Judgment : VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“C.P.C.” for short) is filed aggrieved by the Judgment and decree, dated 10.10.2017 in A.S.No.279 of 2012, on the file of the Judge, Family Court-cum- XII Additional District Guntur (“First Appellate Court” for short). The appeal in A.S.No.279 of 2012 is filed aggrieved by the Judgment and decree, dated 03.09.2012 in O.S.No.183 of 2009, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri (“Trial Court” for short) in respect of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property. The second appeal is confined to Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property. 2. The appellants herein are the defendant Nos.2 & 4 to 8 and the respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein are the plaintiffs and 3 rd respondent herein is the 1 st defendant in O.S.No.183 of 2009, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri. 3. The plaintiffs initiated action in O.S.No.183 of 2009, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, with a prayer for partition of plaint „A? and „B? schedule properties into two equal shares and to allot one such share to the 2 nd plaintiff and for recovery of a sum of Rs.12,000/- per annum from 1 st defendant towards maintenance of 1 st plaintiff by creating charge over the plaint schedule properties that may fell to the share of the 1 st defendant. 4. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, preliminarily decreed the suit with costs. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendants in the above said suit filed A.S.No.279 of 2012, on the file of the Judge, Family Court-cum-XII Additional District Guntur in respect of Item No.1 of plaint 'A' schedule property. The First Appellate Court dismissed the first appeal. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendant Nos.2, 4 to 8 in the suit approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The First Appellate Court dismissed the first appeal. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendant Nos.2, 4 to 8 in the suit approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.173 of 2015, is as follows: The 1 st plaintiff is wife, 2 nd plaintiff is son of 1 st defendant, 2 nd defendant is elder brother, 3 rd defendant, who is wife of 2 nd defendant, is sister-in-law of 1 st defendant. During pendency of the suit, 3 rd defendant died. Consequently, defendant Nos.4 to 8 were brought on record being legal heirs of deceased-3 rd defendant. The plaint schedule properties are the ancestral properties got through inheritance, partition and acquisitions from the ancestral nucleus. In the partition that took place among father and his sons i.e., defendant Nos.1 and 2, plaint schedule properties fell to share of 1 st defendant. The 1 st defendant is committing acts of waste and is entering into some sham, nominal, collusive, null and void transactions, which are detrimental to the interest of plaintiffs, at the instance of defendant Nos.2 and 3 and has neglected and refused 1 st plaintiff. Both the plaintiffs have constrained to file the suit. 7. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 filed written statements separately before the trial Court denying the averments in the plaint and the same is adopted by the 3 rd defendant. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows: The properties purchased in the names of plaintiffs are not shown in the schedule for considering and as such, the suit for partial partition of properties is not maintainable and the value of the property that stands in the name of 1 st plaintiff is more than Rs.10 lakhs and therefore, she is not entitled to claim maintenance from 1 st defendant. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 jointly purchased an extent of Ac.0-28 cents covered by D.No.164/1 of Penumaka village with their self-earnings. Subsequently, both defendant Nos.1 and 2 partitioned the said property and Item No.1 of plaint schedule property fell to share of 1 st defendant. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 jointly purchased an extent of Ac.0-28 cents covered by D.No.164/1 of Penumaka village with their self-earnings. Subsequently, both defendant Nos.1 and 2 partitioned the said property and Item No.1 of plaint schedule property fell to share of 1 st defendant. Having fallen that Item No.1 of plaint schedule is not convenient in enjoying of 1 st defendant, he sold the said property to 3 rd defendant under a registered sale deed, dated 26.06.2001. 8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the 2 nd plaintiff is entitled for partition of the suit schedule properties into two equal shares and is entitled to one such share? (2) Whether the 1 st plaintiff is entitled for recovery of Rs.12,000/- per annum towards maintenance from 1 st defendant? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for other reliefs as prayed for? (4) To what relief? The learned trial Judge framed the following issue on 25.07.2007: Whether the sale transaction in between 1 st defendant and 3 rd defendant in respect of Item No.1 of the written statement schedule property is valid, true and binding on the plaintiffs? The learned trial Judge framed the following issue on 23.01.2012: Whether 1 st defendant purchased Item No.1 of written statement schedule in the name of 1 st plaintiff who in turn, sold the same and has purchased Item Nos.2 to 4 of written statement schedule in the name of the 2 nd plaintiff? 9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.W.1 was examined and Exs.A.1 to A.17 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.7 were marked. 10. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, preliminarily decreed the suit with costs. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.7 were marked. 10. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, preliminarily decreed the suit with costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendants filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.279 of 2012, on the file of the Judge, Family Court-cum-XII Additional District Guntur in respect of Item No.1 of plaint 'A' schedule property, wherein, the following points came up for consideration: 1) Whether Item No.1 of plaint 'A' schedule property is the joint family property of plaintiffs and 1 st defendant, in which 2 nd plaintiff got a share and if so, to what extent? 2) Whether the judgment and decree in O.S.No.183/2009, dated 03.09.2012, on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, in respect of Item No.1 of plaint 'A' schedule is liable to be set aside? 3) To what relief? 11. The learned Judge, Family Court-cum-XII Additional District Guntur i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points as above, against the defendants/appellants and in favour of the plaintiffs/ respondents and dismissed the appeal. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendants in O.S.No.183 of 2009 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 12. On hearing both sides counsel at the time of admission of the second appeal, on 04.09.2024, the following substantial questions of law are framed: (1) Whether both the Courts below are right in decreeing the suit for partition without giving any findings that the Item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property is either joint family property or ancestral property? (2) Whether the suit for partition is maintainable for partition of the properties or part of the property does not belong to the joint family of the plaintiffs? 13. Heard Sri Sreenivasa Rao Velivela, learned counsel for the appellants and heard Sri Habibulla Shaik, learned counsel, representing on behalf o Sri Venkata Subba Reddy Mule, learned counsel for the respondents. 14. 13. Heard Sri Sreenivasa Rao Velivela, learned counsel for the appellants and heard Sri Habibulla Shaik, learned counsel, representing on behalf o Sri Venkata Subba Reddy Mule, learned counsel for the respondents. 14. The Law is well settled that under Section 100 of CPC the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence. In a case of Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh , [ AIR 1993 SC 398 ] , the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court which was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature.” In a case of Kondira Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar , [AIR 1999 SC 471] , the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 15. The undisputed facts are the plaintiffs are wife and son of 1 st defendant and 2 nd defendant is brother of 1 st defendant and 3 rd defendant is the wife of 2 nd defendant and 3 rd defendant died and defendant Nos.4 to 8 were brought on record as legal representatives of 3 rd defendant along with 2 nd defendant. It is also not in dispute by both the parties that Item Nos.2 and 3 of the plaint 'A' schedule properties are ancestral properties and 1st defendant i.e., the husband of 1 st plaintiff and father of 2 nd plaintiff. It is also undisputed that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 are doing cultivation and there are no independent source of income to 1 st defendant. It is also undisputed that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 are doing cultivation and there are no independent source of income to 1 st defendant. It was contended by the 1 st defendant that the said Item No.1 of plaint 'A' schedule property is purchased from out his own funds and Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property is not purchased from ancestral nucleus. 16. The 1 st plaintiff in order to prove her case examined herself as P.W.1 and also relied on documentary evidence, Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.17. On the other hand, 1 st defendant himself and his brother jointly purchased Ac.0-28 ½ cents covered by D.No.164/1 of Penumaka village with their self earnings. The contention of the 1 st defendant is that subsequently he sold away his share in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property i.e., Ac.0-14 ¼ cents to the 3 rd defendant, who is no other than the wife of 2 nd defendant, under Ex.B.3, dated 26.06.2001. Since the plaintiffs relied on the evidence of P.W.1 and also documentary evidence to prove their case, the 1 st defendant has to produce a cogent evidence to show that from out of his self earnings he purchased half of the Item No.1 of plaint 'A' schedule property. But, for the reasons best known to the 1 st defendant, though he was very much alive and he was moving in the village, he did not choose to enter into the witness box. The law is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a case of Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao and others , [ AIR 1999 SC 1441 ] where the Hon'ble Apex Court held that; “Where the party to the suit does not appear into witness box and states his own case on oral and does not offer himself to the cross examination by the other side, a presumption would arose that the case set up by him is not correct”. 17. It is an admitted fact by the date of purchase of item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property under a registered sale deed, dated 25.02.1984, the marriage of the 1 st plaintiff with 1 st defendant was performed. 17. It is an admitted fact by the date of purchase of item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property under a registered sale deed, dated 25.02.1984, the marriage of the 1 st plaintiff with 1 st defendant was performed. Their marriage was performed in the year 1981 and the 2 nd plaintiff was born by the year 1984 by the date of acquisition of item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property by the defendant Nos.1 and 2 jointly. Originally, the plaintiffs instituted a suit in O.S.No.480 of 2001 in the year 2001 before the Senior Civil Judge, Guntur and subsequently, it was transferred to Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri after constitution of the Senior Civil Judge Court, Mangalagiri and the same has been renumbered as O.S.No.183 of 2009. It is relevant to say that the 2 nd defendant i.e., D.W.1 in his evidence in cross examination itself admitted that the 1 st defendant and himself together purchased Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property with the income derived on own cultivation of lands and also from the income derived on doing cultivation on lands. The contention of the plaintiffs is that to defeat the rights of the 2 nd plaintiff, the 1 st defendant executed a nominal sale deeds in favour of third parties and he has refused and neglected to maintain the plaintiffs. In fact, the cause of action is mentioned the same in the plaint itself. It is undisputed fact that the family of defendant Nos.1 and 2 are agricultural family, except doing cultivation, they are not having any independent source of income. The 1 st plaintiff severely contended that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 jointly purchased Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property with the ancestral nucleus. It is the specific case of the 1 st defendant that half of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property was purchased with his own earnings along with 2 nd defendant jointly, but there is no evidence to show that the 1 st defendant purchased half of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property with his self-earnings. The 1 st defendant did not enter into the witness box to prove his defence put forth by him in the written statement. The 1 st defendant did not enter into the witness box to prove his defence put forth by him in the written statement. Therefore, it cannot be simply said that half of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property was purchased by the 1st defendant with his self-earnings. 18. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the initial burden is on the plaintiffs to prove about the existence of Hindu Undivided Family and placed a reliance of Bhagwat Sharan (dead through Legal Representatives) vs. Purushottam and others , [(2020) 6 Supreme Court Cases 387] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “The law is well settled that the burden lies upon the person who alleges the existence of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) to prove the same. It is clear that not only jointness of the family has to be proved but burden lies upon the person not only jointness of the family has to be proved but burden lies upon the person alleging existence of a joint family to prove that the property belongs to the joint Hindu family unless there is material on record to show that the property is the nucleus of the joint Hindu family or that it was purchased through funds coming out of this nucleus.” The learned counsel for the appellants placed another reliance of Goli Eswariah vs. Commissioner of Gift Tax, Andhra Pradesh , [1970 (2) Supreme Court Cases 390] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “The separate property of a Hindu ceases to be a separate property and acquires the characteristic of a joint family or ancestral property not by any physical mixing with his joint family or 'his ancestral property but by his, own volition and intention by his waiving and surrendering his separate rights in it as separate property.” The learned counsel for the appellant placed another reliance of D.S. Lakshmaiah and another vs. L. Balasubramanyam and another , [(2003) 10 Supreme Court Cases 310] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “In Baikuntha Nath Paramanik (dead) by His L.Rs. & Heirs v. Sashi Bhusan Pramanik (dead) by his L.Rs. & Ors. & Heirs v. Sashi Bhusan Pramanik (dead) by his L.Rs. & Ors. [ (1973) 2 SCC 334 ], this Court again held that when a joint family is found to be in possession of nucleus sufficient to make the impugned acquisitions then a presumption arises that the acquisitions standing in the names of the person who were in the management of the family properties are family acquisitions. In Surendra Kumar v. Phoolchand (dead) through LRs & Anr. [ (1996) 2 SCC 491 ], this Court held that where it is established or admitted that the family which possessed joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed sufficient nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the presumption arises that it was the joint property and the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family funds. In Achuthan Nair v. Chinnammu Amma & Ors. [ AIR 1966 SC 411 ], it was noticed that there were number of properties owned by joint family which were received at the time of separation under a decree passed in a partition suit. The claim of the defendants in the written statement was that the property in question had been purchased from the private funds of defendant No.1 and her son defendant No.4. In this decision too, it was reiterated that when it is proved or admitted that a family possessed sufficient nucleus with the aid of which the member might have made the acquisition, the law raises a presumption that it is a joint family property and the onus is shifted to the individual member to establish that the property was acquired by him without the aid of the said nucleus.” Learned counsel for the appellants placed another reliance of Rohit Chauhan vs. Surinder Singh and others , [(2013) 9 Supreme Court Case 419] , wherein the Apex Court held that “the moment a son is born, the property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener”. In the case on hand, in the alleged sale deed under Ex.B.3, dated 26.06.2001, it was recited that to discharge the debts 1 st defendant is alienating his half share of the property in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property to the 3 rd defendant, who is none other than the wife of own brother of 1 st defendant. There is no evidence on record on behalf of the defendants that the 1 st defendant is indebted to several others. Furthermore, it is the specific case of the 1 st plaintiff that her father-in-law died in the year 1977 and her marriage was taken place with the 1 st defendant in the year 1981 and her father-in-law was alive by the time of marriage, herself and her husband continues to live jointly with her in-laws, but for the reasons best known to the 1 st defendant, he did not produce any evidence to show that to discharge the debts incurred by him, he alienated his half share i.e., Ac.0.14 ¼ cents in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property to the 3 rd defendant. As stated supra, the 1 st defendant did not enter into the witness box to prove the defence put forth by him in the written statement. At best, the 1 st defendant can alienate his share of property i.e., Ac.0-07 1/8 cents from out of Ac.0-14 ¼ cents of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property to the 3 rd defendant, but he cannot alienate the share of 2 nd plaintiff to the 3 rd defendant since by the date of alleged alienation to 3 rd defendant, the 2 nd plaintiff is having right to an extent of half share from out of Ac.0-14 ¼ cents i.e., for an extent of Ac.0-7 1/8 cents in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a reliance of C. Krishna Prasad vs. C.I.T., Bangalore , [(1975) 1 Supreme Court Cases 160] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property only as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property only as regards his male issue. As regards other relations, it is separate property, and if the coparcener dies without leaving male issue, it passes to "his heirs by succession (see p. 272 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law 14th Ed). A person who for the time being is the sole surviving coparcener is entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were his separate property. He may sell or mortgage the property without legal necessity or he may make a gift of it. If a son is subsequently born to him or adopted by him, the alienation, whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations made by his father before he was born or begotten (see p. 320 ibid.). In view of the above it cannot be denied that the appellant at present is the absolute owner of the property which fell to his share as a result of partition and that he can deal with it as he wishes.” In Rohit Chauhan’s (7 supra), the Apex Court held as follows: In our opinion coparcenary property means the property which consists of ancestral property and a coparcener would mean a person who shares equally with others in inheritance in the estate of common ancestor. Coparcenary is a narrower body than the Joint Hindu family and before commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, only male members of the family used to acquire by birth an interest in the coparcenary property. A coparcener has no definite share in the coparcenary property but he has an undivided interest in it and one has to bear in mind that it enlarges by deaths and diminishes by births in the family. It is not static. We are further of the opinion that so long, on partition an ancestral property remains in the hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a separate property and such a person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property treating it to be his separate property but if a son is subsequently born, the alienation made before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, the property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener. The view which we have taken finds support from a judgment of this Court in the case of M. Yogendra v. Leelamma N., (2009) 15 SCC 184 , in which it has been held as follows: “29. It is now well settled in view of several decisions of this Court that the property in the hands of a sole coparcener allotted to him in partition shall be his separate property for the same shall revive only when a son is born to him. It is one thing to say that the property remains a coparcenary property but it is another thing to say that it revives. The distinction between the two is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In the case of former any sale or alienation which has been done by the sole survivor coparcener shall be valid whereas in the case of a coparcener any alienation made by the karta would be valid.” Learned counsel for the appellants placed another reliance of Radha Bai vs. Ram Narayan and others , [(2020) 19 Supreme Court Cases 513] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “Where a coparcener takes definite share in the property, he is owner of that share and as such he can alienate the same by sale or mortgage in the same manner as he can dispose of his separate property.” Learned counsel for the appellants placed another reliance of Hardeo Rai vs. Sakuntala Devi and others , [(2008) 7 Supreme Court Cases 46] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “For the purpose of assigning one's interest in the property, it was not necessary that partition by metes and bounds amongst the coparceners must take place. When an intention is expressed to partition the coparcenary property, the share of each of the coparceners becomes clear and ascertainable. Once the share of a co-parcener is determined, it ceases to be a coparcenary property. The parties in such an event would not possess the property as "joint tenants" but as "tenants in common". When an intention is expressed to partition the coparcenary property, the share of each of the coparceners becomes clear and ascertainable. Once the share of a co-parcener is determined, it ceases to be a coparcenary property. The parties in such an event would not possess the property as "joint tenants" but as "tenants in common". The decision of this Court in State Bank of India [ (1969) 2 SCC 33 )], therefore is not applicable to the present case.” The Apex Court in the aforesaid case law further held as follows: “Where a coparcener takes definite share in the property, he is owner of that share and as such he can alienate the same by sale or mortgage in the same manner as he can dispose of his separate property.” In a case of Rohit Chauhan’s case (7 supra), the Apex Court held as follows: “In our opinion coparcenary property means the property which consists of ancestral property and a coparcener would mean a person who shares equally with others in inheritance in the estate of common ancestor. Coparcenary is a narrower body than the Joint Hindu family and before commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, only male members of the family used to acquire by birth an interest in the coparcenary property. A coparcener has no definite share in the coparcenary property but he has an undivided interest in it and one has to bear in mind that it enlarges by deaths and diminishes by births in the family. It is not static. We are further of the opinion that so long, on partition an ancestral property remains in the hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a separate property and such a person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property treating it to be his separate property but if a son is subsequently born, the alienation made before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, the property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener.” In the case on hand, Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property was purchased by defendant Nos.1 and 2 jointly with the ancestral nucleus of Item Nos.2 and 3. But, the moment a son is born, the property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener.” In the case on hand, Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property was purchased by defendant Nos.1 and 2 jointly with the ancestral nucleus of Item Nos.2 and 3. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 got item Nos.2 and 3 of the plaint schedule properties under family partition and with the income of ancestral nucleus, the defendant Nos.1 and 2 purchased Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property and defendant Nos.1 and 2 have no other avocation except cultivation which is admitted by 2nd defendant i.e., D.W.1 in his evidence in cross examination itself. There was a clear admission of 2nd defendant i.e., D.W.1 in his evidence in cross examination that they belongs to agricultural family and with the income on agriculture, they purchased Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property. There was a specific admission by the 2nd defendant i.e., D.W.1 in his evidence in cross examination that except agriculture, they are not having any avocation. As stated supra, though the 1st defendant had taken a defence in the written statement that with his self-earnings Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property was purchased jointly with his brother 2nd defendant, the same is not proved by the 1st defendant. Moreover, the 1st defendant did not enter into the witness box, though he was alive and moving at village, for the reasons best known to him. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 jointly purchased Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property in an extent of Ac.0-28 ½ cents, therefore, the 1st defendant is having Ac.0-14 ¼ cents and 2nd defendant is having Ac.0-14 ¼ cents in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property. Therefore, the 2nd plaintiff is having half share in Ac.0-14 ¼ cents in item No.1 of plaint 'A' schedule property. By giving cogent reasons, the learned First Appellate Judge clarified the aspect in its judgment that 2 nd plaintiff is entitled half share from out of Ac.0-14 ¼ cents in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property and remaining half share in Ac.0-14 ¼ cents falls to the share of 1 st defendant. By giving cogent reasons, the learned First Appellate Judge clarified the aspect in its judgment that 2 nd plaintiff is entitled half share from out of Ac.0-14 ¼ cents in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property and remaining half share in Ac.0-14 ¼ cents falls to the share of 1 st defendant. As on the date of sale of Ac.0-14 ¼ cents by the 1 st defendant to the 3 rd defendant under Ex.B.3, the 2 nd plaintiff is already born and so by birth itself, the 2 nd plaintiff is having right over half of Ac.0-14 ¼ cents in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property as a coparcener. Once, the son is born to the 1 st defendant, the characteristic of coparcenary property will revive and 2 nd plaintiff is having right by birth in the property of 1 st defendant and become a coparcener since the 1 st defendant purchased half of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property with ancestral nucleus. 20. The law is well settled by the Apex Court in Sheela Devi and others vs. Lal Chand and another , [2007 (2) ALT 52 (SC)] wherein it was held that; “The principle of law applicable in this case is that so long a property remains in the hands of a single person, the same was to be treated as a separate property and thus, would be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as the same were his separate property, but, if a son is subsequently born to him or adopted by him, the alienation whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations so made by his father before he was born or begotten. But, once a son is born, it becomes a coparcenary property and he would acquire an interest therein.” In the case on hand, Item No.1 of the plaint A' schedule property was purchased by defendant Nos.1 and 2 jointly with the ancestral nucleus, therefore, the 1 st defendant has got half share in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property. Out of half share in Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property, the 1 st defendant has got half share and the 2 nd plaintiff being the son of 1 st defendant is having half share in Ac.0-14 ¼ cents, since the half of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property was purchased by the 1st defendant with the ancestral nucleus. By a moment, a son is born to 1 st defendant, it is his ancestral property, therefore, the 2 nd plaintiff has got half share in half share of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property by birth which was purchased by the 1 st defendant with 2 nd defendant jointly from out of ancestral nucleus. Therefore, the 1 st defendant cannot alienate the share of 2 nd plaintiff i.e., Ac.0-07 1/8 cents in Ac.0-14 ¼ cents which is half of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property. At best, the 1 st defendant can alienate his share i.e., Ac.0-07 1/8 cents to the 3 rd defendant. The alienation was made by the 1 st defendant to the 3 rd defendant, who is none other than the wife of own brother of 1 st defendant before filing of the suit in the year 2001. 21. In the case on hand, the 2 nd plaintiff is having right over half share in Ac.0-14 ¼ cents which is half of Item No.1 of the plaint 'A' schedule property by birth in the year 1982 itself and therefore, Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act is applicable to the present facts of the case. By giving cogent reasons and on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned First Appellate Judge came to the same conclusion and rightly dismissed the first appeal. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the decree and judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Judge and as such the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 22. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.