JUDGMENT : Chandra Shekhar Jha, J. Heard Mr. Ranjan Kumar Jha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Kunal Tiwary, learned AC to GA-II, for the State. 2. The present writ application preferred by aforementioned six petitioners under section 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, with following prayers and for reliefs: “(I) For quashing the prosecution of the petitioners in connection with Katihar Town (Sahayak) P.S. Case No.403 of 2018 dated 25.06.2018 in respect whereof a written report was filed by the Respondent no.4 before the Respondent no.3 on 25.06.2018, attributing offences under Section 409/34 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that since the petitioners were not at all connected with preparation and approval of the estimate of the scheme in question even if a wrong provision was made in the estimate of aforesaid scheme, the petitioners had committed no offence, if they had executed the work strictly in accordance with the estimate prepared by other accused persons and approved by the Chief Engineer. (II) For issuance any other appropriate writ/writs,order/orders, direction/directions for which the writ petitioners would be found entitled under the facts and circumstances of the case.” Substantial Question of Law involved in the present writ application. “(1) WHETHER, the prosecution of the petitioners in the instant case would be misuse of the process of the court and ,therefore, it is liable to be quashed qua the petitioners ? (II) WHETHER, if it is not the allegation that the petitioners have any role in preparation of estimate for any wrong provision made in the estimate by the others can be a ground for prosecution of the petitioners ? (III) WHETHER, if after the irregularity in respect of item no.9 of the scheme in question was pointed out by the Flying Squad and on the basis of its recommendation, the payment made to the contractor in item no.9 of the estimate was already recovered and was credited to the government account, the department and/or the informant had any occasion to lodge First Information Report against the petitioners ? (IV) Whether the prosecution of the petitioners is otherwise bad in law?” Prayer of the petitioners in the present writ application may reads as under: “It is, therefore, prayed that to admit this application, issue Rule NISI, calling upon the Respondents to show cause as to why this application be not admitted or disposed of at the time of Admission Stage itself and on return of the Rule, if no sufficient cause is shown,make the Rule absolute, allow this application and after hearing the parties be further pleased to quash the prosecution of the petitioners in connection with Katihar Town (Sahayak) P.S. Case No.403 of 2018 dated 25.06.2018 pending in the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katihar AND/OR Pass such other order or orders as this court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. AND During the pendency of this writ application, the further proceeding of Katihar Town (Sahayak) P.S. Case No.403 of 2018 dated 25.06.2018 pending in the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katihar the petitioners may kindly be stayed.” Facts of the case with date of events Sl.No . Date Events 1. A decision was taken by the Water Resources Department for raising and strengthening of Mahananda River Right and Left Embankment with other allied works for protection of public at large which was being affected by the flood of river Mahananda. The said scheme was being sponsored by Ganga Flood Control Commission (Government of India). 2. The Water Resources Department, Bihar was notified as the Nodal Agency to implement the aforesaid scheme of Government of India. The Flood Control Division, Katihar was declared as Nodal Division for the aforesaid scheme. 3. 06.04.2010 (Anne-P-1) The estimate was prepared by the Flood Control Division, Katihar which was signed by Sri Jai Prakash Chaudhary and Sri Ram Ekbal Sinha in the capacity of Junior Engineers. It was signed by Sri Mukhlal Ram and Sri Subhash Rai in the capacity of Assistant Engineer and by Sri Upendra and Sri Mod Narayan Chaudhary in the capacity of Executive Engineer and Engineer respectively. 4. The petitioners were not associated with the preparation of estimate of said scheme in any manner whatsoever. 5. The administrative approval of the scheme was approved by the Government of Bihar after concurrence of G.F.C.C.(Wing of Central Government). 6. 4. The petitioners were not associated with the preparation of estimate of said scheme in any manner whatsoever. 5. The administrative approval of the scheme was approved by the Government of Bihar after concurrence of G.F.C.C.(Wing of Central Government). 6. The estimate of the scheme so prepared was approved by the Chief Engineer. 7. A tender notice was issued for selection of Contractor. 8. After following the procedure for finalizing the contract, the Tender Committee of the department constituted in the headquarter had awarded the contract of said scheme to M/s G.S. Co. Infrastructure Private Ltd. of Chandigarh. 9. After the work was allotted to the aforesaid company, the company proceeded with the work under the supervision of the petitioners and it was successfully discharging its contractual obligation in view of the provisions made in the estimate. 10. While the work was in progress, it was supervised by the Quality Control Division of the Department and Senior Engineers on times without number and no fault was found either with the work done by the contractor or with the estimate. 11. June, 2013 The work was complete in June, 2013. 12. On receipt of some complaints, a Flying Squad was appointed to enquire and report on the complaint. 13. 25.07.2016 (Anne-P-2) The Flying Squad reported irregularities with respect to item no.9 of the estimate. 14. 23.03.2017 (Anne-P-3) The money paid to the contractor under item no.9 of the estimate was recovered from the contractor and it was credited to the government account. 15. 07.07.2017 (Anne-P-4) The Executive Engineer Flood Control Division, Katihar informed the department about the recovery and closure of agreement with the Contractor. 16. The show cause notices were issued to the petitioners and the petitioners filed their response wherein they had categorically stated that they were not connected with the preparation of estimate in any manner whatsoever and therefore, they should not be penalized for an irregularities even since it was not done by them. 17. When the aforesaid File was placed before the Internal Vigilance Wing of the Water Resources Department, it was opined by Vigilance Wing of the department that if this irregularity would not have been detected by the Flying Squad, the government had suffered a financial loss of public money. 18. A direction was issued by the department to lodge the First Information Report. 19. 18. A direction was issued by the department to lodge the First Information Report. 19. 25.06.2018 (Anne-P-6) The Respondent no.4 filed a written report before the Respondent no.3 upon which the Respondent no.3 instituted a formal First Information Report and registered a case being Katihar Town (Sahayak) P.S. Case No. 403 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 409/34 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. Mr. Ranjan Kumar Jha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that in the year 2010, the petitioner no. 1 was posted as an Assistant Engineer in the Flood Control Division, Salmari of the Water Resource Department., Bihar. The petitioner no. 2 was posted in the capacity of Junior Engineer (JE), whereas petitioner nos. 5 and 6 were posted there in the capacity of Executive Engineer and Assistant Engineer, respectively, in the same Division. It is further submitted that so far as petitioner nos. 3 and 4 are concerned, they were posted as JEs in the Flood Control Division, Katihar, at the relevant time. 4. It is submitted by Mr. Jha that in the year 2010, a decision was taken by the Water Resource Department for raising and strengthening the height of the right and left embankments of the Mahananda River crossing the district of Katihar with other allied works for the protection of the public at large, which was being affected by the flood of the river Mahananda. The exercise was taken under the Flood Management Scheme (in short, ‘FMS’), Phase-1, which was sponsored by the Govt. of India. It is submitted that the Water Resources Department, Bihar was notified as its Nodal Agency to implement the aforesaid scheme of the Govt. of India. 5. It is further submitted that for the aforesaid exercise, an estimate was drawn and prepared by the Flood Control Division (in short, ‘FCD’), Katihar, without any participation of petitioner nos. 3 & 4 despite of their posting over there. It is pointed out that the prepared estimate, as aforesaid, was signed by Sri Jai Prakash Choudhary and Sri Ram Ekbal Sinha, in the capacity of Junior Engineers. The document was further endorsed by Sri Mukhlal Ram and Sri Subhash Rai in their official capacity as Assistant Engineers, and was subsequently approved and signed by Sri Upendra and Sri Mod Nrayan Chaudhary in their capacity as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer respectively. The document was further endorsed by Sri Mukhlal Ram and Sri Subhash Rai in their official capacity as Assistant Engineers, and was subsequently approved and signed by Sri Upendra and Sri Mod Nrayan Chaudhary in their capacity as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer respectively. The aforesaid estimate/cost of scheme dated 06.04.02010 is annexed with the petition as Annexure ‘P-1’. 6. It is further submitted by Mr. Jha that the aforesaid scheme was sent for technical sanction to the Chief Engineer of the Department, which was also technically sanctioned by him. The aforesaid estimate was forwaeded to the Government of India for investment clearance through the G.F.C.C. In pursuance thereof, a tender notice was issued for the selection of a contractor , and upon completion of the requisite procedure for finalization of the contract, the Tender Committee of the Department, constituted at the Headquarters, awarded the contract pertaining to the said scheme to M/S 16 G.S. Co. Infrastructure Private Limited of Chnadigarh (hereinafter referred to as the “Company”). It is pointed out that at the time of the award of the contract to the aforesaid contractor, the estimate of the scheme was verified by the tender committee, rate-wise and item-wise, but no fault was found thereof. 7. In the aforesaid context, it is further submitted that the Company commenced execution of the assigned work, as detailed hereinabove, under the supervision of the petitioners, and wass duly discharging its contractual obligations in accordance with the provisions stipulated in the sanctioned estimate. Since the work was being executed in accordance with the specifications laid down in the sanctioned estimate, the petitioners, in their respective official capacities prepared the Measurement Book reflecting the work carried out by the Contractor, strictly within the scope and provisions of the said estimate. 8. It is pointed out that only after satisfactory work, the payment was made to the contractor after approval of the department, and no fault was found at any level. The work, as aforesaid, was completed in the year 2013, and thereafter, certain complaints were received against the contractor and department, pursuant to which a Flying Squad was constituted to verify the allegation raised through different complaints. 9. It is submitted by Mr. The work, as aforesaid, was completed in the year 2013, and thereafter, certain complaints were received against the contractor and department, pursuant to which a Flying Squad was constituted to verify the allegation raised through different complaints. 9. It is submitted by Mr. Jha, that Flying Squad Circle No. 1 of the Water Resource Department conducted an enquiry and submitted its report to the Principal Secretary of the Department on 25.07.2016, pointing out certain irregularities with respect to item no. 9 of the estimate, which was not technically required to be provided for a scheme of raising, strengthening and brick soling of an embankment, and, therefore, it was recommended for recovery of the amount already paid to the contractor under item no. 9 of the estimate, which is evident from the report dated 25.07.2016 annexed with the present petition as Annexure ‘P-2’. 10. It is also submitted by Mr. Jha that in view of the recommendation of the Flying Squad, corrective measures were immediately taken and money paid to the contractor under item no. 9 of the estimate was recovered from the contractor and was credited to the account of the department on 23.03.2017. Thus, no amount of government money was misappropriated by the petitioners, which is evident from the copy of the transfer entry order dated 23.03.02017, annexed as Annexure ‘P-3’ with the petition. 11. It is also submitted that with the aforesaid recovery, the Flood Control Department, Katihar, informed the department about the recovery and closure of the agreement with the contractor vide letter no. 708 dated 07.07.2017, which is annexed as Annexure ‘P-4’ with the present writ application. 12. It is pointed out that, surprisingly, vide letter no.647 dated 08.05.2017 and letter no. 380 dated 08.03.2017, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner nos. 1 and 2, whereafter petitioner nos. 1 and 2 filed their response on 27.11.2017 and 02.05.2018 respectively, wherein both these petitioners categorically stated that they were not connected with the preparation of estimate in any manner, as submitted aforesaid, and they are not concerned with any irregularities. The same reply was also filed by petitioner no. 6. Petitioner no. 5 already retired by that time, i.e. in the year 2012 itself; therefore, no show cause notice was received by him. 13. The same reply was also filed by petitioner no. 6. Petitioner no. 5 already retired by that time, i.e. in the year 2012 itself; therefore, no show cause notice was received by him. 13. It is submitted that when the aforesaid matter was placed before the Internal Vigilance Wing of the Water Resource Department, it was opined by the Vigilance Wing of the Department that if this irregularity had not been detected by the Flying Squad, the government would have suffered a financial loss of public money and merely on the basis of opinion and assumption, Departmental Vigilance Wing, issued a direction to lodge the present First Information Report, in response of which the respondent no. 4 filed a written information/report before respondent no. 3 on 25.06.2018 alleging attempt to cause wrongful loss to the State but without attributing any specific allegation against any of the accused persons named by him in his written report, whereafter, respondent no. 3, who is the SHO Katihar Town, lodged the present FIR being Katihar Town (Sahayak) P.S. Case No. 403 of 2018 dated 25.06.2018 for the offences punishable under Sections 409/34 of the I.P.C., which is also annexed with the present petition as Annexure ‘P-6’ (Prayed to quash). 14. It is submitted that the allegation, as discussed aforesaid, does not constitute a prima-facie case qua attempt for the offence punishable under section 409 of the I.P.C. and, therefore, the FIR in issue be quashed and set aside in view of legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Others. reported in 1999 Supp (1) SCC 335. 15. While concluding the argument, it is further submitted by Mr. Jha that, besides the aforesaid discussed merit, as available for quashing of the present FIR, another important ground to quash the FIR in issue is the delay in investigation, which is pending for the last seven (7) years against petitioners, as the FIR in issue was lodged on 25.06.2018. In support of his submission, Mr. Jha relied upon the legal report of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Pankaj Kumar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2008) 16 SCC 117 ; Biswanath Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 97; Santosh De Vs. Archna Guha and others , reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 735 and N. Raghavender Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2008) 16 SCC 117 ; Biswanath Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 97; Santosh De Vs. Archna Guha and others , reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 735 and N. Raghavender Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (20210 18 SCC 70. 16. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, filed a counter affidavit on 09.10.2020, submitted that the petitioners, being technical persons, were posted thereof and actively participated in the alleged payment to the company for unwanted work mentioned at item no. 9 of the contract. Being technical persons they must have pointed it out, but it is fairly conceded that the extra payment qua item no. 9 was immediately returned to the department by the company and the allegation is only limited to an attempt to commit the alleged offence. It is also submitted that the investigation of this case is still pending qua petitioners. 17. This Court perused the material available on record and canvassed the argument as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. It is also submitted that the investigation of this case is still pending qua petitioners. 17. This Court perused the material available on record and canvassed the argument as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. It would be apposite to reproduce the FIR being Katihar Town (Sahayak) P.S. Case No. 403 of 2018 dated 25.06.2018, for better understanding of the factual aspects of this case, which is as under: dk;Zikyd vfHk;ark dk dk;kZy;] ck<+ fu;a=.k ize.My] dfVgkjA i=kad --------617@dfVkgj] fnukad ---------------25&26@2018 lsok esa] Fkkuk/;{k egksn;] lgk;d Fkkuk] fejppkbZckM+h] dfVgkjA fo"k;%& izkFkfedh ntZ djus ds laca/k esaA izlax%& foHkkxh; i=kad&la0& 22@fu0fl0 ¼iw0½&01&07@2014@1181 fnukad & 25-05-2018 ,oa eq[; vfHk;ark] ck<+ fu;a=.k ,oa ty fuLlj.k] ty lalk/ku foHkkx] dfVgkj dk i=kad 1433 fnukad 21-06-2018 egk'k;] mijksDr fo"k;d izklafxd i= ds lanHkZ eas lwfpr djuk gS fd ck<+ fu;a=.k izeaMy dfVgkj ,oa ck<+ fu;a=.k izeaMy lkyekjh }kjk o"kZ 2010 ls o"kZ 2013 rd vij egkuUnk Qst&1 ds v/khu egkuUnk unh ds nkW;s ,oa ckW;s rVca/k esa djk;s x;s dk;ksZa dh tkWp foHkkxh; mM+unLrk tkWp ny }kjk dh xbZA foHkkxh; mM+unLrk tkWp ny }kjk ik;k x;k fd jksfyax dEisD'ku en esa vuko';d :i ls 76-69 yk[k #i;s dk izko/kku izkDdyu esa fd;k x;k FkkA fØ;kfUor djus okys vfHk;arkvksa }kjk laosnd dks bl en esa 53-52 yk[k Hkqxrku fd;k x;k Fkk ftldh olwyh mM+unLrk tkWp ny }kjk izfrosnu nsus ds ckn laosnd ls dj yh xbZ gSA mM+unLrk tkWp ny ds izfrosnu dh foHkkxh; leh{kk ds Øe esa izkDdyu rS;kj djus okys] izkDdyu dh Lohd`fr nsus okys ,oa dk;Z djkus okys 20 vfHk;arksvksa dks feV~Vh ds dEisD'ku en esa nks ckj izko/kku fd;s tkus ds dkj.k laosnd dks Wrongful Gain ,oa ljdkj dks Wrongful loss djkus ds iz;kl dk nks"kh ik;k x;k tks ,d vkijkf/kd d`R; gSA bu vfHk;arkvksa ds fØ;kdyki dks vijkf/kd dksVh dk ekurs gq, izkFkfedh ntZ djus dk vkns'k izklafxd foHkkxh; i= }kjk lalwfpr gSA ck<+ fu;a=.k izeaMy dfVgkj ds dk;Zikyd vfHk;ark uksMy inkf/kdkjh ds :i esa ukfer FksA blfy, v/kksgLrk{kjh }kjk funs'kkuqlkj mM+unLrk tkWp esa nks"kh ik;s x;s vfHk;arkvksa ij izkFkfedh ntZ djus gsrq vkosnu fn;k tk jgk gSA vkosnu ds lkFk izklafxr i=kas dh Nk;k izfr ,oa mM+unLrk tkWp ny dk 670 i`"Bksa dk tkWp izfrosnu layXu fd;k tk jgk gSA vuqjks/k gS fd uhps mYysf[kr vfHk;arkvksa ij izkFkfedh ntZ dj dkuwuh dkjZokbZ djuk pkgsaxsa rFkk ntZ izkFkfedh la[;k ls v/kksgLrk{kjh dks voxr djkuk pkgsaxs] rkfd foHkkxh; mPpinkf/kdkfj;ksa dks lwfpr fd;k tk ldsA fo'oklHkktu g0@& vLi"V dk;Zikyd vfHk;ark ck<+ fu;a=.k izeaMy] dfVgkj LFkk;h irk%& xzke$iks0&lSni qj Fkkuk%& xksikyiqj] ftyk%&Hkkxyiqj eks0&7463889238 18. It would further be apposite to reproduce section 409 of the I.P.C. which reads as under: “409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent. Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 19. Taking note of submissions and counter submissions, and also upon perusal of the record, it transpires that petitioners were not members of the estimate committee in terms of the letter dated 25.07.2016. It also transpires that estimate was approved at all higher levels including by the Technical Committee. It is also an admitted position that the payment was received by the Company, which has not been arrayed as an accused in this case. The non- impleadment of the Company, despite its receipt of the payment, raises serious questions regarding the propriety and fairness of the proceedings. 20. Admittedly, the payment for unwanted work out of certain irregularities in item no. 9 as received by the Company was returned to the department, which is apparent through the letter dated 23.03.2017. 21. It is the settled position of law that to constitute an offence under section 409 of the IPC, there must be ‘entrustment’ along with ‘breach of trust’. It is an admitted position that the work was under execution after approval from the higher level, and the petitioners were only monitoring the work on site in terms of the contractual obligation of the Company, and, in view of the same, it cannot be said that any entrustment of property was with them. The gravamen of the offence of criminal misappropriation lies in the presence of a dishonest intention in dealing with the property belonging to another. There is no retention of property even for a moment with the petitioners. This is a case of extra payment by the department to the Company, where even an estimate was not prepared by the petitioners, which was immediately returned to the department when it was brought to the knowledge of the Company. There is no retention of property even for a moment with the petitioners. This is a case of extra payment by the department to the Company, where even an estimate was not prepared by the petitioners, which was immediately returned to the department when it was brought to the knowledge of the Company. This may be a case of irregular payment but cannot be said by any stretch of prudent imagination as an attempt qua criminal breach of trust. The allegation, as alleged in the FIR prima facie not appear to constitute the legal ingredients of the alleged offence under section 409 of the IPC qua petitioners. 22. It would be apposite to reproduce paras 41, 45 & 46 of N. Raghavender’s case (supra), which reads as under for ready reference: “41. We may point out that in the case before us, neither the trial court or the High Court has discussed the ingredients of Sections 409, 420, or 477-AIPC, nor have they made any effort to refer to the specific evidence which may satisfy such ingredients. There is no gainsaying that the role of the trial court and the High Court is not just to decipher and bring to light the relevant evidence, but also to apply the relevant laws to the factual matrix before it. It further appears that the courts below have interchanged and mixed up the allegations against the appellant. While the charges were framed primarily with respect to the issuance of the three loose cheques and the alleged unlawful withdrawal of Rs 10 lakhs from Account No. 282, the courts below have proceeded to convict the appellant on the ground that he prematurely and fraudulently enchased the two FDRs, which stood in the name of B. Satyajit Reddy. 45. Section 409IPC pertains to criminal breach of trust by a public servant or a banker, in respect of the property entrusted to him. The onus is on the prosecution to prove that the accused, a public servant or a banker was entrusted with the property which he is duly bound to account for and that he has committed criminal breach of trust. (See Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 547 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 979 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 638] ) 46. (See Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 547 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 979 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 638] ) 46. The entrustment of public property and dishonest misappropriation or use thereof in the manner illustrated under Section 405 are a sine qua non for making an offence punishable under Section 409IPC. The expression “criminal breach of trust” is defined under Section 405IPC which provides, inter alia, that whoever being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over a property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property contrary to law, or in violation of any law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or contravenes any legal contract, express or implied, etc. shall be held to have committed criminal breach of trust. Hence, to attract Section 405IPC, the following ingredients must be satisfied: 46.1. Entrusting any person with property or with any dominion over property. 46.2. That person has dishonestly misappropriated or converted that property to his own use. 46.3. Or that person is dishonestly using or disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation of any direction of law or a legal contract.” 23. As far second submission as raised by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners I.e., qua inordinate delay of investigation, it appears that admittedly the investigation of this case is pending for last seven (7) years, which appears prima facie the violation of the right of the speedy trial of petitioners/accused as available under article 21 of the Constitution of India. 24. It would further be apposite to reproduce the para nos. 25 to 28 of the Pankaj Kumar Case (supra), which reads as under:- “25. Though, it is true that the plea with regard to inordinate delay in investigations and trial has been raised before us for the first time but we feel that at this distant point of time, it would be unfair to the appellant to remit the matter back to the High Court for examining the said plea of the appellant. Though, it is true that the plea with regard to inordinate delay in investigations and trial has been raised before us for the first time but we feel that at this distant point of time, it would be unfair to the appellant to remit the matter back to the High Court for examining the said plea of the appellant. Apart from the fact that it would further protract the already delayed trial, no fruitful purpose would be served as learned counsel for the State very fairly stated before us that he had no explanation to offer for the delay in investigations and the reason why the trial did not commence for eight long years. Nothing, whatsoever, could be pointed out, far from being established, to show that the delay was in any way attributable to the appellant. 26 . Moreover, having regard to the nature of the accusations against the appellant, briefly referred to above, who was a young boy of about eighteen years of age in the year 1981, when the acts of omission and commission were allegedly committed by the concerns managed by his parents, who have since died, we feel that the extreme mental stress and strain of prolonged investigation by the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the sword of Damocles hanging perilously over his head for over fifteen years must have wrecked his entire career. 27. Be that as it may, the prosecution has failed to show any exceptional circumstance, which could possibly be taken into consideration for condoning the prolongation of investigation and the trial. The lackadaisical manner of investigation spread over a period of four years in a case of this type and inordinate delay of over eight years (excluding the period when the record of the trial court was in the High Court), is manifestly clear. 28. Thus, on facts in hand, we are convinced that the appellant has been denied his valuable constitutional right to a speedy investigation and trial and, therefore, criminal proceedings initiated against him in the year 1987 and pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Latur, deserve to be quashed on this short ground alone.” 25. In this context, it would be apposite to reproduce the para no. 5 of the Biswanath Prasad Case (supra), which reads as under:- “5. It is true that the charges against the appellant relate to misappropriation of public funds. In this context, it would be apposite to reproduce the para no. 5 of the Biswanath Prasad Case (supra), which reads as under:- “5. It is true that the charges against the appellant relate to misappropriation of public funds. In such a case, we should take a more stricter view as indicated in the Constitution Bench decision in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701 ] . But there are certain circumstances in this case which induce us to interfere in the matter. The most glaring one is that even though the FIR was issued on 10-12- 1977, the charge-sheet was filed only on 5-2- 1983, i.e., after a lapse of 5 years. No explanation is forthcoming for this extraordinary delay. Maybe, this being a case of misappropriation of public funds, the investigation may have taken a longer time but it cannot certainly take more than five years, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Added to the said circumstance is the fact that even though there was no stay in this special leave petition/criminal appeal, the case has not progressed much as stated above. Moreover, the appellant has been dismissed from service on these very allegations. His provident fund and gratuity amounts have been forfeited and he has crossed the age of superannuation. Calling upon him now to enter upon defence, after 16 years, in all the facts and circumstances of the case, is bound to cause prejudice to him.” 26. It would further be apposite to reproduce the para nos. 4, 6 and 18 of the Santosh De Case (supra), which reads as under:- “4. A few relevant facts may be stated. The respondent was the Director of Mines, Government of Bihar. A raid was conducted on his premises and certain amount of cash and jewellery recovered. On 27-3-1978, a preliminary charge-sheet was filed under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The substance of the charge was that the respondent was in possession of assets beyond the known sources of his income. On 15-12-1982, the Government of Bihar refused to grant sanction for prosecuting the respondent, which was required under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. For that reason — or any other, as the case may be — no final charge- sheet was filed. On 15-12-1982, the Government of Bihar refused to grant sanction for prosecuting the respondent, which was required under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. For that reason — or any other, as the case may be — no final charge- sheet was filed. Yet the proceedings were kept pending. It is in these circumstances that the respondent approached the High Court by way of a writ petition which was allowed. We are also told that in the criminal appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, this Court made an order on 23-11-1987 permitting the parties to lead evidence with the restriction that no further proceedings shall be taken in the matter. Taking advantage of the said interim order, it appears, sanction for prosecution was accorded by the State Government on 29-3-1990 but it is stated by the learned counsel for the respondent, no statements of witnesses were recorded in the case. Meanwhile, the respondent retired from service on 30-11-1991. 6. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the delay in conduct of the case has been caused by the accused- respondent. From 1978 to 1986 and again from November 1987 till this day, there has been no progress in the case. Not a single witness has been examined so far. In these circumstances, following the principles enunciated in Abdul Rehman Antulay v.R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] , the judgment of the High Court is affirmed and the criminal appeal is dismissed. 18. While we appreciate that a serious criminal offence might have taken place at the hands of Respondents 1 to 9, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that almost 17 years have elapsed since the date of that occurrence and there are these several delays pointed out earlier which remain unexplained. We think that in the circumstances the rights of Respondents 1 to 9 to a speedy trial have been breached and no interference with the judgment under appeal is called for. The appeal is dismissed. 27. And in para 102 of the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has provided the guidelines, which are being reproduced hereunder for a ready reference: ‘ 102. The appeal is dismissed. 27. And in para 102 of the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has provided the guidelines, which are being reproduced hereunder for a ready reference: ‘ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.’’ 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion and by taking note of the fact that the allegation as made in the FIR does not constitute any prima facie offence punishable under section 409 of the IPC qua petitioners, rather it only suggests irregular payment to the Company, out of contractual obligation, where petitioners not even appears to be a part of estimate committee and, moreover, the payment made for unwanted work as per the report of flying squad committee immediately returned to the department by the accused/company, therefore, FIR being Katihar Town (Sahayak) P.S. Case No. 403 of 2018 dated 25.06.2018, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katihar, is hereby quashed/set aside qua above-named petitioners with consequential proceedings, if any. 29. Accordingly, the present writ application stands allowed. 30. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned trial court/concerned court immediately.