JUDGMENT : Anant Ramanath Hegde, J. These two Second Appeals arise from the judgment and decree in a suit for declaration of title, based on the registered sale deed, and in the alternative, on a plea of adverse possession. 2. The suit is decreed in part, declining the relief of declaration of title based on the sale deed as well as adverse possession. A decree for injunction is granted, holding that the plaintiffs are in possession. 3. Both plaintiffs’ First Appeal against the decree declining relief of declaration of title and defendants’ appeal against the decree granting injunction are dismissed, and the Trial Court judgment is affirmed. Hence, these two appeals, one by the plaintiffs and the other by the defendants. 4. Claim for declaration of title stems under the sale deed dated 15.07.1971, said to have been executed by the plaintiffs' father's vendor. Alternative relief of declaration of title, by adverse possession is also sought, in the event of plaintiffs not establishing title under the sale deed. 5. Both Courts concurrently held that the plaintiff’s father’s vendor did not have the title. Declaration based on adverse possession is rejected for want of necessary plea and evidence on adverse possession. 6. Both Courts concurrently held that plaintiffs’ are in possession, without title and decree for injunction is granted against the defendants who held to be the owners. 7. These appeals are admitted vide order dated 18.01.2016 to answer the following substantial question of law: "Whether both the Courts below have committed a serious error in granting the equitable relief of injunction by ignoring the material evidence, i.e. Ex.D1-registered partition deed and Ex.P1-sale deed under which the plaintiff claims to be the owner." 8. This Court, after hearing both parties, framed the following two substantial questions of law and heard both counsel on all substantial questions of law. (i) “ Whether Trial Court and First Appellate Court were justified in granting an injunction against the defendants after adjudicating that plaintiffs are not the owners and defendants are the owners”. (ii) In a suit for declaration of title and injunction, after recording the finding that the plaintiffs are not the owners but in possession, and defendants are the owners without possession, could there be a decree for possession in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs? 9. (ii) In a suit for declaration of title and injunction, after recording the finding that the plaintiffs are not the owners but in possession, and defendants are the owners without possession, could there be a decree for possession in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs? 9. Parties to the present appeals are referred to as per their respective designation before the Trial Court. 10. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that plaintiffs' father's vendor (‘vendor’) for short who is the brother of defendants had sold the property to the plaintiffs' father under a registered sale deed dated 15.07.1971 and since then, the plaintiffs' father was in the exclusive possession of the property and after the death of the plaintiffs' father, the plaintiffs are in exclusive possession of the property and the defendants have no manner of right, title and interest over the same. 11. It is urged that the defendants were very much aware of the execution of the sale deed by the vendor who is the brother of defendants, in favour of the plaintiffs' father. Plaintiffs' father came in possession of the property under the registered sale deed of 1971 in the year 1971 itself. 12. Alternatively, it is urged that, assuming that the property was allotted to the defendants under a registered partition deed dated 13.05.1963, and not to the vendor, the possession since 1971 is held to be proved by both Courts. Thus, the possession through an invalid sale deed is to be construed as adverse and hostile to the interest of the defendants. Thus, the suit ought to have been decreed for the alternative relief of declaration of title based on adverse possession. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants/respondents would contend that the registered partition deed dated 13.05.1963 in the defendants’ family is established. None of the family members, including the vendor, has questioned the partition deed of 1963. In the said partition, the suit property is allotted to the share of the defendants and not the vendor under whom the plaintiffs’ father claimed. The defendants are in possession of the said property. Vendor, i.e. defendants' brother, could not have sold the property which is not allotted to his share and which is not in his possession. Thus, it is urged that the declaration of title is rightly rejected. 14. The defendants are in possession of the said property. Vendor, i.e. defendants' brother, could not have sold the property which is not allotted to his share and which is not in his possession. Thus, it is urged that the declaration of title is rightly rejected. 14. In addition, it is also urged by the learned counsel for the defendants that the Pw1 in his evidence has stated that he has been dispossessed during the pendency of the suit by the defendants, and the finding that the plaintiffs are in possession is erroneous. 15. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs, by way of reply, would contend that the plaintiffs' possession over the property is very much established in view of the admission by the defendants. 16. This Court has considered the contentions raised at the bar and perused the records. 17. Ex.D-1 is the registered partition deed dated 13.05.1963 in the family of the vendor. The vendor is the defendants' brother. The plaintiffs have not questioned the partition deed, and this document is undisputed. Said document establishes that the suit property and also the remaining portion of the same survey number, in all measuring 1 acre 35 guntas, is allotted to the share of the defendants. Vendor was not allotted any share in the said property. Thus, the vendor could not have sold 1 acre 10 guntas in survey number 139 under the registered sale deed dated 15.07.1971. Concurrent finding in this behalf is justified. 18. As far as the plea relating to adverse possession is concerned, it is noticed that in the plaint, the ingredients of adverse possession, i.e. hostile, continuous, uninterrupted possession to the knowledge of the defendants, denying the title of the defendants, are missing. There is no evidence on adverse possession. Adverse possession is claimed only by way of an alternative relief without there being a pleading and evidence to that effect. Thus, both Courts have rightly held that the plea of adverse possession is not established. 19. Now the question is whether the finding relating to possession recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the First Appellate Court requires interference. 20. It is noticed that the revenue records disclose the names of the plaintiffs. Thus, both Courts have rightly held that the plea of adverse possession is not established. 19. Now the question is whether the finding relating to possession recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the First Appellate Court requires interference. 20. It is noticed that the revenue records disclose the names of the plaintiffs. The statement in the evidence referred to by the learned counsel for the defendants reads as under:- The statement in the evidence of Dw-1 referred to by the counsel for the plaintiffs reads as under:- 21. On considering the aforementioned statements, this Court is of the view that the statement in examination in chief of the plaintiffs cannot be construed as an admission relating to possession of the property by the defendants. Whereas, the defendant's statement, which is a statement made on 14.03.2002 (after the plaintiffs’ statement), would reveal that plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property. The record of right produced before the trial Court would reveal the names of the plaintiffs' farther. The defendants’ admission is much more categorical relating to the possession of the plaintiffs over the property. Thus plaintiffs’ possession (without any title) is established. 22. However, the question is whether the injunction should be granted in plaintiffs’ favour when it is adjudicated that the plaintiffs have no title over the suit property and that too against the defendants who have established their title before the Court. 23. Learned Counsel of the plaintiffs would urge that if title is not established, at least injunction should be granted till plaintiffs are evicted in due process of law. Granting a decree for injunction till plaintiffs are evicted through a “due process of law” is one way of looking at it. In such an event, the defendants need to file a suit seeking possession and to execute the decree for possession. 24. The above theory contains a fallacy. It proceeds on the premise that only the plaintiffs claim has undergone the test of ‘ due process’ , and adjudication of the defendants’ title is yet to undergo the ‘due process’ test.Such interpretation is impermissible. 25. In a suit, many a time, if not all the time, not only are the right and liability of the plaintiff/s decided, but also the right and liability of the defendants are adjudicated. This is one such suit. 25. In a suit, many a time, if not all the time, not only are the right and liability of the plaintiff/s decided, but also the right and liability of the defendants are adjudicated. This is one such suit. Plaintiffs’ relief for declaration of title is declined and the plaintiffs are found to be in possession without title. At the same time defendants’ claim of ownership is also adjudicated and defendants are held to be the owners without possession. This adjudication is by a competent court, in a manner contemplated under law. Thus, there is complete adjudication of rights and liabilities of both sides by following a due process . What logically flows from the said adjudication is the plaintiffs are in unauthorised possession of the property. 26. Assuming that the defendants need to file a suit to seek possession despite the declaration by the Court that the plaintiffs are not the owners but in possession, and the defendants are the owners without possession; the question is what is that the Court is required to adjudicate in the said suit? The answer is ‘nothing’. There is no lis at all. Reason is that the defendants in the said suit (plaintiffs of this proceeding) will have no defence left. Such a second suit is wholly unwarranted, and it serves no purpose other than burdening the already overburdened system and dragging the person whose rights are adjudicated into one more litigation. 27. At this juncture, reference to some of the judgments would be apposite. 28. In Thomas Cook India Limited vs.Hotel Imperial (2006) 88 DRJ 545 , Delhi High Court, in deciding an interlocutory application seeking an injunction by a person, in permissive possession, under a settlement in Court, against the real owner held as under. 27. This brings me to the second aspect of ‘due process of law’. It was urged by Mr Kaul that even if the plaintiff was in unlawful possession, it could only be evicted by due process of law, and therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to an order of injunction preventing the defendants from removing the plaintiff from the said two rooms except through due process of law. It must be made clear that this argument fails in the context of this case because the plaintiff was never in possession and therefore there is no question of dispossession in the sense usually understood. It must be made clear that this argument fails in the context of this case because the plaintiff was never in possession and therefore there is no question of dispossession in the sense usually understood. The plaintiff had a mere right to use; such right was revocable, it has been revoked, and the plaintiff is entitled under section 63 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, to a reasonable time to leave the premises and take away its goods. The argument also fails because by rushing to court the plaintiff has indeed invited a judicial determination of its status. If it got an order of injunction it would enure to its benefit. But, if it did not, then it can't be heard to say that this court has to grant an injunction all the same because otherwise it would give a licence to the defendants to forcibly throw out the plaintiff without filing a suit for possession, 28. Now, this ‘due process’ or ‘due course’condition is satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a right (injunction against dispossession), is not of much consequence. What is important is that in either event it is an action before the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the ‘bare minimum’ requirement of ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ of law would stand satisfied as recourse to law would have been taken. In this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e., for taking back something from the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not. I would think not. In any event, the ‘recourse to law’ stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial determination is made with regard to the first party's protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff's failure to make out a case for an injunction does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said two rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law. 29. In paragraph No. 79 in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira (2012) 5 SCC 370 : the Apex Court has held as under. Due process of law 79. Due process of law means that nobody ought to be condemned unheard. The due process of law means a person in settled possession will not be dispossessed except by due process of law. Due process means an opportunity to the defendant to file pleadings including written statement and documents before the court of law. It does not mean the whole trial. Due process of law is satisfied the moment rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a competent court. 30. Further in paragraph No. 80 of the said judgment the Apex Court has approved the ratio in Thomas Cook supra. It is also noticed that the suit property is a vacant agricultural land. This being the position, this Court is of the view that the plaintiffs should vacate the land consequent to the dismissal of this appeal, as the plaintiffs have no title over the suit property. 31. The above noted two judgments are rendered in a context where the plaintiff in permissive possession filed the suit, probably after the licence/permission was revoked seeking protection against forcible eviction. 32. On similar lines, the coordinate bench of this Court in Sri Babagouda Lakhamgouda Patil and Smt. Dundhawwa and others granted a decree for possession, in favour of the defendant, in a suit for specific performance after declining the relief of specific performance and recording a finding that the plaintiff is in possession under the agreement for sale. 33. 32. On similar lines, the coordinate bench of this Court in Sri Babagouda Lakhamgouda Patil and Smt. Dundhawwa and others granted a decree for possession, in favour of the defendant, in a suit for specific performance after declining the relief of specific performance and recording a finding that the plaintiff is in possession under the agreement for sale. 33. If the ratio in the aforementioned judgments is borne in mind, in a case of this nature, the decree for possession in favour of the defendants who are held to be the owners without possession, and the plaintiffs whose claim relating to ownership both under a sale deed and by way of adverse possession is answered in negative, is a judicial compulsion and just a formality 34. The right to pass such a decree for possession in favour of the defendants in a suit for declaration and injunction filed by the plaintiffs, after adjudication of the rights of the parties is indeed traceable to inherent power of the Court which is not conferred by statute, but which is recognised and saved in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 35. The only technical aspect would be the payment of Court Fee by the defendants in whose favour the decree is passed. The suit property is an agricultural land assessed to land revenue. The market value for the purpose of payment of Court fee would be 25 times of the revenue payable on the suit land which is Rs.43/-. Thus, valuation for Court Fee would be Rs.1,075/-. Defendants are required to pay Court Fee of Rs.27/- which is far less than the expenditure that would be incurred by the Court towards the stationery in deciding the suit, if initiated by the defendants. Nevertheless to complete the formality, the defendants shall pay Rs.27/- towards Court Fee to enable the Registry to draw the decree for possession. 36. Further, it is to be observed that this Court has concurred with the findings that the plaintiffs have not acquired title over the property. The remedy for the plaintiffs is to take action for the recovery of sale consideration amount and/damages as advised in law against the vendor or his successors. 37. Liberty is reserved to the plaintiffs to take such action as advised in law, subject to just exceptions in law. 38. The remedy for the plaintiffs is to take action for the recovery of sale consideration amount and/damages as advised in law against the vendor or his successors. 37. Liberty is reserved to the plaintiffs to take such action as advised in law, subject to just exceptions in law. 38. Hence, the following: ORDER (i) RSA No.2681/2027 is allowed (ii) The judgment and decree dated 12.09.2002 in O.S. No.413/1998 passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Malur, as well as judgment and decree dated 23.07.2007 passed by First Appellate Court granting injunction in favour of the plaintiffs are set-aside. (iii) Consequently, suit in O.S. No.413/1998 on the file of Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division) is dismissed. (iv) RSA No.2702/2007 is dismissed. (v) Three months time granted to the plaintiffs to handover the possession of the suit property to the defendants, failing which the defendants are entitled to execute this decree for possession. (vi) Liberty is reserved to the plaintiffs to take such action as advised in law, subject to just exceptions in law.