JUDGMENT : 1. Order no. 163/DMS/PSA/2023 dated 07.02.2023 (impugned detention order) passed by District Magistrate, Shopian – respondent no. 2, (for short ‘detailing authority’) whereby detenu, namely, Mohd Yaseen Naikoo S/o Gh. Qadir Naikoo R/o Bonbazar Shopian Tehsil & District Shopian, has been placed under preventive detention with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, is sought to be quashed and the detenu set at liberty on the grounds made mention of in the instant petition. 2. Respondents have filed reply affidavit, insisting therein that the activities indulged in by detenu are highly prejudicial to the security of the State and, therefore, his remaining at large is a threat to the security of State. The activities narrated in the grounds of detention have been reiterated in the reply affidavit filed by respondents. The factual averments that detenu was not supplied with relevant material relied upon in the grounds of detention have been refuted. It is insisted that all the relevant material, which has been relied upon by the detaining authority, was provided to the detenu at the time of execution of warrant. 3. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner states that the detaining authority in the grounds of detention on the basis whereof impugned order of detention has been passed in its entirety are vague, hypothetical, fallacious, generalised, creation of fiction and make-believe, irrelevant, non-existent and indefinite, unaccompanied by material particulars and details, like place, date, place of occurrence, incidents, etcetera not specific in nature with reference to any time in which the said activities were committed or sequence of events. He also avers that mere use of expressions like “hard core OGW” etcetera without referring to any incident or actual narration of facts (culpability) by no logic relevance or rational, justify the detention of detenu under the Act and even not a single incident or activity criminal in nature qua FIR is reported against detenu as such, impugned order of detention is bad in law and that such generalised allegations can be levelled against any innocent person. It is also being stated by learned counsel for petitioner that detaining authority has failed to consider or forward representation made on 22.02.2023 against impugned order of detention to the Government, which has resulted in violation of important constitutional and legal rights of detenu. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for respondents, while opposing the submission of learned counsel for petitioner would vehemently contend that the order under challenge has been passed by detaining authority validly and legally owing to activities of detenu being prejudicial to the security of the State. 6. The submission that has been given vehemence by learned counsel for detenu and is also made mention of in the petition, is that representation filed by detenu through his brother has not been considered by the respondents. In their Reply Affidavit filed by respondents, particularly Preliminary Objections at Para E, it is stated by respondents that “detenue despite having received the aforesaid entire material has not so far chosen to make any representation against his detention”. Admittedly, a copy of representation, placed on record by petitioner as Annexure III to writ petition, has been filed by detenu through his brother, against detention on 22.02.2023 and the same has not been considered till date. There is, thus, substance in the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that non-consideration of representation of detenu vitiates impugned order of detention. Law in this regard is settled as the Supreme Court in Tara Chand v. State of Rajasthan and others , 1980 (2) SCC 321 and Raghavendra Singh v. Superintendent, District Jail , Kanpur and others (1986) 1 SCC 650 , has held that if there is inordinate delay in considering the representation that would clearly amount to violation of the provisions of Article 22(5) as to render the detention unconstitutional and void. 7. In Rajammal v. State of Tamil Nadu and others , 1999(1) SCC 417 , it has been held as follows: “It is a constitutional obligation of the Government to consider the representation forwarded by the detenu without any delay. Though no period is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution for the decision to be taken on the representation, the words "as soon as may be" in clause (5) of Article 22 convey the message that the representation should be considered and disposed of at the earliest.” 10. Though no period is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution for the decision to be taken on the representation, the words "as soon as may be" in clause (5) of Article 22 convey the message that the representation should be considered and disposed of at the earliest.” 10. In K.M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 476 , it has been held as follows: “.... it is settled law that there should not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation would be breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal.” 11. In Ummu Sabeena v. State of Kerala , (2011) 10 SCC 781 , the Supreme Court has held that the history of personal liberty, as is well known, is a history of insistence on procedural safeguards. The expression ‘as soon as may be’, in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India , clearly shows the concern of the makers of the Constitution that the representation, made on behalf of detenu, should be considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency and without any avoidable delay. 12. In Sarabjeet Singh Mokha v. District Magistrate Jabalpur and others reported in (2021) 20 SCC 98 , the Supreme Court has reproduced certain observations made by the Supreme Court on the consideration of representation by appropriate government and by the Advisory Board in Ankit Ashok Jalan (supra), which are reproduced hereunder: “39 In a recent decision of a three judge Bench of this Court in Ankit Ashok Jalan v. Union of India51, Justice UU Lalit revisited the body of precedent on the subject and noticed the qualitative difference between the consideration of a representation by the appropriate government on the one hand and by the Advisory Board on the other. Justice UU Lalit, speaking for himself and Justice Indu Malhotra (with Justice Hemant Gupta dissenting52) observed: “16. These decisions clearly laid down that the consideration of representations by the appropriate Government and by the Board would always be qualitatively different and the power of consideration by the appropriate Government must be completely independent of any action by the Advisory Board. Justice UU Lalit, speaking for himself and Justice Indu Malhotra (with Justice Hemant Gupta dissenting52) observed: “16. These decisions clearly laid down that the consideration of representations by the appropriate Government and by the Board would always be qualitatively different and the power of consideration by the appropriate Government must be completely independent of any action by the Advisory Board. In para 12 of the decision in Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty [Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty v. State of W.B., (1969) 3 SCC 400 : (1970) 1 SCR 543 ] it was stated that the obligation on the part of the Government to consider representation would be irrespective of whether the representation was made before or after the case was referred to the Advisory Board. As stated in para 18, this was stated so, as any delay in consideration of the representation would not only be an irresponsible act on the part of the appropriate authority but also unconstitutional. The contingency whether the representations were received before or after was again considered in para 29 of the decision in Haradhan Saha [Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] .” Justice UU Lalit categorized the different stages for when a representation is received and disposed, with the underlying principle that the representation must be expeditiously disposed of, at every stage: “17. In terms of these principles, the matter of consideration of representation in the context of reference to the Advisory Board, can be put in the following four categories: 17.1. If the representation is received well before the reference is made to the Advisory Board and can be considered by the appropriate Government, the representation must be considered with expedition. Thereafter the representation along with the decision taken on the representation shall be forwarded to and must form part of the documents to be placed before the Advisory Board. 17.2. If the representation is received well before the reference is made to the Advisory Board and can be considered by the appropriate Government, the representation must be considered with expedition. Thereafter the representation along with the decision taken on the representation shall be forwarded to and must form part of the documents to be placed before the Advisory Board. 17.2. If the representation is received just before the reference is made to the Advisory Board and there is not sufficient time to decide the representation, in terms of law laid down in Jayanarayan Sukul [Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 219 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 92] and Haradhan Saha [Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] the representation must be decided first and thereafter the representation and the decision must be sent to the Advisory Board. This is premised on the principle that the consideration by the appropriate Government is completely independent and also that there ought not to be any delay in consideration of the representation. 17.3. If the representation is received after the reference is made but before the matter is decided by the Advisory Board, according to the principles laid down in Haradhan Saha [Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816], the representation must be decided. The decision as well as the representation must thereafter be immediately sent to the Advisory Board. 17.4. If the representation is received after the decision of the Advisory Board, the decisions are clear that in such cases there is no requirement to send the representation to the Advisory Board. The representation in such cases must be considered with expedition. 13. In the case in hand, it is an admitted position that representation had been made by detenu through his brother. However, respondents in their reply affidavit have stated that although detenu was informed about his right of making representation against his detention to detaining authority as also government, but no such representation has been made by detenu. In that view of matter all other grounds raised against impugned order of detention need not be discussed and deliberated upon and as a consequence of which impugned order of detention is vitiated. 14. For the reasons discussed above, the detention Order 163/DMS/PSA/2023 dated 07.02.2023, passed by District Magistrate, Shopian, is quashed. In that view of matter all other grounds raised against impugned order of detention need not be discussed and deliberated upon and as a consequence of which impugned order of detention is vitiated. 14. For the reasons discussed above, the detention Order 163/DMS/PSA/2023 dated 07.02.2023, passed by District Magistrate, Shopian, is quashed. Respondents, including Superintendent Jail concerned, are directed to release the detenu forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case. 15. Disposed of.