JUDGMENT : The Second Appeal has been filed against the Judgment and Decree passed in A.S.No.537 of 1999 dated 25.01.2002 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Trichy reversing the Judgment and Decree passed in O.S.No.5 of 1994 dated 27.02.1998 on the file of the District Munsif, Musiri. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their ranking in the Trial Court. 3. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.5 of 1994 on the file of the District Munsif, Musiri are the appellants herein. 4. The case of the plaintiffs is that the portion marked as BCEF in plaint plan (marked as Ex P-1) is suit 'B' schedule property. The portion marked as EFGH in plaint plan A-1 is suit 'A' schedule property. Originally, ABEFCD portion in the plaint belonged to Vaiyapuri Chettiar. The wife of Vaiyapuri Chettiar inherited the property and sold suit 'B' schedule property to one Mookan Chettiar through Ex.A3 dated 06.06.1918. Thereafter, the wife of said Mookan Chettiar sold the said property to one Rathinammal through Ex.A4 dated 22.06.1955. Thereafter, the said Rathinammal sold the said property to 1 st plaintiff through Ex.A5 dated 11.05.1968. When the said property was under the possession and enjoyment of the 1 st plaintiff, the defendants asked the 1 st plaintiff to sell said property to them, however, she refused. Enraged by this, the defendants highhandedly encroached and put up construction in the 'B' schedule property. The construction put up by the defendants is shown as 'C' schedule in the plaint. The 'A' schedule property was bought by the 2 nd plaintiff, who is none else than the son of the 1 st plaintiff from one Pichai Chettiar S/o Rathinammal through Ex.A6 dated 02.09.1993. As the defendants have created documents and claimed that the property purchased by the 1 st plaintiff is 'A' schedule and not 'B' schedule and further they claimed ownership over 'B' schedule through Ex.B1, the suit was constrained to be filed to declare that the 1 st plaintiff is the sole, absolute and exclusive owner of the suit 'B' Schedule property and to deliver possession of the 'B' schedule property to the first plaintiff and to grant a mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiffs directing the defendants to remove the construction in 'C' schedule property. 5. The defendants filed a written statement and contested suit. 5. The defendants filed a written statement and contested suit. It is denied that the subject matter of conveyance under 22.06.1955 sale deed was a schedule property. It is false to state that Rathinam Ammal vendee under sale deed was put into possession of 'B' schedule property and in pursuance of said sale deed, she has been in enjoyment of 'B' schedule property openly, peacefully, continuously and uninterruptedly for more than that the statutory period of limitation and thus, she had perfected title by adverse possession also in respect of 'B' schedule property. As mentioned supra, the subject matter of conveyance under sale deed dated 22-6-1955 was only a schedule property and Lakshmi Ammal was in enjoyment of A schedule property only. The averments in para 11 of the plaint are totally false. The first plaintiff purchased under sale deed dated 11-5-1968 from prior owner Rathinam Ammal only 'A' schedule property and since 'A' schedule property was situated adjacent west of Akkandi Chettiar manai, it has been rightly described in said sale deed as west of Akkandi Chettiar manai. The first plaintiff has purchased under sale deed only 'A' schedule property and she has been in possession and enjoyment of 'A' schedule property only and she has perfected title to A schedule property only by adverse possession also. The averments to the contra in para 11 of plaint are totally false. Even in the partition deed dated 09-07-1993, it is held that in 2 nd defendant's family owner of 'A' schedule property is derived to Arumugham Chettiar H/o Kailasam Ammal. The averments in para 12 of plaint are not fully correct. It is true that the managers of Chatram purchased ABCD property under sale deed dated 28-7-1993 from Beerala Ammal and 2 others. By mistake in that sale deed western boundary was wrongly described as Arumugham Chettiar manai. Taking advantage of that wrong description, the plaintiff wants to claim title to schedule property in 1 st plaintiff's family. The first plaintiff has forgotten the fact that in her sale deed dated 11-5-1968 western boundary was rightly described as Akkandy Chettiar manai. The averments in para 13 of plaint are totally false. It is false to state that Lakshmi Ammal has been under the care and protection of Rathinam Ammal since she was residing at Thatiengarpettai. The first plaintiff has forgotten the fact that in her sale deed dated 11-5-1968 western boundary was rightly described as Akkandy Chettiar manai. The averments in para 13 of plaint are totally false. It is false to state that Lakshmi Ammal has been under the care and protection of Rathinam Ammal since she was residing at Thatiengarpettai. It is equally false to state that after the demise of Lakshmi Ammal, Rathinam Ammal has taken possession of 'A' schedule property for her share from Akkandy Chettiar and others and she has been in enjoyment of 'A' schedule property for many years more than the statutory period of limitation. 6. It is further stated that the averments in para 14 of plaint are totally false. Pichal Chettiar never inherited 'A' schedule property from her mother. It is equally false to state that on behalf of Pichai Chettiar, the first plaintiff's husband has been enjoying the 'A' schedule property. Pichai Chettiar has no title to 'A' schedule property. Pichal Chettiar has no right and competency to sell 'A' schedule property to the 2 nd plaintiff under sale deed dated 02-09-1993. When Pichal Chettiar's mother Rathinagiri Ammal sold 'A' schedule property under sale deed 11.05.1960 to Kailasam Ammal, the said Pitchai Chettiar knowing fully well the contents of said sale deed, has attested the sale deed. In that sale deed, it has been clearly stated that said property is situated adjacent west of Akkandy Chettiar manai. Hence, A schedule property was already sold by his mother to Kailasam under sale deed dated 11-05-1968. Hence, the said Pichat Chettiar has no right to convey again same A schedule property to the 2 nd plaintiff under sale deed dated 02-09-1993. After knowing the mistaken boundary recitals in sale deed dated 23-07-1993 in favour of one Balasubramaniam and another trustee Pichal Chettiar, he has created the sale deed in favour of the 2 nd plaintiff under sale deed dated 02-09-1993, as if he has got right to convey the A schedule property again. The sale deed dated 02.09.1993 in favour of the 2 nd plaintiff is a void document. The said sale deed cannot confer any title much less valid title in favour of the 2 nd plaintiff in respect of A schedule property. The sale deed dated 02.09.1993 in favour of the 2 nd plaintiff is a void document. The said sale deed cannot confer any title much less valid title in favour of the 2 nd plaintiff in respect of A schedule property. The 2 nd plaintiff and his vendor have never been in enjoyment of A schodule property at any point of time much less for more than the statutory period of limitation and the plaintiff has no prescribed title to A schedule property by adverse possession also. The B schedule property was purchased by another Balasubramaniam and one Veerappa Chettiar as trustees of Chatram under sale deed dated 01-12-1993 from Sivamanikkam for Rs.3,500/ and trustees of said Chatram were put into possession of B schedule property in pursuance of said sale deed. The said vendor Sivamanikkan Chettiar in turn purchased said B schedule property under sale deed dated 03.04.1959 from prior owner Kamalathammal. Thus, another Balasubramaniyam and his vendors have been in possession and enjoyment of B schedule property openly, continuously, peacefully and uninterruptedly for more than several statutory periods and they have in any event prescribed title to B schedule property by adverse possession also. 7. On the basis of the above said pleas set out by the respective parties, the following issues were framed by the Trial Court for consideration: 8. Before the Trial Court, on the side of the plaintiffs, two witnesses have been examined as P.W.1 and P.W.2 and 7 documents have been marked as Ex.A1 to Ex.A7. On the side of the defendants, the third defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and examined another witnesses as D.W2 and D.W.3 and marked 5 documents as Ex.B1 to Ex.B5. 9. The Trial Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence, decreed the suit as prayed for and dismissed the suit with regard to mesne profits and directed the defendants 3 and 4 to remove the construction upon C schedule property within a period of three months. Aggrieved by this, the defendants filed the appeal in A.S.No.537 of 1999 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Trichy. The First Appellate Court, by its Judgment dated 25.01.2002 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved by this, the plaintiffs filed the present second appeal. 10. Aggrieved by this, the defendants filed the appeal in A.S.No.537 of 1999 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Trichy. The First Appellate Court, by its Judgment dated 25.01.2002 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved by this, the plaintiffs filed the present second appeal. 10. While admitting the second appeal, this Court has formulated the following substantial questions of law:- “Whether the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are sustainable in law as they have not considered the entire evidence to decide the issue and the relevant provisions of law applicable to the facts of the case?.” 11. The learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs submitted that the finding of the First Appellate Court is erroneous and unsustainable and it failed to give valid reason for reversing the judgement of the Trial Court and ignored the boundaries mentioned in the documents Exs.A3, A4 and A5 which are related to B schedule property. The First Appellate Court overlooked the fact that Mookan Chettiar and Akkandi Chettiar are pangalies and only due to the relationship Akkandi Chettiar was shown as the owner of the eastern site in Ex.A5 sale deed. The First Appellate Court failed to consider the fact that in the sale deed in favour of the defendants 3 and 4 dated 28.07.1993 which was marked as Ex.A7 /Ex.B1, the eastern boundary was shown as appellants property which will clearly establish that the appellant has got title in respect of B schedule property. The First Appellate Court failed to consider the fact that in the document Ex.A3 and A4, eastern boundary was shown as the property belonging to Mookan Chettiar family. 12. The learned counsel further submitted that even in Ex.B1, it is mentioned that the eastern boundary in property belongs to Arumugam Chettiar. DW1 also admitted in his evidence that Arumugam Chettiar referred to in Ex.B1 is none else than the husband of 1 st plaintiff. The defendant has come up with faint explanation that their Eastern boundary is mistakenly mentioned belong to 1 st plaintiff. It is not acceptable for the reason that DW1 has stated that he did not choose to rectify the error in mentioning the boundary in Ex.A1 in spite of the fact that his vendor Seevalammal is alive. The defendant has come up with faint explanation that their Eastern boundary is mistakenly mentioned belong to 1 st plaintiff. It is not acceptable for the reason that DW1 has stated that he did not choose to rectify the error in mentioning the boundary in Ex.A1 in spite of the fact that his vendor Seevalammal is alive. If the misdescription of boundary is genuine, he would have taken steps to rectify the same approaching his vendor. His inaction is an ample proof that his claim of mistaken reference to Eastern boundary is false and an afterthought. He further submitted that the defendant has created Ex.B3 taking advantage of the fact that in Ex.A5 eastern boundary is referred to as land belong to Akkandi Chettiar. Since the predecessor of the 1 st plaintiff namely, Mookan Chettiar and Akkandi Chettiar happened to be Pangaligals their names had been used interchangeably while referring to properties on the Eastern side of the plaintiffs' property. The above explanation offered by plaintiff merit acceptance. Further, one of the witnesses examined as DW2 is none other than grandson of Akkandi Chettiar. He has stated that extent of Arumugam Chettiar's (Husband of first plaintiff and the father of the second plaintiff) property is 24 feet on East West and he has been enjoying the same for more than thirty years. More importantly, DW2 has stated that his property is on the East of Arumugam Chettiar's property and Sivamanickam Chettiar's property is on West of 24 feet enjoyed by Arumugam Chettiar. The vendor of third defendant namely, Sivamanickam examined as DW3 and he has stated that the property on the east of his property belong to KailasamAmmal the 1 st plaintiff and further east of the 1 st plaintiff's property alone belong to Akkandi Chettiar. From the evidence of DW2 and DW3, it is clear that the property purchased by the defendant from Seerammal and Sivamanickam through Ex B1 and B3 are one and the same which has been shown as 'ABCD' in plaint plan. It is to be noted that the combined east-west measurement of both A and B schedule as per A-5 and A-6 is 23 feet. Exactly enjoyment of this extent by the plaintiff has been testified by defendant side witness DW2. It is not uncommon in villages to identify a family through a common eldest member/Ancestor. It is to be noted that the combined east-west measurement of both A and B schedule as per A-5 and A-6 is 23 feet. Exactly enjoyment of this extent by the plaintiff has been testified by defendant side witness DW2. It is not uncommon in villages to identify a family through a common eldest member/Ancestor. Hence, since both Mookan Chettiar and Akkandi Chettiar were pangalis and Akkandi chettiar happened to be an elder member, his name had been mentioned in Ex.A5. When the factum of enjoyment of 24 feet on East West between the land of Akkandi Chettiar GLIH and ABCD in plaint plan has been established through the evidence of DW2, the First Appellate Court ought to have confirmed the judgment of Trial Court. He further submitted that the First Appellate Court instead of appreciating both documentary and oral evidence in entirety chosen to consider Exs.A5 and A6 alone and disregarding other documents. It is pertinent to note that though five witnesses have been examined in this case, none of the testimonies of witnesses were discussed by the First Appellant Court. It is settled principle that the First Appellate Court shall give reasons for not accepting the findings recorded by the Trial Court. Besides that the First Appellate Court is duty bound to answer all issues framed by the Trial Courts independently while revering the judgment. The finding of the First Appellate Court that the boundaries mentioned in Ex.A5 and A6 are one and the same for reaching the conclusion that the properties purchased by the plaintiff 1 and 2 are 'A' schedule alone is factually erroneous. The First Appellate Court has failed to see that the eastern and western boundaries mentioned in the said two documents are different. The learned counsel further submitted that the consistent stand of the defendant is that they have no claim over suit 'A' schedule and the dispute is only with regard to 'B' schedule. This stand of the defendant is also amplified in their evidence. The First Appellate Court ought to have noted that the possession and enjoyment of both A and B schedule properties by the plaintiffs have been established. Hence, the learned counsel pleaded to allow the second appeal. 13. Though notice has been served on the respondents and their name is also printed in the cause list, they have not appeared either in person or through his counsel. Hence, the learned counsel pleaded to allow the second appeal. 13. Though notice has been served on the respondents and their name is also printed in the cause list, they have not appeared either in person or through his counsel. Hence, this Court appointed Mr.Narmadhan, Advocate, as Amicus curiae to assist the Court. Under these circumstances, this Court after hearing the learned counsel for the appellants, decided the second appeal. 14. I have considered the matter in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the materials available on records carefully. 15. A perusal of the records, it is noticed that the portion marked as BCEF in the plaint plan ( marked Ex.A1) is the suit B schedule property. The portion marked as EFGH in the plaint plan A1 is the suit A schedule property. 16. Further, on perusal of the records, the fact reveals that Kamatchiammal W/o Vaiyapuri Chettiar sold a portion of the property to an extent of 15.28 cents in S.No.35 to Lakshmiammal W/o Mookan Chettiar, on 06.06.1918, which is evidenced from Ex.A3 sale deed dated 06.06.1918. The description of property is mentioned as follows:- 17. Thereafter, Lakshmiammal sold the same property to Rathinamammal on 22.06.1955 by way of a registered sale deed, which is evidenced as Ex.A4. The description of property is as follows:- 18. Thereafter, the said Rathinammal sold the same property to Kailasamammal, the plaintiff's wife, on 11.05.1968 by way of a registered sale deed which is evidenced by Ex.A5. The description of property is as follows:- 19. According to the plaintiffs, these sale deeds Exs.A3, A4 and A5 pertaining to the plaint B schedule property, which is denied by the defendants. Further, on perusal of the records, it is noticed that Pitchai Chettiar S/o Rathinammal sold a portion of the property on 02.09.1993 by way of a registered sale deed, which is evidenced as Ex.A6 sale deed dated 02.09.1993. The above sale deeds Ex.A3, A4 and A5 are the relevant to decide the case. Kamatchi Ammal W/o Vaiyapuri Chettiar sold a portion of the property to the extent of 14½ cents east west and 28½ north south with boundary as mentioned supra, in which, western boundary is mentioned as the property belong to the Kamatchi Ammal. The above sale deeds Ex.A3, A4 and A5 are the relevant to decide the case. Kamatchi Ammal W/o Vaiyapuri Chettiar sold a portion of the property to the extent of 14½ cents east west and 28½ north south with boundary as mentioned supra, in which, western boundary is mentioned as the property belong to the Kamatchi Ammal. While selling the same property by Lakshmi Ammal to Rathinammal on 22.06.1955 by way of a registered sale deed (Ex.A4), the same extent mentioned western boundary as though, she had property on the western side, which is wrong. 20. It is a wrong discussion. Lakshmiammal may not have any property on western side since she had sold entire property what she had purchased from Kamatchi Ammal to Rathinammal. Therefore, the description on the wester side in Ex.A4 sale deed dated 22.06.1955 is wrong one. 21. Further, on perusal of records, it is noticed that Rathinammal sold the property purchased by her from Lakshmiammal to Kailasammal on 11.05.1968 by way of sale deed Ex.A5. In the sale deed, Rathinammal sold entire property what she had purchased from Lakshmiammal. Therefore, Rathinammal may not have any property in that survey number. In such circumstances, the son of Rathinammal i.e., Pitchai Chettiar may not have nay property to sell to the second plaintiff Shanmugam on 02.09.1993 by way of a sale deed (Ex.A6) pertaining to A schedule property. 22. Further, the plaint allegation that after the death of Lakshmi Ammal, Rathinammal had taken possession of A schedule property for her share from Akkandi Chettiar Vaikara is not supported by any evidence. Therefore, the plaint allegation in para 13 is not proved by the plaintiffs. Under these circumstances, the First Appellate Court taking note of the description of the property in the sale deed dated Ex.A4 dated 11.05.1968 has rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs purchased A schedule property alone and not B schedule property, which is discussed by the First Appellate Court in para 10 of its Judgment. The same is reproduced hereunder:- 23. In view of the above, the plaintiffs failed to prove that she is having title over the B schedule property. Therefore, the First Appellate Court rightly allowed the appeal and set aside the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court. Therefore, the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court is sustainable in law. The same is reproduced hereunder:- 23. In view of the above, the plaintiffs failed to prove that she is having title over the B schedule property. Therefore, the First Appellate Court rightly allowed the appeal and set aside the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court. Therefore, the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court is sustainable in law. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 24. In the result, the Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.