JUDGMENT : 1. Leave granted. 2. We are a little taken aback having read the impugned judgment and order dated 3rd May, 2024 of the relevant Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court disposing of the intra-court appeal LPA No.148 of 2023 in the manner it did. After dismissing the intra-court appeal agreeing with the Single Bench that the writ petition suffered from unexplained delay of 8 (eight) years, the penultimate paragraph refers to an order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice requiring counsel for the parties to give a list of judgments in advance so that they are placed before the Court without wastage of any time and also records learned counsel for the appellants having referred to certain judgments which were not so informed earlier. Under such circumstances, the concluding paragraph records the refrain exercised by the Division Bench from adverting to those judgments on account of non-compliance by the learned counsel with the directions given by the Chief Justice and that, even otherwise, the petition before the Single Bench being hopelessly barred by laches was rightly dismissed. 3. We are informed by learned counsel for the appellant that at the time of hearing of the intra-court appeal, judgments were sought to be cited on his behalf to persuade the Division Bench hold that the Single Bench was grossly in error in dismissing the appellant's writ petition on the ground of laches in its presentation and to reverse such dismissal in view of absence of any notification for acquisition of the subject land. However, that did not fructify because the list of judgments was not circulated earlier. 4. It is not disputed at the Bar that the Chief Justice of the High Court has issued an order, which were observed in the breach by the counsel for the appellant. However, we are minded to believe that such order, by its very nature, must have been administrative instructions which were aimed at ensuring speedy disposal of the proceedings before the High Court as well as for the purpose of convenience of the judges on the benches to administer quick and responsive justice without, however, affecting their discretion in the matter of conducting judicial proceedings. We have not been shown that the order contained a default clause that if the list of judgments proposed to be cited is not circulated in advance, such judgments would not be looked at irrespective of the consequences. Even if such order did contain such a clause, and notwithstanding the fault or lapse of the counsel in not circulating the list of judgments, nothing prevented the Division Bench of the High Court in exercise of its judicial discretion to consider whether the judgments proposed to be cited were at all relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the lis before it. Such a course of action would have certainly promoted fairness in delivering justice and in such circumstances, not seen as amounting to defiance of the order containing administrative instructions. Whatever was required for a court of law to administer substantive justice ought to have been adhered to, without feeling inhibited by any such instructions. Importantly, the aspect as to how a bench of a high court would conduct its judicial proceedings is a matter which is beyond the realm of control of the primus inter pares of such court and, thus, cannot be regulated by his administrative instructions. We are certain that the Chief Justice of the High Court did not intend that for a breach of the instructions so issued, a litigant would be deprived of the opportunity of citing judgments. If indeed the judgments counsel for the appellant proposed to cite were examined and found relevant, the Division Bench could have and should have relied on it; or else, if materiality of such judgments were not found, a line of disapproval would have been sufficient observing that the ratio of such decisions did not have any application to the case at hand. Regrettably, while attempting to accelerate the decision, the impugned order of dismissal of the intracourt appeal has generated an additional litigation resulting in more delay and further prolongation of resolution of the case. This could have easily been avoided if only the judgments proposed to be cited were considered by the Division Bench. 5. That apart, having regard to several decisions of this Court on the point and at the risk of repetition, we are constrained to observe that the litigant should not have been made to suffer for any fault or lapse on the part of his counsel. 6. 5. That apart, having regard to several decisions of this Court on the point and at the risk of repetition, we are constrained to observe that the litigant should not have been made to suffer for any fault or lapse on the part of his counsel. 6. The impugned judgment and order of dismissal of the intracourt appeal is set aside. This is a fit and proper case where the rival claims ought to be decided afresh; hence, we order a remand. This would result in revival of the intra-court appeal and its restoration on the file of the High Court. Let the appeal be now decided in accordance with law, as early as possible. All points, on the merits of the rival claims, are kept open. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. 8. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.