ORDER : HIRDESH, J. This misc. appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act filed by the appellants/claimants, arising out of the impugned award dated 14.11.2007 passed by Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred as "Claims Tribunal), Mungawali District-Guna in Claim Case No.03/2006, whereby, the Claims Tribunal has rejected the claim petition for seeking compensation filed by appellants/claimants. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 10.10.2005 at about 06:30 AM, Kadir Ahmad was travelling from village Khiriya to Mungawali in Auto bearing Registration No.MP-08T-9924. As soon as the auto reached near Village Chinkupur Mungawali Chanderi Road, respondent No.2 overturned the auto by driving rashly and negligently as a result of which, Kadir Ahmad suffered injuries. Other people sitting in the auto also suffered serious injuries. During treatment, Kadir Ahmad died. Thereafter, police registered the case against Driver of the offending vehicle auto. After completion of investigation and other formalities, police had filed charge-sheet. 3. On account of death of deceased Kadir Ahmad, appellants/claimants filed a claim petition seeking compensation. Respondents appeared before the Claims Tribunal and filed written statements and denied claim averments. 4. The Claims Tribunal after hearing both the parties framed issues and after taking evidence of both the parties and documents available on record, rejected the claim petition filed by claimants on the ground that claimants are unable to adduce any eye-witness in regard to prove the fact that at the time of accident, offending vehicle was being driven by Driver/respondent No.2 in rash and negligent manner. 5. Being dissatisfied by the impugned award, appellants filed this appeal and submitted that impugned award passed by the Claims Tribunal is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to law. It is further submitted that appellants by way of oral as well as documentary evidence before the Claims Tribunal have proved that at the time of accident, offending vehicle was being driven by Driver/respondent No.2 in rash and negligent manner due to which, deceased was succumbed. Hence, prayed for setting aside the impugned award and seeking compensation for which they are entitled to. 6. By filing I.A.No.7229/2008, cross- objections under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC, learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 submitted that at the time of accident, Driver of the offending vehicle was having a valid and effective licence to drive the vehicle. Hence, prayed for setting aside the impugned award and seeking compensation for which they are entitled to. 6. By filing I.A.No.7229/2008, cross- objections under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC, learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 submitted that at the time of accident, Driver of the offending vehicle was having a valid and effective licence to drive the vehicle. Therefore, Claims Tribunal has wrongly exonerated the Insurance Company from its liability to pay compensation and, therefore, prayed for setting aside the findings recorded by the Claims Tribunal in this regard against respondents No.1 and 2. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for Insurance Company supported the impugned award and prayed for rejection of appeal. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record of Claims Tribunal. 9. On perusal of the impugned award, it is found that Claims Tribunal gave a finding that appellants are unable to adduce any eye-witness with regard to alleged accident and, therefore, they have failed to prove that at the time of accident, the offending vehicle was being driven by Driver/respondent No.2 in rash and negligent manner. 10. On perusal of document adduced by claimants i.e. merg intimation (Ex.P-4), it is clear that alleged accident was occurred on 10.10.2005 and information of the same was given to the police on the very same day i.e.10.10.2005 and on receiving of such information, police recorded a merg intimation and investigated the matter. After registration of FIR against the driver of the offending vehicle and after completion of investigation and other formalities, police filed charge sheet. 11. Now, question arises for consideration of this appeal that due to lack of eye-witness account, whether the Tribunal has committed error in holding that the Driver was not driving the alleged vehicle in rash and negligent manner due to which, the accident had occurred and whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the facts of the present case or not?. 12. In the case of Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi vs. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. 12. In the case of Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi vs. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1977 SC 1735 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident "speaks for itself" or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence. Salmond on the Law of Torts (15th Ed.) at p. 306 states : "The maxim res ipsa loquitur applies whenever it is so improbable that such an accident would have happened without the negligence of the defendant that a reasonable injury could find without further evidence that it was so caused". In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 28, at page 77, the position is stated thus : "An exception to the general rule is that the burden of proof of the alleged negligence is in the first instance on the plaintiff occurs wherever the facts already established are such that the proper and natural inference arising from them is that the injury complained of was caused by the defendant's negligence, or where the event charged as negligence 'tells its own story' of negligence on the part of the defendant, the story so told being clear and unambiguous". Where the maxim is applied the burden is on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not negligent or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part. Where the maxim is applied the burden is on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not negligent or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part. For the application of the principle it must be shown that the car was under the management of the defendant and that the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who had the management used proper care." 13. Similarly, in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board Vs. Kamalakshy Amma reported in 1987 ACJ 251 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also observed as under:- "The maxim res ipsa loquitur is a principle which aids the court in deciding as to the stage at which the onus shifts from one side to the other. Section 114 of the Evidence Act gives a wide discretion to the courts to draw presumptions of fact based on different situations and circumstances. This is in a way, recognition of the principle embodied in the maxim res ipsa loquitur. The leading case on the subject is Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H & C 596. Erle C.J. in the said case has stated that, "where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the 8 of 18 defendants, that the accident arose from want of care''. Evershad M. R. in Moore v. R. Fox & Sons (1956) 1 OB 596 affirmed and followed the principle laid down in Scott's case. Winfield in his famous treatise on Tort, after referring to the decisions which founded the above doctrine, has mentioned the two requirements to attract the above principle. They are, (i) that the "thing" causing the damage be under the control of the defendant or his servants and (ii) that the accident must be such as would not in the ordinary course of things have happened without negligence. This principle which was often found to be a helping guide in the evaluation of evidence in English decisions has been recognised in India also. This principle which was often found to be a helping guide in the evaluation of evidence in English decisions has been recognised in India also. The Supreme Court in Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 has discussed the applicability of the maxim res ipsa loquitur in civil as also criminal cases, in the light of the provisions of the Evidence Act." 14. Further, in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Gita Bindal reported in 2013 (8) R.C.R. (Civil) 245 the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has summarised the legal position as to applicability of the principle of res ipsa loquitur as under:- i. Res ipsa loquitur means that the accident speaks for itself. In such cases, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. ii. Where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use propercare, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care. iii. There are two requirements to attract res ipsa loquitur, (i) that the "thing" causing the damage be under the control of the defendant and (ii) that the accident must be such as would not in the ordinary course of things have happened without negligence. iv. Res ipsa loquitur is an exception to the normal rule that mere happening of an accident is no evidence of negligence on the part of the driver. This maxim means the mere proof of accident raises the presumption of negligence unless rebutted by the wrongdoer. v. In some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him, but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident, but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence. This hardship is to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur is that the accident speaks for itself or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. vi. This hardship is to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur is that the accident speaks for itself or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. vi. The effect of doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur' is to shift the onus to the defendant in the sense that the doctrine continues to operate unless the defendant calls credible evidence which explains how the accident or mishap may have occurred without negligence, and it seems that the operation of the rule is not displaced merely by expert evidence showing, theoretically, possible ways in which the accident might have happened without the defendant's negligence. The doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur', therefore, plays a very significant role in the law of tort and it is not the relic of the past, but the living force of the day in determining the tortuous liability. vii. The principal function of the maxim is to prevent injustice which would result if a plaintiff were invariably compelled to prove the precise cause of the accident and the defendant responsible for it, even when the facts bearing in the matter are at the outset unknown to him and often within the knowledge of the defendant. 15. In the present case, it is established that deceased died in the accident and police after registering the FIR, investigated the matter and filed charge sheet against the driver of the offending vehicle auto, but the owner and driver of the offending vehicle have utterly failed to adduce any evidence in rebuttal of criminal documents and evidence of the claimants produced before the Tribunal. It was the duty of the Driver to show either that in fact, he was not negligent or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part, but he was unable to adduce any evidence in this regard. So, a presumption must be drawn against him in this regard. 16. It was the duty of the Driver to show either that in fact, he was not negligent or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part, but he was unable to adduce any evidence in this regard. So, a presumption must be drawn against him in this regard. 16. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, the Tribunal has committed error in holding that appellants were unable to prove that Driver was not driving the vehicle in rash and negligent manner at the time of accident and, therefore, the findings recorded by the Claims Tribunal in this regard deserves to be set aside and it hereby set aside and in view of this Court, Driver of the offending vehicle is liable for accident and it is not a case of false implication of the vehicle. 17. In cross-objections, respondent No.1 and 2 submitted that at the time of accident, the Driver was having a valid licence to drive the light motor vehicle. 18. It is also not disputed that at the time of accident, he was driving the offending auto which weight is less than 7500 kgs. 19. Regarding driving of LMV and unladen weight of vehicle, in the case of Mukund Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Mukund Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 2017 SC 3668 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- “(ii) A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg. would be a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a road roller, 'unladen weight' of which does not exceed 7500 kg. and holder of a driving licence to drive class of "light motor vehicle" as provided in section 10(2)(d) is competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg. or a motor car or tractor or road-roller, the "unladen weight" of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued under section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54/1994 and 28.3.2001 in the form”. 20. That is to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued under section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54/1994 and 28.3.2001 in the form”. 20. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that no separate endorsement on licence is required to drive transport vehicle. So, Claims Tribunal has committed an error in exonerating Insurance Company from its liability. The findings recorded by Claims Tribunal that owner and driver of the offending vehicle breached the terms and conditions of Insurance Policy is hereby set aside and, therefore, finding of Tribunal in this regard is modified to the extent that Insurance company is liable to pay compensation jointly and severally alongwith owner and driver of the offending vehicle. 21. In the present case, Claims Tribunal has also committed error in not assessing any compensation amount in favour of appellants/claimants for which they are entitled to. Therefore, this case may be remanded back to the learned Tribunal for deciding the claim case of claimants afresh as per law in the light of aforesaid observations only for assessing just and proper amount of compensation. Accordingly, the impugned award is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Claims Tribunal. After taking evidence of both the parties and giving proper opportunity of hearing to both the parties, Claims Tribunal shall pass a fresh award by assessing the proper compensation in favour of claimants. 22. With aforesaid observations, this appeal stands disposed of. Copy along with record be sent to the concerned Claims Tribunal for necessary information and compliance.