JUDGMENT : Easwaran S., J. Efficacy of an award passed under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act 1894 after the promulgation of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, Act 30 of 2013) has arisen for consideration in this appeal preferred by the claimant. Though the claimant sought reference under Section 18 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, the Subordinate Judges court, Thalassery by judgment and decree dated 15.06.2020 upheld the award passed by the Collector, granted enhancement to the claimant and answered the reference in L.A.R. No.1 of 2016. Aggrieved by the same the claimant is before us in appeal. 2. The brief facts for the disposal of the appeal are as follows: An extent of 0.1850 hectares of land comprised in Re-survey No.50/2 (New Survey No.50/7) of the Eruvatty village of Thalassery taluk was acquired for the purpose of establishing SV/IP Station of Gas Authority of India Limited. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded a total compensation of Rs.6,27,605/- (Rupees Six Lakhs Twenty Seven Thousand Six Hundred and Five only). Dissatisfied with the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimant sought reference under Section 18 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act. 3. Before delving further into the issues presented before us in the present appeal, we need to notice certain indisputable facts. The date of Section 4(1) notification was on 14.12.2012. The award was passed on 15.03.2014 fixing the land value at Rs.13,734/- per cent. The erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was repealed by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, Act 30 of 2013) on 1.1.2014. Pursuant to the award dated 15.3.2014, the land was taken possession on 11.4.2014. The reference court answered the reference on 15.6.2020. While answering the reference, the reference court noticed that though the claimant contended that since the award was passed after the enactment of the new Act, he was entitled to get compensation as per the scheme under Act 30 of 2013, subsequently, after the argument was concluded, he had agreed to the award be passed as per Section 18 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 . Therefore, the reference court concluded that in view of the endorsement ‘waving his right under the new Act’, the court can proceed under the earlier Act, and, accordingly rendered its findings. 4. Therefore, the reference court concluded that in view of the endorsement ‘waving his right under the new Act’, the court can proceed under the earlier Act, and, accordingly rendered its findings. 4. Certain intricate questions have presented itself before us for consideration. For the sake of convenience, we deem it appropriate to broadly frame the following questions which arise for consideration. a. Whether the award dated 15.3.2014 has any efficacy of law in view of the promulgation of Act 30 of 2013. b. Whether the claimant can waive his right to claim compensation under the New Act. c. Whether the Sub Court, Thalassery, had jurisdiction to answer the reference. 5. We have heard Sri. Joby Jacob Pulickekudy, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri. T.K. Shajahan, the learned Senior Government Pleader, Smt. Latha Anand, the learned counsel appearing for the requisitioning authority, and Sri. P.B Krishnan, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. Chithra, the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court to assist the Court on the intricate questions of law. 6. The efficacy of the award dated 15.3.2014. 6.1. In the present case, Section 4(1) notification was issued on 14.12.2012. Under the earlier regime of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , before passing an award, it is imperative to issue a declaration under Section 6 . Section 6 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act reads as under: 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. 6.1. In the present case, Section 4(1) notification was issued on 14.12.2012. Under the earlier regime of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , before passing an award, it is imperative to issue a declaration under Section 6 . Section 6 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act reads as under: 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. – (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, [when the [appropriate Government] [or the Board of Revenue] is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A, sub- section (2)], that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders [ or of the Secretary of the Board of Revenue, as the case may be], [and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notifications under Section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section 5-A, sub-section (2)]: [Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1),- (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification:] Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. [Explanation 1.- In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. [Explanation 1.- In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Explanation 2.- Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues]. (2) [Every declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, [and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall state] the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. (3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration the [appropriate Government] [or the Board of Revenue, as the case may be,] may acquire the land in a manner hereinafter appearing. 6.2. Section 11A of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act reads as under: “11-A. Period within which an award shall be made. -The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation.- In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.” 6.3. Therefore, it is clear that an award is required to be passed within two years from the date of declaration made under Section 6 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 . In the present case, though the notification dated 14.12.2012 does not suffer from any infirmities, the problem is compounded by the fact that the State chose to pass an award only on 15.3.2014 by which time, Act 30 of 2013 came into force. 6.4. Section 24 of Act 30 of 2013 provides for the lapsing of the award under the earlier regime of land acquisition. Section 24(1) of the Act 30 of 2013 reads as under: “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ,- (a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 6.5. A reading of Clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 24 shows that when an award under Section 11 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act has not been passed, then the provisions for determination of the compensation under the new Act shall apply. This means the acquisition proceedings taken under the earlier Act will not lapse, but the award has to be passed following the prescribed procedure under the new Act. 6.6. Turning to the procedure prescribed under the new Act, we find that there is substantial change in the procedure followed while determining compensation. Section 26 of Act 30 of 2013 deals with the procedure, and Section 28 is the provision that deals with the parameters to be considered by the Collector while determining the compensation. This leads to a question as to what is the legal status of the award passed on 15.3.2014. 6.7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Senior Counsel Sri. P.B. Krishnan, the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court would unanimously assert before this Court that the award passed after coming into force of the new Act has no legal sanctity. 6.8. 6.7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Senior Counsel Sri. P.B. Krishnan, the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court would unanimously assert before this Court that the award passed after coming into force of the new Act has no legal sanctity. 6.8. To appreciate the above contention, we need to elaborately consider the impact of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others [ 2020 (8) SCC 129 ] wherein, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court extensively considered the question of lapsing of the acquisition proceedings under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act on promulgation of Section 24. We deem it appropriate to extract paragraph Nos.162, 163, 164,165 and 166 of the aforesaid judgment as follows: “162 . The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011 (Bill No.77 of 2011) was introduced in the Parliament. The provisions of S.24, as introduced in the said Bill, read as under: "24. Land Acquisition process under Act 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case where a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued before the commencement of this Act but the award under Section 11 thereof has not been made before such commencement, the process shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government shall initiate the process for acquisition of land afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where possession of land has not been taken, regardless of whether the award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Act (1 of 1894) has been made or not, the process for acquisition of land shall also be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government shall initiate the process of acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 163. It is apparent from S.24(1), as introduced originally, contained a provision with respect to award, which has not been made, but it was later on amended, and now as provided in S.24(1)(a), there is no lapse and only higher compensation is available in case award has not been passed. The earlier Section 24(2) contained only the provision with respect to possession of the land that has not been taken. The earlier Section 24(2) contained only the provision with respect to possession of the land that has not been taken. Earlier, there was no time limit prescribed, and it was proposed that the process for acquisition of land shall lapse. Clause 24 of Notes on clauses of Bill read thus: "Clause 24 seeks to provide that land acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases where the award has not been made and possession of land has not been taken before the commencement of proposed legislation." 164. After considering the various suggestions of the State Government, the Committee made some recommendations, which are extracted hereunder: "16.5 The Committee note that Clause 24 of the Bill provides that land acquisition cases/process shall be invalid on enactment of the new Act in cases where Collector has not given award or possession of the land has not been taken before the commencement of the proposed legislation. Some of the representatives of the industry and also the Ministries like Railways and Urban Development submitted before the Committee that land acquisition proceedings already initiated under the existing Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should not lapse as it would lead to time and cost overrun in many infrastructural projects. However, in such cases land compensation and R&R benefits could be allowed as per the provisions of LARR Bill. The Committee would like the Government to re - examine the issue and incorporate necessary provisions in the Rules to be framed under the new Act with a view to ensuring that the land owners / farmers / affected families get enhanced compensation and R & R package under the provisions of the LARR Bill, 2011 and at the same time, the pace of implementation of infrastructural projects is not adversely impacted." 165. Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29.8.2013, were referred to during the hearings, to cite various reasons given in respect of the question why effect should be given retrospectively in cases where acquisition has not been completed. Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister concerned at the relevant time, replied to debate about the retrospective part with respect to Section 24 thus: "... The hon’ble member has also raised question about retrospective clause. Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister concerned at the relevant time, replied to debate about the retrospective part with respect to Section 24 thus: "... The hon’ble member has also raised question about retrospective clause. This is about Section 24 under which it has been provided that if the award has not been passed under the previous law than the new law will be applicable. Secondly, if the award has been passed and no compensation has been given and no physical possession has been taken the new law will be applicable. The third situation where this clause will be applicable is when award has been passed but farmer has not been given more than 50 per cent compensation which will entail enforcement of this law. The hon’ble member and several others have raised this apprehension that this Act will ultimately give vast powers to the bureaucracy. In regard to this apprehension I would like to say that we have fixed time limit at every level of the procedure and I hope that the states will adhere to these timelines." (emphasis supplied) 166. It is clear that while replying to the debate, the Minister concerned has stated that there would be lapse only if in case possession has not been taken and compensation has not been paid. The emphasis right from the beginning was on possession. Thus, from the perusal of debate too, it is apparent that the word "or" had been understood as "and".” 6.9. The Supreme Court, after analysing the debates in the Lok Sabha as regards the element of lapsing of the earlier land acquisition proceedings, made the final analysis of Section 24 of Act 30 of 2013 as follows: “191. S.24(1)(a) operates where no award is made in a pending acquisition proceeding; in such event all provisions of the new Act relating to determination of compensation would apply. S.24(1)(b) logically continues with the second situation, i.e. where the award has been passed, and states that in such event, proceedings would continue under the 1894 Act. S.24(2) - by way of an exception, states that where an award is made but requisite steps have not been taken for five years or more to take possession nor compensation has been paid then there is lapse of acquisition. If one of the steps has been taken, then the proviso can operate. Time is the essence. S.24(2) - by way of an exception, states that where an award is made but requisite steps have not been taken for five years or more to take possession nor compensation has been paid then there is lapse of acquisition. If one of the steps has been taken, then the proviso can operate. Time is the essence. It is on the basis of time - lag that the lapse is provided and in default of payment for five years as provided on failure to deposit higher compensation is to be paid. It is based on that time - lag higher compensation has to follow. It is not the mere use of colon under Section 24(2) but the placement of the proviso next to Section 24(2) and not below Section 24(1)(b). Thus, it is not permissible to alter a placement of proviso more so when it is fully in consonance with the provisions of Section 24(2). Section 24(2) completely obliterates the old regime to the effect of its field of operation. Under Section 24(1)(a), there is a partial lapse of the old regime because all proceedings, till the stage of award are preserved. The award, in such proceedings, made after coming into force of the 2013 Act has to take into account its provisions, for determination of compensation. Thus, proceedings up to the stage of the award are deemed final under the old Act. In the case under Section 24(1)(b), the old regime prevails. The proviso is an exception to Section 24(2) and in part the new regime for payment of higher compensation in case of default for 5 years or more after award.” 6.10. On a close exploration of the principles expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are definite in our view that though the proceedings for the acquisition of the land in question would not lapse, the award passed on 15.3.2014 is certainly without jurisdiction and therefore the award does not have the efficacy of law. 6.11. In Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation v. Mahesh and Others [ 2022 (2) SCC 772 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the issue once again and it was held that Clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act would apply as the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the earlier regime had not culminated into an award till the repeal of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 . Section 24(1)(a) partly nullifies the legal effect of the saving clause under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as it hybridizes the application of the 1894 Act and 2013 Act. The validity of the acquisition proceedings under the earlier Act is certainly preserved. Paragraph No.15 and 16 of the said judgment reads as under: “ 15. In the present case, clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act would apply as the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act had not culminated into an award till the repeal of the 1894 Act. Section 24(1)(a) partly nullifies the legal effect of savings under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as it hybridizes application of the 1894 Act and the 2013 Act. While preserving validity of the acquisition proceedings by issue of declarations under the 1894 Act, it states that all the provisions for determination of compensation under the 2013 Act shall apply. The section consciously saves the legal effect of the notifications issued under Section 4 and / or Section 6 of the 1894 Act and obviates the necessity to issue a fresh notification under the 2013 Act. This “perseveration of the determination date” for the computation of compensation for the awards made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is a thought through legislative invocation that curtails time delays and cost escalation of infrastructure projects, as well as checks the post - acquisition notification malpractices, and at the same time ensures that the landowners are entitled to the benefit of the enhanced compensation as per the 2013 Act. 12. In Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others (2020 KHC 6270 : (2020) 8 SCC 129 : 2020 (4) SCC (Civ) 496] (Lapse - 5 Judges), a Constitution Bench held that where proceedings for acquisition had been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act had been made, the provisions of the 2013 Act would apply limited to determination of compensation. Where, however, an award had been made under the 1894 Act, clause (b) to Section 24(1) protects the vested rights of the parties. Where, however, an award had been made under the 1894 Act, clause (b) to Section 24(1) protects the vested rights of the parties. We need not, for the purpose of the present case, elucidate the ratio of the aforementioned judgment on interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, but it is apposite to notice that the Constitution Bench has emphasised that the 2013 Act provides for higher compensation along with provisions for rehabilitation, and that this intended benefit, wherever applicable, should not be taken away. At the same time, on the aspect of legal interpretation, it is observed that full effect has to be given to the provisions contained in Section 24 as it is not for the Court to legislate. The Courts can and do, in appropriate cases, clear ambiguity in legislations.” 6.12. On a cumulative consideration of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Indore (Supra) and Maharashtra Vidarbha (Supra), we are inclined to hold that the proceedings taken by the State for acquiring the land in question will not lapse but the award passed on 15.3.2014 is null and void. 7. The applicability of the doctrine of eminent domain. It must be remembered that when the State seeks to deprive the citizen of the right over the property, it exercises the power conferred on it under the doctrine of eminent domain. The said principle allows the Government to take private property for a public use, which is also known as forced acquisition or expropriation. This principle highlights the balance between promoting societal welfare and protecting private property rights. Historically, the ethical implications and practical applications of the aforesaid doctrine have been subjected to intense public debate. The Government can acquire the land if it is reasonably shown that the property is to be used for public purposes. The State can acquire the land under eminent domain laws as long as the property owner is compensated at a fair market value. The contemporary idea of eminent domain stems from the English Common Law, where the crown’s power to acquire private property for a greater good was established. Gradually this idea transformed into a more systematic legal framework, encompassing restitution to safeguard the landowners from unjust expropriation. The contemporary idea of eminent domain stems from the English Common Law, where the crown’s power to acquire private property for a greater good was established. Gradually this idea transformed into a more systematic legal framework, encompassing restitution to safeguard the landowners from unjust expropriation. It is precisely keeping in mind the sound principles governing the exercise of the power under the aforesaid doctrine that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were enacted. A reading of the preamble of the Act 30 of 2013 and the statement of objects gives a fair indication about the concerns/shortcomings that were expressed in the implementation of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and hence mentions fair compensation for acquiring private land and a fair rehabilitation of the landowners and those affected by the acquisition of the land became more important. It is perhaps with the belief that a combined approach was necessary, one that legally explains the clauses of rehabilitation and resettlement and assists the Government in acquiring the land for a public purpose, the Act 30 of 2013 was enacted. When we look into the salutary principles which guided the Parliament to enact the Act 30 of 2013, the right to receive compensation to a compulsory acquisition though not enshrined under Article 300A of the Constitution of India became imbibed under the said Article thereby casting an obligation on the State to pay adequate compensation to an individual once the property is sought to be acquired. 8. On the touchstone of the principles as enunciated by us above, when we investigate the action of the State in the present case, it certainly falls short of the purpose for which Act 30 of 2013 was enacted. Such a colourable exercise of power by the State in passing an award under the erstwhile regime of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , despite the coming into force of the new enactment, is clearly arbitrary and illegal, thus, calling for a further scrutiny by this court. 9. Though the appellant raised this issue before the reference court, the reference court concluded that since the appellant, immediately after the arguments were over, endorsed in the application that he was satisfied with compensation under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , the contention on the efficacy of the award stood waived by the claimant. 10. 9. Though the appellant raised this issue before the reference court, the reference court concluded that since the appellant, immediately after the arguments were over, endorsed in the application that he was satisfied with compensation under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , the contention on the efficacy of the award stood waived by the claimant. 10. Applicability of the Doctrine of Waiver ‘Waiver’, as the word suggests is giving up consciously a right which is conferred upon an individual. Waiver can be that of an individual right, a contractual right, or even a statutory right. The law regarding waiver needs no further exposition at our hands especially since it is now settled that even if a provision of law is mandatory in its operation, if such provision deals with the individual rights of a person concerned and the same is for his benefit, the same can be waived by the said person. Before delving deep into this issue, let us first consider whether the appellant had any vested right or any right accrued under the earlier regime of land acquisition, namely the Land Acquisition Act 1894. 11. A “right accrued” is certainly saved by the saving clause under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. However, the mere right, existing on the date of repeal of the Statute, to take advantage of the provision of the repealing Statute is not a right accrued within the meaning of the saving clause. [See Abbot Vs Minister for Lands [(1895) AC 425] & G. Ogden Industries Pvt. Ltd Vs. Heather Doreen Lucas [(1969) 1 ALL ER121] 12. In this context, it is worthwhile to extract the observations of Lord Atkin’s observations in Hamilton Gell v. White, [1922 (2) KB 422 : 38 TLR 829]. “It is obvious that that provision was not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act, such for instance as the right of compensation for disturbance conferred upon tenants generally under the Act of 1908, for if it were the repealing Act would be altogether inoperative. It only applies to the specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or other of the events specified in the statute.” 13. It only applies to the specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or other of the events specified in the statute.” 13. The observations of Lord Atkin in Hamilton Gell v. White, [1922 (2) KB 422 : 38 TLR 829 were quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Lalji Raja & Sons v. Firm Hansraj, [ (1971) 1 SCC 721 : (1971) 3 SCR 815 ] 14. In Halsbury’s Laws of England Volume 36 of Page 444 it is stated as follows: “A statutory right which is granted in privilege may be waived either altogether or in a particular case.” 15. The above passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Ltd vs. State of Gujarat [ 1969 (2) SCR 60 ] wherein it was held that if all persons interested in the land, waive the benefit of procedure under Section 5-A, the government may lawfully issue a composite notification under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act. 16. In Lachoo Mal v. Radhey Shyam [ 1971 (1) SCC 619 ] , the Supreme Court held that as a general principle, everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity which may be dispensed without infringing any public right or public policy. Thus the maxim which sanctions the non-observance of the statutory provisions is “cuilibet licet renuntiare Juri pro se introducto ”. 17. As a general rule, any person can enter into a binding contract to waive the benefits conferred upon him by an Act of Parliament or, as it is said, can contract himself out of the Act unless it can be shown that such agreement is in the circumstances of a particular case contrary to the public policy. In India, contracting out of the Statute is prohibited under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, when we read the purpose of Act 30 of 2013, it becomes clear that the Statute is one for the benefit of general public and contracting out of the same will defeat the public policy. 18. In India, contracting out of the Statute is prohibited under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, when we read the purpose of Act 30 of 2013, it becomes clear that the Statute is one for the benefit of general public and contracting out of the same will defeat the public policy. 18. In Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai vs. M/s Virgo Steels [ 2002 (4) SCC 316 ] , the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a mandatory requirement of the Statute can be waived by the party concerned. In answering this question, the Court said that “we are aided by a catena of judgments of this Court as well as the Privy Council.” We shall first refer to the judgment of the Privy Council which has been consistently followed by the Supreme Court in a number of subsequent cases involving similar points. 19. In Vellayan Chettiar v. Govt. of Province of Madras [ AIR 1947 PC 197 ], the Privy Council held that even though Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code is mandatory, still non-issuance of such notice would not render the suit bad in the eye of law because of such non-issuance of notice can be waived by the party concerned. In the said judgment, the Privy Council held that the protection provided under Section 18 is a protection given to a person concerned, and if, in a particular case, that person does not require the protection, he can lawfully waive his right. 20. In Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh [ AIR 1964 SC 1300 ] the Supreme Court followed the judgment in Vellayan Chettiar (Supra) and held that even though the requirement of Section 35 of the Bengal Moneylenders Act is mandatory in nature, such mandatory requirement could be waived by the party concerned, since on a true construction of Section 35 of that Act, the Supreme Court was of the view that the said Section is intended only for the benefit of the judgment-debtor and, therefore, he can waive the right conferred on him under the said section. 21. 21. In Sidheswara Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Iqbal [ 2013 (10) SCC 83 ] , the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a borrower can waive the mandatory period of thirty days in issuing the sale under the provisions of the Security Interest Enforcement Rules, 2002 and held that the provisions contained under the Act and the Rules are intended only for the benefit of the borrower, the right can be waived by the individual borrower. 22. The principles discussed above also finds a place in the book authored by Spencer Bower and Turner on Estoppel by Representation, 3 rd Edition, where the learned author has carved out succinctly the principles governing the waiver of a right by an individual. The learned authors have expressed their views at page No.143 as follows: “If the public, or a class or section of the community, are interested, as well as himself, in the general observance of the conditions prescribed by the statute, it has always been held on the ground of public policy that there can be no waiver, even by express contract or consent, of the right to such observance by any individual party; but where, on the other hand, no public interest, and no interest intended to be promoted or protected by the statute, is in the least affected by the contract or consent to waive, and the matter is one which concerns the parties alone, such contract or consent has never been interfered with, but on the contrary has always been enforced. So also, in cases of waiver by conduct which gives rise to an estoppel, the same essential distinction has always been observed. On the one side of the line are the cases where the estoppel or waiver, if allowed, would defeat the objects of the statute, and injure the interests of the public, or of persons other than the immediate parties, and where therefore the affirmative answer of illegality has prevailed, and the estoppel has been defeated”. (R.v. Blenkinsop [1892 (1) Q.B.43] 23. (R.v. Blenkinsop [1892 (1) Q.B.43] 23. The ratio decidendi culled out from the decisions of the Supreme Court and the discussions by us above would irresistibly lead to a conclusion that even though a provision of law is mandatory in its operation, if such provision is one which deals with the individual rights of the person concerned and for his benefit, the said person can always waive such a right. 24. Whether Waiver is permissible when the element of public duty is involved.? 24.1. We deem it appropriate to consider this issue especially since the reference court proceeded to answer the reference solely on the ground of waiver. Normally, when a question of waiver is presented before the court, the courts will have to see whether the right sought to be waived imposes a corresponding duty on the State. It is an element in the concept of property that the right to it can be given up if the owner thinks fit. Where the right is conferred by the Act, this liberty to renounce is precluded only where the Parliament so intends. Such an intention may exist on grounds of public policy, or where other persons have an equal right which might be adversely affected by renunciation. The intention may be set out expressly, or may be left to be inferred. See Francis Bennion on Statutory Interpretation Second Edition]. 24.2. The author in his book at Page 37 goes on to opine that where a person is entitled by virtue of a legislation to the performance of a duty by another and the case is within the principle pacta privata juri publico derogare non possunt (a public right is not overridden by an agreement of private persons), then the person under the duty cannot effectively contract out of performing it and the beneficiary cannot effectively waive his performance. 24.3. The question whether it is possible to contract out, or waive performance, of a statutory duty depends as always on the wording of the legislation. A well-drafted modern Act makes the matter clear. The aforecited maxim derives at a time when such clarity was rare, Acts were the subject of the disorganised composition. The aforesaid rule was applied in relation to a protective provision concerning insurance policies. In Equitable Life Assurance Society of USA vs. Reed [1914 AC 587]. A well-drafted modern Act makes the matter clear. The aforecited maxim derives at a time when such clarity was rare, Acts were the subject of the disorganised composition. The aforesaid rule was applied in relation to a protective provision concerning insurance policies. In Equitable Life Assurance Society of USA vs. Reed [1914 AC 587]. Lord Dunedin said, “ their lordships have no doubt that this section intended to lay down a rule of public policy and it is impossible for either an assured or an assurer to contract himself out of it or to waive its effect.” 25. When the aforesaid rule is applied to the modern context of interpretation of the Act 30 of 2013, we find that the District Collector or the Land Acquisition Collector was obliged to follow the procedure laid down under the new Act. The non-adherence to the provisions will render the award void and the State cannot clothe the award with a legal colour on the ground of waiver and apply it against the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 26. There is yet another reason as to why the plea of waiver must fail. The right to hold property is a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. When a forceful acquisition of property by the State in the exercise of the power of “eminent domain”, the claimant has every right to receive just and equitable compensation. Once we read the right to receive just and equitable compensation as a right embodied under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, then it becomes imperative for us to hold that the right to receive compensation becomes a constitutional right as well as a human right. This will lead to a larger question before us as to whether a constitutional right can be waived by a party. 27. In Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar [ 2024 (10) SCC 605 ] the Supreme Court held that the right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. 28. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy [ (2008) 15 SCC 517 ], the Supreme Court held that if the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed. 29. In Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Another v. Bimal Kumar Shah and Others [ (2024) 10 SCC 533 ] , the Supreme Court formulated seven sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property. Paragraph 30 of the judgment reads as under. "30. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property? Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are: (i) The duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property -the right to notice. (ii) The duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition - the right to be heard, (iii) The duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire- the right to a reasoned decision. (iv) The duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose - the duty to acquire only for public purpose, (v) The duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate- the right of restitution or fair compensation, (vi) The duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings -the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and (vii) The final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting – the right of conclusion.” 30. Therefore, we conclude that the right to hold property under Article 300-A is a Constitutional right as well as human right. That leads to another vexatious question: Can the party waive the said right? Therefore, we conclude that the right to hold property under Article 300-A is a Constitutional right as well as human right. That leads to another vexatious question: Can the party waive the said right? In this regard we find that there is a considerable difference between the American Constitution and our Constitution which combines the Rule of Law propagated by British Constitution and equal protection clause under the 14 th Amendment to the American Federal Constitution. 31. In Behram Khursid Pesikaka Vs State of Bombay [ (1955) 1 SCR 613 ] , the Supreme Court considered this pivotal question and held that the doctrine of waiver of the constitutional rights as propounded certain American Judges interpreting the American Constitution cannot be applied to our Constitution. It was ultimately held that the said theory has no application so far as the rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution is concerned. 32. In Basheshar Nath Vs Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi & Rajasthan and Another [(1958) SCC Online 7] the Supreme Court reiterated that the rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution cannot be waived by the individual. But, we must note that at the time when the Supreme Court rendered the Judgment, Article 19(1) (c) was there in the Constitution. 33. The situation however underwent a change when the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act 1978 was promulgated by which Article 19(1)(c) was omitted. Instead of Article 19(1)(f), Article 300-A was inserted. Does the insertion of Article 300-A change the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Basheshar Nath(supra). 34. We are inclined to think that it does not. The reason being the enlargement of the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution through Judicial Interpretation. Once the right to hold the property is considered as a Human Right then the same will automatically fall with the folds of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. But at the same time, it may not be possible to hold that any attempt to deprive the person his right to hold property will offence Article 21. 35. In Chameli Singh Vs State of U.P. [ (1996) 2 SCC 549 ] a three bench of the Supreme Court, enumerating the components of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, held that that the right of the State to acquire property through eminent domain will not amount to deprivation of right to livelihood. 35. In Chameli Singh Vs State of U.P. [ (1996) 2 SCC 549 ] a three bench of the Supreme Court, enumerating the components of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, held that that the right of the State to acquire property through eminent domain will not amount to deprivation of right to livelihood. Acquisition in accordance with procedure is valid exercise of power. 36. What happens if the acquisition is not accordance with procedure? Does it offend Article 21 of the Constitution of India? We are inclined to think that violation of the procedure established by law for acquisition of land will offend Article 21 of the Constitution of India primarily for the reason that the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 includes Right to Shelter which is a fundamental right enshrined under Article 19(1) (e). [see U.P.Avas Evam Parishad Vikas and another Vs Friends Cooperative Housing Society Ltd and Another [1995 Supp (3) SCC 456)]. 37. In N.D. Jayal Vs Union of India [ (2004) 9 SCC 362 ] the Supreme Court held that rehabilitation of the oustees is a necessary corollary of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore we are inclined to hold that a citizen cannot tell the state that you can discriminate by waiving the right under Article 21. 38. Thus, we see no reason not to hold that the right to hold property has a close nexus with Right to Life under Article 21 and the right to hold the property being a constitutional right and a human right is intertwined with Article 21 any decision to deprive the said right can only be done by awarding a just and equitable compensation and thus cannot be waived by the land owner. Accepting the proposition would go against the constitutional mandates but also would go against the public policy of the State, which led to the enactment of the Right to Fair Compensation, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Therefore, we hold that the reference court erred egregiously in holding that it had the jurisdiction to consider the reference because the appellant had waived his right to get compensation under Act 30 of 2013 and chose to confine his right to the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 . 39. Therefore, we hold that the reference court erred egregiously in holding that it had the jurisdiction to consider the reference because the appellant had waived his right to get compensation under Act 30 of 2013 and chose to confine his right to the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 . 39. Even if we are to assume for a moment that the right to hold property is only a Constitutional right, even then it will be difficult for us to uphold the order of the reference court . It is true that Article 300-A provides that the right to property can be deprived through due process of law. The due process means initiating measures under the Act 30 of 2013. The state cannot justify its action or failure to follow the procedure under Act 30 of 2013 on the ground that the landowner has waived his right under the new Act. Upholding the said view may lead to anarchy permitting the State to violate the constitutional mandate. We are thus of the view that the protection of the right to property under Article 300A cannot be unilaterally waived by an individual or authority, as it is a constitutional right. However, it can be restricted or deprived of only in accordance with valid laws passed by the legislature and subject to constitutional procedures thereby casting an obligation on the state to follow the due process of law thereby creating a balance between individual property rights and public or state interest under the framework of the Indian Constitution. 40. Incidentally, we may also consider whether a party can waive the right under the Statute and opt for a right which was never there, since the earlier Statute stood repealed. This according to us assumes significance especially since the reference court negated the challenge to the award on the ground that the claimant has waived his right to receive the compensation under the new Act. 41. When a Statute is repealed, there is no right accrued within the meaning of the usual saving clause. Normally, when a statute is repealed, the repeal and saving clause under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will come in aid to protect any action that is taken in pursuance to the repealed provisions. It is in this context the observations of Lord Atkin in Hamilton Gell vs. White [(1922) 2 KB 422] assumes significance. Normally, when a statute is repealed, the repeal and saving clause under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will come in aid to protect any action that is taken in pursuance to the repealed provisions. It is in this context the observations of Lord Atkin in Hamilton Gell vs. White [(1922) 2 KB 422] assumes significance. In this case, when the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act was repealed, the Collector was obliged to pass the award after following the procedure under the new Act. Therefore, we are of the view that as of 1.1.2014, when Act 30 of 2013 came into force, there was no vested right accrued in favour of the appellant to enable him to waive his right to get the benefit of the erstwhile regime of the land acquisition. Lack of Jurisdiction of Reference Court 42. That leads us to the final question as to whether the reference court on a finding that the award is unenforceable in law could have set it aside? The power of the reference court under Section 18 is to judge whether the compensation granted by the Land Acquisition Officer was adequate or not. Going by the scheme of Section 18 , we find that the reference court can only answer the question which is referred before it, that is, whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Collector is adequate or not. Aggrieved by an order answering the reference under Section 18 , the party can prefer an appeal under Section 54 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 . Thus, in the present case, ideally, the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer ought to have been challenged by the appellant before this Court in appropriate proceedings especially since the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 having stood repealed with effect from 1.1.2014, a reference under Section 18 could not have been maintained except in cases where the award was passed prior to 1.1.2014. We say so because, the party aggrieved by the compensation awarded to him under the provisions of the new Act shall have the right to move before the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority constituted under Section 51 of the Act 30 of 2013. Instead of adopting the said recourse, the appellant, on a misconception, continued to prosecute the application under Section 18 and thereafter carried forward the challenge before this Court in the present appeal. Instead of adopting the said recourse, the appellant, on a misconception, continued to prosecute the application under Section 18 and thereafter carried forward the challenge before this Court in the present appeal. This leads to a question whether, in the present appeal, we can exercise the power of the appellate court and correct the error which has crept into while passing the award by the Land Acquisition Officer. The answer to this question would perhaps lie under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. 43. The High Court’s power under Article 215 is of the widest amplitude. The High Court can determine its own powers in an unlimited manner to render justice. Prima facie, no matter is deemed beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so. It must also be borne in mind that even when we are exercising the appellate jurisdiction under Section 54 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act 1894, we are not precluded from exercising our inherent power to set right the illegality perpetuated by the State and the injustice caused to the appellant due to the jurisdictional error committed by the reference court. Therefore, we are of the view that the award dated 15.3.2014 as well as the judgment and decree of the Sub Court, Thalassery in L.A.R. No.1 of 2016 requires to be interfered with. Therefore, we set aside the award as well as the judgment and decree of the reference court and remand the matter back to the District Collector, Kannur for the purpose of redetermining the market value of the land in accordance with the principles governing the determination of the same under Section 26 of Act 30 of 2013 and pass an award determining the compensation under Section 27 and disburse the same to the appellant at any rate within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. We also take note of the fact that during the pendency of the appeal, the State has deposited the compensation as ordered by the reference court and the appellant has withdrawn the same from the Sub Court, Thalassery. We make it clear that on redetermination of the compensation, the State is required to deposit only the balance amount after deducting the amount of Rs.29,75,414/- deposited before the Sub Court, Thalassery. The appeal is thus allowed. The cost made easy. We make it clear that on redetermination of the compensation, the State is required to deposit only the balance amount after deducting the amount of Rs.29,75,414/- deposited before the Sub Court, Thalassery. The appeal is thus allowed. The cost made easy. 44. Before parting with this case, the Court would like to express our deep appreciation and gratitude to the learned Senior counsel Shri. P.B. Krishnan, appointed as Amicus Curiae in this case. Senior Counsel’s unparalleled legal acumen, impeccable presentation of the law, and commitment to assisting the Court in navigating the complexities of the issues presented have been invaluable. The Court recognizes the effort of the learned Senior counsel contributing significantly to the fair and just resolution of the case and the Court is deeply appreciative of the contributions made. Ordered accordingly.