JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. 1. The petitioners have filed the present petitions for quashing of FIR No. 113/16 dated 23 rd December 2016, registered in Police Station Kandaghat, District Solan for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341 , 323, and 201 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code ( IPC ), Section 3 (1) (s) (r) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) (SC ST) Act and Section 7 (1) (b) of Protection of Civil Rights (PCR) Act, 1855 and the consequential proceedings pending before learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class (JMFC), Kandaghat. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petitions are that the informant made a complaint to the police, asserting that he was a Ward Member of the Gram Panchayat, Basha. He was returning to his home on 23 rd December 2016 at about 6:45 PM in his vehicle. When he reached near the house of accused Chatter Singh, he found that Chatter Singh was standing on the road. He stopped the informant’s vehicle and started abusing him. He asked the informant to come out of the vehicle. The informant asked Chattar Singh as to what the matter was. Accused Sheela Devi, wife of Chattar Singh, came to the spot armed with a stick. They started beating the informant with a stick. Joginder Kumar and his wife, Kalpana Devi, came to the spot after hearing the informant’s cries. Chattar Singh and his wife, Sheela Devi, said that the informant was a Koli worth two Cowries and how he dared to take the vehicle from the area of Chattar Singh. Lal Chand and Ishwar Dutt also came to the spot and rescued him and Joginder Singh from Chattar Singh and his wife, Sheela Devi. Chattar Singh and his wife went from the spot after abusing the informant. They told the informant that he had no right to use the passage in the area. He was worth two paisa, and why he had visited Ward No. 03. Chattar Singh and his son, Om Prakash, used to abuse the informant by calling him Koli. When the informant tried to leave the spot in his vehicle, Om Prakash and Sunil Kumar stopped his vehicle. He was worth two paisa, and why he had visited Ward No. 03. Chattar Singh and his son, Om Prakash, used to abuse the informant by calling him Koli. When the informant tried to leave the spot in his vehicle, Om Prakash and Sunil Kumar stopped his vehicle. They put two bags of sand on the road and prevented the informant from proceeding further. They abused the informant in the name of his caste. Accused Chattar Singh does not allow the informant to use the passage near his house because he belongs to a Scheduled Caste. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The police filed the chargesheet before the learned JMFC, Kandaghat, after the completion of the investigation. 3. Aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and initiation of the proceedings before learned JMFC Kandaghat, the petitioners/accused have filed two separate petitions for quashing the FIR. It has been asserted that the informant lodged a false and fabricated complaint by distorting the facts. A reading of the FIR does not disclose the commission of any offence. The petitioners did not abuse the informant, nor did they abuse him by his caste name. The FIR was lodged to harass the petitioners and to force them to allow the Gram Panchayat, Basha, to construct a Link Road through their land. The petitioners had objected to the construction of the Link Road, and the Panchayat had also passed a Resolution rejecting the objections of the petitioners. The petitioners have also filed a Civil Suit, which was decreed by learned Civil Judge Kandaghat, Solan on 16.11.2016. The petitioners had earlier filed a petitions under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR, which was withdrawn by them. The grounds taken in the present petition are different and independent of the contentions raised in the earlier petition. Learned JMFC had wrongly committed the case to the learned Special Judge, Solan. The allegations made in the FIR are false. The informant and witnesses are inimical towards the petitioners and their family members. They have several litigations amongst themselves. The statements of the witnesses are completely silent regarding the uttering of the words in public view. The presence of the petitioners on the spot was not established by the informant at the time of the incident. The informant and witnesses are inimical towards the petitioners and their family members. They have several litigations amongst themselves. The statements of the witnesses are completely silent regarding the uttering of the words in public view. The presence of the petitioners on the spot was not established by the informant at the time of the incident. The evidence collected by the police does not support the allegations of the informant regarding the obstruction caused to his vehicle. The police did not investigate the matter fairly. The judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge regarding the petitioner’s land were deliberately not collected by the police; hence, the petition. 4. I have heard Mr. Rakesh Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners. He submitted that the allegations made in the FIR do not constitute the commission of a cognizable offence, and learned Trial Court erred in summoning the petitioners. There is litigation between the parties, and this fact was not considered by the police. The petitioners have obtained a decree in their favour. A false FIR was lodged to compel the petitioners to permit the Gram Panchayat to construct the road. A second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings be quashed. He relied upon Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand, Cr. Appeal No. 707 of 2020 decided on 05.11.2020 , Naushad Ahmad Ansari vs. State of Uttarakhand, SLP (Crl) No. 9111 of 2022 decided on 12.12.2024 and Muskan Enterprises vs. State of Punjab, 2024 INSC 1046 in support of his submission. 5. I have given considerable thought to the submission made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufÏciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police ofÏcers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efÏcacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 7. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 , wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. 8. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 9. The FIR clearly mentions that the petitioners- Chattar Singh and his wife Sheela Devi had stopped the informant’s vehicle, beaten him and abused him in the name of his caste in the presence of Joginder Kumar and Kalpana Devi. It mentions that the petitioners, Om Prakash and Sunil Kumar, had put two bags of sand in front of the informant’s vehicle and abused him. These allegations clearly show that the petitioners had wrongly restrained the informant, gave him beatings and abused him in the name of his caste. These allegations disclose the commission of cognisable offences. 10. It was submitted that the incident had not taken place at a public place within public view. This submission is not acceptable. These allegations clearly show that the petitioners had wrongly restrained the informant, gave him beatings and abused him in the name of his caste. These allegations disclose the commission of cognisable offences. 10. It was submitted that the incident had not taken place at a public place within public view. This submission is not acceptable. The FIR clearly mentioned that the petitioners had abused the informant on the road, which is a public place, in the presence of Joginder Singh and his wife, Kalpana, within the public view. Therefore, the submission that the incident had not taken place in a public place in public view is not acceptable. The judgment cited on behalf of the petitioners in Hitesh Verma (supra) does not apply to the present case because the incident in the cited case had not taken place at a public place within public view. 11. It was submitted that false averments were made in the FIR. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held : - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) Department of Home, (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060: “ 14. 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) Department of Home, (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060: “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23. In Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23, this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 . The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 . The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufÏcient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 13. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 14. It was submitted that F.I.R. is actuated by mala fide because the petitioners had filed a Civil Suit against the Gram Panchayat, Basha. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh, 2023 (6) SCC 559 that when an investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed, the question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was observed: “78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, they would pale into insignificance if sufÏcient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint. 79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. 79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of contradiction that it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a prosecution should have been but has not been launched) the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot- free, despite there being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is difÏcult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete. Needless to observe, the first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct” punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an investigation.” 15. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 2884 . It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 2884 . It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 , “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” xxx 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 16. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground of enmity. 17. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 16. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground of enmity. 17. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating ofÏcer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 18. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences, and it cannot be quashed at this stage. 19. It is undisputed that the petitioners had filed a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. previously, which was withdrawn. It was asserted in the present petitions that the pleas taken in the present petitions were not taken in the earlier petition. It was nowhere mentioned that any subsequent event had taken place after the withdrawal of the previous petition. It was held in R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna Sastry, (2002) 10 SCC 401 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1135 : 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that where no development had taken place after the rejection of the earlier petition, the second petition is not maintainable. It was observed: “6. There can be no two opinions that the order dated 28-1-1995 has become final. It was observed: “6. There can be no two opinions that the order dated 28-1-1995 has become final. Learned counsel for the respondents made an endeavour to show that it is open to the same parties to move the High Court once again on causes which developed subsequent to 28-1-1995. We are not considering that contention in the present case, for the second petition for quashing was not made on the strength of anything which developed subsequent to 28- 1-1995 but only on the facts which subsisted before that date. If that be so, the High Court had no power to upset the order dated 28-1-1995 with the help of any subsequent order, though in this case, the High Court did so without being informed of the prior order.” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399 that a person approaching the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should take all the pleas, and it is impermissible to file the petitions in piecemeal. It was observed: “10. In S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunan 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 94 , the Madras High Court observed that a person who invokes Section 482 Cr. P.C. should honestly come before the Court raising all the pleas available to him at that point of time, and he is not supposed to approach the Court with instalment pleas. It was further observed that there may be a change of circumstances during the course of criminal proceedings which would give scope for the person aggrieved to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, but when he is posted with all the facts and circumstances of a case, he cannot withhold part of it for the purpose of filing yet another petition seeking the same relief. 11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C., ignoring this principle, would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause thereof arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted. 21. A similar view was taken in Naushad Ahmad Ansari (supra) wherein it was observed: “8. It is a matter of record that a previous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. stood dismissed, and an appeal against such dismissal to this Court was also dismissed. The law on this point is well-settled. The dismissal of a previous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not bar a subsequent petition, under the said Section, from being entertained, if the facts so justify. (See Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 559 and Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706 ) The record is silent as to which facts persuaded the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction for a second time when one such petition already stood dismissed and such order, confirmed by this Court. It has been treated like an application coming up at the first instance. Such an approach is not justified.” 22. Similar is the judgment in Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4107, wherein it was observed: “18. Recently, this Court in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399 has again held that there is no blanket rule against the filing of successive petitions under section 482, Cr. P.C. before the high court. It was also held that if such a petition is filed, it must be seen whether there was any change in facts or circumstances necessitating the filing of such a petition.” 23. In the present case, there is no change in the circumstances, and the present petitions are not maintainable. 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the present petitions fail and the same are dismissed. 26. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petitions and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.