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2025 DIGILAW 589 (HP)

Gurvinder Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-04-02

RAKESH KAINTHLA

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JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 419 , 420, 356-D and 376 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ), vide FIR No. 267 of 2016, dated 23.8.2016 registered at Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. The police filed the charge sheet. The petitioner was released on bail. He could not appear during the trial as he was suffering from a serious ailment. The co-accused has been acquitted. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence the petition. 2. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim made a complaint to the police asserting that she came in contact with Sagir Ali. He proposed to marry the victim. He called the victim on 21.9.2015 and demanded Rs.7.00 lacs to settle the case filed against him. The victim transferred Rs.1,70,000/- as per the directions of Sagir Ali. Sagir Ali visited the victim on 18.10.2015 and took Rs.1,30,000/- from her. He married the victim on 12.3.2016. He took her to Zirakpur, and thereafter, he dropped her in her maternal home. He did not contact the victim. The victim made inquiries and found that the real name of Sagir Ali was Gurvinder Singh (present petitioner), who was already married. The petitioner had taken Rs.3.00 lacs from the victim by making misrepresentations to her. The petitioner did not appear before the Court, and he was declared proclaimed offender on 20.6.2023. The police arrested him on 19.10.2024. The petitioner remained absconding for eight years, and he was arrested after much effort. He would abscond again in case of his release on bail. Hence, the status report. 3. I have heard Mr. Vinod Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 4. Mr Vinod Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The learned Trial Court has already acquitted the co-accused by disbelieving the prosecution version. The petitioner cannot be convicted on the basis of the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 4. Mr Vinod Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The learned Trial Court has already acquitted the co-accused by disbelieving the prosecution version. The petitioner cannot be convicted on the basis of the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. The trial is an empty formality and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 5. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner had absconded in the proceedings pending against him and he would abscond again in case of his release on bail. The offence against the petitioner is heinous. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramratan v. State of M.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068 , wherein it was observed as follows: - “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice”, has been construed in several decisions of this Court. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice”, has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570 , this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: — “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779 , laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the application for bail and observed: “ 4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 9. It is undisputed that the petitioner had absconded in the proceedings pending against him, and he was declared a proclaimed offender by the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar , 1958 SCC OnLine SC 81 : 1958 SCR 1226 : 1958 CRI LJ 701: 1958 SCJ 672 : AIR 1958 SC 376 that an absconding accused compromises fair trial and is not entitled to bail. It was observed: “6. Now, it is obvious that the primary object of criminal procedure is to ensure a fair trial of accused persons. Every criminal trial begins with the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and provisions of the Code are so framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be throughout governed by this essential presumption, but a fair trial has naturally two objects in view; it must be fair to the accused and must also be fair to the prosecution. The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from this dual point of view. The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from this dual point of view. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that, in a criminal trial, witnesses should be able to give evidence without any inducement or threat, either from the prosecution or the defence. A criminal trial must never be so conducted by the prosecution as it would lead to the conviction of an innocent person; similarly, the progress of a criminal trial must not be obstructed by the accused so as to lead to the acquittal of a really guilty offender. The acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty are the objects of a criminal trial, and so there can be no possible doubt that if any conduct on the part of an accused person is likely to ob- struct a fair trial, there is occasion for the exercise of the inherent power of the High Courts to secure the ends of justice. There can be no more important requirement of the ends of justice than the uninterrupted progress of a fair trial, and it is for the continuance of such a fair trial that the inherent powers of the High Courts are sought to be invoked by the prosecution in cases where it is alleged that accused persons, either by suborning or intimidating witnesses, are obstructing the smooth progress of a fair trial. Similarly, if an accused person who is released on bail jumps bail and attempts to run to a foreign country to escape the trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the inherent power would be justified in order to compel the accused to submit to a fair trial and not to escape its consequences by taking advantage of the fact that he has been released on bail and by absconding to another country. In other words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to his release on bail puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial it- self and if there is no other remedy which can be effectively used against the accused person, in such a case, the inherent power of the High Court can be legitimately invoked. In regard to non-bailable offences, there is no need to invoke such power because Section 497(5) specifically deals with such cases. In regard to non-bailable offences, there is no need to invoke such power because Section 497(5) specifically deals with such cases. The question which we have to decide in this case is whether the exercise of inherent power under Section 561-A against persons accused of bailable offences who have been released on bail is contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of Section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure .” (Emphasis supplied) 10. In the present case, the petitioner had obstructed the progress of the trial by absconding, and he is not entitled to bail. 11. Reference was made to the judgment and the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court against the co- accused. However, the judgment and the evidence against the co-accused is not admissible against the petitioner because he was not present before the Court while recording the evidence, and only evidence recorded in his presence can be used as per Section 273 of Cr.P.C. There is no evidence that the requirements of Section 299 of Cr.P.C. have been satisfied to render the evidence admissible against the petitioner. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements of the witnesses recorded by the learned Trial Court in the absence of the petitioner. 12. As per the FIR, the petitioner had misrepresented himself to be a bachelor and had taken more than Rs.3.00 lacs from the victim. He had absconded during the proceedings, and there is a force in the submission of Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, that the petitioner is not likely to face trial because of his past conduct. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be released on bail. 13. No other point was urged. 14. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 15. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.