JUDGMENT : (G. RADHA RANI, J.) CCCA No.119 of 2006 is filed by the appellant-defendant No.1 and CCCA No.155 of 2006 is filed by the appellant-defendant No.2 aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 25.04.2006 passed by the IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in O.S. No.28 of 1997. 2. The respondent Nos.2 to 5 were the wife and children of the original plaintiff Sri Narsing Rao Chavan. The original plaintiff (plaintiff No.1) died and as per the orders in I.A. No.1741 of 2002 the respondent Nos.2 to 5 were brought on record on 06.01.2003. Initially, the suit was filed by the original plaintiff against defendant No.1 alone. Subsequently, defendant No.2 was also impleaded in the suit as per the orders in I.A. No.283 of 2002 dated 02.12.2003. 3. The suit was filed for cancellation of sale deed dated 26.05.1995 registered as document No.2358 of 1995 in respect of a portion of a house bearing No.4-6-260 to 264 admeasuring 92.5 sq. yds., situated at Esamiabazar, Hyderabad. The plaintiff contended that originally the house property bearing No.4-6-259, 261 to 264 (old) and presently bearing Municipal No.4-6-260 to 264 admeasuring 185 square yards situated at Esamiabazar, Hyderabad, was owned and possessed by late D. Jagannath Rao, who purchased the same under document No.931 of 1987 and he died intestate leaving behind him, his wife Smt. D. Godavari Bai. Smt. D. Godavari Bai also died on 07.03.1994. They had no issues. During her lifetime, Smt. Godavari Bai executed a Will bequeathing the aforesaid properties in favour of the plaintiff No.1, who was her natural brother. One Smt. G. Prameela Bai, wife of G. Mohan Rao (the sister’s daughter of Smt. Godavari Bai) also claimed right of ownership in and over the property claiming that she was the adopted daughter of Smt. Godavari Bai and filed a suit for injunction bearing O.S. No.1831 of 1994 on the file of III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The matter was settled between the plaintiff No.1 and G. Prameela Bai out of court inter alia agreeing to share the property equally and the said suit was withdrawn. Smt. G. Prameela Bai and the plaintiff jointly sold a portion of the aforesaid property admeasuring 92.5 sq.yds., in favour of the son of defendant No.1. As per the settlement, the entire sale consideration was paid to Smt. G.Prameela Bai. Smt. G. Prameela Bai and the plaintiff jointly sold a portion of the aforesaid property admeasuring 92.5 sq.yds., in favour of the son of defendant No.1. As per the settlement, the entire sale consideration was paid to Smt. G.Prameela Bai. As per the settlement, the remaining half property i.e. H.No.4-6-260 to 264 admeasuring 92.5 sq.yds., (the suit schedule property) was conveyed to defendant No.1 under registered sale deed document No.2358 of 1995. The sale transaction agreed in respect of the suit schedule property was Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two lakhs only). The defendant paid Rs.50,000/- i.e. Rs.25,000/- on 24.04.1995 on the date of the agreement and Rs.25,000/- on 28.05.1995 to the plaintiff as he was alone entitled to receive the entire sale consideration amount pertaining to the plaint schedule property. But, for the best reasons known to defendant No.1, the sale consideration amount was shown in the sale deed as Rs.1,90,000/-. The defendant issued two post-dated cheques on 26.05.1995 on the date of registration of Sale Deed, one cheque bearing No.651851 dated 25.06.1995 for Rs.25,000/- and the second cheque bearing No.651853 dated 25.08.1995 for Rs.1,25,000/-, both drawn on Andhra Bank, Hyderabad in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in good faith accepted the said two post-dated cheques. As per the terms of the sale deed, in case the cheques or any one of the two cheques were not honoured for want of any reason, the sale transaction would become null and void in respect of the Schedule property and the plaintiff had got every right to cancel the sale deed and in such event, the defendant would have no right to take any kind of excuse or objection. The defendant No.1 was fully aware of the said terms embodied in the sale deed. 3.1. The plaintiff further averred that Sri V.Rajagopal was his counsel in O.S. No.1831 of 1994 and also in R.C.Nos.492 of 1994, 442 of 1994 filed by the tenants under Section 9 of the Rent Control Act for deposit of rent before the court of the II Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad. Sri Rajagopal, Advocate, mediated the said transaction and a sum of Rs.50,000/-was given by the defendant to the plaintiff on two different dates as stated earlier on 24.04.1995 and 28.05.1995. An account was also opened in Syndicate Bank, Kachiguda, Hyderabad bearing No.13479 in the name of the plaintiff No.1 with the introduction of Sri V. Rajagopal. Sri Rajagopal, Advocate, mediated the said transaction and a sum of Rs.50,000/-was given by the defendant to the plaintiff on two different dates as stated earlier on 24.04.1995 and 28.05.1995. An account was also opened in Syndicate Bank, Kachiguda, Hyderabad bearing No.13479 in the name of the plaintiff No.1 with the introduction of Sri V. Rajagopal. The Advocate Sri V.Rajagopal identified the plaintiff No.1 at the time of opening of the said account. An amount of Rs.500/- was deposited in the account and Rs.4,500/- was given to the plaintiff No.1. The remaining amount of Rs.45,000/- was kept with Sri V.Rajagopal. The two cheques given by the defendant No.1 to the plaintiff were also kept with Sri V.Rajagopal being the mediator. When the cheques were to be presented on due dates, the plaintiff approached Sri Rajagopal, Advocate, who informed that there was still time of six months. The plaintiff in good faith kept quiet. Subsequently, the plaintiff and Rajagopal went to the bank for encashment of cheques and found that there was no amount to the credit of the defendant No.1 in his bank account. The plaintiff No.1 suspected the attitude of the defendant No.1 and Sri Rajagopal and demanded the amount of Rs.45,000/- forthwith and also to return the two post-dated cheques which were in the custody of Sri V.Rajagopal. On refusal to pay the said amount of Rs. 45,000/- and to return the cheques, the plaintiff No.1 filed a written complaint before the Bar Council of State of Andhra Pradesh against Advocate Sri V. Rajagopal bearing complaint No.63 of 1996 which was pending enquiry. The plaintiff No.1 also got issued notice dated 14.03.1996 to the defendant No.1 showing his intention to cancel the sale deed as the balance amount was not paid. The defendant No.1 in collusion with Sri V. Rajagopal, Advocate, took back the cheques from him. Sri V. Rajagopal, Advocate had no authority to deliver the cheques to the defendant No.1 as he was only a mediator and custodian of the cheques. The defendant No.1 sent a reply dated 04.04.1996 stating that in lieu of the post-dated cheques for Rs.25,000/- and for Rs.1,25,000/-, she had paid the amount of Rs.1,50,000/- in cash to the plaintiff No.1. The said averments of the defendant No.1 were false, mischievous and without any basis. The plaintiff No.1 had not received the amount. The defendant No.1 sent a reply dated 04.04.1996 stating that in lieu of the post-dated cheques for Rs.25,000/- and for Rs.1,25,000/-, she had paid the amount of Rs.1,50,000/- in cash to the plaintiff No.1. The said averments of the defendant No.1 were false, mischievous and without any basis. The plaintiff No.1 had not received the amount. In fact, a small amount was paid on different dates to the plaintiff No.1 as stated in the notice dated 14.03.1996. In all, a sum of Rs.70,000/- was paid by the defendant out of which Rs.45,000/- was with Sri V. Rajagopal, Advocate against whom a complaint was already lodged before the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh. The defendant No.1 had falsely taken a stand that she has paid the amount to the plaintiff No.1. As per the terms of the sale deed dated 26.05.1995, the plaintiff had every right to cancel the sale deed as the defendant No.1 failed to pay the balance of sale consideration amount. As the sale deed was executed without consideration and as the defendant No.1 had not paid the amount, the sale transaction had become null and void and the plaintiff No.1 was entitled to cancel the sale deed. 3.2. The plaintiff further averred that he had delivered the vacant and actual possession of the plaint Schedule property to the defendant No.1 and sought for re-delivery of the possession of the plaint schedule property in his favour and claimed damages of Rs.3,000/- per month from the date of the suit and also sought for mandatory injunction restraining the defendant No.1 from alienating the plaint schedule property in favour of any third person. 4. The defendant No.1 filed written statement contending that the plaintiff No.1 approached the Court with unclean hands suppressing the material facts. The plaintiff No.1 along with Smt. G. Prameela Bai sold the property in question to him under a registered sale deed dated 26.05.1995 for a lawful and valid consideration and the plaintiff No.1 put the defendant in possession of the property sold under the sale deed and since the date of sale, the defendant was in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property. She further submitted that the cheques mentioned in the plaint for Rs.25,000/- and Rs.1,25,000/- were issued by the defendant No.1 to the plaintiff No.1 and the said cheques were returned to the defendant No.1 after collecting the cash from her in lieu of the said cheques on 26.06.1995 and 29.08.1995 and in token of receipt of the amount in lieu of the cheques, the plaintiff No.1 executed the receipts dated 22.06.1995 and 24.08.1995. Thus, the entire agreed sale consideration was received by the plaintiff No.1 and suppressing the material facts, the plaintiff No.1 got issued a legal notice dated 14.03.1996 through his Advocate to which the defendant got issued a reply notice dated 04.04.1996 mentioning the true facts that he paid the amount in cash in lieu of the cheques. Since the plaintiff received the entire sale consideration, he was not entitled either for cancellation of the sale deed or for damages as claimed in the suit. 4.1. She further submitted that subsequent to the purchase of the property, the defendant had sold the said property to Sri R. Yadagiri (defendant No.2) and put him in possession of the property and that the said purchaser was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. She further contended that the allegations made against Sri V. Rajagopal, Advocate by the plaintiff No.1 were false and incorrect. In view of the payment of entire sale consideration, the plaintiff No.1 was not entitled for the relief of cancellation of the sale deed executed by him and prayed to dismiss the suit. She further contended that as the sale deed was executed by the plaintiff No.1 along with Smt. G. Prameela Bai, Smt. Prameela Bai was also a proper and necessary party to the suit and the suit was bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary party and liable to be dismissed on the said ground also. 5. Subsequent to the written statement filed by the defendant No.1, defendant No.2 was impleaded as per the orders in I.A. No.283 of 2002 dated 02.12.2003. The defendant No.2 filed written statement contending that he was a bonafide purchaser, who purchased the suit schedule property from the defendant No.1 by paying the total sale consideration as agreed under the agreement of sale dated 19.12.1996. Possession was delivered to him by defendant No.1. The defendant No.2 filed written statement contending that he was a bonafide purchaser, who purchased the suit schedule property from the defendant No.1 by paying the total sale consideration as agreed under the agreement of sale dated 19.12.1996. Possession was delivered to him by defendant No.1. Ever since the date of delivery of possession, he was enjoying the suit schedule property, without any hindrance or interference from anybody as absolute owner of the property. After purchase of the suit schedule property, he had developed the same by investing huge amounts and was paying property tax and enjoying other facilities like water, electricity etc. He also contended that the suit was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of proper and necessary party Smt. G. Prameela Bai, who also executed sale deed along with the plaintiff No.1 in favour of defendant No.1. 6. Basing on the said pleadings, the trial court framed the issues as follows: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree for cancellation of sale deed, dated 26.05.1995 in favour of defendant as prayed for? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for redelivery of possession of the plaint schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages at Rs.3000/- p.m., from the date of the suit for the unauthorized occupation of the defendant as prayed for? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mandatory injunction as prayed for against the defendant? 5. To what relief? An additional issue was framed on 14.06.2004 as follows: Whether the defendant No.2 is a bonafide purchaser for valid consideration? 7. The plaintiff No.2, the wife of the original plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and Exs.A1 to A5 were marked on behalf of the plaintiffs. The General Power of Attorney holder and son of defendant No.1 was examined as DW.1. A witness, who alleged to have paid a sum of Rs.75,000/- to defendant No.1 in turn to pay to the plaintiff No.1, against the cheque for Rs.1,25,000/- and who was alleged to be present at the time of payment, was examined as DW.2. The defendant No.2 was examined as DW.3. The husband of defendant No.1 was examined as DW.4. Exs.B1 to B56 were marked on behalf of the defendants. 8. The defendant No.2 was examined as DW.3. The husband of defendant No.1 was examined as DW.4. Exs.B1 to B56 were marked on behalf of the defendants. 8. The learned IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, on considering the evidence of both the parties and on hearing the arguments adduced by the counsel representing both the parties, decreed the suit in part, cancelling the sale deed bearing document No.2358 of 1995 dated 26.05.1995 executed by the plaintiff No.1 in favour of defendant No.1 and directed the defendants to redeliver the vacant possession of the suit schedule property within sixty (60) days from the date of judgment. The relief of the claim for damages @ Rs.3,000/- per month was dismissed. The relief of mandatory injunction restraining the defendants from alienating or creating any encumbrances over suit schedule property was granted. The additional issue was answered holding that the defendant No.2 was not a bonafide purchaser. 9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 25.04.2006 in O.S. No.28 of 1997 passed by the learned IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, both defendant Nos.1 and 2 preferred these appeals. 10. Heard Sri Kasireddy Jagathpal Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant (defendant No.1) in CCCA No.119 of 2006, Sri Goverdhan Venu, learned counsel representing Nomos Vistas, record for the appellant (defendant No.2) in CCCA No.155 of 2006 and Sri T.V. Rajeevan, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 5-plaintiff Nos.2 to 6. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant in CCCA No.119 of 2006 (defendant No.1) contended that the trial court failed to verify whether the cheques were deposited in the bank for realization of the amount as stated by the plaintiff No.1. It was the duty of the plaintiff No.1 to deposit the cheques before the Bank for realization of the amount, but he did not deposit the same and on the other hand stated that he deposited the cheques and the same were dishonoured. As per the terms of the sale deed, as the plaintiff had not deposited the cheques, he could not seek for cancellation of the sale deed. As per the terms of the sale deed, as the plaintiff had not deposited the cheques, he could not seek for cancellation of the sale deed. The trial court erred in giving a finding that the defendant No.1 had not paid the balance sale consideration of Rs.1,50,000/- against the two cheques, as she had not filed the receipts before the trial court, but the trial court failed to discuss as to how the cheques had come to the custody of defendant No.1 and failed to observe that without receipt of the balance sale consideration, the vendor would not return the cheques to the purchaser. The court below failed to consider the evidence of DW.4, the husband of the defendant No.1 wherein he stated that the plaintiff Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan personally approached him and requested him to pay the amount in cash and accordingly, defendant No.1 paid the amount in cash and received the cheques. The cheques itself were the acknowledgment to defendant No.1. Without receipt of payment, nobody would return the cheques as such, the court below ought to have accepted the contention of the defendants. 11.1. He further contended that the plaintiff No.1 had received the sale consideration in the presence of Mr. Rajagopal. All the witnesses went to the house of plaintiff No.1 and paid the same. To that effect, the defendants’ witnesses deposed, but the court below failed to consider the same. The receipts were filed before the Bar Council of A.P., as such, the same could not be filed before the court. The Bar Council of A.P. also observed that the defendant No.1 paid the amounts to the counsel Mr. Rajagopal and that Mr. Rajagopal did not pay the amount to plaintiff No.1. If the counsel received the amounts from the defendant No.1 and if he did not repay to the plaintiff, the plaintiff No.1 ought to have filed the suit against Mr. Rajagopal, Advocate, but not against the defendants. The plaintiff No.1 failed to explain as to why they had given cheques to their counsel. The court below ought to have seen that the Bar Council of India had set aside the order passed by the Bar Council of A.P. The said order was marked as Ex.B56. The Disciplinary Committee observed that all the receipts were genuine. The plaintiff No.1 failed to explain as to why they had given cheques to their counsel. The court below ought to have seen that the Bar Council of India had set aside the order passed by the Bar Council of A.P. The said order was marked as Ex.B56. The Disciplinary Committee observed that all the receipts were genuine. As the matter was pending before the Bar Council of India, the defendant No.1 did not obtain the original receipts and could not file the same before the court. The court below discarded the evidence of DW.2 on the ground that he did not speak about payment of Rs.25,000/-. As DW.2 was present while making payment of Rs.1,25,000/-, DW.2 would speak only to that extent. The court below erred in observing that DW.4 had introduced a new story about sharing of sale consideration between the plaintiff No.1 and Smt. G. Prameela Bai at the rate of Rs.2,00,000/- and Rs.3,00,000/-, respectively. It was not a new version. It was a fact that there were two house properties, one house property was purchased by DW.1 for a sale consideration of Rs.3,00,000/- and the plaint schedule property was purchased for a sale consideration of Rs.2,00,000/-. DW.4, the husband of defendant No.1, was the right person to depose in respect of the transaction, because the entire transaction took place through him only. 11.2. He further contended that the court below failed to consider the evidence of PW.1 wherein she admitted in the cross-examination that as per the understanding of payment of amount by way of cash, the post dated cheques should be returned to defendant No.1. Since the cheques were returned to defendant No.1, it had to be presumed that the balance sale consideration was received by the plaintiff No.1. The court below passed the decree only on the basis of non-filing of the receipts. The receipts were not at all criteria to decide the matter. The other circumstances would need to be taken into consideration. There was a dispute between the plaintiff No.1 and his counsel. The counsel had received the sale consideration from defendant No.1 and returned the cheques, but the sale consideration was not paid by the counsel to the plaintiff No.1. As such, it could not be said that defendant No.1 did not pay the balance sale consideration to the plaintiff No.1. There was a dispute between the plaintiff No.1 and his counsel. The counsel had received the sale consideration from defendant No.1 and returned the cheques, but the sale consideration was not paid by the counsel to the plaintiff No.1. As such, it could not be said that defendant No.1 did not pay the balance sale consideration to the plaintiff No.1. As per the Transfer of Property Act, once the property was transferred by way of registered sale deed, it should not be cancelled. If the purchaser was due any balance sale consideration, the purchaser has to file a suit for recovery of the amount as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr. , [ AIR 1999 SC 1441 ] and as per the judgment of the High Court of Madras in CDJ MHC 852/2005. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant in CCCA No.155 of 2006 (defendant No.2) also contended that there was no cause of action for the plaintiffs to seek for the relief of cancellation of the sale deed, as the cheques alleged to have been given towards part sale consideration amount were not dishonoured. The moment the sale deed was executed and registered, there was transfer of ownership with all rights and interest in the property. For the alleged non-payment of the part promised money, the sale deed could not be cancelled. The only relief that could be claimed by the plaintiff was for recovery of money. The sale would be complete as soon as the sale deed was executed and possession was handed over. The sale deed itself would disclose that possession was handed over to the defendant No.1. There was no such concept like conditional sale under Transfer of Property Act or under any other law. The sale would be complete as soon as the sale deed was executed and possession was handed over. The sale deed itself would disclose that possession was handed over to the defendant No.1. There was no such concept like conditional sale under Transfer of Property Act or under any other law. The word ‘conditional sale’ was used only in two contexts (1) mortgage by conditional sale and (2) mortgage by re-conveyance and relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr., wherein it was held that the definition of sale would include the transfer of ownership even if the consideration was not paid in full; and of Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain & Others v. Ramakianth Eknath Jajoo , [CDJ 2009 SC 593] and Pandit Chunchun Jha v. Sheikh Ebadat Ali and another , [ AIR 1954 SC 345 ] wherein the principles for determining whether the given transaction was a mortgage by conditional sale or sale outright with a condition for repurchase, were reiterated. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Yogendra Prasad Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Ram Bachan Devi & Others , [CDJ 2023 SC 687] wherein it was held that the recitals of the sale deed were crucial to consider whether there was transfer of title and possession. 12.1. He further contended that the trial court failed to see that when the document was executed by two persons, one person alone could not seek for cancellation. The other executant of the sale deed was a proper and necessary party and the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary party. It was for the court to frame an issue in the said regard and to answer the same at the time of judgment. The trial court failed to see that the cheques given towards part sale consideration amount were produced by the defendant No.1 which would clearly show that the cheques were returned by the plaintiff to the defendant No.1 after receiving the amount in cash. The trial court failed to see that the payment of part sale consideration amount promised to be paid under the sale deed was proved to have been paid through the evidence of DWs.1 to 4. 12.2. The trial court failed to see that the payment of part sale consideration amount promised to be paid under the sale deed was proved to have been paid through the evidence of DWs.1 to 4. 12.2. The learned counsel for the appellant-defendant No.2 further contended that the trial court failed to see that the plaintiff relied upon Ex.A5 order passed by the disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of A.P. to show that the receipts stated to have been issued acknowledging the receipt of balance sale consideration had been forged. But, the trial court failed to take into consideration the order passed by the Bar Council of A.P. (Ex.A5) as well as the order under Ex.B56 passed by Bar Council of India, wherein the order under Ex.A5 was set aside. The trial court failed to see that when the cheques were in the custody of the defendant and acknowledgments for receipt of amounts covered by cheques were filed under Ex.A5 and B56, it was proved that the part consideration promised to be paid was paid. The trial court erred in holding that the defendant No.2 was not a bonafide purchaser and failed to look into the fact that he made improvements to the property. The trial court failed to consider that there was no relevant entry in B Register prohibiting transfer of property by Sub-Registrar and there was no impediment for transfer of the property. The sale was not void ab initio, it was only voidable. But no action was taken by the plaintiffs from 1995 till 2002, the date of execution of the sale deed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2. No criminal complaint was filed against the Advocate Sri V. Rajagopal and no money recovery suit was filed against defendant No.1. The burden shifted on the plaintiff as soon as the cheques were produced. No grounds were made out for cancellation of sale deed and contended that the judgment of the trial court was erroneous and prayed to allow the appeal. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 5-plaintiff Nos.2 to 6, on the other hand, contended that at the stage of issuing notices in the suit itself, the property was sold by defendant No1 to defendant No.2. As such, the doctrine of lis pendens would attract. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 5-plaintiff Nos.2 to 6, on the other hand, contended that at the stage of issuing notices in the suit itself, the property was sold by defendant No1 to defendant No.2. As such, the doctrine of lis pendens would attract. There was no averment with regard to dishonour of cheques in the pleadings, as such, no issue was framed. Without pleadings, the counsel for the appellants was submitting arguments in the said regard. There was a covenant in the sale deed that the sale proceedings would be completed only subject to the realization of the encashment of the two post-dated cheques issued by the purchaser. A complaint case was filed by the original plaintiff against his counsel before Bar Council of A.P. vide Complaint Case No.63 of 1996. The grounds raised in the appeals were contrary to the pleadings and prayed to dismiss the appeals. 14. Now the points for consideration in these appeals are: 1. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of the co- vendor to the sale deed? 2. Whether the sale is complete by the date of execution of sale deed (Ex.A1) and whether the respondents-plaintiffs are entitled for cancellation of sale deed dated 26.05.1995 executed by the original plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1 as prayed for? 3. Whether the defendant No.2 was a bonafide purchaser or was covered by the doctrine of lis pendens? 4. Whether the judgment of the trial court is in accordance with law and on facts on record? 5. To what result? 15. POINT No.1 The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants was that as the sale deed was executed by two persons Sri Narsing Rao Chavan and Smt. G. Prameela Bai, the plaintiff (Narsing Rao Chavan) alone could not seek for cancellation of the same and Smt. Prameela Bai was also a necessary party and the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 in their written statements had raised the said aspect. But, no issue was framed in the said regard. 15.1. But, the trial court considered the said aspect and observed that: “It is true that Smt. G. Prameela Bai also executed the sale deed along with the plaintiff No.1 in favour of the defendant in respect of the plaint schedule property. But, no issue was framed in the said regard. 15.1. But, the trial court considered the said aspect and observed that: “It is true that Smt. G. Prameela Bai also executed the sale deed along with the plaintiff No.1 in favour of the defendant in respect of the plaint schedule property. But, as already observed, she is added as one of the executants of the sale deed on account of compromise in O.S. No.1831 of 1994 as a joint owner and since she has already sold her property of 92.5 sq. yds., in favour of defendant No.1’s son and received entire sale consideration and she is only a proforma party in the sale deed and she is not entitled for any sale consideration, therefore, she is not a necessary party to the suit.” 15.2. Both the defendant Nos.1 and 2 also admitted about the compromise between Smt. G. Prameela Bai and Sri Narsing Rao Chavan and both of them together executing sale deeds in favour of defendant No.1 and her son to the extent of their shares, as per the compromise. DW.1 and DW.4 also stated in their evidence with regard to the said compromise and executing sale deeds accordingly and Prameela Bai receiving her share of Rs.3,00,000/- to the extent of her half share and the consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- to be paid to the plaintiff Sri Narasing Rao Chavan alone pertaining to his half share. Thus, the defendants also admitted that though she was a co-vendor, she was only a proforma party, as she received the entire sale consideration pertaining to her half share. 15.3. As the co-vendor Smt. G. Prameela Bai had already aligned her interest in the property and received her share of consideration, she is only a proforma party and the rights and issues between the parties can be adjudicated even without her presence. As no relief is claimed against her, the suit is not bad for non-joinder of the co-vendor. As such, point No.1 is answered holding that the suit is not bad for non-joinder of Smt. Prameela bai. 16. POINT No.2: In a contract of sale, payment of consideration was essential. If the consideration is not paid, the transfer can be challenged. A sale deed that recites payment but in reality no payment was made can be invalidated if proved. Mere execution and registration would not always complete a sale. 16. POINT No.2: In a contract of sale, payment of consideration was essential. If the consideration is not paid, the transfer can be challenged. A sale deed that recites payment but in reality no payment was made can be invalidated if proved. Mere execution and registration would not always complete a sale. If full consideration is not paid and there was failure of contractual obligation, cancellation can be sought. The courts can cancel a deed even after registration if the reality shows non-payment. If payment of consideration was sine qua non for execution, non-payment renders the document voidable. If sale was conditional upon payment and there was no actual payment then a buyer cannot claim title unless he proves payment. 17. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 specifies when cancellation of a written instrument can be ordered. It reads as follows: “ 31. When cancellation may be ordered.— (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.” 18. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines ‘sale’ as follows: “54. “Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part- paid and part-promised. Such a transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immoveable property, of a value of less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs; in possession of the property. In the case of tangible immoveable property, of a value of less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs; in possession of the property. A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” 19. The definition of sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act includes transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised. As such, the non-payment of the full consideration cannot be a ground for cancellation of sale deed. But, if the sale deed includes a condition that payment of full consideration is an important part of the contract, (either immediate payment or within a timeframe) the plaintiff can seek for cancelation of the sale deed. As such, payment of consideration was vital for a valid sale and mere registration is not enough if payment was absent. Sale deed can be cancelled if there was non-payment and serious prejudice was caused to the vendor. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidhyadhar v. Manik Rao and Ant. (1 supra) held that: “36. The definition indicates that in order to constitute a sale, there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another, i.e., transfer of all rights and interests in the properties which are possessed by that person are transferred by him to another person. The transferor cannot retain any part of his interest or right in that property or else it would not be a sale. The definition further says that the transfer of ownership has to be for a "price paid or promised or part-paid and part- promised". Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of the transaction of sale. The words "price paid or promised or part- paid and part-promised" indicate that actual payment of whole of the price at the time of the execution of sale deed is not sine qua non to the completion of the sale. Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of the transaction of sale. The words "price paid or promised or part- paid and part-promised" indicate that actual payment of whole of the price at the time of the execution of sale deed is not sine qua non to the completion of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid but the document is executed and thereafter registered, if the property is of the value of more than Rs.100/-, the sale would be complete. 37. There is a catena of decisions of various High Courts in which it has been held that even if the whole of the price is not paid, the transaction of sale will take effect and the title would pass under that transaction. To cite only a few, in Gayatri Prasad v. Board of Revenue and Ors. (1973) Allahabad Law Journal 412, it was held that non-payment of a portion of the sale price would not effect validity of sale. It was observed that part payment of consideration by vendee itself proved the intention to pay the remaining amount of sale price. To the same effect is the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sukaloo and Anr. v. Punau. 38. The real test is the intention of the parties. In order to constitute a "sale", the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property and they must also intend that the price would be paid either in presenti or in future. The intention is to be gathered from the recital in the sale deed, conduct of the parties and the evidence on record.” 20. The sale deed dated 26.05.1995 executed by the original plaintiff in favour of the defendant No.1 vide registered document No.2358 of 1995 was marked as Ex.A1. The recitals of the sale deed would disclose that one G. Prameela Bai W/o. Sri G. Mohan Rao, and Sri Narasing Rao Chavan (original plaintiff) S/o.late Sri Marthanda Rao Chavan were the vendors and Smt. J. Sharada Bai W/o.Sri J. Harilal (defendant No.1) was the purchaser. It was mentioned therein that late Sri D. Jagannath purchased the immovable property bearing Municipal No.4- 6-259, 261 to 265 situated at Esamiabazar, Hyderabad, presently Municipal No.4-6-260 to 264 situated at Qassab Galli, Esamiabazar, Hyderabad, admeasuring 185 sq. It was mentioned therein that late Sri D. Jagannath purchased the immovable property bearing Municipal No.4- 6-259, 261 to 265 situated at Esamiabazar, Hyderabad, presently Municipal No.4-6-260 to 264 situated at Qassab Galli, Esamiabazar, Hyderabad, admeasuring 185 sq. yds., vide registered document No.931 of 1957 registered before the Sub-Registrar, Hyderabad and he died intestate in the year 1966. His wife late Smt. D. Godavari Bai succeeded to the properties purchased by her husband and she was in continuous physical possession till her death. She died intestate on 07.03.1994 due to illness and old age leaving behind her the vendors as her legal heirs and successors to the said property. After the death of Smt. D. Godavari Bai, the vendor Nos.1 and 2 were at logger heads with each other in the matter of possession of the said property and vendor No.1 Smt. G. Prameela Bai filed a suit in O.S. No.1831 of 2014 on the file of the III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, but on the advice of the elders and well wishers, had withdrawn the suit. The said suit was dismissed as not pressed on 24.05.1985 with an understanding to share the undivided property of 185 sq. yds., proportionately in equal shares admeasuring 92.5 sq.yds, each. The purchaser agreed to purchase one part of the said property for a total sale consideration of Rs.1,90,000/-. The vendor No.1 G. Prameela Bai has given her consent for the above consideration to be paid to vendor No.2, as she has received the entire consideration of Rs.3,00,000/- with regard to the sale of the property of the other part of 92.5 sq. yds., and as agreed upon, the purchaser has paid in cash Rs.40,000/- to the vendor No.2 Sri Narsing Rao Chavan and also issued two post dated cheques for the balance amount of Rs.1,50,000/- out of the total consideration of Rs.1,90,000/-. On receiving the two post dated cheques, and cash of Rs.40,000/-, Sri Narsing Rao Chavan had agreed to give his acceptance for the registration of the sale of the schedule property to the extent of his half share from the joint property. But it was also further recorded that the sale proceedings would be completed only subject to the realization of the encashment of the above mentioned two post dated cheques issued by the purchaser and accepted by the vendor No.2 in good faith. But it was also further recorded that the sale proceedings would be completed only subject to the realization of the encashment of the above mentioned two post dated cheques issued by the purchaser and accepted by the vendor No.2 in good faith. That, in case if the above mentioned cheques anyone or all the two cheques are dishonoured for want of any reason best known to the purchaser, the sale proceedings would be nullified to the extent of schedule property and the vendors herein are empowered to cancel the sale deed in future for which the purchaser has no excuse and objection. 21. Thus, the recitals of the sale deed would disclose that it was a conditional sale and the sale proceedings would be completed only subject to realization of the encashment of two post dated cheques and in case, the cheques were dishonoured, the sale proceedings could be nullified and the vendors were empowered to cancel the sale deed. The intention of the parties also could be gathered from the recitals of the sale deed that if the vendor No.2 had not received the entire sale consideration, the sale is liable to be cancelled. It was a condition precedent agreed by the parties prior to registering the sale deed itself. 22. As the original plaintiff died, the wife of the original plaintiff was examined as PW.1. She filed her evidence affidavit on the same lines as averred in the plaint. In the cross-examination made by the counsel for defendant No.1, she stated that she was present when the negotiations took place between her husband and defendant No.1. Before filing of the suit, a notice was given to defendant No.1. They had not received any amount from defendant No.1 for execution and registration of sale deed as on the date of it. She stated that there was no middleman for the transaction between defendant No.1 and her husband on one side and her husband and Prameela Bai on the other side. There was no agreement to sell before the sale deed. She admitted that their previous counsel was Sri V. Rajagopal and that the entire transaction was conducted in his presence. The amount of Rs.50,000/- received from defendant No.1 was kept with their advocate Rajagopal as they had confidence on him. There was no agreement to sell before the sale deed. She admitted that their previous counsel was Sri V. Rajagopal and that the entire transaction was conducted in his presence. The amount of Rs.50,000/- received from defendant No.1 was kept with their advocate Rajagopal as they had confidence on him. The sale deed was also got prepared by Rajagopal and it was mentioned in the sale deed that apart from Rs.50,000/- for the balance amount of Rs.1,25,000/- and for Rs.25,000/-, two post dated cheques were given. She admitted that those two cheques were also kept with Mr. Rajagopal and the understanding was that on payment of the amount by way of cash by defendant No.1, the post dated cheques would be returned to defendant No.1. She stated that she was not aware whether Mr. Rajagopal received the amount from defendant No.1 and returned post dated cheques and that she was not aware whether her husband received the cheques from Rajagopal. She also admitted that since Mr. Rajagopal did not pay the amount to them, they filed a complaint against him before the Bar Council of A.P. She stated that she was not aware whether any suit was filed against Mr. Rajagopal for recovery of amount and admitted that basing on the punishment given to Mr. Rajagopal by the Bar Council, they filed the present suit. She admitted that they had confidence and trusted Mr. Rajagopal in the beginning. She stated that she was not aware whether any receipts were obtained from Mr. Rajagopal while handing over the cheques to him and that she did not know whether her husband asked Mr. Rajagopal demanding cheques from him. She denied that her husband and Mr. Rajagopal after collecting the amounts from defendant No.1 returned the post dated cheques to her. She admitted that personally she had no knowledge as to what transpired between her husband and Mr. Rajagopal. 23. Thus, the oral evidence of PW.1 is not of much use to gather as to what actually transpired between the original plaintiff, their counsel Rajagopal and defendant No.1. But, the documents marked under Ex.A5, the Disciplinary Committee Proceedings of the Bar Council of A.P. and Ex.B.56, the proceedings of the Bar Council of India would give a glimpse of it. 24. But, the documents marked under Ex.A5, the Disciplinary Committee Proceedings of the Bar Council of A.P. and Ex.B.56, the proceedings of the Bar Council of India would give a glimpse of it. 24. The certified copy of the order dated 31.01.1998 passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of A.P. in Complaint Case No.63 of 1996 was marked as Ex.A5. The original plaintiff in the present case was the complainant in the said complaint case and Sri V. Rajagopal, Advocate was the respondent in the above complaint. It was alleged in the above complaint by the complainant that the respondent-Advocate received two cheques bearing No.651851 for Rs.25,000/- dated 25.06.1995 and cheque bearing No.651853 for Rs.1,25,000/-, dated 25.08.1995 and the complainant received Rs.10,000/- from the purchaser and when the complainant asked the respondent-Advocate to deposit the said two cheques received by him, the later dragged on the matter on one pretext or the other and after four months, the respondent-Advocate returned the cheques to Smt. Sharada Bai (defendant No.1 in the present case) with a malafide intention. 25. The respondent-Advocate in the said complaint offered his comments stating that he was engaged by the complainant (plaintiff in the present case) in three cases i.e. O.S.No.1831 of 1994 filed by G. Prameela Bai against the complainant in the court of III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and R.C. No.492 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad and in R.C. No.442 of 1994 on the file of the II Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad and all the cases were pertaining to the property bearing No.4-5-260 to 264, Esamiabazar, Hyderabad and during the pendency of O.S. No.1831 of 1994 both the parties compromised and a settlement deed was executed on 28.04.1995. Under the said settlement, the complainant and Smt. Prameela Bai agreed to sell the disputed property and received the sale consideration in the ratio of 2:3 respectively. The property was sold for Rs.5,09,000/- under registered sale deeds dated 31.05.1995 and 01.06.1995. According to the settlement, Smt. Prameela Bai received Rs.3,00,000/- and the complainant received Rs.2,00,000/-. He denied that he mediated the sale transaction and that had he received a sum of Rs.50,000/- from Smt. Sharada Bai. He stated that the complainant had received his share of sale consideration from Smt. Sharada Bai under four receipts. According to the settlement, Smt. Prameela Bai received Rs.3,00,000/- and the complainant received Rs.2,00,000/-. He denied that he mediated the sale transaction and that had he received a sum of Rs.50,000/- from Smt. Sharada Bai. He stated that the complainant had received his share of sale consideration from Smt. Sharada Bai under four receipts. On 23.05.1995 the complainant, after receiving Rs.50,000/- from Sharada Bai, approached him to introduce him to open a bank account and accordingly, he introduced the complainant, on which a bank account was opened in Syndicate Bank, Kachiguda Branch. 26. During the course of enquiry before the Bar Council of A.P., the original receipts were also filed by the respondent Advocate and the same were marked as Exs.R10, R11, R13 and R14. The complainant disputed his signatures on the said receipts and as such, the said receipts were sent to the Director, A.P. Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. The Assistant Director, who examined the said signatures, gave her opinion that the person, who wrote the standard signatures, did not write the questioned signatures. 27. Considering the evidence on record, the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of A.P., opined that the respondent Advocate not only produced the original fabricated receipts, but also vehemently and assertively sought to establish to prove the fabricated receipts as genuine one and hence, opined that the respondent Advocate had colluded with Smt. Sharada Bai (defendant No.1) and her husband Harilal in setting up a false case of alleged cash payment to the complainant under Ex.R13 and R14 in lieu of two cheques and the respondent Advocate was behind it and responsible for the filing of the forged stamped receipts and considered it as a grave professional misconduct and directed to remove his name from the rolls of the Bar Council. 28. The respondent-Advocate challenged the said order before the Bar Council of India. The certified copy of the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India was marked as Ex.B56 by the defendants. 28. The respondent-Advocate challenged the said order before the Bar Council of India. The certified copy of the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India was marked as Ex.B56 by the defendants. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India in DC Appeal No.18 of 1998 on reappraising the evidence on record, observed that the complainant failed to adduce any evidence, oral and documentary to substantiate his allegation against the appellant therein (Advocate) and Exs.R7 and R8 would prove that the complainant had received post-dated cheques from the purchaser and the same were subsequently handed over to the purchaser after receiving cash in lieu of those post dated cheques and as such, allowed the appeal by setting aside the order passed by the Disciplinary Committee No.V of the Bar Council of A.P. in Complaint Case No.63 of 1996. 29. The son of the defendant No.1 and the owner of the adjoining property, who purchased another half of the house bearing No.4-6-260 to 264 out of 185 sq. yds., situated at Esamiabazar, Hyderabad, from Smt. Prameela Bai and the plaintiff herein jointly, was examined as DW.1. He gave evidence as the Special Power of Attorney holder of DW.1 on behalf of his mother. He stated that Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan (the original plaintiff) and Smt. Prameela Bai offered to sell part of the house bearing No.4-6-260 to 264 admeasuring 92.5 sq. yds., and they agreed to purchase the same and accordingly, Smt. Prameela Bai as well as Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan executed a registered sale deed in his favour by receiving the entire sale consideration on 27.05.1995. They also requested to purchase another part of the said land, which was the suit schedule property. They had expressed their inability to pay the entire sale consideration immediately. As such, Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan, as well as Smt. Prameela Bai requested them to pay part of the sale consideration and for the remaining amount requested for issuance of cheques. To avoid future complications, if Prameela Bai could not turn up to execute a registered sale deed as unnecessarily the matter would be pending, on the request of Mr. As such, Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan, as well as Smt. Prameela Bai requested them to pay part of the sale consideration and for the remaining amount requested for issuance of cheques. To avoid future complications, if Prameela Bai could not turn up to execute a registered sale deed as unnecessarily the matter would be pending, on the request of Mr. Narasing Rao Chavan, they paid part sale consideration of Rs.25,000/- on 25.04.1995 and a sum of Rs.25,000/- on 28.05.1995 and for the balance consideration, they issued two post dated cheques on 26.05.1995 at the time of registration of the sale deed vide cheque bearing No.651851 dated 25.06.1995 for Rs.25,000/- and cheque bearing No.651853 dated 25.08.1995 for Rs.1,25,000/- in favour of the plaintiff Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan on the condition that after receipt of the amount, Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan had to return the cheques respectively to them or he has to deposit the said cheques for realization. 30. DW.1 further stated that they were informed that Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan was not having any account as such, requested for payment by way of cash. He stated that the entire transaction took place in the presence of Mr. V. Rajagopal, Advocate. The said Rajagopal was the counsel for the plaintiff and all the sale deeds were prepared by him only and the entire payments were made in the presence of Mr. Rajagopal, Advocate. He further contended that after receipt of the amount in cash, the cheques were returned to them. 31. In his cross-examination, he stated that defendant No.1, i.e. his mother and his father did not obtain any acknowledgment of receipt showing that the plaintiff received the amount in lieu of two cheques. He stated that he was not aware that his father filed the two receipts marked as Exs.R13 and R14 in the Complaint Case No.63 of 1996 and that his father deposed in that case that the plaintiff on receipt of cash in lieu of cheques passed the receipts. 32. He stated that he was not aware that his father filed the two receipts marked as Exs.R13 and R14 in the Complaint Case No.63 of 1996 and that his father deposed in that case that the plaintiff on receipt of cash in lieu of cheques passed the receipts. 32. The evidence of DW.1,the Special Power of Attorney holder of defendant No.1 is against the stand taken by defendant No.1 in her written statement wherein defendant No.1 stated that the cheques were returned to the defendant No.1 by collecting cash from her in lieu of the said cheques on 26.06.1995 and 29.08.1992 and in token of receipt of the amount in lieu of the cheques, the plaintiff executed the receipts dated 22.06.1995 and 24.08.1995. Thus, defendant No.1 stated about executing the receipts but DW.1 denied that his mother and father did not take any acknowledgement of receipt showing that the plaintiff received the amount in lieu of the cheques. DW.4 also stated about passing of the receipts by the plaintiff when amount was paid in cash in lieu of cheques. Thus, the evidence of DW.1 that no receipts were passed cannot be relied upon. DW.1 admitted that defendant No.1 had no proof of payment of Rs.1,50,000/- i.e. two cheque amounts to the plaintiff. He also stated that defendant No.1 sold the property to defendant No.2. 33. The defendants also got examined DW.2 to prove that he was also present at the time of payment of Rs.1,25,000/- to the plaintiff. DW.2 stated that he arranged a sum of Rs.75,000/- to defendant No.1 and he along with Harilal (DW.4) and Sanjay Kumar (DW,1) went to the house of Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan (Plaintiff) and paid Rs.1,25,000/- to him in the presence of Mr. Rajagopal-Advocate and after receipt of Rs.1,25,000/-, Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan had returned the cheque for Rs.1,25,000/- to the defendants in his presence. 34. The evidence of this witness is silent about passing of any receipt by the plaintiff in token of receiving cash in lieu of the cheque. The presence of this witness was not stated by defendant No.1 in her written statement or not stated by DW.1 in his evidence affidavit. No document was filed by DW.2 in proof of arranging the sum of Rs.75,000/- to defendant No.1. No date was even mentioned by him as to when he arranged the amount of Rs.75,000/- to defendant No.1. The presence of this witness was not stated by defendant No.1 in her written statement or not stated by DW.1 in his evidence affidavit. No document was filed by DW.2 in proof of arranging the sum of Rs.75,000/- to defendant No.1. No date was even mentioned by him as to when he arranged the amount of Rs.75,000/- to defendant No.1. No bank statement was filed by him to show that he was having that much amount in his account and as to when he withdrew the same and given to the defendant No.1 for payment of the same to the plaintiff. Thus, no reliance can be placed upon his oral evidence to believe that he was present at the time of the said transaction and that an amount of Rs.1,25,000/- was paid by defendant No.1 to the plaintiff. 35. The father of DW.1 and the husband of defendant No.1 was examined as DW4. DW.4 stated that Prameela Bai and Narsing Rao Chavan approached them and offered to sell the schedule of property for a consideration of Rs.5,00,000/- out of which Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan is entitled to Rs.2,00,000/- and Smt. Prameela Bai was entitled for Rs.3,00,000/-. Accordingly, part of the house bearing No.4-6-260 to 264 admeasuring 92.5 sq. yds., of property was executed by them in favour of Mr. Sanjay Kumar (DW.1), who was his son and part of the schedule or property admeasuring 92.5 sq. yds., was executed by Narsing Rao Chavan and Prameela Bai in favour of his wife Smt. Sharada Bai (defendant No.1) by receiving a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- and for balance sale consideration of Rs.1,50,000/- they have given two post dated cheques for Rs.25,000/- and for Rs.1,25,000/-, dated 25.06.1995 dated 25.08.1995, respectively. Mr. Rajagopal, Advocate was the counsel of Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan and both the parties used to act on his advice and on his advice, he issued two post dated cheques to Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan. As per his information, out of Rs.3,50,000/- Smt. Prameela bai had received Rs.3,00,000/- and the balance amount of Rs.1,50,000/- was received by Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan. 36. DW.4 further stated that later Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan approached him and requested him to pay the amount by way of cash as he was in urgent need of money and that he had not opened any account. Believing the version of Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan. 36. DW.4 further stated that later Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan approached him and requested him to pay the amount by way of cash as he was in urgent need of money and that he had not opened any account. Believing the version of Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan, they had paid a sum of Rs.25,000/- three days preceding the date of cheque i.e. on 22.06.1995. The plaintiff received the amount and returned the cheque and passed a receipt on 22.06.1995 and on the request of the plaintiff, they had paid a sum of Rs.1,25,000/- by way of cash on 24.08.1995 in the presence of Mr. Harimohan, S.K. Karanlal, Sanjay Kumar etc., and Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan passed a separate receipt for the said amount. He stated that the original receipts were taken by Mr. Rajagopal-Advocate and when he objected for the same, the advocate informed that as already post dated cheques had been returned which were lying with them and already sale deed was executed by both the parties and amounts were paid against the cheques, they would not face any problem. He further contended that if there was any dispute between Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan and Mr. Rajagopal, Mr. Narsing Rao Chavan would need to file a suit against Mr. Rajagopal and that without receipt of the sale consideration against the cheques, nobody would return the cheques to the party. 37. In his cross examination, DW.4 admitted that he was examined as RW.2 before the Bar Council of A.P., on behalf of V. Rajagopal, Advocate in the case filed by plaintiff No.1. He denied that he gave two post-dated cheques to Rajagopal, Advocate. He stated that he paid Rs.25,000/- by way of cash to plaintiff No.1 on 22.06.1995 and obtained receipt from him and also obtained receipt for payment of Rs.1,25,000/- to the plaintiff on 24.08.1995. 38. Thus, DW.4 admitted that there were receipts passed by the plaintiff No.1 when the defendant No.1 paid the amount in cash in lieu of cheques. But, the said receipts were not filed before the Court. His contention was that the original receipts were taken by Mr. Rajagopal for filing the same in Complaint Case No.63 of 1996. 38. Thus, DW.4 admitted that there were receipts passed by the plaintiff No.1 when the defendant No.1 paid the amount in cash in lieu of cheques. But, the said receipts were not filed before the Court. His contention was that the original receipts were taken by Mr. Rajagopal for filing the same in Complaint Case No.63 of 1996. Not obtaining the original receipts filed before the Complaint Case No.63 of 1996 and not filing the same before the civil court would raise a strong suspicion over the case of the defendants, particularly, in view of the observation of the Disciplinary Committee No.V of the Bar Council of A.P. wherein the said receipts were sent to the expert and basing on the expert opinion, found them to be fabricated. The Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India observed that as the stand of both RW.1 (Respondent-Advocate) and RW.2 (Harilal, husband of defendant No.1 examined as DW.4 in this case) was that the original money receipts were there with RW.2 which were handed over to RW.1 for production of the same before the Bar Council, under such circumstances, even if the evidence of CW.2 (hand writing expert) was relied upon, any manipulation of forgery of the money receipts on the part of RW.2 could not be ruled out and further observed that in the absence of any cogent material or evidence worth believing, it was not safe to conclude that the advocate had forged the money receipts after returning the post dated cheques to the purchaser. 39. Thus, a suspicion would raise that either the Advocate V. Rajagopal or DW.4 herein might have forged the money receipts. The defendant No.1 ought to have examined the said Advocate Rajagopal to whom he handed over the original receipts, as a witness on his behalf to prove the said fact or ought to have filed the original receipts in proof of his contention of payment of the amounts of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.1,25,000/- in cash in lieu of cheques issued by defendant No.1. 40. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant No.2 was that producing the original cheques by the defendant No.1 itself could be considered as an acknowledgment in proof of payment of money in cash and without the payment of money, the cheques would not have been returned to defendant No.1. 40. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant No.2 was that producing the original cheques by the defendant No.1 itself could be considered as an acknowledgment in proof of payment of money in cash and without the payment of money, the cheques would not have been returned to defendant No.1. But, filing of the original cheques by defendant No.1 itself cannot be considered as proof of payment of cash in lieu of the cheques, when the plaintiff was contending about the collusion between his counsel Rajagopal and defendant No.1 and handing over the original cheques to defendant No.1 by his counsel without his consent and without payment of any cash to him. DW.4 examining on behalf of the Advocate Rajagopal in Complaint Case No.63 of 1996 as RW.2 and non- filing of the receipts in this case, strengthens the allegation of collusion made by the plaintiff against them. The opinion of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of A.P. about the fabrication of receipts was not set aside by the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India. In view of the evidence of handwriting expert before the Bar Council of A.P., the fabrication of receipts is proved which was also affirmed by the Bar Council of India. The Bar Council of India exonerated the advocate from the allegations made against him raising suspicion that the fabrication of receipts by RW.2 cannot be ruled out. As such, the same would prove that there is fabrication of receipts but there is no conclusive proof as to who fabricated them, which probabilises the allegation of forgery and collusion between the Advocate Rajagopal and DW.4. 41. As the plaintiff - vendor was able to prove his case by preponderance of probability that he was not paid full consideration due to the fraud and collusion between defendant No.1 and his Advocate Rajagopal, and as there is a condition precedent incorporated in the sale deed itself that if consideration was not paid in full, the sale deed is liable to be cancelled, the sale is not complete and the sale deed can be cancelled. 42. 42. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants – defendant Nos.1 and 2 that the cheques were not presented by the plaintiff and as the same were not dishonoured empowering the vendors to cancel the sale deed, could not be given much importance, as the evidence of PW.1 would establish that the cheques were kept in the possession of their counsel Sri Rajagopal and that their counsel had returned the cheques to defendant No.1, without the consent of the plaintiff. The conduct of the plaintiff No.1 filing a case against his own Advocate for taking action against him before the Bar Council of A.P. itself would show that he had not received the amount in cash in lieu of the cheques, due to which he went to such an extent of lodging the complaint against his own counsel for handing over the cheques to defendant No.1 without payment of the balance sale consideration amount to him. As such, point No.1 is answered in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs as against the appellants- defendant Nos.1 and 2 holding that the plaintiffs are entitled for cancellation of the sale deed dated 26.05.1995 executed by the original plaintiff (plaintiff No.1) in favour of defendant No.1. 43. POINT No.3: The defendant No.2 examined himself as DW.3. He stated that he purchased the suit schedule property by paying total sale consideration from defendant No.1 through agreement of sale dated 19.12.1996 and ever since the date of purchase he was in possession and enjoyment of the same. He also stated that he constructed a house by investing huge amount. He contended that he was a bonafide purchaser of the suit schedule property. The unregistered agreement of sale dated 19.12.1996 was marked as Ex.B4. The said document was validated by impounding the same on 16.06.2004. No registered sale deed was obtained by defendant No.2 from defendant No.1 in his favour since the date of agreement of sale on 19.12.1996. This itself raises a suspicion over the bonafide nature of the above transaction. As no bonafide purchaser would remain silent without obtaining a registered sale deed executed in his favour after entering into the agreement of sale. It also raises a suspicion over the conduct of defendant Nos.1 and 2 that the agreement of sale was hurriedly executed with a prior date to the date of filing of the suit after receipt of notice from the defendant. It also raises a suspicion over the conduct of defendant Nos.1 and 2 that the agreement of sale was hurriedly executed with a prior date to the date of filing of the suit after receipt of notice from the defendant. No absolute rights over the property could be conveyed through agreement of sale. As such, the defendant No.2 cannot be considered as a bonafide purchaser. 44. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents- plaintiffs was that at the stage of issuing notices, the property was sold by defendant Nos.1 and 2, as such, the doctrine of lis pendens attracts. Even if DW.3 (defendant No.2) is considered as a bonafide purchaser that he purchased the property without notice of prior claim, the doctrine of lis pendens overrides the rights of a bonafide purchaser. No notice either actual or constructive of the pending litigation, is required under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The mere existence of the suit is enough to bind the purchaser. The object of the doctrine is to prevent multiplicity of the litigation during the pendency of suit. The transfer made by defendant No.1 to defendant No.2 conveying the property is subject to the rights declared by the court in the litigation. As such, even though the purchase of property is valid, it would be subject to the outcome of the suit. Defendant No.2 cannot claim any protection on the ground of bonafide purchaser. His remedies lie in seeking restitution or damages from his seller, but he could not avoid the effect of the judgment in the pending suit. As such, point No.2 is answered holding that the agreement made by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 was bound by the doctrine of lis pendens. 45. POINT No.4: As the judgment of the trial court is in accordance with law and facts on record, this Court does not find any illegality to set aside the same. 46. POINT No.5: In the result, both the appeals filed by defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 are dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 25.04.1997 passed in O.S .No.28 of 1997 by the IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. No costs. Miscellaneous Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.