the respondent and acted without application of mind while imposing the penalty of dismissal from service against the respondent. On a perusal of the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, we find that the representation submitted by the respondent has been duly adverted to and objectively considered by both the authorities and the same were found to be devoid of substance. 35. It is trite law that in disciplinary proceedings, it is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to deal with each and every ground raised by the delinquent officer in the representation against the proposed penalty and detailed reasons are not required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment if he accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Our view stands fortified by the decision of this Court in Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank [Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, (2021) 3 SCC 806 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 624] , wherein it was held : (SCC p. 810, para 11) “11. … Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the disciplinary authority.” 36. All that is required on the part of the disciplinary authority is that it should examine the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material placed on record during the course of enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This is precisely what was done by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority while dealing with the case of the respondent. 37. In our considered view, the Division Bench fell into grave error in substituting the standard of proof required in a criminal trial vis-à-vis the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer. This is precisely what was done by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority while dealing with the case of the respondent. 37. In our considered view, the Division Bench fell into grave error in substituting the standard of proof required in a criminal trial vis-à-vis the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer. It is a settled principle of law that the burden laid upon the prosecution in a criminal trial is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a disciplinary enquiry, the burden upon the department is limited and it is required to prove its case on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. 38. In this regard, we are benefitted by the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 ] , wherein this Court held as follows : (SCC p. 623, para 15) “15. … A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court….” 55. In the reported decision of Umesh(supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus :- “…………………………………………………………………………………… 15. The enquiry report concluded in this backdrop that the misconduct was established on the basis of the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3. Referring to the evidence of the complainant, the enquiry officer held that if in truth the respondent had not demanded a bribe and PW 1 was returning a loan amount to the respondent as stated by DW 1, there was no necessity for the complainant to visit the office of the Lokayukta and to sign a complaint. Referring to the evidence of the complainant, the enquiry officer held that if in truth the respondent had not demanded a bribe and PW 1 was returning a loan amount to the respondent as stated by DW 1, there was no necessity for the complainant to visit the office of the Lokayukta and to sign a complaint. The complainant was also present for the pre-trap and trap mahazar and appended his signatures. The enquiry report finds that there was no reason for PW 2 and PW 3 to depose falsely. No material inconsistencies were elicited during the cross-examination by the respondent. Consequently, the defence that the amount which was recovered from the respondent represented a loan was disbelieved and the misconduct was held to beproved. 16. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction. 17. In a judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 298 : (1977) 1 SLR 750 ] , V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. set out the principles which govern disciplinary proceedings as follows : (SCC p. 493, para 4) “4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, 1872 may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, 1872 may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The “residuum” rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence — not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.” (emphasis in original and supplied ) These principles have been reiterated in subsequent decisions of this Court including State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena [State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1455] ; Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh [Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh, (2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067] ; Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764 : 2005 SCC (L& S) 1020] and CISF v. Abrar Ali [CISF v. Abrar Ali, (2017) 4 SCC 507 : (2018) 1 SCC (L& S) 310] . **************************************************************** 22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not reappreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct. [State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 : (2020) 1 SCC (L&;S) 547; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L& S) 80; R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (L& S) 1424 and CISF v. Abrar Ali, (2017) 4 SCC 507 : (2018) 1 SCC (L& S) 310] ……………………………………………………………………………………” 56. Keeping in mind the propositions of Law as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court if I look to the enquiry report dated 22.03.2006 which is impugned in the instant writ petition, it reveals to me that by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the said enquiry report was prepared based on no evidence at all. Rather it appears to this Court that in the said quasi-judicial proceedings rules of natural justice and fair play have been observed by the enquiry authority in as much as the delinquent got sufficient opportunity to cross- examine the PWS as well as to adduce evidence on his behalf by tendering DWS. 57. Though Mr. Banerjee in course of his argument vividly contended that the in the said disciplinary proceeding the complainant was not examined and even then the written complaint as lodged by the complaint and the cassette containing the conversations with the accused and the delinquent were exhibited, however in considered view of this Court non- examination of the complainant and the marking of the said written complaint and the said cassette are not at all fatal since it is trite Law that in a domestic enquiry strict rules of evidence for proving documents is not a sine qua non. 58. It further appears to this Court that before the enquiry officer the other members of the trap team adduced evidence and those PWs have been substantially cross- examined and after assessing such evidence the enquiry officer submitted his report which in considered view of this Court cannot be termed arbitrary. It thus appears to this Court that in absence of any perversity and/or any material showing exclusion of material evidence and/or for consideration of some extraneous material the decision making process of the enquiry authority has been vitiated, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the findings of enquiry authority, disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. 59. In further considered view of this Court the reported decision of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) as cited on behalf of the writ petitioner is not at all helpful to the writ petitioner in as much as in the said judgement the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed the view that in a domestic enquiry the provisions of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not strictly applicable however principle applied therefrom can be applied in specific cases. This Court in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgement has already come to a finding that in course of the said enquiry proceeding the other members of the trap team has adduced oral evidence and that the said PWs have proved the documents and materials following the established procedure of Law. 60. At this juncture I shall make an endevour to consider the effect of the judgement and order of acquittal dated 07.12.2024 as passed in Special Case No. 02 of 2005 by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special), 3rd Court, Bankura in the disciplinary proceeding against the writ petitioner and in doing so I also propose to look to relevant reported decisions as cited from the Bar. 61. In the reported decision of G.M tank (supra) as cited both by Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Koley the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the resultant effects of acquittal of the delinquent in a criminal trial who is found guilty in the disciplinary proceeding where departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts, charges, evidences and witnesses are the same and in doing so the Hon’ble Apex Court held thus:- “30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant’s residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case [ (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L& S) 810] will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by theappellant deserves to be allowed.” 62. In the reported decision of Ram Lal (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the legal position regarding the effect of acquittal as passed in a criminal trial and the order of dismissal passed in the departmental enquiry expressed the following view:- “12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the Court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. If the Court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The Court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. (See G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat; (2006) 5 SCC 446 , State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao; (2008) 15 SCC 657 and S. Samuthiram; (2013) 1 SCC 598 .)” 63. A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sitaram Mishra (supra) as cited by Mr. Koley, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held thus:- “14. The fact that the first respondent was acquitted in the course of criminal trial cannot operate ipso facto as a ground for vitiating the finding of misconduct which has been arrived at during the course of the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court, in our view, has drawn an erroneous inference from the decision of this Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mine Ltd; (1999) 3 SCC 679 . The High Court adverted to the following principle of law laid down in the above judgment: (SCC p. 687, para 13) "13. ... While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance." 64. Since in the case of G.M Tank (supra), Ram Lal (supra) and Sitaram (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court placed their reliance upon the judgement of M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat gold Mines Ltd. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 this Court also proposes to look to the reported decision of M. Paul Anthony (supra) wherein another bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed the following view:- “13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer to in this case, and the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance. 14. The first decision of this Court on the question was rendered in Delhi Cloth & anr; General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan [ AIR 1960 SC 806 : (1960) 3 SCR 227 : (1960) 1 LLJ 520 ] in which it was observed as under: “It is true that very often employers stay enquiries pending the decision of the criminal trial courts and that is fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the criminal trial court before taking action against an employee. In Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. Newsman’s Printing Works [1956 LAC 188] this was the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced.” ******************************************************************** 16. We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced.” ******************************************************************** 16. The question cropped up again with a new angle in Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari [ AIR 1969 SC 30 : (1969) 1 SCR 134 ] as it was contended that initiation of disciplinary proceedings during the pendency of a criminal case on the same facts amounted to contempt of court. This plea was rejected and the Court observed as under: “The issue in the disciplinary proceedings is whether the employee is guilty of the charges on which it is proposed to take action against him. The same issue may arise for decision in a civil or criminal proceeding pending in a court. But the pendency of the court proceeding does not bar the taking of disciplinary action. The power of taking such action is vested in the disciplinary authority. The civil or criminal court has no such power. The initiation and continuation of disciplinary proceedings in good faith is not calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice in the pending court proceeding. The employee is free to move the court for an order restraining the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings. If he obtains a stay order, a wilful violation of the order would of course amount to contempt of court. In the absence of a stay order the disciplinary authority is free to exercise its lawful powers.” 17. These decisions indicate that though it would not be wrong in conducting two parallel proceedings, one by way of disciplinary action and the other in the criminal court, still it would be desirable to stay the domestic enquiry if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against the employee in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal court. The case-law was reviewed by this Court in Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [ (1988) 4 SCC 319 : 1988 SCC (L& S) 950 : 1988 Supp (2) SCR 821 : AIR 1988 SC 2118 ] and it was laid down as under: (SCC p. 323, para 7) “7. The case-law was reviewed by this Court in Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [ (1988) 4 SCC 319 : 1988 SCC (L& S) 950 : 1988 Supp (2) SCR 821 : AIR 1988 SC 2118 ] and it was laid down as under: (SCC p. 323, para 7) “7. The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, strait- jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general guideline.” The Court further observed as under: (SCC p. 323, para 8) “8. In the instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts. We are of the view that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the High Court was not right in interfering with the trial courts order of injunction which had been affirmed in appeal.” ************************************************************************** 22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.” 65. In the light of the proposition of law as enunciated in the aforementioned three reported decisions this Court at the very outset proposes to look to the charges of the said Regulations in respect of which the delinquent being the writ petitioner was found guilty in the enquiry proceeding which has been upheld both by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority. 66. 66. Regulation 38 says about the integrity of the employees of the respondent no.1/ board (now company) while Regulation 59 deals with the obligation of the employees of the respondent/company to observe rules and procedures in all matters and also to abide by the rules, regulations, orders and circulars that may be issued from time to time either by the respondent/ company or by any appropriate officer of the said company. 67. Regulation 61 deals with resultant effect of any misconduct or breach of discipline which according to the said Regulations would be punishable to the extent provided under the said Regulations. In Regulation 61 some illustrations have been given and under Clause (e) of Regulation 61 causing loss to the respondent company by any act of the employee or by the failure on the part of the employee to act in a manner he should have done comes under the purview of misconduct or breach of discipline. 68. Section 7 of the said Act deals with the offence relating to public servant being bribed. The said Section mandates that any public servant who obtains or accepts or attempts to take from any person an undue advantage with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant or obtains or accepts an undue advantage or any personal reward for improper or dishonest performance of public duty shall be punished with imprisonment as mentioned in the said Section and would be liable to pay fine. 69. Keeping in mind the provisions of the aforementioned Regulations as well as legislative mandate as mentioned in Section 7 of the said Act, if I look to the factual aspects as involved in the instant writ petition it reveals that the articles of charges as framed against the present writ petitioner was on account of alleged demand and acceptance of bribe from one Dinabandhu Gorai with an assurance that in the event such bribe is paid to him the writ petitioner being Divisional Engineer (Commercial) would not raise huge amount of energy bill upon the complainant namely; Shri Gopal Chandra Niyogi who at that material time was an owner of a cold storage. 70. 70. It further appears from the supplementary affidavit as filed on behalf of the writ petitioner that in the Special Court case no.02 of 2005, the accusations lebelled against the writ petitioner was more or less the same. On comparative study of articles of charges dated 29.03.2003 and the written complaint as lodged in connection with the said criminal trial it reveals that it is the case of the respondent company and its instrumentalities that on account of such illegal demand of bribe by the writ petitioner a trap team was prepared to arrange for trap programme and in such trap programme the writ petitioner was apprehended. 71. In view of such, this Court has got no hesitation to hold that the charges as framed against the delinquent in the said enquiry proceeding and the charge under Section 7 of the said Act which is the subject matter of Special Court Case no. 02 of 2005 are almost similar and identical. It further reveals that PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4, PW6, PW7 and PW8 of the said enquiry proceeding also deposed as PW3, PW5, PW2, PW6, PW4, PW10 and PW8 in the said Special Court Case respectively. 72. On comparative study of the enquiry report which is under challenge before this Court it reveals that the aforementioned prosecution witnesses are not only vital witnesses in the said enquiry proceeding but also they are the members of the trap team and in that capacity they deposed in the aforementioned criminal trial. 73. In view of such, this Court has also got no hesitation to hold that the witnesses more specifically the vital witnesses to the said disciplinary proceeding are also identical and similar in the criminal proceeding. 74. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Banerjee that from the supplementary affidavit it would reveal that in Special Court Case no.02 of 2005 the learned trial court passed the judgement and order of acquittal of the accused who is the writ petitioner herein not on account of benefit of doubt. Rather it appears to this Court that such judgement was passed by the said trial court in the said criminal trial after appreciation of the entire prosecution witnesses both oral and documentary and the learned trial court in its judgement and order dated 07.12.2024 expressly held that the accused person before him (who is the writ petitioner herein) deserves honourable acquittal. 75. 75. Though in course of his argument Mr. Koley contended that the aforementioned judgement and order dated 07.12.2024 is the subject matter of appeal before this Hon’ble Court and further contended that the said judgment and order dated 07.12.2024 acquitting the present writ petitioner from the charge has not reached finality however, no materials have been placed on behalf of the respondent/authority that this High Court granted any order of stay over the judgement and order dated 07.12.2024 as heavily relied upon on behalf of the writ petitioners. 76. In view of the acquittal of the present writ petitioner in the aforementioned criminal trial where charge has been framed against him under Section 7 of the said Act this Court finds no reason at all to sustain the findings of the enquiry officer under cover of his report dated 22.03.2006, the finding of the disciplinary authority pursuant to the memo dated 11.01.2007 whereby and whereunder the writ petitioner was dismissed from his service with the forfeiture of entire gratuity as well as the memo dated 28.03.2007 as issued by the appellate authority affirming the punishment as imposed by the disciplinary authority. 77. Consequently, the writ petition succeeds. 78. Consequently, the articles of charges dated 29.03.2003 as framed against the writ petitioner, the enquiry report dated 22.03.2006, the finding of the disciplinary authority as communicated vide memo dated 11.01.2007 and the finding of the appellate authority as communicated to the writ petitioner under cover of memo dated 28.03.2007 are all hereby set aside and quashed. 79. Since the writ petitioner has already crossed his age of superannuation long back, there cannot be any order for his reinstatement. 80. No case has been made out by the writ petitioner in the instant writ petition that from the day of his dismissal from service till the day of his actual superannuation he was not gainfully employed anywhere and as such the writ petitioner is not entitled to any arrear pay and/or backwages. 81. 80. No case has been made out by the writ petitioner in the instant writ petition that from the day of his dismissal from service till the day of his actual superannuation he was not gainfully employed anywhere and as such the writ petitioner is not entitled to any arrear pay and/or backwages. 81. In view of such, it would be just and proper in directing respondent/authorities more specifically the respondent no.1/company to disburse admissible amount of pension to the writ petitioner by holding that the writ petitioner was in service till the actual day of his superannuation in the post of Divisional Engineer (Commercial) and accordingly, the respondent no.1/ company is directed to disburse admissible amount of pension to the writ petitioner with effect from September 2025 and the arrear of pension as payable to the writ petitioner shall be paid by the respondent no.1/ company without interest in three equal installments out of which first installment shall have to be paid by the last day of April 2026, the second installment shall have to be paid by the last day of August 2026 and the third and last installment shall have to be paid by the last day of December 2026. 82. Before parting with it is further made clear that in the event the present writ petitioner is not under the scheme of pension he is entitled to gratuity as well as of other retiral benefits without any interest by holding that the writ petitioner superannuated from the post of Divisional Engineer (Commercial) but without any amount of arrear of pay and/or backwages. However, all such retiral benefit shall have to be disbursed to the writ petitioner by the respondent no.1/ company by the last day of December, 2025 and that the said retiral benefit shall not carry any interest in the event the said retiral benefit is disbursed within the time specified by this Court in default the same will carry interest at the rate of 9 % per annum till the date of actual payment. 83. With the aforementioned observation WPA 10060 of 2007 is allowed and disposed of. 84. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be given to the parties on completion of usual formalities. Later 1. 83. With the aforementioned observation WPA 10060 of 2007 is allowed and disposed of. 84. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be given to the parties on completion of usual formalities. Later 1. After pronouncement of the judgement, Mr.Koley, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents prays for stay of the operation of the instant judgement dated 10.09.2025 as passed in connection with the instant writ petition. 2. Such prayer is considered and rejected.