ORDER : 1. This misc. appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) of CPC has been filed by appellant-defendant therein, assailing the order dated 25.09.2023 passed by Principal District Judge, Shivpuri District-Shivpuri in Regular Civil Appeal No.27A/2021, setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 09.10.2021 passed by Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pohari, District-Shivpuri in Civil Suit No.3-A/2017 and remanding the matter to the trial Court. 2. A few facts necessary for the adjudication of this appeal, as narrated therein, are that plaintiff is the legal owner of shop in dispute and a suit has been filed by Shri Ramji Lal Gupta, Ex-officio President of Shri Ramjanaki Mandir Trust (in short ''the Trust'') on behalf of the Trust. It was pleaded that on 01-01-2007 a shop measuring 17x 24 feet from Temple Trust for Rs.1,500/- per month was taken by defendant on rent for the purpose of running sweets business, on the basis of oral agreement with the rust and vacant possession of the shop in dispute was handed over to defendant on the same day. As per oral agreement, the tenancy would commence on the first day of each Gregorian month and conclude on the last day of that month. The monthly rent of Rs.1,500/- was to be paid on the first day of following month, against which a receipt would be issued. It was further agreed that whenever the Trust required the said shop, the defendant would vacate it upon receiving one month's prior notice. The defendant had paid rent to the Trust from 01-01-2007 to 31-12-2013 and from 1 st January, 20014, defendant stopped making rental payments. It was further pleaded that when the trust demanded outstanding rent of Rs.49,500/- defendant persistently avoided payments. Consequently, on 05-10-2016, the Trust issued a legal notice to defendant by registered mail demanding payment of outstanding rent and seeking vacation of the suit shop. Despite receiving the legal notice, defendant neither vacated the disputed shop nor paid the outstanding rent of Rs.54,000/-, therefore, present suit has been filed for eviction of defendant and recovery of outstanding rent. 3. Defendant filed his written statement denying the plaint avermennt. It was pleaded that defendant on the basis of order dated 30-07-2008 passed by Revenue Court (SDO) claimed himself to be the ownership of disputed shop, and denied plaintiff’s title over the suit shop. 3. Defendant filed his written statement denying the plaint avermennt. It was pleaded that defendant on the basis of order dated 30-07-2008 passed by Revenue Court (SDO) claimed himself to be the ownership of disputed shop, and denied plaintiff’s title over the suit shop. It was pleaded that suit shop is situated in survey no.427/1 and his name has been recorded as owner of suit shop in the revenue record as he had purchased the suit shop by way of registered sale deed dated 10-11-1986 and since then, he is having possession of shop and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between defendant and plaintiff. Hence, prayed for dismissal of suit. 4. On the basis of pleading of the parties, trial Court framed issues. On the basis of oral as well as documentary evidence, the trial Court allowed the suit of plaintiff partially with a direction that defendant immediately hand over the vacant possession of portion of disputed shop in survey no. 427 to the plaintiff. Being dissatisfied, defendant filed a regular civil appeal before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate Court vide impugned order dated 25-09-2023 remanded the matter to the trial Court after allowing the application filed by plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. Hence, this appeal. 5. It is contended on behalf of appellant that suit shop is situated in survey no. 427/1 and is recorded in the name of appellant as an owner in the revenue record. He had purchased the the suit shop by way of registered sale deed dated 10-11-1986. It is further contended that the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable before the trial Court since no resolution empowering the President was produced regarding prosecution of suit in the name of registered Public Trust. The plaintiff has remained unsuccessful in proving the relationship of landlord and tenant, therefore, no question of grant of decree about arrears of rent is made out. It is further contended that the trial Court has committed an error in holding that defendant could not prove his title on the basis of registered sale deed, although the plaintiff is the owner of suit property. It is further contended that the trial Court has committed an error in holding that defendant could not prove his title on the basis of registered sale deed, although the plaintiff is the owner of suit property. It is also contended that during pendency of appeal before the First Appellate Court, the plaintiff had placed on record some documents of chartered accountant of the Trust to show the defendant to be tenant of property, which could not be filed by plaintiff earlier and First appellate Court without considering the relevancy of document and without going through the mandatory provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, in a mechanical manner allowed the application of plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC by remanding the matter back to the trial Court. 6. In support of contentions, learned Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of Satish Kumar Gupta vs. State of Haryana and Others, 2017 Supreme (SC) 177, in which the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 20 has observed as under:- ''20. It is clear that neither the trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill in the lacunae or to patch up the weak points in the case. There was no ground for remand in these circumstances.'' 7. Further, learned Counsel for appellant has placed reliance on the decision of Pramod Kumar Jain and Ors. vs. Kusum Lashkari and Ors. 2019 Supreme (MP) 834, in which the coordinate Bench of this Court in para 34 and 35 has observed as under:- ''34. So far as application under Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code is concerned, appellants through the said application (IA No.15374/2017) has tried to bring certified copy of the plaint filed by the plaintiff before the Civil Judge Class-I, Vidisha in which copy of the plaint dated 20-03-1963 and the order dated 7-8-1964 whereby counsel for the then plaintiffs pleaded no instructions. Besides that, appellants have tried to bring certain more documents on record, but those documents including the sale deed of 1971 are of no relevance for adjudication of this litigation. 35. Besides that, appellants have tried to bring certain more documents on record, but those documents including the sale deed of 1971 are of no relevance for adjudication of this litigation. 35. Even otherwise, through this application, appellants have not successfully demonstrated the due diligence factor and it appears that these documents are not helpful for reaching at just conclusion of litigation. It appears to be a dilatory tactics. Those documents are not such material documents which may change the fate of litigation conclusively therefore, documents are rejected to be taken on record. Provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code does not authorize any lacuna or gaps in evidence to be filled up at the stage of appeal. It is the duty of the litigating party to show due diligence (See: N. Kamalam (Dead) and another vs. Ayyasamy and another (2001) 7 SCC 503 and Basayya I. Mathad vs. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 120 ] and recent pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad Patel (D) Thr. Lrs. vs. Shivnath and Others, (2019) 6 SCC 82 . '' 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant, has also placed reliance on the decision of Sarita Sharma vs. State of MP and Others, (2019) 4 MPLJ 461 , in which the coordinate Bench of this Court in para 21 has observed as under:- ''21. Even otherwise, it is settled principle of law that such documents by ways of additional evidence, cannot be permitted to fill up the lacuna. The provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC has not been engrafted in the Code, so as to patch up the weak point in the case and to fill up the omission in the Court of appeal. It does not authorize any lacuna or gaps in evidence to be filled up at the stage of appeal. (See; N. Kamalam (Dead) and another Vs. Ayyasamy and another reported in (2001) 7 SCC 503 ). No additional evidence ought to be permitted to be taken on record, which was well within the knowledge of plaintiff during trial and it could have been adduced during trial. (See; N. Kamalam (Dead) and another Vs. Ayyasamy and another reported in (2001) 7 SCC 503 ). No additional evidence ought to be permitted to be taken on record, which was well within the knowledge of plaintiff during trial and it could have been adduced during trial. When PW-1 during examination categorically admitted that he had the certified copy of the sale deed on which plaintiff placing her reliance in application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, then it cannot be inferred that the additional evidence sought to be taken on record was based on due diligence.Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat and another Vs. Mahendra Kumar Parshottambhai reported in (2006) 9 SCC 772 , dwelled upon this issue and considered the aspect of due diligence. It is the duty of the litigating party to show due diligence.” 9. By placing reliance on Coordinate Bench decision of this Court in the case of Murari Lal vs. Ram Kumar Ojha and another, (2015) 1 MPLJ 243 , Jagnnath and Another vs. Karuna and Others, (2018) 3 MPLJ 98 and Sudesh Kohli vs. Chandrani Mishra and Anr. (2020) 1 MPLJ 377 , learned Counsel for the appellant contended that order of remand passed by First appellate Court was not proper without considering the merits of the case where re-trial of case was not necessary and without going through the basis requirements under Order 41 Rule 23 and 23-A of CPC. In this regard, he has referred to para 3, 4, 11 and 15 of judgment of Murari Lal (supra) as under:- ''3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad v. Sunder Singh ( (2008) 8 SCC 485 ), has lucidly and succinctly explained the scope and application of the aforesaid provision, as contained under Order XLI rule 23 of C.P.C. with reference to nature of jurisdiction of the appellate Court. Relevant para 18 of the judgment is reproduced below:- "18. It is now well settled that before invoking the said provision, the conditions precedent laid down therein must be satisfied. It is further well settled that the Court should loathe to exercise its power in terms of Order 41 rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an order of remand should not be passed routinely. It is now well settled that before invoking the said provision, the conditions precedent laid down therein must be satisfied. It is further well settled that the Court should loathe to exercise its power in terms of Order 41 rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an order of remand should not be passed routinely. It is not to be exercised by the appellate Court only because it finds it difficult to deal with the entire matter. If it does not agree with the decision of the trial court, it has to come with a proper finding of its own. The appellate Court cannot shirk its duties." 4. Order XLI rule 23A of C.P.C. in the statute w.e.f. 1.2.1977 provides for application of Order XLI rule 23 of C.P.C. in the matters where the court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on preliminary point, and the decree is reversed in appeal and re-trial is considered necessary, the appellate court shall have the same powers as it has under Order XLI rule 23 of C.P.C. As such, the twin requirements of the provision are to the effect that; (i) The trial Court disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point, and (i) the decree is reversed in appeal and re-trial is considered necessary. In other words, if the appellate Court finds a judgment under appeal to be not satisfactory in the manner required by Order XXII rule 3 C.P.C. or Order XII rule 21 C.P.C. and, hence, it is not a judgment in the eyes of law, it may set aside the same and send the matter back for rewriting of the judgment so as to protect valuable rights of the parties. However, the appellate Court should be circumspect in ordering remand and it should not be exercised when the case is not covered either by rule 23 or 23A of Order XLI of C.P.C. as an unwarranted order of remand unnecessary prolongs the litigation, which in all fairness should be avoided. (2002) 2 SCC 686 (P. Purushottam Reddy and another v. Pratap Steels Ltd.), is referred to. Though the provision confers discretionary jurisdiction on the appellate court, but order of remand should not be passed routinely. 11. (2002) 2 SCC 686 (P. Purushottam Reddy and another v. Pratap Steels Ltd.), is referred to. Though the provision confers discretionary jurisdiction on the appellate court, but order of remand should not be passed routinely. 11. The scope and nature of jurisdiction conferred on appellate Court under Order XLI rule 23 and Order XLI rule 23A C.P.C. are well settled as observed in the opening part of the order. The ingredients of Order XLI rule 23A C.P.C. are two fold, firstly; the appellate Court upon consideration of the pleadings and material brought on record by way of oral and documentary evidence in the event reaches the conclusion to ré-verse the findings of the trial Court; only thereafter, and secondly; it has to apply its mind as to whether the circumstances warrant retrial. Upon fulfillment of these two requirements, the provisions of Order XLI rule 23C.P.C. can be applied in the matter of remand of the case. 13. Admittedly, the First Appellate Court has not dealt with the appeal on merits and made an observation that the aforesaid evidence was not dealt with by the trial Court while recording the aforesaid findings and that is the reason why the impugned judgment and decree suffers from perversity of approach.'' Learned Counsel for appellant further referred to para and 4 of judgment of Jagnnath (supra) as under:- ''2. In the light of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syeda Rahimunnisa Vs. Malan Bi (Dead) by L.Rs. (2016) 10 SCC 315 and by this Court in the cases of Murarilal Vs. Ram Kumar Ojha ILR (2014) MP 2162, Shivdayal Vs. Meena Bai ILR (2014) MP 2174, wherein the scope, limit, extent and dimension of jurisdiction of the appellate Court under Order 41 Rules 23 and 23-A CPC are laid down requiring the appellate authority to first address on justifiability of reversing the findings of the Court below and ascertaining the requirement for remand thereafter shall exercise jurisdiction under Order 41 Rules 23 and 23-A CPC. 4. In the opinion of this Court, the appellate Court appears to be oblivious of the statutory requirement under Order 41 Rules 23 and 23-A of CPC in the context of power of remand. 4. In the opinion of this Court, the appellate Court appears to be oblivious of the statutory requirement under Order 41 Rules 23 and 23-A of CPC in the context of power of remand. In the light of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syeda Rahimunnisa (Supra) and of this Court in the cases of Murarilal (Supra) and Shivdayal (Supra), the impugned order of remand cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.'' 10. Under these circumstances, it is prayed that the impugned order dated 25-09- 2023 passed by First appellate Court be set aside with a direction to the First appellate Court to hear the appeal on merits and the application filed by plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC be dismissed. 11. On the other hand, learned Counsel for respondent- plaintiff opposed the contentions of appellant by supporting the impugned order passed by the First appellate Court. It is submitted that the defendant himself entered into tenancy with the Trust on 01-01-2007, paid rent and continued possession under the aegis of President of Trust and once tenancy and possession under the Trust is admitted, the technical objection regarding authorization of President to file the suit cannot defeat substantive rights of the Trust. The revenue Court order dated 30-07-2008 does not create ownership in favour of defendant and the revenue entries also do not confer the title of defendant over immovable property. Plaintiff had produced audited balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of Chartered Accountant which clearly show about tenancy and transaction in regard to disputed shop and should strengthen the conclusion already drawn by the trial Court in para 53 and 58 because of the fact these documents could not be produced earlier as the same were remained in the custody of former Chairman Shri Ramjilal who was aged, ailing and has since passed away and non-production was due to circumstances beyond the control of Trust and subsequent recovery from personal record justifies production at the appellate stage. Non-production of documents earlier was not due to negligence or mala fides. It is further contended that defendant produced site map Ex.D7 which shows that the shop is located in survey no.479 whereas the Trust land is situated in Survey No.478. Non-production of documents earlier was not due to negligence or mala fides. It is further contended that defendant produced site map Ex.D7 which shows that the shop is located in survey no.479 whereas the Trust land is situated in Survey No.478. Further, from the evidence Rambabu Mangal (PW-2) it is proved that the defendant was occupying the shop in dispute by paying consideration to the Trust. The trial Court in its judgment recorded an erroneous conclusion against the plaintiff on the relationship of landlord and tenant but in conclusion gave a finding about the ownership and entitlement of Trust over the disputed shop and rightly held that the Trust was entitled to evict the defendant and obtain vacant possession. Therefore, additional documents ought to be produced only corroborate the findings and are necessary not to fill lacunae but to ensure a complete and just adjudication of the dispute. The order of remand passed by First appellate Court was not in a mechanical manner but was a judicious exercise to ensure both the parties to prove or rebut the new evidence. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the First appellate Court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity, on the contrary, it ensures that the real issues between the parties i.e. existence of tenancy, arrears of rent and entitlement of possession are adjudicated with all relevant material on record. Hence, prayed for dismissal of this appeal. 12. Heard learned Counsel for parties. Perused the impugned orders and documents available on record. 13. For ready reference, Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC is produced as under:- “ 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.— (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. 12. Heard learned Counsel for parties. Perused the impugned orders and documents available on record. 13. For ready reference, Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC is produced as under:- “ 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.— (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if— (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed,or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 14. Plaintiff had filed application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC along with documents i.e audited balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of Chartered Accountant to prove tenancy and transaction in regard to the disputed shop. In para 03 it was pleaded by plaintiff that the said documents were with Shri Ramjilal and his health was so bad and he could not even walk and his memory has also become weak, hence, he did not tell Narendra Kumar Shrivastava about these documents and neither Narendra Kumar Shrivastava was aware of this nor did he take it from Ramjilal. Narendra Shrivastava in para 14 of his cross-examination deposed that he has been duly appointed as a trustee of Mandir since 2006. The trust holds meetings every two months to increase the salaries of priests, appoint new priests, and to discuss delays in rent payments or to recover them as required. In para 15, he denied that there has been no accounting of temple's income and expenditures in relation to its properties since his appointment as trustee and in para 16, he stated that a complete statement of temple's income and expenditure is submitted with SDM Pohri, copy of which is kept in the Trust's record. In para 15, he denied that there has been no accounting of temple's income and expenditures in relation to its properties since his appointment as trustee and in para 16, he stated that a complete statement of temple's income and expenditure is submitted with SDM Pohri, copy of which is kept in the Trust's record. Rambabu Mangal (PW2) in his cross-examination deposed that Temple is a trust whose proceedings are conducted in writing, not verbally. In para 12, he stated he has been a member and treasurer of Trust for the last 10-12 years and all proceedings of the Trust including hiring and removing tenants, extending tenancies or making policy decisions are conducted in writing since 2006, a record of which is available with SDO, Pohri, but the Trust did not produce any written evidence regarding renting of disputed shop to defendant for Rs.1500/- per month. Without such evidence, it cannot be proven that defendant has been a tenant of plaintiff at the disputed shop since 1 st January, 2007 and plaintiff plaintiff failed to establish relationship between the plaintiff and defendant as landlord and tenant. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and Another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 regarding applicability of production of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 has held in detail as under:- ' '36. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the First court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 37. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 38. Under Order XLI , Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. [Vide: Lala Pancham & Ors. (supra) ]. 39 . It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the First Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non- production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the First court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non- production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the First court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the First court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 40 . The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41 . The words "for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires" in the beginning of sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court requires additional evidence, that this rule will apply, e.g., when evidence has been taken by the First Court so imperfectly that the Appellate Court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment. 42 . Whenever the appellate Court admits additional evidence it should record its reasons for doing so. (Sub-rule 2). It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against a too easy reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation and the statement of reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this rule has been properly exercised by the Court below. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the rule. 43. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the rule. 43. The reasons need not be recorded in a separate order provided they are embodied in the judgment of the appellate Court. A mere reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case, or mere statement that the evidence is necessary to pronounce judgment, or that the additional evidence is required to be admitted in the interests of justice, or that there is no reason to reject the prayer for the admission of the additional evidence, is not enough comp1iance with the requirement as to recording of reasons. 44 . It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice – delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; State of Uttaranchal & Anr. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; State of Uttaranchal & Anr. v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, AIR 2008 SC 2026 ; The Secretary & Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1285 ; and Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited & Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 336 ). 45. In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore v. H. Narayanaiah etc. etc., AIR 1976 SC 2403 , while dealing with the issue, a three judge Bench of this Court held as under: “We are of the opinion that the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its insistence by leading other evidence.” (Emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Basayya I. Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1108 . 46. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Venkataramiah (Supra), while dealing with the same issue held: “It is very much to be desired that the courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of cl. (2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence….. The omission to record reason must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.” (Emphasis added) In the said case, the court after examining the record of the case came to the conclusion that the appeal was heard for a long time and the application for taking additional evidence on record was filed during the final hearing of the appeal. In such a fact-situation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47 . In such a fact-situation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47 . Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record such application may be allowed. 48 . To sum up on the issue, it may be held that application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the appellate court. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage. Stage of Consideration : 49. An application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the Court. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 193 and Natha Singh & Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053 ). 16. In view of provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC such documents by way of additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill up the lacuna or gap in evidence at the stage of appeal which were well within the knowledge of plaintiff during trial and the same could have been adduced during trial. It cannot be inferred that the additional documents sought to be taken on record was based on due diligence. Accordingly, the First appellate Court has committed an error in allowing the application of plaintiff for taking the additional documents at appellate stage, which could have produced in the trial Court. Hence, the application filed by plaintiff under order 41 Rule 27 of CPC deserves to be and is hereby rejected. 17. The scope and nature of jurisdiction conferred on appellate Court under Order XLI Rule 23 and Order XLI Rule 23A CPC are well settled as observed above. The ingredients of Order XLI Rule 23A CPC are two fold. Firstly ; the appellate Court upon consideration of the pleadings and material brought on record by way of oral and documentary evidence in the event reaches the conclusion to reverse the findings of the trial Court. Secondly , it has to apply its mind as to whether the circumstances warrant retrial. Upon fulfillment of these two requirements, the provisions of Order XLI Rule 23 CPC can be applied in the matter of remand of the case. 18. In view of foregoing reasons and discussions, the First Appellate Court has, in fact, erroneously exercised the jurisdiction under Order XLI Rule 23 of CPC while ordering remand of the case to the trial Court for fresh adjudication instead of deciding it on merits. Hence, the impugned judgment passed by the First Appellate Court is liable to be and is hereby set aside. Hence, the impugned judgment passed by the First Appellate Court is liable to be and is hereby set aside. Both the parties are directed to appear before First Appellate Court first on 13 th of October, 2025 and the First Appellate Court shall decide the appeal on its own merits after affording due opportunity of hearing to both the parties and on the basis of evidence available on record. 19. The misc. appeal stands allowed with the aforesaid. No order to as to costs.