JUDGMENT : M.S. Sonak, J. 1. Heard Mr Ayush Agarwal for the Petitioner. Mr More learned Additional Government Pleader appears for the State of Maharashtra. 2. This Petition was moved before us citing extreme urgency and after obtaining orders for placing this matter before this Bench. 3. The Petition challenges the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board’s closure directions dated 5 March 2025 at Exhibit ‘A’ (pages 42 and 43) of this Petition. 4. Mr Agarwal submitted that the Regional Officer, Mumbai, has issued this order. In terms of Office Order No.E/28 of 2000 at Exhibit ‘R’ (pages 131 and 132), regional officers can exercise the powers of the Board only in cases of extreme urgency. He pointed out that this office order also requires the Regional Officers to follow the principles of natural justice before exercising the powers of the Board. 5. Mr Agarwal submits that the impugned closure directions have been issued without compliance with principles of natural justice and any case of extreme urgency being made out. He submitted that prosecution has already been filed against the Petitioner. He submitted that though the Petitioner may not have obtained environmental clearance for constructing the mall or may not have any consent to establish or operate the mall, still the impugned closure directions should not have been issued because the Petitioner applied under some amnesty scheme in 2016, and this application is still pending. For these reasons, he submitted that this Petition be admitted, and interim order issued. 6. We have considered Mr Agarwal’s submissions in the context of the impugned closure directions dated 5 March 2025 and the office order at Exhibit ‘R’. Admittedly, the Petitioner has constructed a mall and has commenced operations in this mall without obtaining any environmental clearance before such mall was built and operations commenced. Further, there is also no dispute that the operations at this mall were commenced without obtaining any consent to establish/operate from the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board. These basic, and we should say gross, facts are undisputed and were admitted by the Petitioner. 7. The argument about non-compliance with principles of natural justice may be debatable in the gross facts of this case. However, there can be no unnatural expansion of the principles of natural justice entirely divorced from the realities of the situation. These basic, and we should say gross, facts are undisputed and were admitted by the Petitioner. 7. The argument about non-compliance with principles of natural justice may be debatable in the gross facts of this case. However, there can be no unnatural expansion of the principles of natural justice entirely divorced from the realities of the situation. Once the Petitioner has admitted to having constructed a mall without obtaining any environmental clearance and further admitted to not obtaining consent to establish/operate such a mall, we fail to see how such a Petitioner can complain about any alleged violation of principles of natural justice. 8. There was no clarity about the application under some amnesty scheme. No amnesty scheme entitles establishment or operations without consent under the Air and Water pollution control legislation. The alleged pendency of an application under some amnesty scheme does not operate as some deemed environmental clearance or entitle the lawbreaker to continue to break the law indefinitely. The contention that the Petitioner has applied for under some amnesty scheme certainly does entitle the Petitioner to reap commercial profits at the cost of environmental concerns. 9. The argument that the Regional Directors can exercise powers only in extreme urgencies cannot be countenanced, at least in the facts of this case. Operating a mall that is put up without obtaining any environmental clearance is extremely serious and operating such a mall without obtaining consent to establish/operate magnifies the seriousness of the ecological issue. The argument almost suggests that the Regional Director had to wait for some environmental disaster and only then exercise the powers delegated to him or her. That would not be the correct interpretation of the office order cited before us. 10. The faint contention that no closure directions could have been issued until the prosecution launched against the Petitioner for virtually admitted breaches of the environmental legislation is concluded is misconceived. The object and scope of criminal prosecution and the issuing of closure directions are distinct. Compliance with environmental legislation enacted in the public interest cannot be allowed to be defeated based upon such contentions. At least the Writ Court will not lend its assistance to perpetuating such gross and acknowledged illegalities affecting the environment. 11. The Petitioner has alternate remedies under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. At least the Writ Court will not lend its assistance to perpetuating such gross and acknowledged illegalities affecting the environment. 11. The Petitioner has alternate remedies under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. There is no reason why these alternate remedies have not been resorted to. Mr Agarwal submitted that the remedies are before different for a, and according to him, this was a case of violation of natural justice and, therefore, this Petition ought to be entertained. Accordingly, he insisted that this Court entertains this Petition. At the petitioner’s insistence, having entertained the petition, we find that no case is made out to interfere with the impugned closure direction. 12. As noted earlier, since there is no dispute whatsoever that the Petitioner has taken the law into his own hands and proceeded with the construction of a mall without obtaining any environmental clearance, it is only proper that the closure directions are implemented immediately. As if this was insufficient, the Petitioner has not even bothered to obtain any consent to establish or operate from the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board. The Petitioner virtually considers itself above the law and has shown scant regard for environmental concerns. 13. In any event, faced with these undisputable facts, this Court, the extraordinary, equitable and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot be invoked to allow the Petitioners to continue with their gross illegalities and, too, for commercial gains. This Court’s extraordinary, equitable, and discretionary jurisdiction is to promote justice and not perpetuate such gross illegalities. 14. In such a grave situation, even if we were to assume some merit in the claims regarding the alleged failure of natural justice or the regional director exceeding his powers, nonetheless, this Court, when confronted with operations conducted with impunity and in violation of essential environmental legislation, could have itself ordered such closure and halted the further perpetuation of these serious illegalities. If justice is the byproduct of even a flawed exercise of authority by MPCB [which, in this instance, it is not], the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be exercised to obliterate justice and establish environmental injustice. [See M.S. Sanjay v. Indian Bank, Civil Appeal No. 1188/2025 decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 29.01.2025 and Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 SCC 100 ] 15. [See M.S. Sanjay v. Indian Bank, Civil Appeal No. 1188/2025 decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 29.01.2025 and Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 SCC 100 ] 15. For the above reasons, we see no merit in this Petition and consequently dismiss the same. 16. We must also record that after we heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and were about to dictate the order, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that we should allow the Petitioner to move the Regular Bench. Such a request is unfortunate and should never have been made in the first instance. This is a matter where the Petitioner moved the Regular Bench, citing urgency. Because the Regular Bench was unavailable, the alternate designated Bench was moved. Since one of the Hon’ble Justices recused, the case was moved before another alternate Bench. Since that Bench also expressed some difficulties, orders were obtained from the Hon’ble Chief Justice to assign the matter to this Bench. If, after hearing the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in some detail, we thought that no relief is due to the Petitioner, no request should have been made on behalf of the Petitioner to send the matter before some other Bench. 17. We were inclined to dismiss this Petition with costs, but the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner expressed that he made the last request without instructions, so we refrain from imposing any costs in the fond hope that this will not be repeated in the future. 18. The MPCB must immediately enforce its closure directions. Mr More to communicate this order to the MPCB.