JUDGMENT : Ravi Nath Tilhari, J. Heard Sri Virupaksha Dattatreya Gowda, learned counsel representing Sri Vivekananda Virupaksha, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri K.Narsireddy, learned counsel for respondents. 2. This appeal under Section 104 r/w Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘the C.P.C’) has been filed by the appellants/defendants, challenging the order dated 02.11.2022 passed by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Kurnool in O.S.No.70 of 2021 filed by the respondents/plaintiffs, in I.A.No.154 of 2021, granting temporary injunction. 3. The respondents filed O.S.No.70 of 2021 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 24.12.2018 as also for permanent injunction. They filed I.A. for grant of temporary injunction. 4. There was another suit, in O.S.No.63 of 1999 with respect to the subject matter of the agreement of sale pending in the court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool, for partition between the parties thereto which included the defendant of O.S.No.70 of 2021. 5. As per the plaintiffs’ case, the defendants are the absolute owners of the plaint schedule property to an extent of Ac.1.35 cents in Sy.No.371/3D of Kallur Village and they entered into an agreement for Rs.1,42,50,000/- by executing agreement of sale dated 24.12.2018. They received earnest money of Rs.35,60,000/-, out of which, an amount of Rs.15,60,000/-was received in cash and Rs.20,00,000/- was received by transfer. The plaintiffs had to pay the balance of Rs.1,06,90,000/- by 23.06.2019 after receiving the final decree copy, as the final decree proceeding pertaining to the plaint schedule property in O.S.No.63 of 1999, was pending. Both the parties agreed for the forfeiture of earnest money and for cancellation of the agreement, in the event of not paying the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time. There was also a condition to supply final decree copy to the plaintiffs by the defendants by 23.06.2019. In the event of not supplying the final decree copy, the defendants were liable to return the earnest money by cancelling the agreement. The plaintiffs submitted that the said condition was incorporated to conclude the sale at the earliest time and was not to be misused. They approached the defendants for supply of final decree copy before the scheduled date and even thereafter, the defendants postponed the process and finally they failed to produce the copy of the final decree, by taking shelter under Covid-19 pandemic situation. They approached the defendants for supply of final decree copy before the scheduled date and even thereafter, the defendants postponed the process and finally they failed to produce the copy of the final decree, by taking shelter under Covid-19 pandemic situation. The plaintiffs had always been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. However, the defendants sent notice dated 16.08.2021 that the final decree could not be passed till 23.06.2019. It was passed on 16.10.2019. There was some mistake in the final decree, which was got amended on 11.12.2000. The defendants, therefore, offered to return the earnest money to the plaintiffs, for which the plaintiffs were not prepared. 6. The defendants 1 to 4 filed their counter-affidavit, and the defendant No.5 adopted the same. The case of the defendants is that they are the absolute owners and agreed to sell the plaint schedule property at Rs.1,42,50,000/-, for which they entered into sale agreement dated 24.12.2018. They also received advance of Rs.35,60,000/-. As per the agreement, the plaintiffs agreed to pay the balance of Rs.1,06,90,000/- to the defendants by 23.06.2019 as also for forfeiture of the advance and for cancellation of the agreement in the event of not paying the balance sale consideration by 23.06.2019. The plaintiffs failed to pay the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time. Time was the essence of the contract. At the time of the agreement, final decree petition was pending. One of the terms of the agreement was that in case the copy of the final decree was not obtained by the defendants by 23.06.2019, the defendants would be liable to return the advance money. The final decree could not be passed till 23.06.2019. There was mistake in survey number in the final decree dated 16.10.2019 and the same was amended on 11.12.2020. Consequently, the defendants, to return the advance amount, served notice to the plaintiffs. They opposed grant of temporary injunction. 7. The learned trial court, granted the temporary injunction vide order dated 02.11.2022, restraining the defendants, their heirs, agents or anybody on their behalf, from alienating the plaint schedule property, to third parties. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that time was the essence of the contract. The agreement specifically provided that the plaintiffs had to make payment of the balance sale consideration by 23.06.2019. But the plaintiffs did not make the payment of the balance of sale consideration. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that time was the essence of the contract. The agreement specifically provided that the plaintiffs had to make payment of the balance sale consideration by 23.06.2019. But the plaintiffs did not make the payment of the balance of sale consideration. They could not seek a specific performance of the contract. He submitted that as per the terms of the agreement if the defendants failed to get the copy of the final decree by 23.06.2019, the advance given by the plaintiffs was liable to be refunded by the defendants to the plaintiffs. So if the defendants were not able to get the copy of the final decree, at the most, they would be liable for refund of the earnest money, for which they issued notice. Consequently, the learned trial court was not right in granting the temporary injunction. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the learned trial court has not recorded any finding on the point of prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. He placed reliance in the cases of Saradamani Kandappan Vs. S.Rajalakshmi, AIR 2011 SC 3234 , Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji vs. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526 , K.Ravi Prasad Reddy vs. G.Giridhar, 2022 (2) ALD 357 and Kashi Math Samsthan vs. Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy, (2010) 1 SCC 689 . 10. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the plaintiffs had always been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and they were also ready to make the balance payment. But, the defendants evaded to receive the amount and in spite of the plaintiffs’ efforts, they were not able to get the copy of the final decree in O.S.No.63 of 1999, in which the decree was passed on 16.10.2019, which was amended with respect to the survey number on 11.12.2020. The defendants could not take the advantage of their failure to obtain the decree in time. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the learned trial court recorded the findings on all the necessary aspects to consider temporary injunction matter, including on ‘primafacie case’. There was no illegality in the order granting temporary injunction. 12. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the learned trial court recorded the findings on all the necessary aspects to consider temporary injunction matter, including on ‘primafacie case’. There was no illegality in the order granting temporary injunction. 12. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. 13. The point which arises for our consideration is: “Whether the order under challenge granting temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents, deserves to be maintained or set aside, in the light of the submissions advanced ? 14. Order XXXIX, Rule I of the C.P.C reads as under: “ORDER XXXIX TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS AND INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS Temporary injunctions 1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.—Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise— (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to [defrauding] his creditors, (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit] as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.” 15. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned trial court has not considered the point of prima facie case and in absence thereof temporary injunction could not be granted. 16. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned trial court has not considered the point of prima facie case and in absence thereof temporary injunction could not be granted. 16. In Kashi Math Samsthan v. Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy, (2010) 1 SCC 689 the Hon’ble Apex Court, observed that it is settled that in order to obtain an order of injunction, the party who seeks for grant of such injunction has to prove that he has made out a prima facie case to go for trial, the balance of convenience is also in his favour and he will suffer irreparable loss and injury if injunction is not granted. 17. ‘Prima facie case’ means that there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of the plaintiffs being entitled to the relief asked for. The existence of prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. ‘Prima facie case’ it is settled in law that, is not to be confused with the prima facie title, which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only, ‘prima facie case’ is a substantial question raised, bonafide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. 18. We refer to the case of Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719 in which the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “4. Order 39 Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing... or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause (c) was brought on statute by Section 86(i)(b) of the Amending Act 104 of 1976 with effect from February 1, 1977. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause (c) was brought on statute by Section 86(i)(b) of the Amending Act 104 of 1976 with effect from February 1, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power except the inherent power under Section 151 CPC to grant ad interim injunction against dispossession. Rule 1 primarily concerned with the preservation of the property in dispute till legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court, on exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction, is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. 5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise hits sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 19. In Wander Ltd. vs. Antox India P. Ltd, 1990 SUPP (1) SCC 727 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. 20. A perusal of the judgment shows that the learned trial court considered the pleadings of both the sides elaborately. It recorded the undisputed facts between them, that the defendants are the owners of the plaint schedule property, the agreement of sale.Ex.P1; that the advance amount was paid and the terms and conditions of Ex.P1 were not disputed. 20. A perusal of the judgment shows that the learned trial court considered the pleadings of both the sides elaborately. It recorded the undisputed facts between them, that the defendants are the owners of the plaint schedule property, the agreement of sale.Ex.P1; that the advance amount was paid and the terms and conditions of Ex.P1 were not disputed. It recorded the argument of the defendants inter alia that the plaintiffs got no prima facie case as time was the essence of the contract and clearly observed that the question, if the plaintiffs are entitled for decree of specific performance and if the plaintiffs have complied their part of the contract or not, or the condition with respect to the payment of the balance of sale consideration was depending upon the fulfillment of the condition of getting the final decree; or such condition was independent, or the promises were reciprocal, all these facts could be gone into and decided only during trial. The learned trial court recorded its satisfaction that the merits of the suit can be decided after both parties entered into the witness box. At the stage of grant of temporary injunction, in view of the agreement of sale (Ex.P1) and the contents thereof not being in dispute and the payment of part of the consideration as advance also having been admitted by the defendants, the learned trial court granted temporary injunction. Therefore, we are of the view that it cannot be said that the prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs was not made out. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioners may be right only to this extent that the trial Court did not specifically record that prima facie case was made out, but we are of view from reading of the judgment, in particular paragraphs 11 and 12, that the trial court considered the aspect of prima facie case in detail and also being satisfied that it was made out, and the matter required consideration on merits of the suit, after both parties entered into the witness box, it granted temporary injunction. The learned trial court also considered the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dalpat Kumar(supra). So, the argument that ‘prima facie case’ was not considered, is unsustainable. The learned trial court also considered the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dalpat Kumar(supra). So, the argument that ‘prima facie case’ was not considered, is unsustainable. When consideration of and satisfaction on the point of ‘prima facie case’ is clear from the order impugned, merely because the trial court in so many words did not record that the ‘prima facie case was made out’ would not vitiate the order of grant of temporary injunction. 22. We are of the considered view that the agreement for sale is admitted. The terms and conditions therein are also not disputed. The defendants also received part of the sale consideration as advance amounting to Rs.35,60,000/-. The question, which require consideration in the trial inter alia is, whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree of a specific performance, or refund of the earnest money only; and also if the time was the essence of the contract or not. So, it cannot be said that there was no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs, or no irreparable injury would be caused to the plaintiffs if the defendants transfer the plaint schedule property in favour of any third party. The balance of convenience has been recorded in favour of the plaintiff on which point submission to the contrary has not been made. 23. Learned counsel for the appellants placed much reliance in Saradamani (supra), to contend that the time was the essence of the contract and the conditions in the agreement were not reciprocal but were independent of each other. We are of the view that such questions require consideration in the trial, after the parties lead evidence. At the stage of the temporary injunction matter, a mini trial cannot be conducted. Consideration of such questions at the stage of the temporary injunction, will certainly affect the merits of the suit during tiral. In Saradamani (supra) such question came to be considered after the suit was decreed and in the suit finding on such aspect had been returned, and not at the stage of grant of temporary injunction. 24. Consideration of such questions at the stage of the temporary injunction, will certainly affect the merits of the suit during tiral. In Saradamani (supra) such question came to be considered after the suit was decreed and in the suit finding on such aspect had been returned, and not at the stage of grant of temporary injunction. 24. It is also well settled in law on which there cannot be any dispute, as held in Kashi Math Samsthan (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for appellant that when a party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, question of considering the balance of convenience or irreparable loss and injury to the party concerned would not be material at all, that is to say, if that party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, it is not open to the court to grant injunction in his favour even if, he has made out a case of balance of convenience being in his favour and would even suffer irreparable loss and injury if no injunction order is granted. But, in the present case, the prima facie case was made out. The plaintiffs succeeded in establishing that they had a case for trial. 25. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance in Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji (supra). In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that there is a distinction between the readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes the financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinized. This judgment was placed reliance to contend that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. 26. On the aforesaid, We are of the view that there is no dispute about the distinction between readiness to perform and willingness to perform the contract but the question whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract or not, require determination, in trial based on evidence, which is yet to be lead in the suit. 27. In Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corpn. 27. In Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, 1993 (3) SCC 161 the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the purpose of temporary injunction is, to maintain the status quo. The court grants such relief according to the legal principles-ex debito justitiae. In para No.30, it was held as under: “30. It need not be said that primary object of filing a suit challenging the validity of the order of demolition is to restrain such demolition with the intervention of the court. In such a suit the plaintiff is more interested in getting an order of interim injunction. It has been pointed out repeatedly that a party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of right or course. Grant of injunction is within the discretion of the court and such discretion is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that unless the defendant is restrained by an order of injunction, an irreparable loss or damage will be caused to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of temporary injunction is, thus, to maintain the status quo. The court grants such relief according to the legal principles - ex debito justitiae. Before any such order is passed the court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him.” 28. The grant of temporary injunction, during pendency of the suit, by not alienating the subject property as also to avoid multiplicity of legal proceedings is, in our view the sound exercise of judicial discretion, by the learned trial court. 29. The grant of temporary injunction, during pendency of the suit, by not alienating the subject property as also to avoid multiplicity of legal proceedings is, in our view the sound exercise of judicial discretion, by the learned trial court. 29. In K. Ravi Prasad Reddy vs. G. Giridhar, 2022 SCC OnLine AP 135 : AIR 2022 AP 59 this court after referring to Wander Ltd (supra), Esha Ekta apartments CHS Ltd. v. the Municipal Corporation of Mumbai, ( 2012 (4) SCC 689 ) and Skyline Education Institute (India)(P) Ltd. v. S.L.Vaswani, ( 2010 (2) SCC 142 ) held that in appeals in relation to the exercise of discretion of the trial court in deciding an application for temporary injunction, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. The appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. 30. Paras 31 and 32 of K. Ravi Prasad Reddy(supra) are as under: “31. With respect to the exercise of appellate powers in relation to the exercise of discretion by the trial court in deciding an application for temporary injunction, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. (supra) held that in such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not re-assess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not re-assess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. 32. In Esha Ekta Appartments Chs Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Mumbai, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again considered the scope of appellate court power to interfere in an interim order passed by the court at the first instance and held in paragraphs Nos. 19, 20 and 21, which are re-produced, as under: “19. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully scrutinised the record. The scope of the appellate court's power to interfere with an interim order passed by the court of first instance has been considered by this Court in several cases. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., the Court was called upon to consider the correctness of an order of injunction passed by the Division Bench of the High Court which had reversed the order of the learned Single Judge declining the respondent's Sprayer for interim relief. This Court set aside the order of the Division Bench and made the following observations : (SCC p. 733, para 14) “14. … In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion.” 20. In Skyline Education Institute (India) (P) Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani, the three-Judge Bench considered somewhat similar question in the context of the refusal of the trial court and the High Court to pass an order of temporary injunction, referred to the judgments in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn. and observed : (S.L. Vaswani case, SCC p. 153, para 22) “22. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that once the court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and the aid exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity.” 21. In these cases, the trial court and the High Court have, after threadbare analysis of the pleadings of the parties and the documents filed by them concurrently held that the buildings in question were constructed in violation of the sanctioned plans and that the flat buyers do not have the locus to complain against the action taken by the Corporation under Section 351 of the 1888 Act. Both the trial court and the High Court have assigned detailed reasons for declining the petitioners' prayer for temporary injunction and we do not find any valid ground or justification to take a different view in the matter.” 31. Both the trial court and the High Court have assigned detailed reasons for declining the petitioners' prayer for temporary injunction and we do not find any valid ground or justification to take a different view in the matter.” 31. So considered, In the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, we do not find it a case for interference with the order of the learned trial court. 32. The C.M.A. is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed.