JUDGMENT : Saurabh Lavania, J. 1.Heard Sri Angrej Nath Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned State counsel. 2. By means of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following main relief(s):- "(a) to issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Certiorari for quashing impugned order dated 21.02.2025 passed by the opposite party No-2 in Case No.9313/2023 (Computerized Case No-T202308300509313), Shiv Kumar & others Vs Jivanlal & others in respect of Gata No.44/0.012 Hectare, situated in Village- Bhanbhuwa, Pargana-Gwarich, Tehsil- Karnailganj, District- Gonda. (b) to issue direction in any nature which this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the case for securing the property of petitioner and opposite party No-9 & 10 which has been illegally occupied by the opposite party No-3 to 8." 3. At the very outset, learned State counsel raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of this petition. The preliminary objection has been raised on the ground of having a statutory remedy of filing an appeal against the impugned order dated 21.02.2025. He stated that in view of Section 38 (4) of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the "Code of 2006") as amended in the year 2019, the petitioner is having a remedy of filing an appeal before the Authority concerned against the impugned order dated 21.02.2025. Section 38 (4) of the Code of 2006 is extracted hereunder:- "38(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Collector or the Sub-Divisional Officer, as the case may be, under sub-section (3), may prefer an appeal to the Commissioner within a period of thirty days from the date of such order, and the decision of the Commissioner shall, subject to the provisions of section 210, be final." 4. Considered the aforesaid and perused the record. 5. It is undisputed that the petitioner is having a remedy of filing an appeal under Section 38 (4) of the Code of 2006. The law in this regard is well settled, as per which, the writ petitions should not be entertained, if there is a statutory remedy available to the litigant approaching the Court concerned. 6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. & another Vs. The law in this regard is well settled, as per which, the writ petitions should not be entertained, if there is a statutory remedy available to the litigant approaching the Court concerned. 6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. & another Vs. State of Orrisa and others, (1983) 2 SCC 433 , has observed that where a right or liability is created by a statute, which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute must only be availed of. In paragraph 11 of the above report, the Court observed thus:- "11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton6 in the following passage: "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute. . . . But there is a third class, viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it.... The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it.... The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to." The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. (1919 AC 368) and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co. Ltd. (1935 AC 532) and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. ( AIR 1940 PC 105 ). It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine." (emphasis supplied) 7. In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & others Vs. Union of India & others, (1997) 5 SCC 536 , the Hon'ble Apex Court went on to observe that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedy under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. The Court, however, added a word of caution and expounded that the constitutional Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise its jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment. To put it differently, the fact that the High Court has wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not mean that it can disregard the substantive provisions of a statute and pass orders which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed by the statute. 8. In a recent decision in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. , (2021) 6 SCC 771 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell on the "rule of alternate remedy" and its judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted : (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15) '14. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted : (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15) '14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.' 26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] , in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 ] , this Court noted that : (Harbanslal Sahnia case [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 ] , SCC p. 110, para 7) '7. v. Registrar, Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] , in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 ] , this Court noted that : (Harbanslal Sahnia case [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 ] , SCC p. 110, para 7) '7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies : (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] .) The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the appellants' dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.' 27. The principles of law which emerge are that: 27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with." (emphasis in original) 9. Considering the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that in the statute itself a mechanism for redressal of the grievance is provided, as such, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present petition. It is accordingly dismissed , however, with liberty to the petitioner to approach the Authority concerned under Section 38 (4) of the Code of 2006. 10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is also provided that if the remedy aforesaid is availed by the petitioner, then the Authority concerned shall consider and decide the same expeditiously say within a period of six months from the date of approaching the said Authority. 10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is also provided that if the remedy aforesaid is availed by the petitioner, then the Authority concerned shall consider and decide the same expeditiously say within a period of six months from the date of approaching the said Authority. It is in view of Rule 183(4) of the U.P. Revenue Code Rules, 2016 made under U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 and para 458(2) of U.P. Revenue Court Manual, as per which, a revision or appeal should preferably be decided preferably within six months.