ORDER : V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR, J. Cultivating tenants of an agricultural land filed this civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the judgment dated 12.10.2009 of the learned I Additional District Judge, Nellore in C.M.A.No.10 of 2005, confirming the order dated 17.01.2005 of the learned Special Officer-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Nellore in A.T.C.No.4 of 2000. 2. Respondent herein is the landlord. Sri P.Rajasekhar, the learned counsel representing Sri M.Balanaga Srinivas, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners submitted arguments. Despite the notice being served, none entered appearance for respondent. 3. The necessary material facts may be briefly stated here. Ac.5.15 cents of agricultural land in Survey No.1060/2 in Sarvepalli Bit-III in Tatiparthipalem Village, Venkatachalam Mandal, Nellore District of Andhra Pradesh is the subject matter of controversy. Sri Akili Chenchu Venkata Lakshmi Narasimha Rao was the absolute owner of this property. About that there has never been any dispute. He died on 03.11.1989 survived by his wife Varalakshamma and an adopted son Sri Akili Venkata Murali Krishna. They allegedly succeeded the property. Smt. Varalakshamma executed a Will dated 06.02.1998 in favour of her adopted her. She died on 03.06.1999. The adopted son Sri Akili Venkata Murali Krishna filed A.T.C.No.4 of 2000 initially as against respondent No.1- G.Ramachandraiah stating that since 1985 Sri G.Ramachandraiah has been a tenant of the above referred property and it was an oral tenancy entered into between Sri G.Ramachandraiah and the original owner Sri Akili Chenchu Venkata Lakshmi Narasimha Rao. On the death of the original owner, his successors, namely, his wife and adopted son were there and with them the tenant entered into a fresh lease and it was also an oral lease. During the time of the original owner as well as during the time of subsequent lease the tenant was paying maktha as agreed upon. However, after the death of Smt. Varalakshamma the tenant failed to pay the rents. Notices issued remained unanswered. Therefore, in terms of Sections 12 , 13 and 16 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 , Sri Akili Venkata Murali Krishna sought for eviction of the tenants. During the pendency of A.T.C.No.4 of 2000 respondent No.2-Sri A.Ramanaiah was impleaded and thereafter three more respondents were brought on record. Respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 were the very brothers of the first respondent - Sri G.Ramachandraiah. During the pendency of A.T.C.No.4 of 2000 respondent No.2-Sri A.Ramanaiah was impleaded and thereafter three more respondents were brought on record. Respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 were the very brothers of the first respondent - Sri G.Ramachandraiah. In the petition for eviction an additional plea was also taken up by the landlord stating that the respondents have been damaging the schedule mentioned property as they were shifting the soil from the land. It was also pleaded that in violation of the terms of tenancy the original tenant sublet the property in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 5. 4. The original tenant/Sri G.Ramachandraiah filed a counter and the remaining respondents filed a memo adopting it. Their pleaded case is that there was no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and therefore, A.T.C. could not be maintained. They denied the legal status of the petitioner-Sri Akili Venkata Murali Krishna and challenged the adoption as alleged by the petitioner. They also contend that the Will said to have been executed by Smt. Varalakshamma. They further contended that there was an agreement for sale executed in their favour by the original owner in the year 1986 and they are entitled to hold onto their possession. They denied the fresh lease said to have been entered into between the petitioner and his mother with the respondents. They prayed for dismissal of the petition. 5. Learned Special Officer-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Nellore framed the following points for its consideration: 1. Whether the petitioner is the landlord of the schedule property within the meaning of Sec. 2(f) of A.P.Tenancy Act? 2. Whether there is jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondents? 3. If so, whether the petitioner is entitled for eviction of the respondents and delivery of vacant possession of the petition schedule property? 4. To what relief? 6. During enquiry, there was evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and Exs.A.1 to A.17 and the evidence of RWs.1 to 3 and Exs.B.1 to B.12. 7. 3. If so, whether the petitioner is entitled for eviction of the respondents and delivery of vacant possession of the petition schedule property? 4. To what relief? 6. During enquiry, there was evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and Exs.A.1 to A.17 and the evidence of RWs.1 to 3 and Exs.B.1 to B.12. 7. After considering the entire evidence on record and the rival submissions and the legal authorities, the learned Special Officer agreed with the case of the petitioner-Sri Akili Venkata Murali Krishna and recorded its findings that the adoption was proved, the Will was proved and Ex.B.1-agreement for sale was not proved and that there was default on part of the tenants in payment of rents and that there was unauthorized sub-tenancy. Accordingly, the petition was allowed with costs with directions to the respondents/tenants therein to vacate the schedule mentioned land and deliver vacant possession of the same to the petitioner therein on or before 31.03.2005. 8. Aggrieved tenants preferred C.M.A.No.10 of 2005 before the learned I Additional District Judge, Nellore. After due contest and hearing, by order dated 12.10.2009 the learned appellate judge found no merit in the appeal and he agreed with the findings of the Special Officer on all aspects and accordingly dismissed the appeal. At paragraph No.31 it was recorded that the appellants/tenants were already evicted and possession was already delivered to the respondent/landlord. That aspect of the matter is not denied before this Court in this revision. 9. Since law has not permitted a civil revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C., the tenants have preferred this revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. The ardent submissions of the learned counsel for revision petitioners are that the Special Officer as well as the appellate Court ignored the law that an eviction proceedings before a Special Officer have got limited jurisdiction and they ought not to have decided question such as adoption and its validity, the Will and its genuineness and the flow of title which in their true sense belonged to the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Ex.B.1-agreement for sale executed by the original owner was pressed into service by the tenants/revision petitioners and they are entitled to hold on to their possession in terms of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. In the memorandum of grounds, it is mentioned that Ex.B.1 was accepted by the Courts below. Ex.B.1-agreement for sale executed by the original owner was pressed into service by the tenants/revision petitioners and they are entitled to hold on to their possession in terms of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. In the memorandum of grounds, it is mentioned that Ex.B.1 was accepted by the Courts below. It is also mentioned that the Courts below gave a finding that there is no landlord and tenant relationship. Both these aspects are factually incorrect as could be seen from the record. 12. The argument of the learned counsel for revision petitioners is that since the facts on record did not disclose landlord and tenant relationship and the flow of title, decisions rendered by the Courts below suffer from jurisdictional errors and therefore, they shall be set aside. Learned counsel for revision petitioners cited Dontireddy Venkata Reddy v. Bhimavarapu Bhushireddy , [ 1970 2 ALT 237 ] and Golavalli Ramakrishna Murthy v. Muramalla Ammanna Raju , 2008 (5) ALT 712 (S.B.) . 13. The point that falls for consideration is: Whether the orders of the Courts below suffer from jurisdictional errors requiring interference? POINT 14. The following provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Act, 1956’) are required to be noticed: Section 2(f) of the Act, 1956 defines “landlord”, which reads as below: 2(f) "landlord" means the owner of a holding or part thereof who is entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding or part, and includes the heirs, assignees, legal representatives of such owner, or person deriving rights through him. Section 2(c) of the Act, 1956 defines “cultivating tenant” which reads as below: 2(c) "cultivating tenant" means a person who cultivates by his own labour or by that of any other member of his family or by hired labour under his supervision and control, any land belonging to another under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, but does not include a mere intermediary. Section 16 of the Act, 1956 deals with adjudication of disputes and appeal, which reads as below: (1) Any dispute arising under this Act, between a landlord and a cultivating tenant in relation to a matter not otherwise decide by the Special Officer under the provisions of this Act, shall, on application by the landlord or the cultivating tenant, as the case may be, be decided by the Special Officer after making an enquiry in the manner prescribed. Proviso omitted by Act No.28 of 2002 (2) Against any order passed by the Special Officer under this Act an appeal shall lie to the District Judge having jurisdiction, within thirty days of the passing of the order; and the decision of the District Judge on such appeal shall be final. Section 12 of the Act, 1956 provides for resumption of possession of land leased by landlord for his personal cultivation. Section 13 of the Act, 1956 provides for termination of tenancy where there is default in payment of rents or where the tenant has been causing destruction of the property or where the tenant has sublet the property or violated any conditions of the tenancy and it also provides for evictions in those cases where tenant willfully denies the title of the landlord. Section 15 of the Act, 1956 provides for the first option for the tenant to exercise his right to purchase the land leased to him. In the case at hand, tenants never exercised their right under Section 15 of the Act, 1956. 15. The Special Officer as well as the I Additional District Judge in appeal concurrently recorded the findings that the land originally belonged to Sri Akili Chenchu Venkata Lakshmi Narasimha Rao and that it was leased out to the tenant in the year 1985. They also recorded that by virtue of Ex.A.6-adangal it was clear that Sri Narasimha Rao is the owner and respondent No.1 has been in possession of Ac.3.65 cents and respondent No.2 has been in possession of Ac.1.50 cents of the petition schedule property. These findings have attained their finality. In this revision the above aspects have not been challenged. 16. One of the contentions of the revision petitioners was hinged on Ex.B.1. It is an agreement for sale dated 23.07.1986. These findings have attained their finality. In this revision the above aspects have not been challenged. 16. One of the contentions of the revision petitioners was hinged on Ex.B.1. It is an agreement for sale dated 23.07.1986. Referring to it the Courts below have mentioned that there was no credible evidence at all to prove execution of Ex.B.1 by the very original landlord. Those concurrent findings were arrived at only after considering the evidence on record. Therefore, that cannot be called perverse. About Ex.B.1 a few more things could be stated here. Ex.B.1 is an unregistered agreement for sale. The case before the Special Officer was not one for any specific performance. For one to avail protection of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act such a document must be a registered document as held by the Apex Court in Ameer Minhaz v. Dierdre Elizabeth (wright) Issar , [ (2018) 7 SCC 639 ] . There is a further principle that those who intend to avail benefit of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 must plead that they had taken possession of property in part performance of the contract as stated by their Lordships in Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad ., (2018) 7 SCC 646 It is undisputed that in Ex.B.1 there is no reference to the tenancy and there is no mention the tenancy stood terminated. It is never the case of tenants that they had surrendered the property and obtained possession of the property pursuant to Ex.B.1. It seems to me that the revision petitioners here failed to comply with the legal mandates referred to above. Both the Courts below also recorded that there was no acceptable evidence about payment of alleged balance sale consideration by the intending purchasers to the landlord. It was also recorded that RW.1 was even oblivious of death of the original landlord. It is in the above- mentioned circumstances, the inevitable observation that is to be recorded here is that Ex.B.1 stood not proved and any contentions based on Ex.B.1 have no legal consequence. 17. The fact that the original owner died and he was survived by his wife is undisputed. Both the Courts below concurrently recorded their findings that the tenants did not demonstrate before them about payment of rents to her. That finding concerning default also became final. 18. 17. The fact that the original owner died and he was survived by his wife is undisputed. Both the Courts below concurrently recorded their findings that the tenants did not demonstrate before them about payment of rents to her. That finding concerning default also became final. 18. It is only on the death of the wife of the original landlord the litigation cropped up. The definition of ‘landlord’ as contained in Section 2(f) of the Act, 1956 shows that the heirs and legal representatives of the original owner of the land are also landlords. In the case at hand, the respondent herein claimed that he is the landlord and his claim was based on two facts. He stated that he was adopted by the original landlord and his wife. This aspect fell for consideration very seriously before the Courts below. The natural mother of the respondent-Sri Akili Venkata Murali Krishna gave her evidence stating that her son was given an adoption to Sri Akili Chenchu Venkata Lakshmi Narasimha Rao and his wife Varalakshamma while the boy was aged 13 years. Courts below were shown more than abundant evidence with reference to proof of such adoption where there were registered sale deeds and other documents in which Sri Akili Venkata Murali Krishna was shown as adopted son of those spouses. In the light of such overwhelming evidence, both the Courts below held that adoption was proved. The other claim of Sri Akili Venkata Murali Krishna was based on a Will executed in his favour by his adopted mother as per Ex.A.1 which is an un- registered Will dated 06.02.1998. The contentions raised about the proof of that Will were negatived by both the Courts below after recording the ratio of this Court in Jalal and sons v. Sita Bai , [ 2001 (2) ALT 683 ] 19. In this revision the fervent submission of the learned counsel for revision petitioners is that Courts with limited jurisdiction such as the Special Officer held no jurisdiction to decide the factum of adoption and its legality and the factum of Will and its genuineness and therefore those orders are vitiated in the eyes of law and they shall be set aside. In the opinion of this Court there is absolutely no merit in this contention. The tenant is entitled to ask the petitioner to prove the vestitive facts on which the petitioner’s claim rests. In the opinion of this Court there is absolutely no merit in this contention. The tenant is entitled to ask the petitioner to prove the vestitive facts on which the petitioner’s claim rests. By their pleadings before the Special Officer one of the questions that fell for consideration was the legitimacy of the petitioner to seek eviction and that legitimacy was questioned by questioning the adoption he claimed and the Will he claimed. Since there were requisite pleadings placed by the rival parties the forums wherever they were put were obliged to consider them and test them on evidence and reach to their own conclusions. While it is undisputed that a Special Officer entertaining a petition for eviction of cultivating tenants of an agricultural land had to decide the matter in a summary way and had only limited jurisdiction, it does not simply mean that just by looking at the pleadings he had to dismiss the case and drive away the parties to other forums. In the above context, one is required to refer to the ruling of the Apex Court in Bhogadi Kannababu v. Vuggina Pydamma , [ (2006) 5 SCC 532 ] . The questions that came up before their Lordships pertain to the questions concerning the eviction of tenants from an agricultural land and the proceedings were initiated under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 . Persons who claimed to be landlords and who sought for eviction were found to be the second wife of the original landlord and her two children born in that wedlock. While the first marriage was subsisting, the second marriage took place. Questions of jurisdiction were canvassed and their Lordships stated that it would not be necessary to decide the inheritance and entitlement over the properties in the eviction proceedings. It is not necessary to finally adjudicate upon the question of right, title and interest of such legal heirs with respect to the properties in question. In such eviction proceedings based on subletting and default, the Courts need to decide whether relationship of landlord and tenant exists and not the question of title to the properties in question. It is not necessary to finally adjudicate upon the question of right, title and interest of such legal heirs with respect to the properties in question. In such eviction proceedings based on subletting and default, the Courts need to decide whether relationship of landlord and tenant exists and not the question of title to the properties in question. As such questions fall for consideration only incidentally and therefore the Special Officer and the appellate judge were entitled to go into them incidentally and their decisions about such title do not attain finality and if so required those questions could be re-agitated in a comprehensive suit for title. That answers all the contentions raised in this revision. 20. At the bar, the learned counsel for revision petitioners cited Dontireddy Venkata Reddy’s case. , [Supra 1] Their Lordships held that the provisions of the Act, 1956 indicate that the jurisdiction of the Special Officer arises only if the jural relationship of landlord and tenant exists but not otherwise. That being so, a decision on the question whether the relationship of the landlord and cultivating tenant exists is a decision regarding jurisdictional factor and such a decision is neither conclusive nor final and does not oust the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain the proceedings in which the question of jural relationship of landlord and tenant arises. 21. In summation, it is to be stated that the land and the entry of the revision petitioners into it as tenants of the original landlord was never in dispute. Default in payment of rents and unauthorized sublease of property was concurrently recorded. Death of original landlord resulted in succession and inheritance by his wife and adopted son. The status of wife as successor of the original landlord was also never in dispute. The prayer for eviction made by the adopted son was contested without any merits before the Courts below by the tenants. Putting faith in their frivolous pleas the tenants have been perpetuating the litigation. There is absolutely no merit in this revision. There was no wrongful exercise of jurisdiction by both the forums below. The point is answered against the revision petitioners. 22. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.