JUDGMENT : Nitin Jamdar, C. J. By order dated 10 October 2024, the Division Bench opined that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice for referring to the Full Bench to answer the questions framed. Accordingly, this Original Petition is placed before us. 2. The Division Bench framed two questions for consideration by the Full Bench. Firstly, whether the Rules framed under Part I of the Kerala Service Rules (KSR) contemplate covering provisions beyond the legislative fields available to the State. Secondly, whether the executive order issued by the Government implementing the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) scheme can be considered contrary to the State covering the field of subject earmarked for the State. 3. Before addressing these questions, it is necessary to outline a few relevant facts. The Respondent, holding a postgraduate degree, has been employed as a Lecturer in Medico Sociology since 3 November 1997. The Government of Kerala, through Exhibit-P1 order dated 16 June 2000 in G.O.(P) No.145/2000/H&FWD, revised the pay scales and allowances of teachers in Medical, Dental, and Pharmaceutical Science colleges. The order also provided for career advancement after five years of service as a Lecturer. Consequently, the Respondent was entitled to promotion as Assistant Professor on 3 November 2002 and as Associate Professor on 3 November 2007. However, the Petitioners interpreted Exhibit-P1 order as confining these benefits to teachers of medical subjects and excluding those teaching non-medical subjects. Based on this interpretation, the Petitioners stopped the benefits and ordered the recovery of amounts already disbursed. Aggrieved, the Respondent filed W.P.(C) No.6563/2004, challenging the pay slip issued by the Accountant General, which withdrew benefits for teachers of non- medical subjects and directed recovery of payments already made. By judgment dated 16 June 2009, the learned Single Judge quashed the pay slip issued by Petitioner No. 2, which was based on the previous pay scale. Regarding career advancement, the Court held that the Respondent was free to pursue her grievance by making a representation to the Director of Medical Education. In compliance with this judgment, Petitioner No. 1 – Secretary to the Government, Health and Family Welfare/Education Department – issued Exhibit-P3 Government Order dated 17 September 2010. The order reiterated that time-bound promotion was to be granted after five years. In compliance with this judgment, Petitioner No. 1 – Secretary to the Government, Health and Family Welfare/Education Department – issued Exhibit-P3 Government Order dated 17 September 2010. The order reiterated that time-bound promotion was to be granted after five years. However, it clarified that five years of teaching experience (physical) would not include periods of eligible leave, such as earned leave, under the KSR. The Respondent challenged this order before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal. The core issue before the Tribunal was whether, in calculating the five-year period for career advancement, the time spent on duty and leave should be considered. The Respondent contended that having been in the grade of Senior Teacher since 3 November 1997, she was eligible for career advancement from 3 November 2002, including the leave taken. The Petitioner – State, on the other hand, maintained that the five – year period, excluding the leave of the Respondent, was completed only on 12 September 2009. Hence, according to the State, the order granting career advancement from 2009 was correct. The Tribunal, following the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Kerala, Rep. by the Health Secretary and Others v. M.G.Presanna , Judgment in W.A. No. 1021/2010 dated 21 February 2011 , which is with reference to the Government order dated 16 June 2000, held that the period of leave cannot be excluded while calculating the five years of service for granting the benefit of career advancement to the Respondent. The Tribunal allowed the application by order dated 14 July 2017. 4. The State, aggrieved by the said order, filed the present Original Petition. When the matter came before the Division Bench, it took note of the decision in M.G.Presanna, wherein Rule 77 of Part I of the KSR was interpreted to hold that the period of absence referred to under Rule 77 applies to continuous service and that an executive order cannot override a statutory rule. However, the Division Bench expressed doubts regarding the correctness of the legal proposition laid down in M.G.Presanna. In its referral order dated 10 October 2024, the Division Bench observed that the regulation of service conditions of Government employees in the State does not extend to matters arising from the implementation of AICTE schemes under parliamentary legislation. Accordingly, the Division Bench framed the two questions, as mentioned earlier, for consideration by the Full Bench. 5. In its referral order dated 10 October 2024, the Division Bench observed that the regulation of service conditions of Government employees in the State does not extend to matters arising from the implementation of AICTE schemes under parliamentary legislation. Accordingly, the Division Bench framed the two questions, as mentioned earlier, for consideration by the Full Bench. 5. We have heard Mr. Bijoy Chandran, learned Special Government Pleader for the Appellants, and Mr. P. Nandakumar, learned counsel for the Respondent. 6. During the preliminary hearing on 6 December 2024, the learned counsel submitted that no conflict arises between the Kerala Service Rules (KSR) and the executive order issued by the State for implementing AICTE schemes under parliamentary legislation concerning the Government order dated 16 June 2000. The learned counsel further contended that the term technical institution is defined under the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 (AICTE Act) to mean an institution, other than a University, that offers courses or programs in technical education. It also includes such other institutions as may be declared technical institutions by the Central Government through a notification in the Official Gazette, in consultation with the AICTE. 7. Both the learned Special Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the Respondent jointly submitted that Exhibit-P1 Government Order dated 16 June 2000 was issued to revise the pay scales of teaching staff in Medical, Dental, and Pharmaceutical Science colleges, which do not fall within the purview of the AICTE. The decision to implement the AICTE – prescribed pay scale for the teaching staff of the Medical Education Department, effective from 1 January 1996, was taken solely in response to a long-standing demand from the teaching staff of these colleges in the State. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted that the Government Order dated 16 June 2000 was neither issued under any statutory mandate nor in compliance with any AICTE directive, as the teaching staff of medical colleges do not come under the category of technical institutions. It was clarified that the pay scales prescribed by the AICTE were extended to the teaching staff of the Medical Education Department purely as a matter of policy. Accordingly, both the learned counsel for the Respondent and the learned Special Government Pleader concurred that Exhibit-P1 Government Order dated 16 June 2000 is unrelated to the AICTE Act or any directions issued thereunder. Accordingly, both the learned counsel for the Respondent and the learned Special Government Pleader concurred that Exhibit-P1 Government Order dated 16 June 2000 is unrelated to the AICTE Act or any directions issued thereunder. The reference to AICTE in this context is limited to the fact that the pay scales prescribed for technical institutions were adopted for the teaching staff of the Medical Education Department. Upon examining the Government Order dated 16 June 2000 and the relevant statutory provisions, it is clear that the issue of conflict between the Kerala Service Rules (KSR) and the executive order issued to implement AICTE schemes under parliamentary legislation does not arise for consideration and was not required to be addressed. 8. The learned counsel for both parties submit that the only issue for consideration pertains to Clause IV of the Annexure to Exhibit-P1 Government Order dated 16 June 2000. Specifically, the question is whether the period of leave availed by an employee should be included or excluded while calculating the required five years of teaching experience. Clause IV of the Annexure to the Government order dated 16 June 2000 reads as follows: “IV. Career Advancement.- (a) Senior Lecturers who have PG Degree in the speciality concerned and also have 5 years of (Physical) teaching experience will be promoted as Assistant Professors in the scale of pay of Rs. 12000-18300. (b) Assistant Professors with 5 years of teaching experience (Physical) and those who have put in 10 years of total service as Senior Lecturer and Assistant Professor, put together will be promoted as Associate Professor in the scale of pay of Rs. 14300-19250.” (emphasis supplied) Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, and noting that the correctness of the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of M.G.Presanna will be the question to be decided, we reframed the questions of law as to whether Clause IV of the Government Order dated 16 June 2000 which stipulates teaching experience as excluding the period of leave, is contrary to Rule 77 of Part I of the Kerala Service Rules. Also whether the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M.G.Presanna that Clause IV cannot be sustained is correct in law. 9. The learned counsel for the parties have addressed the reframed question of law. 10. Also whether the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M.G.Presanna that Clause IV cannot be sustained is correct in law. 9. The learned counsel for the parties have addressed the reframed question of law. 10. Even on this question, as we heard the matter further, it became evident that there was no specific legal question to be decided. The learned counsel for both parties submitted that, pursuant to the judgment in M.G.Presanna, several teachers, including the Respondent, were granted emoluments. The learned counsel for the Respondent further stated that, as far as the Respondent is concerned, the matter is now purely academic. The Government Order dated 16 June 2000 is no longer in force, having been superseded by subsequent Government Orders issued on 4 January 2001, 10 September 2009, 16 September 2009, 14 December 2009, and thereafter. These orders are more beneficial to the employees. 11. However, the learned Special Government Pleader expressed concern that the observations in M.G.Presanna could create difficulties for the State whenever it seeks to implement policy decisions through executive instructions. The apprehension arises from the observation made in M.G.Presanna that the Kerala Service Rules (KSR), being statutory, will prevail over executive instructions concerning the treatment of leave periods. 12. To understand the context in which the Division Bench made its observations in M.G.Presanna, it is necessary to examine the facts of the case. By order dated 16 June 2000, the State of Kerala revised the pay scales and allowances of teaching staff in Medical, Dental, and Pharmaceutical Science colleges. However, doubts arose regarding the applicability of this order to the teaching staff in science colleges who were not engaged in teaching medicine, dental medicine, or pharmacy. In response, the State Government directed the Accountant General to keep the benefits in abeyance. As a result, M.G.Presanna, a Senior Lecturer, suffered a reduction in pay scale, which she challenged through a writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition, holding that Presanna was also entitled to the benefits under the Government Order. The learned Single Judge observed that the order applied uniformly to all teaching staff, irrespective of whether they were teaching medical or non-medical subjects. Consequently, Presanna was deemed entitled to time-bound promotion and other benefits. Notably, the exclusion of the leave period was never raised as an issue in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge observed that the order applied uniformly to all teaching staff, irrespective of whether they were teaching medical or non-medical subjects. Consequently, Presanna was deemed entitled to time-bound promotion and other benefits. Notably, the exclusion of the leave period was never raised as an issue in the writ petition. The only question in dispute was whether the Government order applied uniformly to all teaching staff. After the writ petition was dismissed, the State of Kerala questioned the eligibility of Presanna on the ground that she had availed herself of leave. A review petition was filed, which was dismissed. When the appeal filed by the State came up for consideration, the learned Special Government Pleader expressly stated that the writ petition was confined solely to the issue of time-bound promotion. In this context, the Division Bench in M.G.Presanna examined the Government Order dated 16 June 2000, which provided no guidance on whether the leave period should be included or excluded in determining continuous service. Given this ambiguity, the Division Bench relied on Rule 77 of the Kerala Service Rules (KSR), which governs the grant of leave. Rule 77(ix) of the KSR defines a "completed year of service" and "one year's continuous service" as continuous service of the specified duration under the Government of Kerala, including periods spent on duty as well as on leave, including leave without allowances. Accordingly, the Government Order dated 16 June 2000 was interpreted in light of Rule 77(ix) of the KSR. The Division Bench thus observed that Rule 77, being statutory, would prevail over executive instructions. As noted earlier, several teachers were granted benefits pursuant to this decision. 13. Subsequently, another Government Order was issued on 14 December 2009, which referred to the earlier Government Orders dated 16 June 2000, 4 January 2001, 10 September 2009, and 16 September 2009. The Government Order dated 14 December 2009 noted that, following the issuance of these orders, the service organization had represented to the State Government, requesting rectification of certain anomalies. This Government Order specifically addressed the calculation of the eligible period of experience. It introduced a provision that now includes sanctioned leave while computing the required period of service. The Government Order dated 14 December 2009 noted that, following the issuance of these orders, the service organization had represented to the State Government, requesting rectification of certain anomalies. This Government Order specifically addressed the calculation of the eligible period of experience. It introduced a provision that now includes sanctioned leave while computing the required period of service. Clause 22 of Annexure I to the Government Order dated 14 December 2009 made it clear that teaching service or teaching experience shall include the periods of eligible sanctioned leave (including LWA on Medical Certificate) reckoned for increments and the deputation period spent for PG studies under Service Quota. There is, therefore, a clear difference between the Government orders of 2000 and 2009. 14. The Division Bench in M.G.Presanna was considering the Government Order dated 16 June 2000, which did not contain any specific stipulation regarding the calculation of five years of teaching experience – particularly, whether the period of leave availed by an employee should be included or excluded. In the absence of such a provision, the Division Bench referred to the Kerala Service Rules (KSR). Notably, the Government Order dated 16 June 2000 did not contain an express stipulation similar to Rule 77(ix) of the KSR. Therefore, the issue of conflict between the Government Order and the KSR was never raised as a point for determination in the writ petition filed by M.G.Presanna. The primary issue in that petition was the applicability of the Government Order dated 16 June 2000 in its entirety. 15. We have been informed that, following the Government Order dated 14 December 2009, further modifications were introduced that benefited employees. Many employees, including the Respondent, have availed the benefits under the 2009 Government Order. The learned counsel further submit that the referral question, if any, should be confined to determining whether the decision in M.G.Presanna can be considered as laying down a binding precedent. 16. It is a well-settled principle of law that a judgment must be understood in the context of the facts of the case and cannot be treated as a general formula. Judicial observations are often case-specific and must be interpreted in light of the pleadings, issues, and evidence presented. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that judgments should be read and applied in the context of the specific facts and circumstances in which they were delivered. Judicial observations are often case-specific and must be interpreted in light of the pleadings, issues, and evidence presented. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that judgments should be read and applied in the context of the specific facts and circumstances in which they were delivered. In the case of State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra , AIR 1968 SC 647 , it was observed as follows: “12. Now let us consider the ratio of the decisions in Nripendra Nath Bagchi's case [ (1966) 1 SCR 771 ], and Ranga Mahammad case [ (1967) 1 SCR 454 ]. In Bagchi case [ (1966) 1 SCR 771 ], this Court laid down that the word “control” found in Article 235 includes disciplinary jurisdiction as well. …. ..............The question of law considered in that decision was as regards the scope of the expression “control over District Court” in Article 235. The reference to the cadre was merely incidental. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury L.C. said in Quinn v. Leathem [(1901) AC 495]. “Now, before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, [(1898) AC 1] and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. ….” *** Further, in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani , (2004) 8 SCC 579 , the Supreme Court emphasised the need to examine a decision carefully as to the facts it was referred to and observed as under: “9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [ 1951 AC 737 : (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at p. 761) Lord Mac Dermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D) “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge,…” 10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. [(1970) 2 All ER 294: 1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 (HL)] (All ER p. 297g-h) Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances”. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. [(1970) 2 All ER 294: 1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 (HL)] (All ER p. 297g-h) Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances”. Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [(1971) 1 WLR 1062: (1971) 2 All ER 1267] observed:“One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.” And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board [ (1972) 2 WLR 537 : (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)] Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c) “There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.” 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.” *** The core principle emerging from these Supreme Court observations is that judgments have to be interpreted in the context of the specific facts and issues they address, and the observations cannot be applied rigidly without considering the factual backdrop of the case. 17. Applying the aforementioned test, upon a detailed analysis of the decision in M.G.Presanna, it is evident that the Division Bench was dealing with a Government Order that did not expressly indicate whether the leave period should be included or excluded in calculating the qualifying period. Due to this ambiguity, the Division Bench resorted to Rule 77 of the Kerala Service Rules and applied the relevant provisions of law. Therefore, the Division Bench in M.G.Presanna did not have the occasion to examine an executive instruction that explicitly defined the method of calculating the qualifying period in the context of leave. Further, the issue of leave inclusion or exclusion had not arisen in the writ petition that led to the appeal. Notably, from 2009 onwards, the position has evolved with the issuance of new Government Orders, which, as informed, are more beneficial to teachers. The teaching staff has been receiving career advancement benefits for several years under these revised policies. 18. Further, the issue of leave inclusion or exclusion had not arisen in the writ petition that led to the appeal. Notably, from 2009 onwards, the position has evolved with the issuance of new Government Orders, which, as informed, are more beneficial to teachers. The teaching staff has been receiving career advancement benefits for several years under these revised policies. 18. Accordingly, we find that the apprehension expressed by the learned Special Government Pleader is unwarranted. The Division Bench in M.G.Presanna has not laid down an absolute proposition of law applicable in all circumstances. The observations in M.G.Presanna were made in the context of the language of the Government Order dated 16 June 2000, which is no longer in force. Since the decision of the Division Bench and its observations were specific to the facts of the case, they cannot be considered a binding ratio applicable to all Government Orders and statutory rules concerning the calculation of continuous service. 19. Thus, the issue of conflict between the KSR and the executive order issued by the State Government for implementing AICTE regulations does not arise in the present case. Likewise, the decision in M.G.Presanna cannot be considered a binding authority on whether the definition of continuous service under Rule 77(ix) of the KSR must always prevail, as the factual matrix of that case did not necessitate such a broad declaration. 20. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, it is clear that the observations made by the Division Bench in State of Kerala v. M.G.Presanna, that Rules will override the executive instructions, were specific to the facts of that case when the application of Rule 77 of Part I of the KSR to Government Order dated 16 June 2000 was under consideration. The Reference is answered accordingly. 21. Both, the learned Special Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the Respondent submit nothing survives in this Petition for adjudication and request that the Petition itself be disposed of instead of sending it back to the Division Bench. Accordingly, having answered the reference as above, the Original Petition is disposed of.