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2025 DIGILAW 577 (AP)

M. Nagendram v. Guntur Sambrajyam

2025-04-04

B.V.L.N.CHAKRAVARTHI

body2025
JUDGMENT : B.V.L.N. CHAKRAVARTHI, J. This Second Appeal is filed by the appellant/defendant under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, assailing the decree and judgment, dated 30.06.2000, on the file of the learned IV Additional District Judge, Guntur, passed in A.S.No.32 of 1997. 02. Heard Sri Venkateswara Rao Gudapati, learned counsel for the Appellant/Defendant and Sri Srikanth Reddy Ambati, learned counsel for the Respondents/Legal Representatives of the PlaintiffsNo.1 and 2. Perused the material on record. PLEADINGS: 03. The appellant is the defendant. The respondents No.1 and 2 are the plaintiffs. The respondents No.3 to 8 who are impleaded as legal representatives of the 1 st plaintiff, who died pending the Second Appeal. The respondents No.9 to 14 are impleaded as legal representatives of the 2 nd plaintiff, who also died pending the Second Appeal. It is pertinent to note down that the suit was filed by the three persons. The 3 rd plaintiff died pending the first appeal. The judgment of the First Appellate Court would disclose that the appeal of the 3 rd plaintiff stands abated, as he died pending the first appeal, but no legal representatives came on record. Hence, the Second Appeal is filed by the defendant showing the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 only as respondents No.1 and 2. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is proceeded with by the defendant against the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 only (represented by their respective legal representatives since they died pending the Second Appeal). The parties in this Second Appeal shall hereinafter be referred to as arraigned in the Original Suit, for convenience and clarity. 04. The suit in O.S.298/1996 on the file of the learned II Addl.District Munsif, Guntur, seeking the relief of permanent injunction, restraining the defendant and her men from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule nadava i.e., passage by the plaintiffs. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 18.11.1996. The plaintiffs filed appeal in A.S.32/1997 on the file of the learned IV Addl. District Judge, Guntur, challenging the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. 05. The learned IV Addl.District Judge, Guntur, vide judgment and decree dated 30.06.2000 allowed the first appeal with costs, and decreed the suit, by setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned II Addl.District Munsif, Guntur. 06. District Judge, Guntur, challenging the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. 05. The learned IV Addl.District Judge, Guntur, vide judgment and decree dated 30.06.2000 allowed the first appeal with costs, and decreed the suit, by setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned II Addl.District Munsif, Guntur. 06. The case of the plaintiffs is that the plaint schedule property is a joint nadava (passage), for the plaintiffs and defendant located on the eastern side of the defendant’s property, southern side of the 1 st plaintiff’s property and northern side of the plaintiffs No.2 and 3 property, as described in the plaint schedule; The plaintiffs and the defendant are using the plaint schedule property as a joint passage since long time without any interference; They are all in joint possession of the said passage; While so, the defendant with a view to grab the said property, by causing obstruction to the plaintiffs from using the passage; The defendant also making attempt to construct a wall to put a gate way in the joint passage to prevent the plaintiffs from using the said property; the plaintiffs filed a rough sketch along with photos as a part of the plaint showing the disputed property, which was marked as Ex.A-1; photos were marked as Exs.A-2 and A-5 and negatives were marked as Exs.A-3 and A-6 respectively; The plaintiffs to establish that the suit property is a joint passage filed copy of sale deeds, which were marked as Exs.A-7 to A-9 respectively. The documentary evidence would establish that the disputed property is a joint passage. The defendant has no right to obstruct the plaintiffs from using the joint passage; Hence, plaintiffs filed the suit for permanent injunction. 07. The documentary evidence would establish that the disputed property is a joint passage. The defendant has no right to obstruct the plaintiffs from using the joint passage; Hence, plaintiffs filed the suit for permanent injunction. 07. The case of the defendant is that she purchased a tiled house situated on the western side of the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 06.04.1990 from one Ravipudi Ratnamanikyam, W/o.Venkateswarlu and her son Ravipudi Venkata Narayana, S/o.Venkateswarlu of Guntur; The suit schedule property is part of the tiled house purchased under the said sale deed; The vendors of the defendant purchased the property (shown as third item) and two other items of property situated on the western side of the plaint schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 30.11.1956 from Pulikonda Venkateswarlu, S/o.Basavaratnam and others; The suit schedule property is shown as third item and styled as ‘joint nadava’ in the title deed of the vendors of the defend ant; it was a joint passage to enter into items No.1 and 2 of the said sale deed from eastern side Circar bazaar (public road) by the owners of items No.1 and 2 only; Therefore, the plaintiffs have no right of passage through the plaint schedule property; They did not purchase any right in the suit schedule property from the vendors of the defendant; The plaint schedule property is an exclusive joint passage for the usage of the owners of items No.1 and 2 properties described in the document dated 30.11.1956 of the vendors of the defendant and also in the link document dated 30.01.1936 of their vendors; The further plea of the defendant is that the 1 st plaintiff, whose property is located on the northern side and the 3 rd plaintiff, whose property is located on southern side to the defendant and also to the plaint schedule property are having Circar bazaar (public road) situated on their eastern side of their respective houses; The 2 nd plaintiff house is towards further south of the defendant; It is also having access to Circar bazaar (public road) on the southern side; Therefore, all the plaintiffs are having access to public roads as stated above. Hence, their contention that the suit schedule property is a joint passage is not tenable on facts; Therefore, they are not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction. ISSUES: 08. Hence, their contention that the suit schedule property is a joint passage is not tenable on facts; Therefore, they are not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction. ISSUES: 08. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for? 2. To what relief? EVIDENCE: 09. During trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, three witnesses were examined as P.Ws-1 to 3 and 9 documents were marked as Exs.A-1 to A-9. On behalf of the defendant, two witnesses were examined as D.Ws-1 and 2 and three documents were marked as Exs.B-1 to B-3. 10. P.W-1 is the son of the 2 nd plaintiff. P.W-2 is the husband of the 1 st plaintiff and P.W-3 is the vendor of the defendant. D.W-1 is the husband of the defendant and D.W-2 is brother of defendant. Ex.A-1 is the plaint plan (rough sketch). Ex.A-2 is a photo and Ex.A-3 is negative. Ex.A-4 is office copy of legal notice issued by the plaintiffs to the defendant claiming the suit property as joint passage and asked the defendant not to make any constructions in the said joint passage, failing which, legal action will be initiated against the defendant. Ex.A-5 is a photo showing the plaint schedule property and Ex.A-6 is negative of Ex.A-5. Ex.A-7 is the registered sale deed dated 01.02.1944. Ex.A-8 is the registered sale deed dated 14.02.1956 and Ex.A-9 is the registered sale deed dated 01.03.1928. Ex.B-1 is the certified copy of registered sale deed dated 06.04.1990. Ex.B-2 is certified copy of registered sale deed dated 30.11.1956 and Ex.B-3 is the certified copy of registered sale deed dated 30.01.1936. FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT: 11. The learned trial Court on consideration of the above oral and documentary evidence, found that the plaint schedule property is not a joint passage as claimed by the plaintiffs, and accordingly dismissed the suit for permanent injunction. FINDING OF THE FIRST APPELLATE COURT: 12. FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT: 11. The learned trial Court on consideration of the above oral and documentary evidence, found that the plaint schedule property is not a joint passage as claimed by the plaintiffs, and accordingly dismissed the suit for permanent injunction. FINDING OF THE FIRST APPELLATE COURT: 12. The learned IV Addl.District Judge, Guntur, on consideration of the above evidence, held that the plaint schedule property is a joint passage for the plaintiffs and the defendant and therefore, the defendant has no right to make any constructions in the said joint passage, causing obstruction to the plaintiffs’ right to use the said joint passage, and decreed the suit setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. 13. Challenging the above judgment of the learned First Appellate Court, the Second Appeal came to be filed by the defendant. The Second Appeal was admitted on 11.12.2000. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION: 14. The following substantial question of law is raised in the Second Appeal for consideration: “Whether the lower Appellate Court is right in reversing the judgment and decree of the lower Court on mis-interpretation of the recitals contained in the document of the defendant, which does not confer any right to the plaintiffs?” 15. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPECTIVE COUNSEL IN THE SECOND APPEAL: The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant contended that the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court mis-interpreted the recitals in the documents (Exs.B-1 to B-3) as if the plaint schedule property is a joint passage of the plaintiffs and the defendant and set aside the well reasoned judgment of the trial Court, which dismissed the suit. He would further submit that the interpretation made by the learned I Appellate Judge about the boundaries mentioned in the documents of the plaintiffs and the defendant is not in accordance with the recitals of the said documents. Further, the learned I Appellate Judge wrongly appreciated the evidence of P.W-3, though he admitted that the plaint schedule property is a part of Ex.A-1 sale deed. He also contended that the learned I Appellate Judge mis-interpreted the words “MEE VAGAIRALU” and “MAA VAGAIRALU”, as found in the sale deed of the defendant, though the learned trial Court explained them correctly, and therefore, came to a wrong conclusion and set aside the judgment of the learned trial Court erroneously. He also contended that the learned I Appellate Judge mis-interpreted the words “MEE VAGAIRALU” and “MAA VAGAIRALU”, as found in the sale deed of the defendant, though the learned trial Court explained them correctly, and therefore, came to a wrong conclusion and set aside the judgment of the learned trial Court erroneously. He would further submit that the learned First Appellate Court ought to have considered the law that the plaintiffs cannot strengthen their case basing on the weaknesses in the case of the defendant in a suit for permanent injunction, when the plaintiffs failed to establish their case. He would further contend that the documents of the plaintiffs do not disclose that the suit schedule property is a joint passage and as per Ex.B-1, it is an exclusive property of the defendant. But, the learned I Appellate Court mis-read the recitals of Ex.B-1 and came to a wrong opinion that the plaint schedule property is a joint passage and therefore, the judgment of the learned I Appellate Court is not sustainable in law and liable to be set aside, restoring the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. 16. The learned counsel for the respondents/legal representatives of the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 contended that as per Ex.A-9 filed by the plaintiffs, which is a registered sale deed dated 01.03.1928 executed in favour of Balija Narasamma, W/o.Lakshmayya by Mahaboob Bi and Venkatamma @ Hafijabi, wives of one Kareem. Undisputedly, the eastern property belongs to the vendor’s vendor of the 3 rd plaintiff. The southern boundary shows the existence of joint lane extended to public road abetted by the plaintiffs No.2 and 3 vendor house wall. Further, the northern boundary also shows the existence of joint passage of 3 rd plaintiff’s vendor’s vendor. Ex.A-9, which belongs to the predecessors of the plaintiffs show the existence of joint passage. Ex.A-8 was subsequently executed by the husband of the 1 st plaintiff on 14.02.1956 in favour of Nujeti Venkayya and Veerayya, sons of N.Guravayya. Among them, Veerayya is none other than the husband of the 2 nd plaintiff. The said sale deed would show the existence of a public road on the eastern side and lane on the southern side, which is nothing but joint lane i.e., plaint schedule property. Among them, Veerayya is none other than the husband of the 2 nd plaintiff. The said sale deed would show the existence of a public road on the eastern side and lane on the southern side, which is nothing but joint lane i.e., plaint schedule property. He would further submit that Ex.A-7 sale deed is nothing but a link sale deed for Ex.A-9 sale deed, it was executed on 02.02.1944 in favour of vendor of the 2 nd plaintiff’s vendor i.e., N.Venkayya and Veerayya, sons of N.Guravayya and it was executed by B.Narasamma and her son Rama Swamy, which discloses that they are the vendors under the said document acquired the said property under sale deed dated 01.03.1928 i.e., Ex.A-9. As per Ex.A-7, eastern boundary belongs to the 3 rd plaintiff, southern boundary is joint lane, and northern boundary shows that it is a passage. Therefore, the existence of passage on northern side connecting public road on the eastern side is very much found in Exs.A-7 to A-9 documents. This fact was corroborated by Ex.B-1 copy of registered sale deed filed by the defendant, which was executed by P.W-3. Ex.B-1 was executed by P.W-3 in favour of the defendant on 06.04.1990. 17. The covenant referred in Ex.B-1 makes it clear to establish the retention of right in the joint lane by the vendor of the defendant for passage of rainwater and sewage water and also using the passage to reach the municipal road, mentioning it as joint lane by the vendor and vendee under the sale deed. P.W-3 would further contend that P.W-3 evidence would establish that he sold a portion of his house to the defendant under Ex.B-1 and joint passage is located on the southern side of the 2 nd plaintiff’s house and on northern side of the 1 st plaintiff’s house. They opened doorways to enter the said joint lane long ago and using the joint lane to reach the public road located on eastern side and that the said joint passage i.e., plaint schedule property is an exclusive property of P.W-3 and it was never alienated to the defendant. The defendant cannot obstruct the plaintiffs from using the said joint passage. 18. He would further contend that as per Ex.A-1 rough sketch, the extent of the property of the defendant is 58 sq. The defendant cannot obstruct the plaintiffs from using the said joint passage. 18. He would further contend that as per Ex.A-1 rough sketch, the extent of the property of the defendant is 58 sq. yards and P.W-3 is having property beyond the defendant’s property and therefore, the covenant was made in Ex.B-1 sale deed retaining the joint right by P.W-3, which he was having with the plaintiffs as found in Ex.A-9 registered sale deed. He would further submit that, Ex.B-3 pertains to the year 1936, which is a link document of the property purchased by P.W-3. It shows that the property consists of three items. The second item relates to the property covered by Ex.B-1 purchased by the defendant and the eastern boundary of the said property would clearly shows that the joint passage and the same was shown as third item in the said sale deed. The boundaries of the said third item would disclose that the southern side property belongs to the 3 rd plaintiff’s vendor, northern side property belongs to the 1 st plaintiff’s vendor, western side property is nothing but the second item, which was sold to the defendant under Ex.B-1 sale deed. The third item covered by the said sale deed would show that the vendor of P.W-3 conveyed joint right to P.W-3 in the joint lane to reach the public road and this was not alienated to the defendant under Ex.B-1 sale deed. Therefore, the defendant cannot claim any exclusive right over the said joint lane against the plaintiffs. 19. The learned I Appellate Judge in her judgment considered Exs.A-7 to A-9 and Exs.B-1 to B-3 with reference to Ex.A-1 rough sketch, which is not under dispute and interpret the boundaries accordingly and came to a right conclusion that the plaint schedule property is a joint passage for the plaintiff and the defendant and therefore, the defendant cannot make any constructions in the said joint passage. But the learned trial Judge erroneously dismissed the suit and hence, set aside the judgment of the learned trial Court and decreed the suit for permanent injunction. In that view of the matter, there are no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the learned I Appellate Court. 20. But the learned trial Judge erroneously dismissed the suit and hence, set aside the judgment of the learned trial Court and decreed the suit for permanent injunction. In that view of the matter, there are no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the learned I Appellate Court. 20. In the light of above rival contentions urged in the Second Appeal, and in view of the judgment of the learned I Appellate Court, reversing the judgment of the learned trial Court basing on facts by interpreting various recitals of the sale deeds referred above, it is appropriate to consider the case of the respective parties with reference to the sale deeds placed on record i.e., Exs.A-7 to A-9 and Exs.B-1 to B-3 and the oral evidence of the respective parties available on record. ANALYSIS: 21. P.W-1 is the son of the 2 nd plaintiff. During his evidence, Ex.A-1 rough sketch (plaint plan) showing the location and existence of the plaint schedule property was filed. According to the said plan, the plaint schedule property i.e., disputed property referred joint nadava (joint passage) is located towards western side of the main road (public road/Circar bazaar). The house of plaintiffs No.1 and 2 are located towards northern side. The house of 3 rd plaintiff is located towards southern side. The house of the defendant is located towards western side of the joint passage. The plaintiffs No.1 and 2 are also having some more property towards southwest of the said joint passage i.e., further west of the 3 rd plaintiff. As per Ex.A-1, 2 nd plaintiff as well as 3 rd plaintiff’s houses are abutting the public road (Circar bazaar) on the eastern side. They also have doorways into the joint passage area as per plan. The defendant has to pass through the said joint passage to reach the public road located towards eastern side of her house. 22. Now the crucial question is “Whether the disputed passage is a joint passage as claimed?” 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.Kishore Kumar Vs. Vittal K.Patkar , [2024 (1) ALD 106] , held that “in a suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction, the burden is always on the plaintiff to prove his title ”. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.Kishore Kumar Vs. Vittal K.Patkar , [2024 (1) ALD 106] , held that “in a suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction, the burden is always on the plaintiff to prove his title ”. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Vasavi Co-operative Housing Society Limited and Others, 2014(2) SCC 269 , held in para 15 as follows: “In a suit for declaration of title, burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff”. 25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jagadish Prasad Patel (dead) through L.Rs. and another Vs. Shivnath and others , [ 2019 (6) SCC 82 ] , held at para 41 as under: “ In the suit for declaration for title and possession, the plaintiffs- respondents could succeed only on the strength of their own title and not on the weakness of the case of the defendants- appellants . The burden is on the plaintiffs-respondents to establish their title to the suit properties to show that they are entitled for a decree for declaration.” 26. Therefore, it is a settled legal position that in a suit for title, possession or permanent injunction relating to immovable property, the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to establish his/her case relating to title or possession. The plaintiffs could succeed only on the strength of their own title and not on the weakness of the case of the defendants. Therefore, in the case on hand, the plaintiffs shall prove their case that the disputed passage is a joint passage for the plaintiffs and the defendant. The plaintiffs to prove their case filed Exs.A-7 to A-9 registered sale deeds. The plaintiffs to corroborate the recitals in their documents also relied on the recitals in Exs.B-1 to B-3 sale deeds, and the oral evidence of P.W-3. 27. According to the testimony P.W-1 and P.W-2, they have been using the disputed passage as joint passage of the plaintiffs and the defendant. They claimed that their properties were purchased by their predecessors under Exs.A-7 to A-9 sale deeds. 27. According to the testimony P.W-1 and P.W-2, they have been using the disputed passage as joint passage of the plaintiffs and the defendant. They claimed that their properties were purchased by their predecessors under Exs.A-7 to A-9 sale deeds. The recitals in the said sale deeds would show the existence of joint passage for the last 70 years. They examined P.W-3, who executed Ex.B-1 sale deed in favour of the defendant to corroborate their case that the disputed passage is a joint passage, and that it was not alienated to the defendant under Ex.B-1 sale deed. 28. Ex.A-7 is a registered sale deed dated 01.02.1944 related to the 1 st plaintiff’s property. Ex.A-8 is a registered sale deed dated 14.02.1956 and Ex.A-9 registered sale deed dated 01.03.1928. P.Ws-1 and 2 in their evidence stated that these documents would disclose the existence of suit property as joint passage. Their evidence would also disclose existence of doorways from their respective houses on to the joint passage. Here, it is pertinent to note down that D.W-1 and D.W-2 also admitted this fact in their evidence during cross-examination. Therefore, it probable the case of the plaintiffs that disputed passage has been used by the plaintiffs also since several years without any objection. 29. P.W-3 is vendor of the defendant under Ex.B-1. His testimony before the learned trial Court would disclose that the defendant is also entitled to use the joint passage to reach the public road located on eastern side. He categorically deposed that it is a joint passage for the plaintiffs and the defendant, and no exclusive right was alienated to the defendant under Ex.B-1 sale deed. Undisputedly, P.W-3 is having a house on the southern of the joint passage. He explained the words “MAA VAGAIRALU” and “MEE VAGAIRALU” as written in Ex.B-1. According to him, it means and refer to the joint right of P.W-3 in the disputed passage, passed on to the defendant, to use the same jointly along with P.W-3, since P.W-3 is having house beyond the property covered by Ex.B-1 sale deed. The defendant cross-examined P.W-3 at length but did not elicit anything to jettison his testimony before the learned trial Court. P.W-3 in the re-examination categorically deposed that it is a joint passage, and it was not sold to the defendant under Ex.B-1 sale deed. 30. The defendant cross-examined P.W-3 at length but did not elicit anything to jettison his testimony before the learned trial Court. P.W-3 in the re-examination categorically deposed that it is a joint passage, and it was not sold to the defendant under Ex.B-1 sale deed. 30. The husband of the defendant in the evidence stated that they purchased 58 sq. yards of site with a right of way in the joint passage. He categorically admitted that the doorways of the plaintiffs were opened on to the disputed property on the date of Ex.B-1and that the steps of the doorway are visible in Ex.A-5 and Ex.A-6 photos. He admitted that P.W-3 is having house on the left side of the joint passage as found in Ex.A-2 photo. Therefore, the admissions of D.W-1 also prove the existence of doorways opened by the plaintiffs on to the disputed property even by the date of Ex.B-1, that they are using the same as a joint passage along with P.W-3 to reach the public road located on the eastern side. 31. Therefore, the oral evidence of P.W-3 is corroborated by D.W-1 to probable the case of the plaintiff that the disputed property is a joint passage and that the plaintiffs have been using it for several years, long before Ex.B-1 sale deed of the defendant. 32. The documentary evidence filed by the plaintiffs under Exs.A-7 to A-9 would disclose that the vendor of the vendors of the 2 nd plaintiff purchased some property under Ex.A-9 sale deed on 01.03.1928. The boundaries of Ex.A-9 disclose that the property located on east relates to the property of the 3 rd plaintiff’s vendor, south relates to the property of the 2 nd plaintiff and 3 rd plaintiff’s vendor and existence of a joint lane. The northern boundary refers to the property of the vendors of the 3 rd plaintiff and existence of a joint lane. Therefore, the oldest document available before the Court refers to existence of a joint lane on the south of 3 rd plaintiff’s property and north of plaintiffs No.1 and 2 property. 33. Ex.A-8 was executed by the husband of the 1 st plaintiff on 14.02.1956 in favour of the husband of the 2 nd plaintiff and father of P.W-1. The recitals of this document also disclose existence of a lane on the southern side and public road on the eastern side. 33. Ex.A-8 was executed by the husband of the 1 st plaintiff on 14.02.1956 in favour of the husband of the 2 nd plaintiff and father of P.W-1. The recitals of this document also disclose existence of a lane on the southern side and public road on the eastern side. Therefore, it corroborates Ex.A-1 plan about the location of the properties. Ex.A-7 is a sale deed dated 01.02.1944 executed in favour of N.Venkayya and N.Veerayya, sons of N.Guravayya. One of them is none other than the husband of the 2 nd plaintiff. The recitals of Ex.A-7 also would disclose existence of property belongs to the vendors of the 3 rd plaintiff on the eastern side and house wall of the 2 nd plaintiff on the northern side. It would also disclose the existence of a lane on the northern side as shown in Ex.A-1 plan. Therefore, the recitals of Exs.A-7 to A-9 would probable the plea of the plaintiffs about the existence of joint passage as shown in the plaint plan. Hence, the recitals of Exs.A-7 to A-9 would establish that P.W-3 deposed truth about the existence of joint lane and that it has been used jointly by the plaintiffs, P.W-3 till execution of Ex.B1, and later by the plaintiffs. P.W-3 and the defendant, after Ex.B-1. 34. In the light of recitals of Exs.A-7 to A-9 and the oral evidence placed by the plaintiffs discussed above, there is no hesitation to conclude that the disputed property is a joint lane of the plaintiffs and the defendant, and it is in existence for several years. Further it was jointly used by the predecessors of the plaintiffs and the predecessors of the defendant without any problem. But, the defendant after purchasing property under Ex.B-1, for the reasons best known to the defendant and her husband, developed an idea to make it as their exclusive property. 35. Ex.B-1 is the sale deed executed by P.W-3 in favour of the defendant. P.W-3 explained the recitals of Ex.B-1 in his sale deed. Considering the recitals under Exs.A-7 to A-9, it cannot be argued that P.W-3 evidence is contrary to the recitals of Ex.B1. In fact, his evidence corroborates the recitals of Exs.A-7 to A-9. He interpreted the words “MEE VAGAIRALU” and “MAA VAGAIRALU”, as per recitals of Exs.A-7 to A-9 and Ex.B-1. P.W-3 explained the recitals of Ex.B-1 in his sale deed. Considering the recitals under Exs.A-7 to A-9, it cannot be argued that P.W-3 evidence is contrary to the recitals of Ex.B1. In fact, his evidence corroborates the recitals of Exs.A-7 to A-9. He interpreted the words “MEE VAGAIRALU” and “MAA VAGAIRALU”, as per recitals of Exs.A-7 to A-9 and Ex.B-1. Therefore, the contention of the defendant that the learned I Appellate Judge mis-interpreted the words “MEE VAGAIRALU” and “MAA VAGAIRALU” found in Ex.B-1 is not tenable in view of above facts. The learned I Appellate Judge did not decide the issue in favour of the plaintiffs basing on Ex.B-1 alone. He considered Exs.A-7 to A-9 with reference to recitals therein, and then read the contents of Ex.B-1 to satisfy herself that it also corroborates the recitals in Exs.A-7 to A-9 sale deeds. Therefore, the contention of the defendant that the I Appellate Court decreed the suit basing on the weakness in the case of the defendant is not tenable. 36. Therefore, the above light of above facts and circumstances which would probable the plea of the plaintiffs that the plaint schedule property is a joint passage, and it was in use as such, for several years, till today to reach the public road on the eastern side and also for flow of rainwater and sewage water and entry of workers to conserve their properties. CONCLUSION: 37. Accordingly, the substantial question of law raised in the Second Appeal is answered that the First Appellate Court did not mis-interpret the recitals of the documents as contended by the appellant/defendant. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that there are no grounds to interfere with the judgment and decree of the learned First Appellate Court. 38. In the light of foregoing discussion, the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed. RESULT: 39. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs throughout. As a sequel, Interlacutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.