JUDGMENT : RAVI V. HOSMANI, J. Challenging judgment and decree dated 14.07.2009, passed by Prl. District & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru, in R.A.no.254/2005, this appeal is filed. 2. Brief facts as stated are, appellant was plaintiff in OS no.147/1998 filed seeking permanent injunction restraining defendants, their agents etc. from interfering with property bearing site no.234 (VP Khata no.369) measuring East-West - 40 ft. and North-South - 30 ft. situated at Kumbalahalli village, Kasaba Hobli, Hoskote Taluk (" suit property" for short). 3. In plaint, it was stated plaintiff was absolute owner of suit property, based on grant and issue of hakkupatra. Since then plaintiff was in peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit property and paying property tax regularly. It was stated that plaintiff had stored building material for construction of house. But, on 25.05.1998, without any manner of right, title or interest over suit property, defendants attempted to interfere with possession. And when plaintiff resisted, they threatened to come again and dispossess plaintiff. Though, plaintiff filed complaint with jurisdictional police, he was directed to approach Civil Court, hence, suit was filed. 4. On appearance, defendant filed written statement denying plaint averments. It was stated plaintiff was educated and gainfully employed in a private firm and permanently resident of Neelasandra in Bengaluru City. It was stated plaintiff got married to daughter of Anjanappa resident of Kumbalahalli. It was stated, plaintiff's father-in-law was Chairman of Kumbalahalli Grama Panchayat and Group Panchayat. Taking undue advantage of same, plaintiff manipulated panchayat records and based on same claiming right over suit property. It was stated plaintiff was not granted any land/site and plaintiff was not in possession. It was stated defendant hailed from poor agricultural labour family and was permanent resident of Kumbalahalli village. It was stated under Government scheme house sites were formed in Sy.no.112 of Kumbalahalli village. On 11.06.1989, defendant was allotted site no.234 measuring East-West - 40 ft., North- South - 30 ft., bounded on East by Gramathana, West by site no.179, North by site no.233 and South by road. Hakkupatra was also issued and since then, defendant was in possession and enjoyment of said site. His name was also shown as khatedar in Forms no.9 and 10 and paying property tax regularly. As absolute owner, defendant had stacked firewood in suit property and contending plaintiff was never in possession, prayed for dismissal of suit. 5. Hakkupatra was also issued and since then, defendant was in possession and enjoyment of said site. His name was also shown as khatedar in Forms no.9 and 10 and paying property tax regularly. As absolute owner, defendant had stacked firewood in suit property and contending plaintiff was never in possession, prayed for dismissal of suit. 5. Based on pleadings, trial Court framed following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff proved that he is in lawful possession of the plaint schedule property as on the date of the suit? 2. Whether the plaintiff further proved that the alleged interference of the defendant as stated in the plaint? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitle for the relief as sought for? 4. What decree or order? 6. In trial, plaintiff examined himself and an independent witness as PWs.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.P1 to Ex.P18. In rebuttal, PoA of defendant and another were examined as DWs.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.D1 to Ex.D26. 7. Thereafter, trial Court answered issues nos.1 to 3 in affirmative and issue no.4 by decreeing suit restraining defendants, etc. from interfering with possession/enjoyment of suit property. 8. Aggrieved, defendant filed RA no.254/2005 on several grounds. Based on same, following points were framed: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves lawful possession over the suit schedule property? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves interference in the enjoyment of the property? 3. What order? 9. On consideration, first appellate Court answered point no.1 was held in negative, point no.2 as not arising and point no.3 by allowing appeal and dismissing suit. Aggrieved thereby, plaintiff is in appeal. 10. Sri GB Nandish Gowda, learned counsel appearing for RB Sadashivappa, advocate for plaintiff submitted plaintiff's appeal was against divergent findings in a suit for bare injunction. It was submitted, plaintiff got suit property under Ex.P.1 - hakkupatra, thus, plaintiff was in possession. On other hand, without any manner of right, defendant claimed to be grantee of suit property on 11.06.1989, but, when plaintiff verified said claim, it was found out, such date fell on Sunday, casting serious doubt about genuineness of grant. 11. Further, apart from Ex.P.1, plaintiff relied on Demand Register Extract, Tax Assessment Extract, Tax Paid Receipts, Licences and Confirmation Certificate as Exs.P2 to P.16. It was submitted, to establish possession, plaintiff examined a resident of village as PW.2, who supported plaintiff's case. On other hand, defendant did not lead evidence. 11. Further, apart from Ex.P.1, plaintiff relied on Demand Register Extract, Tax Assessment Extract, Tax Paid Receipts, Licences and Confirmation Certificate as Exs.P2 to P.16. It was submitted, to establish possession, plaintiff examined a resident of village as PW.2, who supported plaintiff's case. On other hand, defendant did not lead evidence. Therefore, plaintiff's possession was proved. It was submitted, defendant claimed boundaries of suit property was same as plaintiff's property. It was submitted, defendant was granted site no.335, whereas plaintiff's was laying claim over suit property. It was submitted, plaintiff proved boundaries of his property would tally with serial number of adjacent property. But, same would not tally with boundaries of defendant's site. It was submitted, defendant did not examine witness or produce document to establish his title and possession over site no.335. 12. It was submitted, on detailed appreciation of above material, and taking note of defendant's contention based on Ex.D2 and rejecting it, trial Court rightly decreed suit holding plaintiff proved title and possession over suit property. It noted, defendant had not entered witness box and examined his PoA as DW.1 without explanation. It noted measurement of defendant's site would not tally with suit property. 13. But in appeal, without proper re-appreciation, first appellate Court erroneously overturned findings of trial Court and dismissed suit. It was submitted in suit for bare injunction, Courts were prohibited from deciding title by relying upon Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ramji Rai v. Jagdish Mallah, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 200 , holding: "11. In ALVR Ct.Veerappa Chettiar v. Arunachalam Chetti [AIR 1936 Mad 200], it has been held that mere fact that the question of title may have to be gone into in deciding whether an injunction can be given or not is not any justification for holding that the suit is for a declaration of title and for injunction. There can be a suit only for an injunction. The present suit is only for permanent injunction and, therefore, the lower appellate court should have, on the facts and circumstances of this case, confined itself to its dismissal only on the ground that the appellants have failed to show that they were in possession. This has been done but the declaration that the appellants are not the owners, was not necessary." 14. While passing impugned judgment, first appellate Court erroneously examined title, which was beyond its scope. This has been done but the declaration that the appellants are not the owners, was not necessary." 14. While passing impugned judgment, first appellate Court erroneously examined title, which was beyond its scope. It was contended entire judgment of first appellate Court was on appreciation of defendant's evidence only. Therefore, impugned judgment would call for interference. 15. It was submitted, during pendency of this appeal, plaintiff had filed application under RTI Act, 2005 and obtained documents of his grant, including certificate issued by Panchayat confirming said grant. Plaintiff also obtained list of allottees, which revealed there was no allotment to defendant. Hence, application for additional evidence was sought to be led. It was submitted, additional evidence was relevant and necessary for passing proper judgment and prayed for allowing application and remanding matter by relying on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., v. Surendra Oil and Dal Mills reported in (2010) 8 SCC 423, and Wadi v. Amilal , reported in (2015) 1 SCC 677 , held: "4. It cannot be disputed that the correct date of death of Rupa Ram would clinch the issue and enable the Court to pronounce a satisfactory judgment in the suit. A perusal of Mutation No. 49, if proved, would throw considerable light on the issue. On the question of admission of that document by the appellate court, it would be necessary to notice the relevant provision of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure: “27. Production of additional evidence in appellate court.—(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. But if— (a)-(aa) *** (b) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined.” 5. Now it is clear that Rule 27 deals with production of additional evidence in the appellate court. The general principle incorporated in sub-rule (1) is that the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence (oral or documentary) in the appellate court to cure a lacuna or fill up a gap in a case. The exceptions to that principle are enumerated thereunder in clauses (a), (aa) and (b). The general principle incorporated in sub-rule (1) is that the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence (oral or documentary) in the appellate court to cure a lacuna or fill up a gap in a case. The exceptions to that principle are enumerated thereunder in clauses (a), (aa) and (b). We are concerned here with clause (b) which is an enabling provision. It says that if the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, it may allow such document to be produced or witness to be examined. The requirement or need is that of the appellate court bearing in mind that the interest of justice is paramount. If it feels that pronouncing a judgment in the absence of such evidence would result in a defective decision and to pronounce an effective judgment admission of such evidence is necessary, clause (b) enables it to adopt that course. Invocation of clause (b) does not depend upon the vigilance or negligence of the parties for it is not meant for them. It is for the appellant to resort to it when on a consideration of the material or record it feels that admission of additional evidence is necessary to pronounce a satisfactory judgment in the case. 6. In this case, on the question whether Rupa Ram died in 1951 or in 1960/1961, the Revenue Appellate Authority referred to a copy of Mutation No. 49 and remanded the case to the original authority. The document in question would throw light on the germane issue and is, therefore, necessary for pronouncing judgment in the case on the question whether remand of the case was justified. In our view, the Board of Revenue ought to have admitted the additional evidence under clause (b) aforementioned. It erred in declining to admit that document as additional evidence." 16. He also relied on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Bhimeshwara Swami Varu Temple v. Pedapudi Krishna Murthi , reported in (1973) 2 SCC 261 holding: "8. No useful purpose will be served by discussing the oral evidence led by the parties. It erred in declining to admit that document as additional evidence." 16. He also relied on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Bhimeshwara Swami Varu Temple v. Pedapudi Krishna Murthi , reported in (1973) 2 SCC 261 holding: "8. No useful purpose will be served by discussing the oral evidence led by the parties. That evidence is of an uncertain character and is inadequate to displace the presumption arising out of the several entries spread over a large number of years showing that RS no.1057 belonged to the Archakas and was in their possession in their own right." 17. Pointing to admission elicited from DW.1 in cross-examination that site number mentioned in Ex.D2 was 335, whereas, suit property was site no.234. It was further submitted, boundary description of property in Ex.D9 - Form no.9 differed from suit property. Same was not appreciated by first appellate Court. Hence, sought for allowing appeal on ground of improper appreciation of material by first appellate Court relying on decision of this Court in case of Puttaramaiah v. Thimmaiah , reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Kar 790. 18. On above grounds, learned counsel sought for allowing appeal by answering substantial question of law. 19. On other hand, Sri C. Shankar Reddy, learned counsel for defendants [respondent no.1 (2-6)] opposed appeal, submitting that plaint was bereft of particulars of grant, such as date and basis of plaintiff's claim for allotment. Besides, pleadings about interference by defendant were absent. As per law, no amount of evidence without pleading could be appreciated. It was submitted, in written statement, defendant denied plaintiff's possession and claimed defendant to be grantee. Plaintiff had not filed rejoinder denying allotment to defendant. Thus, allotment was not disputed. It was submitted, plaintiff's father-in-law namely, Anjinappa was Chairman of Panchayat. Taking advantage of same and colluding with officials, plaintiff had got Ex.P1. It was submitted, in cross-examination, both PWs.1 and 2 admitted relationship of plaintiff with Anjinappa. PW.1 also admitted he was unaware in which survey number he was granted site. It was submitted, Ex.P1, casts serious doubt about grant as it had overwriting without counter signatures. When allotment was doubtful, suit was liable for dismissal. 20. It was submitted, plaintiff had not produced records to establish entitlement for grant/allotment, which was usually for welfare of EWC, or stated how plaintiff qualified for grant. It was submitted, Ex.P1, casts serious doubt about grant as it had overwriting without counter signatures. When allotment was doubtful, suit was liable for dismissal. 20. It was submitted, plaintiff had not produced records to establish entitlement for grant/allotment, which was usually for welfare of EWC, or stated how plaintiff qualified for grant. He had also not made efforts to examine any officer to corroborate grant/allotment. And it was further submitted, plaintiff cannot succeed merely on weakness of defendant, but has to establish title and possession over suit property as on date of suit. It was submitted, in cross-examination DW.2 had categorically admitted allotment of site in favour of defendant. Thus, judgment and decree of trial Court was without contrary to settled principles of law and first appellate Court on re- appreciation record rightly exercised jurisdiction under Section 96 of CPC, set-aside trial Court decree and dismissed suit. Same was not liable for interference under Section 100 of CPC. 21. It was submitted, though plaintiff had sufficient opportunity to file applications under RTI Act, secure and produce evidence before filing of suit, no explanation was offered for said lapse. It was pointed out that all documents sought to be produced were post-suit, which could not be relied and sought for dismissal of application filed for additional evidence and consequently appeal itself. 22. Heard learned counsel, perused impugned judgment decree and records. 23. This appeal is by plaintiff against divergent finding in a suit for permanent injunction. Suit claim was based on assertion that plaintiff was allottee of suit property under Ex.P.1 - Hakku patra dated 15.06.1990 and claiming to be in possession from said date corroborated by entry of name in revenue records by producing demand register/assessment register extracts as well as tax paid receipts, building licence and confirmation certificate as Exs.P.2 to 16 and alleged defendant had sought to interfere with plaintiff's possession over suit property. It is seen, plaintiff deposed as PW.1 and reiterated plaint averments. He also examined PW.2, a resident of Kumbalahalli, who deposed about plaintiff being in possession of suit property. 24. Suit was opposed denying plaintiff's title as well as possession over suit property, alleging plaintiff was not resident of Kumbalahalli and claiming defendant to be allottee of site under Ex.D2 - Hakkupatra and claiming to be in possession of suit property by producing demand register/assessment register extracts as well as tax paid receipts. 24. Suit was opposed denying plaintiff's title as well as possession over suit property, alleging plaintiff was not resident of Kumbalahalli and claiming defendant to be allottee of site under Ex.D2 - Hakkupatra and claiming to be in possession of suit property by producing demand register/assessment register extracts as well as tax paid receipts. It is seen, husband of defendant was examined as DW.1 and owner of site no.4 as DW.2. 25. While passing judgment and decree, trial Court noted rival pleadings and evidence and observed plaintiff and defendant were rival claimants over suit property on basis of respective hakkupatras at Ex.P.1 and Ex.D.2. At that stage, it noted that defendant had not stepped into witness box. Relying on decision of Apex Court in case of Janaki Vasudev Bhojwani & Anr. v. IndusInd Bank Ltd & Ors. reported in 2005 (2) SCC 217 , to draw adverse inference against defendant and discarding oral evidence of DW1. On scrutiny of documentary evidence, it observed that Exs.D3 to 24 were in respect of site no.335 and concluding that Ex.D2 was not acted upon, to decree suit. 26. In appeal, first appellate Court also traversed rival pleadings and evidence led as well as findings of trial Court especially about discrepancy about site number in Ex.D2 to other exhibits. It however, proceeds to compare Ex.P1 and Ex.D2 to note that both were in respect of site no.234. It also noted some corrections on Ex.P1 with counter-signatures. It however noted date of grant in Ex.D2 was 11.06.1989, whereas, it was 15.06.1990 in Ex.P1. It concluded, after grant of site no.234 under Ex.D2, issuance of Ex.P1 would be unsustainable. Holding even in suit for bare injunction, Courts could go into issue of title to extent of giving finding on lawful possession and concluding that defendant had better title under Ex.D2 over suit property than plaintiff under Ex.P1, it reversed trial Court decree, allowed appeal and dismissed plaintiff's suit. 27. Appeal was admitted on 11.09.2009, to consider following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial Court decreeing the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff is perverse being contrary to the admissions made by DW.1 during the cross examination? 2. 27. Appeal was admitted on 11.09.2009, to consider following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial Court decreeing the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff is perverse being contrary to the admissions made by DW.1 during the cross examination? 2. In view of the admission made by DW.1 that the defendant is in possession of site no.335 as mentioned in Ex.D.2 to D.26, whether the Lower Appellate Court is justified in holding that the plaintiff not in possession of the site no.234 only based on the contents of Ex.D.1? 28. Main grounds urged as about perversity of findings of first appellate Court, firstly for ignoring Exs.D3 to 26 were not in respect of suit property and admission by DW.1 that he was in possession of site no.335 and secondly, failing to appreciate plaintiff's claim insofar as suit property was lawful under Ex.P1 and possession established by consistent revenue records (Exs.P2 to 15) and deposition of PW.2 (resident of same village). 29. In view of observation about failure of plaintiff to produce any corroborative records about grant in favour of plaintiff, an application [Misc.no.15416/2009] was filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC for additional evidence. Documents sought to be produced are Endorsement dated 20.07.2009 and Confirmation Certificate dated 13.08.2009 issued by Executive Officer, Taluk Panchayat Hoskote and application filed under RTI Act with certified copy, relevant portion of list of allottees of sites formed in Sy.no.112. 30. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin , reported (2012) 8 SCC 148 , while considering application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, has held as under: "36. The general principle is that the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The appellate court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, the provision does not apply, when on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, the provision does not apply, when on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the Rule itself. (Vide K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy [ AIR 1963 SC 1526 ] , Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham [ AIR 1965 SC 1008 ], Soonda Ram v. Rameshwarlal [ (1975) 3 SCC 698 : AIR 1975 SC 479 ] and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy [ (1979) 2 SCC 601 : AIR1979 SC 553]. 37. The appellate court should not ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and Mohd. Ali and Co. [ (1978) 2 SCC 493 : AIR 1978 SC 798 ] ) 38. Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the appellate court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate court is empowered to admit additional evidence. (Vide Lala Pancham [ AIR 1965 SC 1008 ]. 39. It is not the business of the appellate court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower court. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate court is empowered to admit additional evidence. (Vide Lala Pancham [ AIR 1965 SC 1008 ]. 39. It is not the business of the appellate court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this Rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [ AIR 1957 SC 912 ] and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam [ AIR 1969 SC 101 ]) 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a “substantial cause” within the meaning of this Rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The words “for any other substantial cause”must be read with the word “requires” in the beginning of the sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the appellate court requires additional evidence, that this Rule will apply e.g. when evidence has been taken by the lower court so imperfectly that the appellate court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment. 42. Whenever the appellate court admits additional evidence it should record its reasons for doing so (sub-rule (2)). It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against a too easy reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation and the statement of reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this Rule has been properly exercised by the court below. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this Rule has been properly exercised by the court below. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the Rule. 43. The reasons need not be recorded in a separate order provided they are embodied in the judgment of the appellate court. A mere reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case, or mere statement that the evidence is necessary to pronounce judgment, or that the additional evidence is required to be admitted in the interests of justice, or that there is no reason to reject the prayer for the admission of the additional evidence, is not enough compliance with the requirement as to recording of reasons. 44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable, particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is the principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision-making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. Recording of reasons is the principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision-making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. (Vide State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar [ (2004) 5 SCC 568 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 49 : AIR 2004 SC 1794 ] , State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi [ (2008) 11 SCC 205 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1093] , Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity [ (2010) 3 SCC 732 : AIR 2010 SC 1285 ] and Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. [ (2010) 13 SCC 336 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 904] ) 45. In City Improvement Trust Board v. H.Narayanaiah [ (1976) 4 SCC 9 : AIR 1976 SC 2403 ] , while dealing with the issue, a three- Judge Bench of this Court held as under : (SCC p. 20, para 28) “28. … We are of the opinion that the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it, an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its existence by leading other evidence.” (emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Basayya I. Mathad v. Rudrayya S.Mathad [ (2008) 3 SCC 120 ] . 46. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K.Venkataramiah [ AIR 1963 SC 1526 ] , while dealing with the same issue held : (AIR p. 1529, para 13) “13. It is very much to be desired that the courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of clause (2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence. … The omission to record the reason must therefore be treated as a serious defect. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.” (emphasis added) In the said case, the Court after examining the record of the case came to the conclusion that the appeal was heard for a long time and the application for taking additional evidence on record was filed during the final hearing of the appeal. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.” (emphasis added) In the said case, the Court after examining the record of the case came to the conclusion that the appeal was heard for a long time and the application for taking additional evidence on record was filed during the final hearing of the appeal. In such a fact situation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47. Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record, such application may be allowed. 48. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that an application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite conditions incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the appellate court. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage." 31. First document produced namely, certificate dated 13.08.2009 issued by Executive Officer, Taluk Panchayat, Hoskote, is to effect that allotment records indicate that allottee of site no.234 of Kumbalahalli was Krishnamurthi s/o Shamanna and that it was not allotted to anyone else. Confirmation Certificate dated 20.07.2009 issued by same authority is to effect that after striking out site no.168 against allottee - Krishnamurthi, site no.234 was mentioned, signature of allottee was taken and site was allotted. Confirmation Certificate dated 20.07.2009 issued by same authority is to effect that after striking out site no.168 against allottee - Krishnamurthi, site no.234 was mentioned, signature of allottee was taken and site was allotted. While, RTI application and relevant portion of list of allottees appears to be in tune with above certificates. Though, their relevancy insofar as subject matter of suit cannot be ruled out in entirety, as noted by both Courts, both plaintiff and defendant are staking claim over suit property under respective hakkupatras namely, Ex.P1 and Ex.D.2, which were issued by same authority to two different parties in respect of same site. 32. Additional evidence sought to be led does not further plaintiff's cause in this regard. Moreover, documents are post-lite. It is also seen defendant has elaborately cross- examined PW.1 on 13.08.2003, with reference to records that would corroborate his claim. Suit was disposed of on 14.06.2005 i.e. nearly one and half years later. Despite same, plaintiff did not make any efforts for securing records even during pendency of first appeal. In application filed, it is merely stated that there was no occasion for plaintiff to enquire about same during pendency of proceedings and only after disposal of appeal, he filed application. It is settled principle of law that application for additional evidence filed by party who was negligent cannot be considered. Since, negligence is apparent in instant case, application for additional evidence is rejected. 33. Though, it is contended that first appellate Court erred in deciding legality of rival claims under respective hakkupatras, de horse other material available on record namely, contents of Exs.D3 to D26 which were in respect of site no.335, it is seen that umpteen suggestions were made to DW.1 that he was in possession of site no.335, which were all consistently denied. 34. Admittedly, neither plaintiff challenged or sought declaration against Ex.D2 nor defendant about Ex.P1 and plaintiff pursued his suit for bare injunction. Though, as per ratio laid down in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy reported in (2008) 4 SCC 594 , there would be prohibition against Courts, deciding title in suit for bare injunction, first appellate Court herein proceeded to evaluate probabilities of claims based on rival documents. Though, as per ratio laid down in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy reported in (2008) 4 SCC 594 , there would be prohibition against Courts, deciding title in suit for bare injunction, first appellate Court herein proceeded to evaluate probabilities of claims based on rival documents. Since, Ex.D2 issued by same authority as that of Ex.P1, but was prior in time than Ex.P1, proceeded to apply principle of law that vendor, who had divested right in respect of particular property, cannot convey lawful title subsequently, denied plaintiff's claim under Ex.P1. 35. If there was any dispute about identity of site allotted to plaintiff and defendant, proper course for plaintiff would be to have filed suit for declaration of title and suit for bare injunction would not be tenable. 36. In view of above discussion, impugned judgment and decree passed by first appellate Court would not suffer from perversity. Substantial questions of law framed are answered accordingly. 37. Consequently, Appeal is dismissed.