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2025 DIGILAW 619 (TS)

Ex. Officio Secry Energy Forest Hydand v. A. P. Rayons Ltd Gaganmahal Hyd

2025-05-02

ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI, TIRUMALA DEVI

body2025
JUDGMENT : (Tirumala Devi Eada, J.) This is an appeal filed by the appellants being aggrieved by the judgment and decree, dated 25.02.1999, passed in O.S.No.874 of 1988 by the learned V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (for short “the trial Court”). 2. The appellants herein are the defendants and the respondent No.1 is the plaintiff before the trial Court and the parties herein are referred to as they were arrayed in the suit before the trial Court for the sake of convenience and clarity. 3. The case of the plaintiff before the trial Court was that the plaintiff is a company engaged in the business of manufacturing Rayon Grade Pulp and that it requires hardwood to manufacture the same and that it has been taking the said raw material from the defendants on being allotted by it from time to time, on payment of the concerned value. It is its further case that as per the G.O.Ms.No.992, dated 22.12.1977, the plaintiff is entitled for supply of mixed hardwood annually @ 75,000 tonnes and it was increased to 1,00,000 tonnes with effect from 1985-86 by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.517, dated 31.12.1985 and that the plaintiff made several representations against the inequitable volume/weight correlation and that they are suffering heavy loss due to the shortage in weight and that the Government has issued G.O.Ms.No.47, dated 10.02.1987 directing the supply of raw material to the plaintiff on actual weighment basis. It is its further case that by a letter dated 25.09.1985, the defendant has allotted 1,50,000 CMTS hardwood stacks quota for the year 1985-86 instructing to take possession of the material within 10 days from various coupes at Warangal, Khammam and Rajamundry from the date of receipt of the intimation and that the material is supposed to be lifted within 45 days of allotment and complete such lifting before 30.04.1986. It was further notified that failure to comply with the conditions would result in the material reverting back to the Government and would also count for the quota of supply for the year. The plaintiff has further submitted that the unlifted material will be sold in public auction at the risk and loss of the plaintiff. 4. It was further notified that failure to comply with the conditions would result in the material reverting back to the Government and would also count for the quota of supply for the year. The plaintiff has further submitted that the unlifted material will be sold in public auction at the risk and loss of the plaintiff. 4. The plaintiff’s further case is that the allotment was communicated in September, 1985 and the plaintiff by its letter dated 30.12.1985 had sought extension of time for lifting the allotment of hardwood, since there is only three months time and it was not possible to lift the large quantity in a short time but the said request for extension of time was not considered. During the last week of January, the allotment orders were received by the plaintiff in respect of 31,050 CMTs of hardwood from various circles and the plaintiff paid royalty of Rs.19,74,378.50 ps. for the said allotment by way of demand draft. It is the case of the plaintiff that since the time available was too short, it could lift only a small quantity of 5043.5 CMTs and that the balance quantity of 26,006.5 CMTs of hardwood could not be lifted, for which the royalty of Rs.16,60,824.10/- was paid and its request for extension of time was turned down arbitrarily. It is the contention of the plaintiff that it was asked to lift the hardwood even before the committee that was appointed to consider the volume/weight ratio could commence its work. It is its further case that the material that could not be lifted at Paloncha was notified for sale by auction on 08.04.1986. That the plaintiff addressed two letters to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests on 16.05.1986 and 19.06.1986 requesting either to refund the royalty that is paid in excess or to adjust the excess amount for future supplies and that they received a reply dated 27.06.1986 saying that the material not lifted would be forfeited and that the plaintiff is not entitled for any refund. It is the contention of the plaintiff that such a condition of forfeiture is opposed to public policy and that the Government should not take undue advantage of its monopolistic control over wood and impose such unreasonable conditions. It is the contention of the plaintiff that such a condition of forfeiture is opposed to public policy and that the Government should not take undue advantage of its monopolistic control over wood and impose such unreasonable conditions. Therefore, the plaintiff issued a notice under Section 80 of CPC on 04.03.1988 and the defendants by their letter dated 19.05.1988 refused to refund the royalty. Hence, the suit. 5. The defendants through their written statement have denied the averments of the petition stating that the recommendations of the committee in respect of volume/weight ratio as accepted by the Government through G.O.Ms.No.47 dated 03.10.1987 to supply raw material on actual payment basis is only prospective and that the said issue of appointment of a committee to look into the volume/weight ratio was initiated in the Chief Minister’s meeting on 17.12.1985 but whereas the allotment of material to the plaintiff was made on 25.09.1985 and that the plaintiff has agreed to the terms and conditions through their letter dated 16.06.1976 and that the said conditions are laid down to protect the interest of Government revenue and public at large. It is their further case that the raw material was allotted in the month of September, 1985 as it was done previously but the plaintiff could not lift the material within time. The plaintiff has paid Rs.19,74,378/- as advance royalty on 08.02.1986, which is after the request for extension of time was rejected by the Government on 04.02.1986. Thus, the contention of the defendant is that the plaintiff waited for the decision of the committee with regard to the volume/weight ratio which is not tenable and that the plaintiff is liable to lift the material at old norms without any reference to the volume/weight ratio experiments till the committee finalizes the recommendations and the same are accepted by the Government. Further, it is submitted by the defendant that on sympathetic grounds, the time was extended up to middle of May, 1986 for lifting the allotted hardwood but the plaintiff’s company could not make use of the same and thus, as per the condition the material got reverted back to the Department and it was disposed of and that the advance royalty of Rs.16.60 lakhs paid by the plaintiff towards the unlifted quantity of 26,006.5 CMDS was adjusted. Further, the 2 nd defendant has intimated through its letter dated 27.06.1986 that the unlifted material will be forfeited and disposed of and the plaintiff will not be entitled for refund and through another letter dated 23.12.1987, the request of the plaintiff company to refund the amount was rejected. Thus, prayed to dismiss the suit. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues for trial: “1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the suit amount, as prayed for? 2) To what relief?” 7. At the time of trial, the plaintiff examined PW1 and got marked Exs.A1 to A5. On behalf of the defendants, DW1 was examined and Ex.B1 was marked. Based on the evidence on record, the trial Court has passed a preliminary decree directing the defendants to render true and correct accounts in respect of the sale proceeds realized by way of re-sale of the un-lifted hardwood 31,050 CMTs and pay the amount that was found due after deducting the expenses incurred for conducting the re-sale and the reasonable charges for care and custody of the unlifted material from 01.05.1986 to the date of re-sale, with interest @ 18% p.a. from the date of the re-sale till the date of decree and @ 6% thereafter till realization on principal amount, adjudged. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the present appeal is preferred by the Government. 8. Heard the submissions of Sri B.Rajeshwar Reddy, learned counsel for appellant No.1, Sri P.Govind Reddy, learned counsel for appellant No.2, Sri Bankatlal Mandhani, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Sri Chinna Basappa Desai, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 9. The learned appellants counsel has submitted that the trial Court ought not to have passed a preliminary decree and that passing of preliminary decree in money recovery suits is unknown to law. He further argued that the trial Court could not peruse Ex.A4 in a correct perspective and that the terms and conditions laid down in Ex.A4 itself is enough to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. He further argued that the trial Court has not noticed the failure on part of the plaintiff to lift the balance quantity of hardwood and that its failure would result in forfeiture of the royalty amount and also the balance quantity of wood would revert back to the Department. He further argued that the trial Court has not noticed the failure on part of the plaintiff to lift the balance quantity of hardwood and that its failure would result in forfeiture of the royalty amount and also the balance quantity of wood would revert back to the Department. He further argued that the terms and conditions in Ex.A4 are not opposed to public policy but they are framed keeping in view about the public policy and also to safeguard the interest of State and that the plaintiff has been following the same terms and conditions for the past few years, over which it was into the same transaction with the defendants. He further argued that the finding of the trial Court that the Government would get unjust enrichment by forfeiting the royalty amount is not proper because the said forfeiture of the advance amount paid by the plaintiff is a result of its failure to lift the hardwood and it is as per the conditions laid down in Ex.A4 but nothing else. Therefore, he prayed to set aside the judgment and decree by allowing this appeal. 10. The learned respondents counsel, on the other hand, has argued that the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court is very much within the purview of law under Order 20 Rule 16 of CPC and also that the trial Court has considered all the aspects and also evidence on record and thereby has decreed the suit and that the Government has forfeited the amount as well as the remaining quantity of hardwood which was sold in public auction and has incurred profits. Thus, the Government could enjoy the benefit in both ways, it has retained the material as well as retained the advance royalty paid by the plaintiff and further by selling the wood it had earned some money. Thus, it amounts to unjust enrichment at the cost of individuals and that a State cannot be permitted to get enriched in an unjust manner. He further argued that the conditions laid in Ex.A4 are not proper and are against public policy and therefore, prayed to dismiss the appeal. 11. Based on the above rival submissions, this Court frames the following points for consideration: 1) Whether the forfeiture of royalty amount is as per the conditions stipulated in the allotment letter? He further argued that the conditions laid in Ex.A4 are not proper and are against public policy and therefore, prayed to dismiss the appeal. 11. Based on the above rival submissions, this Court frames the following points for consideration: 1) Whether the forfeiture of royalty amount is as per the conditions stipulated in the allotment letter? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount from the defendants and whether the defendants are liable to pay the same? 3) Whether the judgment and decree is sustainable in law and under the facts? 4) To what relief? 12. POINT NOs.1 AND 2: a) The admitted facts in the present case are that the plaintiff is a Company which manufactures Rayon Grade Pulp and for the said manufacture it requires the hardwood as raw material and it has been taking the said raw material from the defendants which is the Forest Department. It is further admitted that the defendants allot the hardwood and the plaintiff would pick up the same for the above said purpose. b) The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants and the transaction in the present suit revolves around Ex.A4, which is the allotment letter issued by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. c) A perusal of Ex.A4 shows that the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest has issued proceedings dated 25.09.1985 to the plaintiff company that the requirement of fixed hardwood for the year 1985-86 will be supplied by sale by the Forest Department. It has also specified the quantities that are allotted from different coupes at Warangal, Khammam and Rajamundry and it has further stipulated the terms and conditions that “ the company shall take possession of the material within 10 days from the date of receipt of the intimation and lift the material allotted within 45 days of allotment of such material and the last installment should be lifted before the end of April, 1986 in any case. On failure to take possession or to remove the material within the time allowed the material will be reverted back to the Department and will count towards the supplies for the year 1985-86 and the material will be sold in public auction at the risk and loss of the company. Still the company has the obligation to pay the sale value of the material ”. Still the company has the obligation to pay the sale value of the material ”. d) It is observed that Ex.A4 is dated 25.09.1985 and a perusal of Ex.A3 reveals that the meeting of the Chief Minister was held on 17.12.1985 and in the said meeting evaluating the aspect of weight volume ratio by appointing a committee was taken. The agenda of the meeting itself reveals that there was a request from the plaintiff company to increase the allotment of hardwood and also to ensure that the supply made is actual in weight and not notional since the department is supplying wood in volumetric measurements. It is further revealed by Ex.A3 that on the basis of the experiments conducted by the Committee, if any adjustment becomes necessary in the formula adopted, the company should give a clear undertaking that it will have applicability in future and no claims will be made in respect of past supplies. It was further held that having regard to the decision to be taken in respect of plantation to be raised by Forest Development Corporation for industrial purposes in remote Reserved Forest area which are not earmarked for tree patta scheme for weaker sections, the company will have to accept funding of the cost of raising the plantations. The investment made by the company can be set off to the agreed extent against the royalty payable for the quantity earmarked for supply to the company. Sri Kosavan representing the plaintiff company was called in at the end of the meeting and was informed about the decisions taken and he assured to communicate the said decision to the company and shall also intimate the date by which the operations will commence, on or before 21.12.1985. e) A perusal of Ex.A2 is the G.O.Ms.No.517 dated 31.12.1985 issued in pursuance to the CM meeting, wherein the Government has committed to supply 10,000 tonnes of Eucalyptus wood and 75,000 tonnes of mixed hardwood per annum to the Rayon Grade Pulp Mill which is the plaintiff herein and that the company started receiving its supplies from the Forest Department from 13.03.1980. It is specified in the said G.O. that after carefully examining the representations of the plaintiff company, it is decided to increase the quantity of mixed hardwood assured to M/s.Andhra Pradesh Rayons Limited from 75,000 tonnes to 1,10,000 tonnes per annum from the lease year 1985-86. It is specified in the said G.O. that after carefully examining the representations of the plaintiff company, it is decided to increase the quantity of mixed hardwood assured to M/s.Andhra Pradesh Rayons Limited from 75,000 tonnes to 1,10,000 tonnes per annum from the lease year 1985-86. Thus, there was a request from the plaintiff company to increase the tonnage which was taken up in the CM meeting vide Ex.A3 and the said decision was also communicated to the plaintiff company. f) Ex.A1 is the G.O.Ms.No.992 dated 22.12.1977, by which the royalty was fixed for the supplies to be made and the same was communicated. The defendants are not disputing any of these matters but for Ex.A4 and the conditions stipulated therein. It is quite evident from the evidence on record that the plaintiff was very much well versed with the terms and conditions involved in getting a supply of hardwood from the Government, as it was into such a kind of activity with the Government from 1980 which is evident from Ex.A4. Therefore, now it cannot turn around and say that the condition is against public policy. g) To examine the validity of Ex.A4, the said terms and conditions were communicated to the plaintiff and having accepted the same the payments were made as advance royalty to the defendant vide demand drafts dated 08.02.1986 and 18.02.1986 which are after the issuance of Ex.A4. Thus, the plaintiff cannot deny the validity of terms and conditions laid down in Ex.A4. Thus, he has to abide by the same. Having agreed to the terms and conditions under Ex.A4 and having accepted to lift the hardwood by 30.04.1986, the plaintiff failed to do so and further contends that it was waiting for the appointment of the Special Committee to look into the volume by weight ratio for supplying the hardwood and that the defendant was harsh in proceeding with the matter without waiting for the committees opinion. However, it is to be observed that the decision with regard to the appointment of committee was taken subsequent to allotment under Ex.A4 so the plaintiff cannot take advantage of the said decision to cover its lapses. In Ex.A4/the allotment letter there is no such reference to the plea taken by the plaintiff with regard to the alleged difference in quantity if measured by volume/weight. Therefore, the said contention of the plaintiff is untenable. In Ex.A4/the allotment letter there is no such reference to the plea taken by the plaintiff with regard to the alleged difference in quantity if measured by volume/weight. Therefore, the said contention of the plaintiff is untenable. h) PW1 has admitted that as per clause-3 of Ex.A4, the plaintiff is under an obligation to pay the sale value of the material, if it fails to lift the material within 45 days of allotment and that they never raised any objection or protest to the above said clause and further that the material which is not lifted will be sold in the public auction at the risk and loss of the plaintiff’s company. He further admitted that the stipulation of the said condition is to enable the department from proceeding with the plantation work and that generally the plantation work commences in the month of June every year after burning the waste material. He also admitted that the Government has issued orders to supply the material on weighment basis subsequent to the transactions under Ex.A4. i) The plaintiff tried to extract the opinion of DW1 with regard to the volume by weight conflict in supplying the hardwood. DW1 has stated that on 17.12.1985 the plaintiff company raised objection for volume basis on the ground that they are incurring loss when the charges are being collected basing on volume basis and that the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.47 in the year 1987 and that the hardwood will be supplied on weighment basis but it is prospective in operation. It is further elicited through DW1 that the plaintiff never represented in writing that they wanted time to lift the stock on the ground that their request to supply the hardwood on weighment basis is pending with the Government prior to March, 1986 and that the plaintiff has sent such a representation in March, 1986. It is elicited from DW1 that 543.5 Cubic Mtrs. of hardwood was lifted by the plaintiff out of the allotted 31,050 Cubic Mtrs. It is further elicited that out of the un- lifted hardwood, some quantity was sold in the open auction and some quantity was allotted to other companies and that 804.05 C.Mts was washed away in Godavari floods. j) The learned respondents counsel has relied upon the case in K.Muthushami Gounder v. N.Palaniappa Gounder , [(1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 327] . j) The learned respondents counsel has relied upon the case in K.Muthushami Gounder v. N.Palaniappa Gounder , [(1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 327] . In the said case, one Ganesan executed a registered security bond for a sum of Rs.3,000/- hypothecating the suit property and also executed a promissory note in favour of one Vairavan Chettiar and borrowed monies. Vairavan Chettiar obtained a decree on the strength of the security bond and in execution thereon brought the suit property to sale. The respondent purchased the suit property in the said Court auction and the same was confirmed. The respondent took delivery of the property through Court. One Sandanam Mudaliar and company filed a suit O.S.No.108 of 1950 for recover of money against Ganesan. In that suit, the plaintiffs got attachment before judgment orders with regard to certain amounts due to Ganesan from South Indian Railway. Ganesan filed I.A.No.811 of 1950 seeking for raising the attachment and the same was ordered subject to his furnishing of security. Ganesan executed a registered deed in respect of the said property for Rs.7,000/- and in the said deed, recitals were made referring to the security bond dated 18.02.1950, executed in favour of Vairavan Chettiar, as a prior encumbrance. It was held by the trial court that Ex.A6 i.e. Security Deed is a charge of a peculiar nature and that there is an unquestioned liability and there must be some mode of enforcing it and that it is not a mere undertaking not to alienate but it creates a charge and liability which could be enforced as per law. The defendants counsel by relying upon the present decision has stressed that the plaintiff had a charge over the unlifted material existing in the defendant’s department and that out of the sale proceeds, the plaintiff had to be paid the balance amount of advance royalty lying with the defendant. k) The facts of the cited decision are entirely different from the present case. k) The facts of the cited decision are entirely different from the present case. In the cited decision said Ganesan executed a registered security bond by hypothecating the suit property and thus, he had a charge over the said security deed but in the present case, the plaintiff has agreed to the terms and conditions of the defendant company and it was the hardwood that was sanctioned by the defendant department to which the plaintiff has agreed to lift the same within a stipulated period and it was also mentioned that failure to lift it within the stipulated period would result in the material getting reverted back to the department, thus, there is no charge created on the unlifted material in the present case. Therefore, the said decision is not at all applicable to the present case. l) Thus, an overall perusal of the oral and documentary evidence placed on record reveals that the plaintiff agreed to the terms and conditions laid down in Ex.A4/the allotment letter and has agreed to the allotment of hardwood by the Forest Department and it was under an obligation to lift the same by April, 1986. The plaintiff has failed to do so and thus, the unlifted material would revert back to the Department at the risk and loss of the plaintiff’s company and also that in case if the department incurs any loss, the plaintiff is under an obligation to recoup the same. But nowhere in the evidence, it is elicited that the defendant is under an obligation to pay back the plaintiff, the value of the unlifted material or to refund the amount towards the unlifted material. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek for the payment of the said amounts. In the absence of any condition, the plaintiff has no right to request the defendant for refund of the remaining advance royalty that was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff is very well aware of the stipulated conditions, since it was being into the said transactions since 1980 and has thus, upon agreeing to the terms and conditions under Ex.A4 has entered into the present transaction in 1985 but has failed to lift the material within time and thus, as per the conditions, the advance amount shall be forfeited and the unlifted material i.e. hardwood material would revert back to the department. Therefore, it is held that forfeiture of royalty amount is as per the condition stipulated in the allotment letter and that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the suit amount from the defendants. Point Nos.1 and 2 are answered accordingly. 13. POINT NO.3: a) The appellants counsel has argued that the trial Court has made an error in passing a preliminary decree in a money recovery suit. b) In this context, the argument of the respondents counsel is that the Court was right in granting the preliminary decree as per Order XX rule 16 of CPC. For the sake of reference, the said provision is extracted hereunder: “ 16. Decree in suit for account between principal and agent.— In a suit for an account of pecuniary transactions between a principal and an agent, and in any other suit not hereinbefore provided for, where it is necessary, in order to ascertain the amount of money due to or from any party, that an account should be taken, the Court shall, before passing its final decree, pass a preliminary decree directing such accounts to be taken as it thinks fit.…” c) A plain reading of the provision makes it clear that it refers to the cases wherein there is a dispute between the principal and agent. The present case does not reflect any such relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants. The plaintiff is not an agent and the defendants are not principal. Further, in the present suit there is no amount due from any party and thus there is no necessity to ascertain any account. Therefore, Order XX rule 16 of CPC cannot be invoked in this case. Thus, the argument of the learned respondents counsel is untenable. d) The learned appellants counsel has relied upon the case in K.C.Skaria v. Govt. of State of Kerala and another , [(2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 285] , wherein the tenders for execution of construction work were called by Superintendent Engineer PWD, Central Circle, Kerala and a contractor by name K.C.Skaria entered into an agreement dated 07.06.1982 and agreed to carry on the work as per the terms and conditions laid therein. Certain lapses were found and there were delays in completing the contract and thereafter, a delayed payment was made after making certain deductions. Certain lapses were found and there were delays in completing the contract and thereafter, a delayed payment was made after making certain deductions. Then the said contractor has filed a suit which was decreed in part by the Sub- Judge, thereafter the matter went in appeal and the Kerala High Court has dismissed the suit in toto by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Sub-Judge, then the matter reached the Apex Court and the Apex Court has considered certain points including ‘whether the appellant as an independent contractor, engaged by the State Government for execution of construction work, is entitled to maintain a suit for rendition of accounts by the employee’. The Apex Court has analyzed the said issue and held that in the event of non-payment for the work done, the remedy available for the contractor is only to file a suit for the cost of the work done quantifying the amount due, but, cannot file a suit for rendition of accounts against the employer with a further prayer for a decree for the amount due. It has also discussed about Order 20 Rule 16 of CPC and has clarified that it does not create or confer any substantive right to seek rendition of accounts in any particular type of cases nor in all types of cases. It merely refers to a rule of procedure and would apply where there is an existing right to seek rendition of accounts having regard to the relationship between the parties. It has held that the right to seek rendition of accounts is recognized in law in administration suits for accounts of any property and for its administration suits by a partner of a firm for dissolution of the partnership firm and accounts, suits by beneficiary against trustee(s), suits by a member of a joint family against the karta for partition and accounts, suits by a co-sharer against other co-sharer(s) who has/have received the profits of a common property, suits by principal against an agent, and suits by a minor against a person who has received the funds of the minor. e) It has applied the said principle in this particular case and has held that the independent contractor is not an agent of the employer nor is the employer in the position of the trustee with reference to the independent contract and has finally held that contractor is not entitled to file a suit for rendition of account against the employer and thus, it was held that Order XX rule 16 has no application. f) In the light of the above cited decision, Order XX Rule 16 of CPC, has no relevance in the present case. g) In view of the reasoned findings arrived at point Nos.1 and 2, it is held that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any amount from the defendants and thereby, the judgment and decree of the trial Court is not sustainable either in law or under the facts and circumstances of the case. 14. POINT NO.4: In the result, the appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment and decree, dated 25.02.1999, passed in O.S.No.874 of 1988 by the learned V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. No costs. Miscellaneous Applications, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.