JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. 1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for the following relief: “That the impugned judgment dated 28.05.2024 (Annexure P-1), and award dated 05.01.2023 (Annexure P-2), may kindly be quashed and set aside.” 2. The challenge is to the order passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-Appellate Authority, under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, dated 28.05.2024, in terms whereof, the Appeal under Section 7(7) of the Paymentof Gratuity Act, 1972, by the petitioner herein against order dated 05.01.2023, passed by the learned Controlling Authority- cum-Labour Officer, Kangra at Dharamshala, was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by, inter alia, observing that the appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent has apprised the Court that Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 7522 of 2021, titled State of H.P. and Another Vs. Chaman Lal and in CWP No. 1642 of 2022, titled State of H.P. & Another Vs. Kaul Singh, has already held that an appeal filed beyond the period of limitation is not maintainable and said findings have been returned by the Hon’ble Division Bench based on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and also carefully gone through the order under challenge, this Court does not finds any merit therein. 5. Perusal of record demonstrates that the order of determination of gratuity was passed by the Controlling Authority on 05.01.2023. In terms of the provisions of Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, a person aggrieved by an order passed under sub-Section thereof may within 60 days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such Authority, as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf. Proviso thereto further provides that appropriate Government or Appellate Authority, as the case may be, if it is satisfied that appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of 60 days, can extend the said period by further period of 60 days. 6. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited Vs. Proviso thereto further provides that appropriate Government or Appellate Authority, as the case may be, if it is satisfied that appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of 60 days, can extend the said period by further period of 60 days. 6. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited Vs. Electricity Department and others, (2016) 16 SCC 152 , while interpreting Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which is akin to the provisions of Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, has been pleased to hold as under:- “5. The appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 in the Supreme Court has to be filed within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal. However, the Supreme Court, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing an appeal within the said period of 60 days, may allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days. Thus, the maximum period within which an appeal can be filed under Section 125 is 120 days which includes the discretion granted to the Supreme Court to condone the delay limited to 60 days. The Supreme Court cannot condone the delay beyond 60 days by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and ignoring the special limitation prescribed under the Electricity Act, 2003. This Court in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, at para 32, has settled this issue: "32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory." 7. Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court by placing reliance on the said judgment as well as another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited Vs. Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court by placing reliance on the said judgment as well as another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited Vs. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited and others, (2017) 5 SCC 42 , has been pleased to hold that the maximum period for filing an appeal against the order passed by the Controlling Authority under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity of Act, 1972, is 120 days and an appeal filed beyond the said period is not maintainable. 8. In the light of the fact that herein it is not in dispute that the appeal was not filed within the statutory period of 120 days and further as there is no power conferred upon the Authority to entertain an appeal beyond the period of 120 days, as the appeal filed against the order of the Controlling Authority was not maintainable being beyond the period of limitation, the same was not justiciable. 9. Though in terms of the impugned order, the Appellate Authority has also returned findings on merit, but this Court is of the considered view that as the appeal per se is not maintainable and as otherwise also, the Appellate Authority has upheld the order of the Controlling Authority, this writ petition has no merit as the order passed by the Controlling Authority has attained finality and otherwise also as the order so passed, has not been interfered, by the Appellate Authority, which Appellate Authority could not have had, once period of 120 days had elapsed. Therefore, this Court does not finds any reason to interfere with the order so passed and the petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.