JUDGMENT AND ORDER : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. Heard Ms. Lhousino, the learned legal aid counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. V. Zhimomi, the learned Public Prosecutor, Nagaland. 2. The present revision application is directed against the judgment dated 28.08.2017 passed by the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Dimapur, Nagaland (for short, ‘the learned Trial Court’) in GR Case No.1003/16 by which the petitioner was sentenced to undergo 7 years rigorous imprisonment for offence made out under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and to undergo 4 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 452 of the IPC. It was also directed that both the sentences shall run consecutively. 3. The facts of the instant case as it appears from the materials on record is that on 28.10.2016 at about 2:30 AM, the petitioner herein allegedly entered the house of his previous landlord in order to demand money as he was broke and unable to pay the rent. It was also alleged that the petitioner was serving in the house of the complainant from his age of 10 years as a helper and left their house after he got married. It was also alleged that the petitioner went to the house at 2.30 AM on 28.10.2016 equipped with a Naga dao, knife, wrench and a rope. It was also alleged that the petitioner entered the house of the complainant through the roof and while going through the passage, one maid servant by the name of Rama (Kachari) saw the petitioner and screamed so he hit her on the head with a dao and again he attacked one Mary Konyak, a maid servant of 13 years of age. Thereupon, the petitioner saw the owner of the house Mrs. Atula Jamir and was scared that she would recognize him though his face was covered so he ran away under the cover of darkness. It was also alleged that the petitioner did not stay in Nagaland and he took shelter at Duapathar village under Golaghat, Assam. 4. Subsequent to the incident, an FIR was lodged before the East Police Station, Dimapur which was registered and numbered as Dimapur East P.S. Case No.321/2016 under Sections 450/452/352/307/326 of the IPC. The petitioner was arrested with the help of Borpathar Police and brought to Nagaland. 4. Subsequent to the incident, an FIR was lodged before the East Police Station, Dimapur which was registered and numbered as Dimapur East P.S. Case No.321/2016 under Sections 450/452/352/307/326 of the IPC. The petitioner was arrested with the help of Borpathar Police and brought to Nagaland. During the interrogation, the petitioner confessed to the crime before the Judicial Magistrate on 15.11.2016 and a Charge Sheet dated 15.11.2016 bearing Charge Sheet No.236/2016 under Sections 450/452/352/307/326 of the IPC against the petitioner was submitted. 5. This Court at this stage finds it very pertinent to mention that on 15.11.2016, the Confessional Statement of the petitioner was recorded. It is however interesting to note that at Page 2 of the records, there is an order dated 10.11.2016 which shows that the petitioner upon being arrested was remanded for 72 hours police custody for investigation. At Page 3 of the records, it is seen that there is an order dated 15.11.2016 wherein the petitioner was remanded to judicial custody and 30.11.2016 was fixed for appearance. However, at Page 4 of the records, there is an order dated 12.11.2016 which shows that the petitioner was produced from police custody with a prayer for judicial custody for 15 days which was allowed and the Court fixed the matter on 25.11.2016. On that very day, i.e. on 12.11.2016, an application was filed by the Investigating Officer praying for recording of the Confessional Statement of the petitioner under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Code’). It is also mentioned in the order dated 12.11.2016 that the petitioner was explained of the legal consequences that would ensue. At Page 5 of the records, there is another order dated 15.11.2016 of the Court which stipulates that the Confessional Statement of the petitioner was recorded after the petitioner expressed his willingness. There is no mention of appearance of any counsel on behalf of the petitioner in the said order. The order dated 15.11.2016 also mentions that the petitioner was remanded to judicial custody thereby fixing 30.11.2016 for appearance. 6. This Court had perused the Confessional Statement of the petitioner which is at Page 43 and 44 of the records. The Confessional Statement was recorded in English in four Pages and surprisingly there is no signature of the petitioner in all the pages of the Confessional Statement. 6. This Court had perused the Confessional Statement of the petitioner which is at Page 43 and 44 of the records. The Confessional Statement was recorded in English in four Pages and surprisingly there is no signature of the petitioner in all the pages of the Confessional Statement. It is also relevant to mention that in the only page, where there appears to be a signature of the petitioner, it does not contain any statement confessing to the crime. It is also pertinent to mention that the Confessional Statement so recorded dated 15.11.2016 do not contain any Memorandum at the foot of such Confessional Statement as envisaged under Section 164 (4) of the Code. It is apposite to mention that neither in the order dated 15.11.2016 at Page 4 of the records there is any mention that the Confessional Statement was recorded in the presence of an advocate of the petitioner nor any reasons assigned why there was no compliance to the first proviso to Section 164 (1) of the Code. It is also seen that the order dated 15.11.2016 do not also mention that the Judicial Magistrate had explained in terms with Section 164 (2) of the Code on the date on which the confession was recorded. 7. Be that as it may, the Charge Sheet as stated above was prepared on the very date on which the Confessional Statement was recorded and submitted on 24.01.2017. The records further reveal that there are two orders dated 24.01.2017 at Page 8 and Page 9 of the records. Both the orders are in different handwriting and the signatures appearing of the Magistrate also are different. It is also pertinent to observe that in the order dated 24.01.2017 at Page 8, there appears a signature of the petitioner however in the order dated 24.01.2017 at Page 9, there is no signature of the petitioner. Further to that, in the order dated 24.01.2017 at Page 8, the petitioner had expressed his willingness to take Advocate for his defence and the Court permitted the said prayer and fixed 24.02.2017 for steps. On the other hand, in the order dated 24.01.2017 at Page 9, it is seen that the Charge Sheet was submitted and the Court upon perusal of the Charge Sheet committed the case to the learned Sessions Court, i.e. the learned Trial Court. On the other hand, in the order dated 24.01.2017 at Page 9, it is seen that the Charge Sheet was submitted and the Court upon perusal of the Charge Sheet committed the case to the learned Sessions Court, i.e. the learned Trial Court. The requirement of supplying of the copy to the accused as mandated by Section 207 of the Code was given a complete go by. On this aspect alone, the trial stands vitiated. 8. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of that on 24.02.2017, the learned Trial Court took up the case upon being committed and took cognizance against the petitioner under Sections 352/307/326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and fixed 14.03.2017 for consideration of charge as would appear from Page 10 of the records. In the said order dated 24.02.2017, the petitioner was advised to engage lawyer for his defence. 9. On 14.03.2017, the petitioner was granted bail by the learned Trial Court for a period of 15 days, however, the conditions imposed were local surety of Rs.30,000/- of the like amount of the bailor who is a government servant serving under the jurisdiction of the Court. The conditions of bail so imposed were so onerous that the petitioner could not take the benefit of the bail. 10. The petitioner was produced on 29.03.2017 from jail and on that day, the charge was framed against the petitioner under Sections 450/452/307/352/326 of the IPC and the petitioner pleaded guilty and prayed for mercy as is apparent from a perusal of the order dated 29.03.2017 at Page 14 of the records. It is also very pertinent herein to mention that the learned Sessions Court on the day when the petitioner pleaded guilty did not convict the petitioner which was permissible under Section 229 of the Code but rather fixed for complainant evidence. It is further seen that on 19.04.2017, the learned Trial Judge fixed the matter on 18.05.2017 thereby directing that steps were required to be taken for complainant evidence. However, on 18.05.2017, the learned Trial Court changed its decision to seek further evidence and decided to complete the trial on the basis of the plea of guilt made by the petitioner. 11. However, on 18.05.2017, the learned Trial Court changed its decision to seek further evidence and decided to complete the trial on the basis of the plea of guilt made by the petitioner. 11. The learned Court of the District & Sessions Judge, Dimapur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Trial Court’) thereupon convicted the petitioner under Section 326 of the IPC for a period of 7 years rigorous imprisonment and under Section 452 of the IPC for 4 years and both the sentences were directed to run consecutively without assigning any reasons. It is under such circumstances that the present revision application was filed in the year 2021 with the help of the legal aid counsel. 12. This Court had heard Ms. Lhousino, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Mr. V. Zhimomi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents and perused the materials on record. From a perusal of the records as well as the manner in which the proceedings were conducted as detailed herein above, it shocks the conscious of this Court. It would be seen from a perusal of the impugned judgment dated 28.08.2017 that the learned Trial Court based its judgment of conviction on two aspects. First is the Confessional Statement recorded on 15.11.2016 of the petitioner and the second is the plea of guilty of the petitioner. In the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, this Court had dealt with in detail as to how the Confessional Statement was recorded. In the opinion of this Court, the said Confessional Statement had no value in the eyes of law on the ground that the recording of the Confessional Statement was in violation of Section 164 of the Code. Further to that, the Confessional Statement was of four Pages and there was no signature of the petitioner in the Pages where it was recorded that the petitioner confessed to the crime. 13. Now let this Court take up the second aspect which is the plea of guilty of the petitioner. The plea of guilty at the outset cannot withstand the scrutiny of law as there was no compliance to Section 207 of the Code. This Court further finds it relevant at this stage to take note of how a plea of guilty is to be appreciated in terms with Section 229 of the Code. The plea of guilty at the outset cannot withstand the scrutiny of law as there was no compliance to Section 207 of the Code. This Court further finds it relevant at this stage to take note of how a plea of guilty is to be appreciated in terms with Section 229 of the Code. The law in this regards is settled in the case of Limatoshi vs. State of Nagaland, reported in (2022) 2 GLT 707 wherein the learned Division Bench of this Court dealt with the said aspect as to what procedure is required to be followed when a plea of guilty is entered into. Paragraph Nos.15 to 19 of the said judgment being relevant are reproduced herein under:- “15. The law is by now well settled that when a conviction of an accused is based entirely on his plea of guilt, the court must take care to ensure that the plea of the accused is voluntarily, clear, unambiguous. The accused needs to be clarified and the accused must understand the nature of the allegation made against him and the accused must admit all such facts which are necessary and essential to constitute the offence. The law is also well settled that while convicting a person taking recourse to the provision of Section 229 of the Cr.P.C., the court must have before it all such facts which are essential to constitute the offence and such facts must be admitted by the accused before plea of guilty on the accused is acted upon. The law is also equally settled that Section 229 gives discretion to the court to proceed with the trial even if the accused pleads guilty and such discretion need to be exercised judiciously with proper application of mind. 16. The determination of this Court made in Remeng Mawia (supra) at paragraphs 5,6,7 being relevant for determination of the issue in hand are quoted herein below: "5. While considering the present reference, what strikes us is that the entire conviction of the accused under Section 302 IPC rests on the accused person's plea of guilt. 16. The determination of this Court made in Remeng Mawia (supra) at paragraphs 5,6,7 being relevant for determination of the issue in hand are quoted herein below: "5. While considering the present reference, what strikes us is that the entire conviction of the accused under Section 302 IPC rests on the accused person's plea of guilt. The questions, therefore, which stare at us, most prominently, are: (i) whether it is legally permissible to convict a person of a serious charge, such as, murder on his own plea of guilt and if so, what cautions are required to be applied, for this purpose, by the Court and (ii) whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the plea of guilt, acted upon by the learned Court below, is legally sustainable? 6. While considering the questions posed above, it may be noted that a Sessions Court's power to convict an accused on his plea of guilt is embodied in Section 229 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This section corresponds to Section 271(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Though there is slight variation in the language of Section 229 of the present Code, it substantially remains the same as in Section 271(2) of the old Code. According to Section 229, if the accused pleads guilty, the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict thereon. 7. A careful analysis of the provisions of Section 229 Cr.PC makes it clear that though there is no legal impediment, on the part of the Court of Sessions, to convict a person on his own plea of guilt, discretion does vest in the Court to convict or not to convict an accused based entirely on his plea of guilt. Since no discretion can be exercised by a Court arbitrarily, the exercise of the discretion to convict or not to convict an accused on his plea of guilt can also not be arbitrary and is, in fact, Governed by sound judicial principles and precedents." 17. The other judgment which renders assistance in determining the present case is the decision in Hussain Ali (supra). The relevant paragraphs are quoted herein below: "4. Referring to the statement of the accused appellant, recorded under Section 229 Cr.P.C. wherein the accused stated that he dealt with blow with 'dao' on the neck of his wife because she always used to quarrel with him. The relevant paragraphs are quoted herein below: "4. Referring to the statement of the accused appellant, recorded under Section 229 Cr.P.C. wherein the accused stated that he dealt with blow with 'dao' on the neck of his wife because she always used to quarrel with him. Taking up a clue from this statement Mr. Islam argued that the possibility of sudden quarrel resulting in sudden unfortunate incident cannot be ruled out. 5 ..We are of the view that the discretion exercised by the trial Judge cannot be said to be an appropriate exercise of discretion. As is well known, as a matter of practice Judges prefer not to act on plea of guilt in murder cases lest the evidence may disclose that the facts proved do not in law constitute offence charged, but some lesser offence ..". 18. Coming to the present case, it is apparent from the record that on the date when the accused pleaded guilty he was under judicial custody and he was having no defense counsel to advice him regarding the implication of pleading guilty inasmuch as the record itself reveals that the appellant is an illiterate daily wage earner and belongs to poor strata of the society. In such a situation, it will not be proper to assume that a person like the appellant will be well informed regarding the ingradiance of the offence charged and the punishment thereof. 19. The record and the order impugned also reveals that at no point of time the learned Sessions Judge has intimated/ informed/ warned the accused regarding the implication of his pleading guilty of the offence charged. According to this court, while exercising discretionary power under Section 229 of the Cr.P.C., a duty is cast upon the court to warn the accused person and to explain the implication of pleading guilty, more particularly in a case like the present one, who is illiterate, who is without any defense counsel and in the judicial custody. The word "Explain" used in Section 228 certainly shall include explaining the implication of the plea of guilty. In the case in hand no such explanation is discernible from the record. The word "Explain" used in Section 228 certainly shall include explaining the implication of the plea of guilty. In the case in hand no such explanation is discernible from the record. As the said course of action has not been taken by the learned Sessions Judge while passing the impugned order in exercise of his discretionary power under Section 229 Cr.P.C., in the considered opinion of this court, the same is liable to be interfered.” (emphasis supplied on the underlined portion) 14. From the above quoted paragraphs, it would therefore be seen that when a conviction of an accused is based entirely on his plea of guilt, the Court must take due care to ensure that the plea of the guilt is voluntary, clear and unambiguous. It is also required that the accused be put to notice in the language in which he understands the nature of the allegations made against him. It is also necessary that the accused must admit all such facts which are necessary and essential to constitute the offence. This Court also finds it relevant to observe that the Court while recoding a plea of guilty has to explain to the accused the consequences of accepting the plea of guilty and this aspect has to be recorded by the Court in the records of the case. 15. In the instant case, the records would show that the learned Trial Court in the Proforma of the charges to be framed had inserted the charges in English and framed charges. It is also seen in the said document which is at Serial Nos.88 & 89 of the records that the petitioner had pleaded guilty and claimed to be tried and prayed for mercy. In the order dated 29.03.2017 or even in the charge framing document there is no mention that the consequences of pleading guilty was explained to the petitioner. This Court further finds it apposite to take note of that the petitioner was not a literate person and belonged to the low strata of the society and in the opinion of this Court, it was incomprehensible as to how the petitioner would have been able to understand the contents of the charges so framed as would appear from the charge framing document itself. 16. 16. This Court also takes note of the manner in which the charge was framed in so far as Section 326 of the IPC is concerned. It appears from the said document that something was written therein which was erased by whitener and thereupon something had been written. There is nothing in the records or even the charge framing document explaining why there appears to be something erased by whitener and thereupon written. 17. The manner in which the charges were framed do not appear to be proper without clearly stipulating as why the offences have been charged against the petitioner. Just for example as regards the charge of Section 450 of the IPC, it has been mentioned that ‘you committed House trespass’ but there is nothing mentioned why the petitioner was alleged to have committed house trespass. It therefore appears that the charges were framed not in the manner envisaged under Section 228 (2) of the Code. 18. This Court further finds it pertinent to observe that not only the charges were not framed properly but it was also not explained as required by the settled principles of law and this aspect can be very well discerned from the document of framing charges itself. Further to that, without compliance with Section 207 of the Code, it is difficult to conceive as to how the petitioner would have at all understood the consequences of the charge. Therefore, the plea of guilty by the petitioner in the present facts and circumstances could not have been the basis for conviction of the petitioner. 19. This Court further finds it pertinent to observe a very vital aspect of the matter as would be apparent from a perusal of the orders dated 29.03.2017 and 19.04.2017 which would show that the learned Trial Court did not exercise its discretion to convict the petitioner under Section 229 of the Code on 29.03.2017 but rather fixed for complainant evidence. However, subsequently the learned Trial Court relied upon the plea of guilty made by the petitioner in passing the impugned judgment. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Nani Richo vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Others , reported in (2020) 3 GLR 589 and more particularly to paragraph No.5 which is quoted herein below:- “5. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Nani Richo vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Others , reported in (2020) 3 GLR 589 and more particularly to paragraph No.5 which is quoted herein below:- “5. On examination of the impugned order, it appears to this court that the basis of the decision to convict and sentence the appellant is his plea of guilt. However, the stage of pleading guilty or otherwise was over while on 19.11.2008, the learned Deputy Commissioner, (Sessions Judge) Ziro framed the formal charge in compliance with the provisions of section 228 of the Cr.PC. Then also the appellant pleaded guilty, but, the then learned Sessions Judge (Deputy Commissioner, Ziro) did not apply his discretion to convict the appellant instantly and decided to proceed with the trial of the case. As indicated above, 9 witnesses have already been examined which fact has come out from the impugned judgment itself. Once the stage of exercising power under the provisions of sections 228 and 229 of the Cr.PC is over, the learned Sessions Judge is to proceed with the trial. But, the learned Sessions Judge once again asked the appellant as to whether he would plead guilty. This time also the appellant pleaded guilty in spite of the legal position that except under section 228 of the Cr.PC, the learned Sessions Judge could not have asked the question as to whether the appellant would plead guilty. Otherwise, this will amount to going back to the stage of section 228 of the Cr.PC. The learned Sessions Judge (Deputy Commissioner) Ziro was a competent court to frame charge and apply his discretion as provided in section 229 of the Cr.P.C. On the other hand, even if there was no order by the learned Sessions Judge (Deputy Commissioner) Ziro, deciding to proceed with the trial in spite of the plea of guilt of the appellant, yet, the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia could not have convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner it has been done. Because, a Division Bench of this hon’ble High Court in the case of State of Mizoram v. Ramengmawia, 2006 (1) GLT 762, after discussion of several authorities, held has follows — “From a careful reading of what has been observed and held in Sukhdeo Singh (supra), it is abundantly dear that in law, there is no absolute bar, on the part of the Court of Sessions, to convict an accused on his plea of guilty; but before the conviction of the accused is based entirely on his plea of guilt, the Court must take care to ensure that the plea of accused is voluntary, clear, unambiguous and unqualified, that the accused understands the nature of the allegations made against him and admits them and that the accused admits all such facts, which are necessary and essential to constitute the offence.” The above paragraph quoted would show that once the stage of Sections 228 and 229 of the Code is over, the guilty plea cannot be the sole criterion to convict the accused. 20. This Court finds it relevant to take note of another aspect of the matter in the impugned judgment which relates to sentencing. The learned Trial Court sentenced the petitioner to 7 years RI under Section 326 of the IPC and 4 years under Section 452 of the IPC and directed that the sentences were to run consecutively. There is no reason assigned why the sentences were to run consecutively and not concurrently. This Court further finds it relevant to observe that the learned Trial court even did not care to take note of Section 235 (2) and Section 360 of the Code while sentencing the petitioner. 21. Taking into account the manner in which the impugned judgment dated 28.08.2017 was passed by the learned Trial Court and the reasons so assigned herein above, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law. This Court therefore sets aside the said impugned judgment dated 28.08.2017 passed by the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Dimapur, Nagaland in GR Case No.1003/16. The accused is acquitted from the charges under Sections 326 and 452 of the IPC. 22. Accordingly, this Court directs that the petitioner be forthwith released from the jail. The Registry is directed to take necessary steps for informing the learned Trial Court as well as the other authorities for doing the needful forthwith. 23. The accused is acquitted from the charges under Sections 326 and 452 of the IPC. 22. Accordingly, this Court directs that the petitioner be forthwith released from the jail. The Registry is directed to take necessary steps for informing the learned Trial Court as well as the other authorities for doing the needful forthwith. 23. This Court expresses gratitude to Ms. Lhousino, the learned legal aid counsel for whose zealous endeavour had led to the setting aside of the impugned judgment, though late in the day. This Court expresses regret and remorse that the petitioner due to unavailability of material resources did not receive proper legal assistance for which he remained incarcerated since 10.11.2016. This Court expects more counsels like Ms. Lhousino, shall take interest in protecting the rights of the underprivileged and deprived. 24. Return the LCR(s).