COMMON ORDER : TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO, J. The plaintiff by name Bogirala Kondaiah fled suit O.S. No. 223 of 2016 on the file of Junior Judge (Civil Division) Kanigiri for specific performance to compel the respondent / defendant to execute a sale deed basing on the agreement of sale deed dated 23-08-2013 claiming inertia to do so the same by the Court. While the suit is under trial, the plaintiff died on 21.09.2003. Thereafter, the legal heirs of the deceased plaintiffs’ wife and the children have filed two applications viz., I.A. No.1460 of 2024 to bring them as legal heirs under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC and I.A. No.1459 of 2024 to set aside the abatement under Oder 22 Rule 9 (2) CPC, and filed I.A. 1458 of 2024 on 05.07.2024 to condone the delay in filing the application to bring the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff and to permit the petitioners in the Revision Petition to continue suit. 2. The very learned trial judge has dismissed the I.A. 1458 of 2024 which was filed on 05.07.2024 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking for condonation of delay in bringing the deceased plaintiff’s legal representative with an observation noting “that the party should demonstrate sufficient cause for not meeting the prescribed deadline in filing the application in time, but since the petitioner failed to any explanation for the delay, and the petitioner might be under the impression that the Court would grant his application automatically, basing on the opposing party’s “no objection” endorsement without gauging the merits of the application and it amounts to misconception on the petitioner’s part and the judicial discretion requires more just consent form the other party and the Court must independently assess whether the reasons for the delay are reasonable and justifiable and the onus of providing a valid explanation for the delay does not abate just because the other party does not object”, The other two applications were consequently dismissed vide common order dated 13.11.2024. 3. Assailing the common order dated the 13.11.2024, the present three Civil Revision Petitions filed: CRP No. 3177 of 2024 is filed against order in I.A. 1458 of 2024 which application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the abatement. 3. Assailing the common order dated the 13.11.2024, the present three Civil Revision Petitions filed: CRP No. 3177 of 2024 is filed against order in I.A. 1458 of 2024 which application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the abatement. CRP No. 3178 of 2024 is filed against order in I.A. 1460 of 2024 which application is filed to bring the legal heirs of the deceased original plaintiff. CRP No. 3183 of 2024 is filed against the order in I.A. 1459 of 2024, which application is filed to set aside the abatement on the grounds that procedural and technical hurdles cannot impede substantial justice, the delay is not abnormal, there is no willful latches on the part of the petitioners, and they are illiterate, and refusing to condone the delay is against to settle law of principle. 4. Notice is served on the sole respondent but no appearance is made either in person or through an advocate. Heard, learned counsel for the petitioners and this Court makes the following order. 5. Under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation to have (bring) the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant; of a deceased defendant or respondent made a party is ninety days from the date of death of the plaintiff, defendant or respondent as the case may be. 6. Under Article 121 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation to set aside an abatement is sixty days from the date of abatement. Legal heirs of the deceased can be brought on record within 160 days from the date death of the deceased. 7. This Court is unable to understand how the learned trial Court has calculated 255 days delay in filing the application to set aside the abatement without mentioning the date of filing of application into the Court. The suit would abate as against the deceased plaintiff after the period of 90 days from the date of death as provided under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, if the legal heirs of the deceased were not brought on record without reference to the Court order, automatically. Thereafter, the legal heirs can file an application to set aside the abatement order within 60 days from the date of abatement. Thereafter, the legal heirs can file an application to set aside the abatement order within 60 days from the date of abatement. If, no such application is filed within 60 days from the date of abatement, the Limitation Act provides to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to set aside the abatement. 8. The deceased passed away on 13.09.2023, and there is no indication of when the application was filed in the Court. The Court should exercise caution when issuing orders. If this Court considers the service of notice to the opposing party, the delay in filing the application to set aside the abatement amounts to 24 days, as the notice was served on 23.03.2024, and the Court assumes the application was filed on 24.03.2024. Based on this calculation, there is a 24 days delay in submitting the application to set aside the abatement. However, the length of the delay is not the sole factor in determining whether to condone the delay. 9. The Apex Court, after considering plethora of judgments held in G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer , [ (1988) 2 SCC 142 ] held that “while summarising the position of law on ‘sufficient cause’, that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. 10. In the case of Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Sahu & Others versus Gobardhan Sap & Others , [ 2002(3) SCC 195 ] , the Apex Court has added it emphasis and held in the following: Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 11. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari , [ (1969) 1 SCR 1006 ] and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality , [ (1972) 1 SCC 366 ]. 12. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. " 13. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. " 13. According to the impugned order, the trial Court has not found that the petitioners acted dishonestly, purposefully, or with egregious inaction or lack of bona fides, or that they employed a dilatory strategy to prolong the trial by the party or its counsel. The Apex Court's observations were also not taken into consideration when the petitioners filed their applications in the Court. Furthermore, the Court did not specify the date of filing when determining the delay of 255 days. 14. Hence the applications stand allowed, however, to the lackadaisical attitude of the petitioners, the application for condonation of delay is allowed subject to payment of costs of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand only) payable by the petitioners within a period of three weeks from the date of order to the District Legal Services Authority, failing which the applications impugned in these Revision Petitions filed by the revision petitioners stands dismissed and the trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial. Accordingly, the prayer in the two applications in I.A. 1460 of 2024 and I.A. 1459 of 2024 stands allowed. Consequently, the application for substitution, is allowed and the abatement is set aside. 15. Accordingly, Civil Revisions Petitions are allowed and the impugned common order dated 13.11.2024 is hereby set aside and the trial is directed proceed as per the observation made by this Court. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending in these Civil Revision Petitions shall stand closed.