ORAL ORDER : S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR, J. In this petition, petitioner seeks the following reliefs; " a) Quash the impugned proceedings initiated in C.C.No.1503/2023 (CR.No.31/2015) registered for the offence punishable under Section 406 , 409 & 420 OF IPC pending on the file of the learned Additional Civil Judge and JMFC Court, Mudigere (Notified area) Chikkamagalur District in the interest of justice and equity. b) To issue such other order or to issue such other direction as this Hon'ble Court deems fit in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity. c) Pass any such other order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice and equity." 2. Heard learned Senior counsel Mr. Jayakumar S.Patil for Smt. Galagi Sunita Pralhad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and perused the material on record. 3. In addition to reiterating various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner invited my attention to the impugned complaint in order to point out that all the allegations relate to and are reasonably connected to the petitioner's official duties when he was working as a Chief Officer of Notified Area Committee of Kuduremukh. In this context, it is pointed out that in the absence of sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C., to initiate proceedings against the petitioner in relation to the allegations involving performance of official duties, the impugned proceedings deserve to be quashed. 4. In support of the submissions, learned Senior counsel relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of G.C. Manjunath and others vs. Seetaram , [ (2025) 5 SCC 390 ]. 5. Per contra, learned HCGP submits that there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 6. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it is necessary to extract the charge sheet, which reads as under; 7. In the case of G.C. Manjunath (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows; "38. 5. Per contra, learned HCGP submits that there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 6. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it is necessary to extract the charge sheet, which reads as under; 7. In the case of G.C. Manjunath (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows; "38. While dealing with the provisions of Section 197CrPC, read with Section 170 of the Police Act, this Court in D. Devaraja [ D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain , (2020) 7 SCC 695 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 442 ] observed that not every offence committed by a police officer automatically gets this protection. The safeguard under Section 197CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is limited. It applies only if the alleged act is reasonably connected to the officer's official duties. The law does not offer protection if the official role is used as a mere excuse to commit wrongful acts. However, it was held that the protection of prior sanction will be available when there is a reasonable connection between the act and their duty. While enunciating when the protection of prior sanction will be applicable, this Court held that even if a police officer exceeds his official powers, as long as there is a reasonable connection between the act and his duty, they are still entitled to the protection requiring prior sanction. Excessiveness alone does not strip them of this safeguard. The language of both Section 197CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is clear that sanction is required not only for acts done in the discharge of official duty as well as for the acts purported to be done in the discharge of official duty and/or acts done “under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority”. Sanction becomes mandatory if there is a reasonable connection between the act and the officer's official duties, even if the officer acted improperly or exceeded his authority. Therefore, if a complaint against a police officer involves actions reasonably related to his official role, the Court cannot take cognizance unless sanction from the appropriate Government has been obtained under Section 197CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act. 39. The relevant portion from the abovementioned judgment is as follows: (SCC pp. 719-20, paras 66-70) “66. Therefore, if a complaint against a police officer involves actions reasonably related to his official role, the Court cannot take cognizance unless sanction from the appropriate Government has been obtained under Section 197CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act. 39. The relevant portion from the abovementioned judgment is as follows: (SCC pp. 719-20, paras 66-70) “66. Sanction of the Government, to prosecute a police officer, for any act related to the discharge of an official duty, is imperative to protect the police officer from facing harassive, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous proceedings. The requirement of sanction from the Government, to prosecute would give an upright police officer the confidence to discharge his official duties efficiently, without fear of vindictive retaliation by initiation of criminal action, from which he would be protected under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act . At the same time, if the policeman has committed a wrong, which constitutes a criminal offence and renders him liable for prosecution, he can be prosecuted with sanction from the appropriate Government. 67. Every offence committed by a police officer does not attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act . The protection given under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act has its limitations. The protection is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and official duty is not merely a cloak for the objectionable act. An offence committed entirely outside the scope of the duty of the police officer, would certainly not require sanction. To cite an example, a policeman assaulting a domestic help or indulging in domestic violence would certainly not be entitled to protection. However, if an act is connected to the discharge of official duty of investigation of a recorded criminal case, the act is certainly under colour of duty, no matter how illegal the act may be. 68. To cite an example, a policeman assaulting a domestic help or indulging in domestic violence would certainly not be entitled to protection. However, if an act is connected to the discharge of official duty of investigation of a recorded criminal case, the act is certainly under colour of duty, no matter how illegal the act may be. 68. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted in excess of duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the fact that the act alleged is in excess of duty will not be ground enough to deprive the policeman of the protection of the government sanction for initiation of criminal action against him. 69. The language and tenor of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act makes it absolutely clear that sanction is required not only for acts done in discharge of official duty, it is also required for an act purported to be done in discharge of official duty and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority. 70. To decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with the official duty. In the case of an act of a policeman or any other public servant unconnected with the official duty there can be no question of sanction. However, if the act alleged against a policeman is reasonably connected with discharge of his official duty, it does not matter if the policeman has exceeded the scope of his powers and/or acted beyond the four corners of the law.”" 40. Recently, this Court in Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta [ Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta , (2025) 5 SCC 481 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761 ] dealt with the object and purpose of Section 197CrPC which reads as follows: (SCC paras 25-26) “25. … the object and purpose of the said provision is to protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties within the scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to them. … the object and purpose of the said provision is to protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties within the scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to them. A reading of Section 197CrPC would indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take cognizance of such offences which are mentioned in the said provision except with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government when the allegations are made against, inter alia, a public servant. 26. There is no doubt that in the instant case the appellant herein was a public servant but the question is, whether, while discharging her duty as a public servant on the relevant date, there was any excess in the discharge of the said duty which did not require the first respondent herein to take a prior sanction for prosecuting the appellant herein. In this regard, the salient words which are relevant under sub-section (1) of Section 197 are ‘is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction’. Therefore, for the purpose of application of Section 197 , a sine qua non is that the public servant is accused of any offence which had been committed by him in “discharge of his official duty”. The said expression would clearly indicate that Section 197 CrPC would not apply to a case if a public servant is accused of any offence which is de hors or not connected to the discharge of his or her official duty.” (emphasis in original) "41. In light of the aforesaid judgments, the guiding principle governing the necessity of prior sanction stands well crystallised. The pivotal inquiry is whether the impugned act is reasonably connected to the discharge of official duty. If the act is wholly unconnected or manifestly devoid of any nexus to the official functions of the public servant, the requirement of sanction is obviated. Conversely, where there exists even a reasonable link between the act complained of and the official duties of the public servant, the protective umbrella of Section 197CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is attracted. Conversely, where there exists even a reasonable link between the act complained of and the official duties of the public servant, the protective umbrella of Section 197CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is attracted. In such cases, prior sanction assumes the character of a sine qua non, regardless of whether the public servant exceeded the scope of authority or acted improperly while discharging his duty." "46. In the present case, it is evident that the actions attributed to the accused persons emanate from the discharge of their official duties, specifically in connection with the investigation of criminal cases pending against the complainant. As previously observed, a mere excess or overreach in the performance of official duty does not, by itself, disentitle a public servant from the statutory protection mandated by law. The safeguard of obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority, as envisaged under Section 197CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act cannot be rendered nugatory merely because the acts alleged may have exceeded the strict bounds of official duty. In view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that the learned VIIth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erred in taking cognizance of the alleged offences against the accused persons without the requisite sanction for prosecution in the instant case. The absence of the necessary sanction vitiates the very initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused persons. 47. Admittedly, the alleged incident pertains to the period of 1999-2000. Accused 1, 3 and 4 have since passed away. The proceedings now survive solely against Accused 2 and 5. It is pertinent to note that both Accused 2 and Accused 5 retired from service long ago on attaining the age of superannuation; Accused 2 superannuated in the year 2015 and is presently 71 years of age, while Accused 5 retired in the year 2020 and is now 64 years old. In these circumstances, we are of the considered view that no meaningful purpose would be served by prolonging the criminal prosecution against them. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the ends of justice would be adequately met in the instant case by quashing the proceedings against Accused 2 and 5. 48. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal deserves to succeed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the ends of justice would be adequately met in the instant case by quashing the proceedings against Accused 2 and 5. 48. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal deserves to succeed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 17-3-2021 passed by the High Court in N. Hanumanthappa v. Seetaram [N.Hanumanthappa v. See taram, 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 11901 ] , preferred under Section 482 CrPC is hereby set aside. Consequently, Criminal Petition No. 4512 of 2020 stands allowed. As a result, the summoning order dated 7-5-2016 passed by the learned VIIth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru against Accused 2 and 5, as well as the order dated 11-6-2020 passed by the learned LXIst City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City in affirming the same are hereby quashed." 8. Bearing in mind the principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgment, it becomes absolutely clear that all the allegations made against the petitioner involve and revolve around the performance of his official duties and the entire proceedings in the absence of requisite sanction would not be maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 9. In the result, the following; Order (i) Criminal petition is allowed. (ii) The impugned proceedings initiated in C.C.No.1503/2023 arising out of Crime No.31/2015 for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 409, 420 of IPC pending on the file of the Additional Civil Judge and JMFC Court, Mudigere, is quashed.