ORDER : Y. Lakshmana Rao, J. Criminal revision case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C’) challenging the judgment dated 31.10.2012 in Crl.A.No.157 of 2012 on the file of the learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Markapur, allowing the criminal appeal in part confirming the conviction and sentence against the petitioner for the offence under Section 323 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 (for brevity ‘the I.P.C’), vide judgment dated 01.08.2012 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Podili, in C.C.No.190 of 2008 setting aside conviction and sentence against the petitioner, A2 to A10 for the offences under Section 353 read with 149 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C’) and conviction and sentence against A2 to A10 for the offence under Section 323 r/w 149 of ‘the I.P.C’. 2. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 3. Sri I. Koti Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating the grounds of the revision, submitted that no independent witnesses were examined; P.Ws.1 to 3 are the police constables who were interested witnesses; evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 is not trustworthy since they had not sustained any injuries; P.Ws.1 to 3 are inimical to the petitioner; and requested to allow the criminal revision case. 4. Alternatively, it is submitted that the offence occurred in the year 2008 and nearly 17 years have passed by. The petitioner was in jail for about 4 days. The petitioner’s right to speedy disposal of the criminal revision case as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is infringed, and urged to sentence the petitioner to which he had already undergone. 5. Per contra, Ms. P. Akila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently argued that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubt; though P.Ws.1 to 3 are police officials, their evidence was not tainted with any infirmities; the learned Appellate Court rightly found the petitioner guilty for the offence under Section 323 of ‘the I.P.C’; there was no misreading of the evidence and material irregularity committed by the learned Appellate Court and urged to dismiss the criminal revision case. 6. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 7. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.157 of 2012 dated 31.10.2012 passed by the learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Markapur, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 8. It is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar , [ (2002) 6 SCC 650 ] wherein at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as under: “12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re- appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice.The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. 13. ...In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re- appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla , [ AIR 1951 SC 196 ] at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has no right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP , [ AIR 1962 SC 1788 ] ,at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 11. This Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ cannot invoke its revisional power as a Second Appellate Court and re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the revision case as laid down in the decisions in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh , D Stephens and K Chinnaswamy Reddy 12. The learned Trial Court had examined P.Ws.1 to 5, marked Exs.P1 to 4 for the prosecution. The learned Trial Court had examined P.Ws.1 to 5, marked Exs.P1 to 4 for the prosecution. From the defence side nobody was examined and no document was marked. On 3-9-2008 at 10-00 hours P.W.5/ASI, T.V.Palli Police Station being the Station House Officer received information about the galata ensued in between Mala and Madiga caste people of S.C. colony at Chennareddypalli. Immediately, he deputed the home guards and Police Constables viz., Immadi Ranganayakulu, K.Nagaraju and Chennakesavulu (P.Ws.1 to 3) to Chennareddypalli to enquire into the matter. Accordingly, they had visited the village and having noticed the crowd, they dispersed them. At about 14-30 hours P.W.5 visited Chennareddypalli in connection with the investigation of the case in Crime No.30/2008. P.W.1 came to him and explained about the incident and showed the petitioner who was serving in the army and stated that he was responsible for the occurrence. P.W.5 while examining the scene of offence heard the cries of P.W.1 and accused 1 to 10 were beating and assaulting P.Ws.1 and 2 with hands and legs. Immediately, P.W.5 and P.W.3 rushed there and dispersed the mob and then referred P.Ws.1 and 2 to Govt. Area Hospital, Markapur in 108 ambulance along with P.W.3 for treatment. 13. On hospital intimation the Station House Officer, Markapur Rural Police Station, B.Paparao (L.W.5) had rushed to Govt. Area Hospital, Markapur and recorded the statement of P.W.1 at 18-30 hours on 3-9-2008 and transferred the statement to T.V.Palli P.S, on point of jurisdiction. P.W.5, on receipt of hospital intimation along with a statement of P.W.1 recorded by L.W.5, registered it as a case in Crime No.31/2008 under Sections 353 , 324 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ at 19-30 hours and submitted the original FIR along with a statement of the victim to the learned Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Podili. He had visited the scene of offence, examined, prepared sketch, also visited Government Area Hospital, Markapur and recorded the statements of P.Ws.1 to 3. P.W.4/Dr. Madhava Rao, Medical Officer, Government Area Hospital, Markapur deposed that he treated P.Ws.1 and 2 issued wound certificates opining that the injuries were simple. On 10-9-2008 P.W.5 had arrested A2 to A10 and sent them for judicial remand. It was established that Al to A10 committed the offence punishable under Section 323 r/w 34 of ‘the I.P.C’. 14. P.W.4/Dr. Madhava Rao, Medical Officer, Government Area Hospital, Markapur deposed that he treated P.Ws.1 and 2 issued wound certificates opining that the injuries were simple. On 10-9-2008 P.W.5 had arrested A2 to A10 and sent them for judicial remand. It was established that Al to A10 committed the offence punishable under Section 323 r/w 34 of ‘the I.P.C’. 14. The evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and 5 reveals that the petitioner, being A1, caught hold the shirt of P.W.1 and beat him and the remaining accused pushed P.W.1 to the ground and beat him with hands and legs and all the accused persons also beat P.W.2 with hands and legs. P.W.4 the Medical Officer Government Area Hospital, Makapur testified that he examined P.W.1, but found no injuries. 15. P.W.4 stated further that P.W1 complained of pain over the head, neck, chest and abdomen. P.W.4, on examination, noticed tenderness and pain in the above areas and to that effect he issued Ex.P2 wound certificate. Nothing concrete was elicited from the evidence of the witnesses of prosecution to spurn their evidence that they were speaking falsehood. The learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence from correct perspective and found the petitioner guilty for the offence charged. There is no material irregularity and no flagrant miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the conviction under Section 323 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ shall be maintained. 16. With regard to the sentence of imprisonment of one month and imposition of fine Rs.100/- (Rupees Hundred Only), the offence occurred in the year 2008. Nearly, 17 years passed by. The right to speedy trial is a fundamental right as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar , [ AIR 1979 SC 1360 ] . This right includes speedy disposal of appeals. In addition to the appeals, the right to a speedy trial also includes speedy disposal of criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar , [2000 (1) BLJR 37] . The petitioner had already undergone 4 days of incarceration. The petitioner had also paid the fine amount. The petitioner is an Army man. Moreover, there are no prior or subsequent similar adverse antecedents against the petitioner. 17. The petitioner had already undergone 4 days of incarceration. The petitioner had also paid the fine amount. The petitioner is an Army man. Moreover, there are no prior or subsequent similar adverse antecedents against the petitioner. 17. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the criminal revision case is disposed of maintaining the conviction for the offence under Section 323 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and sentence of fine Rs.100/-, while sentencing the petitioner to suffer the sentence of imprisonment which he had already undergone. 18. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.