Order : (Rakesh Mohan Pandey, J.) 1. The petitioners have challenged the order passed by the Commissioner, Bastar Division Jagdalpur (C.G.) dated 19.12.2018 in Revision Case No.27/A-23/14-15 whereby the revision preferred by respondent No.1 was allowed and the orders passed by the Collector and Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) were set aside. 2. The facts of the present case are that the land admeasuring 2.82 acres situated at Village-Bhirlinga, Tehsil Bastar, District Jagdalpur was recorded in the name of Hanumat. He moved an application seeking permission to sell his property according to the provisions of Section 165(6) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short ‘the Code of 1959’) and the same was allowed vide order dated 14.07.1972 and thereafter, he sold the property through a registered sale deed to one Radhabai. Radhabai sold the property to the petitioners herein. The petitioners were found in possession of the suit property, therefore, on the application moved by Hanumat, a proceeding under Section 170-B of the Code of 1959 was initiated by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) Bastar. The authority concerned rejected the application moved by Hanumat on the ground that earlier, a similar application was moved in the year 1992 and the same was rejected and there was permission according to the provisions of Section 165(6) of the Code of 1959 in favour of Radhabai. Thereafter, Hanumat preferred an appeal before the Collector against the order passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer and the same was rejected on 06.04.2015. He preferred a revision before the Commissioner Bastar, Division Jagdalpur and the same was allowed vide order dated 19.12.2018. The petitioners have challenged the said order by filing the present petition. 3. Mr. Jha, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the Commissioner, Division Bastar committed an error of law in deciding the revision finally by conducting an inquiry according to the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code of 1959 which was not permissible according to the provisions of the Code of 1959. He would further submit that the learned Commissioner ought to have remitted back the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) Bastar, who is the competent authority/tribunal to inquire into the matter with regard to Section 170-B of the Code of 1959. He would further submit that the learned Commissioner ought to have remitted back the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) Bastar, who is the competent authority/tribunal to inquire into the matter with regard to Section 170-B of the Code of 1959. He would contend that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) while exercising the power under Section 170-B of the Act of 1959 has been vested with the power to inquire into the permission granted under Section 165(6) of the Code of 1959. Therefore, the findings recorded by the Commissioner in this regard are also erroneous. He would pray that the order passed by the Commissioner may be set aside and the matter may be remitted back to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) to inquire into the matter and pass an appropriate order afresh. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Paranjpe, the learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 6 would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Jha. He would submit that the Commissioner, Division Bastar has passed a well-reasoned order. He would further submit that earlier, an inquiry was conducted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), therefore, there is no need to conduct a fresh inquiry. He would lastly submit that the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. Mr. Prajapati, the learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State would support the submissions made by Mr. Paranjpe. 6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 7. In the matter of Atmaram Rohulla and others Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 1995 MPLJ 633 , in paras 8, 10 and 12 it was observed and held thus:- “8. Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with three kinds of presumptions; The first deals with a case where the court may presume a fact as proved it may regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it. This is the meaning of the words "may presume". The second deals with the words "shall presume, i.e., where the Evidence Act has directed that the Court shall presume a fact unless and until it is disproved. The third variety is what is referred to as "conclusive proof". This is the meaning of the words "may presume". The second deals with the words "shall presume, i.e., where the Evidence Act has directed that the Court shall presume a fact unless and until it is disproved. The third variety is what is referred to as "conclusive proof". When one fact is declared to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on proof of one fact, regard the other as proved and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it. Sub- section (2) of Section 170-B of the Code merely uses the words "shall be presumed" and does not indicate that it shall amount to conclusive proof and does not bar any evidence being adduced for the purpose of disproving it. The presumption under Sub-section. (2) must, therefore, be regarded as a rebuttable presumption. 10.Petitioners herein filed statements before the S.D.O. referring to the sale deeds under which the tribal vendors parted with their rights and possession in favour of the vendees and also mentioned that the sale deeds were registered after obtaining permission from the District Collector as contemplated under Section 165(6) of the Code. Of the two sale deeds produced before us, we find that one refers to permission granted by the District Collector. In the circumstances, the S.D.O. could have required the petitioners to prove their contention that their possession is traceable to the registered sale deeds contained after securing permission from the District Collector, as required by law. That was not done. The S.D.O. did not do so. He did not even advert to the question whether the presumption under Sub-section (2) is rebutted by the petitioners. He proceeded on the basis that once it is seen that the petitioners did not notify the information to him as required under Sub-section (1) within the period prescribed possession of the petitioners not must be regarded as without any lawful authority and he did not consider the contentions raised by the petitioners. It is necessary that the S.D.O. considers the contentions and records finding in that behalf before deciding whether possession of the land should revert to the person to whom it originally belonged. 12.The impugned order has been passed in violation of the requirements of the provisions of law as we have indicated above and, therefore, deserves to be and is hereby quashed. 12.The impugned order has been passed in violation of the requirements of the provisions of law as we have indicated above and, therefore, deserves to be and is hereby quashed. The S.D.O. will take back the cases on his file and procedure with the enquiry and pass orders afresh in accordance with law and the observations contained in this order. The petitioners shall appear before the S.D.O. on 2- 1 -1995 with all evidence which they desire to place before the S.D.O.” 8. In the matter of Rajkumar Khatwani and others Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, Writ Petition No.1597 of 2001 , the Coordinate Bench has held that the correctness of permission granted under Section 165(6) of the Code of 1959 can be looked into and can be decided by the Sub-Divisional Officer. The relevant para 8 is reproduced herein below:- “8.In the matter of Panch Ram Sahu and others v. Chairman, Board of Revenue and others1, this Court has held that even if the land of aboriginal is sold after due permission of the Collector under Section 165(6) of the Code, the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) is entitled to consider the correctness of the transaction so made by the aboriginal tribe in favour of the non-aboriginal tribe and validity of the permission can be looked into and can be decided. In paragraph 14 of the report, this Court observed as under: - “14. While considering the question, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gopichand v. State of M.P.2 held as under: - “6. At this stage Shri Deoras submits that the Sub- Divisional Officer being subordinate to the Collector would not be in a position to look into the correctness, validity and propriety of the order passed by the Collector under Section 165(6), therefore, in a case where the lands have been transferred with the permission of the Collector, such proceedings cannot be initiated or continued. I am unable to accept this contention. Section 170-B provides that if proper action is not taken by the transferee, then there would be a presumption of fraud in favour of the aboriginal tribe. Even in a case where a party proves that the land was purchased with the permission, the seller can still prove that the permission was obtained by playing fraud on the Collector. Section 170-B provides that if proper action is not taken by the transferee, then there would be a presumption of fraud in favour of the aboriginal tribe. Even in a case where a party proves that the land was purchased with the permission, the seller can still prove that the permission was obtained by playing fraud on the Collector. It is not that the correctness, validity or property of the permission is in question or challenge. The S.D.O. only has to convince himself to the fact of exercise of fraud. Fraud may be exercised in a number of ways. A party may be defrauded even before the application for permission is moved. Permission itself may be the result of fraud or the permission may become ineffective, if certain assurances given by the transferee are not fulfilled by him after obtaining permission. In any case, it would be for the S.D.O. to look into the matter." 9. In the present case, the Commissioner while deciding the revision preferred by respondents No.1 to 6, quashed the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) and the Collector and finally, decided it on merits. 10.With regard to the permission granted under Section 165(6) of the Code of 1959, it was held that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) being the competent authority according to the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code of 1959 can only inquire into the matter, record evidence of the parties, consider the documents and also may declare the transaction null and void. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the Commissioner committed an error of law while deciding the revision finally on merits, therefore, the order dated 19.12.2018 passed by the Commissioner is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bastar to decide the case afresh after holding a due inquiry strictly in accordance with the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code of 1959. The authority concerned is directed to decide the matter expeditiously within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 11.The status as it obtains today shall be maintained by the parties till the proceedings are concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bastar. 12. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed.