JUDGMENT : Pankaj Jain, J. Defendant is in revision aggrieved of order dated 09.10.2017 (Annexure P-8) passed by Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Ferozepur Jhirka, whereby the application filed by petitioner/defendant for setting aside Judgment and Decree dated 09.04.2014 (Annexure P-4) passed by Trial Court on the basis of compromise, has been dismissed. 2. For convenience, the parties are being referred to by their original position in the suit i.e. the appellant as defendant and the respondent as plaintiff. 3. Plaintiff filed suit for possession by way of specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 11.01.2012 qua agricultural land admeasuring 3 Kanal 8 Marla. Plaintiff claimed that defendant agreed to sell suit land in his favour for a valuable consideration of Rs.7 lakh. The earnest money of Rs.6,75,000/- was paid by the plaintiff which was accepted by the defendant. Defendant agreed to execute the registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff on or before 10.01.2013. Plaintiff claimed that on the stipulated date the plaintiff remained present in the office of Sub-Registrar, Punhana with the requisite amount but defendant failed to turn up. Plaintiff got his affidavit attested by the Sub-Registrar recording his presence and always remained ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Plaintiff further claimed that he is still ready and willing to perform his part and prayed that the defendant be directed to execute sale deed in his favour and accept the remaining sale consideration. 3.1. Suit was contested by defendant. It was claimed that agreement to sell propounded by plaintiff was the result of fraud, manipulation, misrepresentation and collusion of plaintiff with scribe, stamp vendor and attesting witnesses. Defendant further claimed that he being minor at the time of execution of agreement to sell, the same was not binding. 3.2. During the pendency of suit, parties compromised. On 25.02.2014, defendant appeared and got his statement recorded before the Trial Court. He placed on record compromise Ex.Cl. In terms of the compromise, suit was decreed vide Judgment and Decree dated 09.04.2014. Trial Court directed defendant to get the sale deed executed and registered in favour of plaintiff on receipt of balance sale consideration within a period of 2 months in terms of compromise. While decreeing the suit, the Trial Court recorded that in terms of compromise, the agreement propounded by plaintiff stands ratified. 3.3. Trial Court directed defendant to get the sale deed executed and registered in favour of plaintiff on receipt of balance sale consideration within a period of 2 months in terms of compromise. While decreeing the suit, the Trial Court recorded that in terms of compromise, the agreement propounded by plaintiff stands ratified. 3.3. A year later, defendant preferred instant application for setting aside Judgment and Decree dated 09.04.2014 passed on the basis of compromise. Defendant alleged forgery and cheating. It was claimed that defendant never signed compromise in terms of which suit was decreed. Being an illiterate, he was incapacitated from signing documents and he only can thumbmark the documents. Thus, pleading that the Compromise dated 25.02.2014 was result of fraud, defendant sought setting aside of decree dated 09.04.2014. It was further pleaded that findings recorded by Trial Court while decreeing the suit with respect to ratification of agreement also cannot be sustained as the agreement having been executed by minor defendant was void ab initio. 3.4. On the basis of pleadings, the Ld. Court of Additional Civil Judge framed following issues:- 1. Whether the Judgment and Decree dated 09.04.2014 is liable to be set aside on the grounds mentioned in the application? OPA 2. Whether the present application is not maintainable in the present form? OPR 3. Whether the applicant has no locus standi to file the present application? OPR 4. Whether the present application is time barred? OPR 5. Whether the application is barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3(a) CPC? OPD 6. Relief. 3.5. While returning finding on issue No.1, the Court relied upon document Ex.R2 i.e. School Leaving Certificate of defendant to hold that a person studying in Class 3 is expected at least to know how to write his own name in Hindi language. It further relied upon deposition made by RW2 Amjad Khan, Advocate who got prepared Compromise dated 25.02.2014. As per him, the compromise was prepared on the instructions of plaintiff as well as defendant. Further the defendant has been shown present in person with his counsel when the compromise Ex.C1 was produced before Trial Court on 25.02.2014. Resultantly, the Court outrightly rejected the plea of fraud and forgery as raised by defendant in respect of alleged Compromise dated 25.02.2014. Further the defendant has been shown present in person with his counsel when the compromise Ex.C1 was produced before Trial Court on 25.02.2014. Resultantly, the Court outrightly rejected the plea of fraud and forgery as raised by defendant in respect of alleged Compromise dated 25.02.2014. Consequently, the application filed by defendant has been dismissed while holding that the Court has no jurisdiction to reverse the finding of Trial Court because the defendant has only a remedy to file appeal against the findings of the Trial Court. The Court further held that findings with respect to ratification of agreement to sell by subsequent Compromise dated 25.02.2014 is beyond the scope of the instant application and the same can only be assailed by filing appeal against the judgment and decree. 4. Counsel for the petitioner/defendant while assailing the impugned order passed by the Court submits that the Court below erred in ignoring the fact that an agreement to sell executed by minor is void ab initio and cannot be ratified by subsequent act. Counsel submits that in order to ratify a contract, the contract need not be void ab initio. He further submits that the law is well settled that any subsequent act cannot lead to cure of the defect in the contract which renders it void ab initio. In order to hammer-forth his contention, he relies upon ratio of law laid down by Privy Council in Mohori Bibee vs. Dhurmodas Ghose, 1903 SCC OnLine PC 4 to submit that a question whether a contract is void or voidable presupposes the existence of a contract within the meaning of the Act, and cannot arise in the case of an infant. He further relies upon Khan Gul & another vs. Lakha Singh and another, 1928 AIR (Lah) 609; Lakhwinder Singh vs. Miss Paramjit Kaur, 2003(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 26; Kartar Singh (Dead) by LRs. vs. Smt. Harbans Kaur, 1994(2) R.R.R. 216 ; G. Annamalai Pillai vs. District Revenue Officer, 1993 (4) JT 113 ; Binny Bawa vs. Vinay Kumar and others, 2012(33) PLR 401; S. Shanmugam Pillai and others vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai and others, 1973(2) SCC 312 ; Govind Ram vs. Piran Ditta and others, 1935 AIR Lahore 561 and Ram Sarup vs. Brij Mohal Lal, 1938 AIR Oudh 14. 5. 5. Per contra, counsel for the plaintiff/respondent submits that at the time the petitioner/defendant was facing the suit, he opted to elect retention of the earnest money which he received at the time of agreement to sell. Having done so, he cannot be allowed to turn back and claim that the election made by him to retain the earnest money could have been so as the basic agreement itself was void. To hammer-forth his contention he relies upon S. Shanmugam Pillai and others vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai and others, (1973) 2 Supreme Court Cases 312; Gopal Prasad vs. Bihar School Examination Board and others, 2020 (18) SCC 255 and Sanjeev Kumar and others vs. Gurdeep Singh and others, 2023(3) RCR (Civil) 391. 6. I have heard counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through records of the case. 7. The facts are not much in dispute. From the bare perusal of agreement to sell dated 11.01.2012, propounded by respondent/plaintiff in the original suit, it is not evident that the vendee/plaintiff knew about the age of petitioner/defendant. There is no covenant unlike one ‘in the agreement involved in Mohori Bibee’s case (supra) to the effect that vendee was made aware of the age of the vendor. Petitioner claims his date of birth to be 10.06.1994. Agreement to Sell propounded by plaintiff is dated 11.01.2012. Dates have been mentioned only to demonstrate that vendor was not of such age that the plaintiff/vendee should infer of his minority from the appearance. Vendor while filing his written statement in the main suit raised the issue of minority. In Compromise dated 25.02.2014, he agreed to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff on or before 25.03.2014 and admitted of having received the amount of Rs.6,75,000/- as earnest money. On 09.04.2014, defendant-Saroon i.e. the present petitioner himself appeared and tendered compromise before the Court which led to passing of the judgment and decree. In the instant application, wherein he has attacked the judgment and decree passed on the basis of compromise, he claimed that the Compromise dated 25.02.2014 itself was forged and fabricated. He also raised issue of minority and thus claimed that the observations made in Judgment and Decree dated 09.04.2014 with respect to ratification of Agreement to Sell dated 11.01.2012 are erroneous. 8. Mr. He also raised issue of minority and thus claimed that the observations made in Judgment and Decree dated 09.04.2014 with respect to ratification of Agreement to Sell dated 11.01.2012 are erroneous. 8. Mr. Jindal has not been able to show any error with respect to findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court regarding legality of the Compromise dated 25.02.2014. The plea raised by petitioner with respect to the same being forged and fabricated has been found to be false. This Court thus find no reason to interfere in the pure findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court with respect to Compromise dated 25.02.2014 having been effected between the parties. 9. The issue on which both the counsels have argued emphatically relates to legality and ratification of Agreement to Sell dated 11.01.2012. The question is “whether in the instant application, the issue regarding legality of Agreement to Sell dated 11.01.2012 can be raised?”. 10. Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC reads as under:- “3. Compromise of suit.— Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.” 11. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions reveals that while dealing with the compromise between the parties, the Court has to be satisfied with respect to compromise on the basis of which decree was passed. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions reveals that while dealing with the compromise between the parties, the Court has to be satisfied with respect to compromise on the basis of which decree was passed. That connotes the agreement whereby defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit. Once defendant himself opted to satisfy the claims of the plaintiff and the compromise or agreement vide which the claim of plaintiff is being satisfied is neither void nor voidable, the Court rightly passed decree. 12. Mr. Jindal has not been able to point out any infirmity in Compromise dated 25.02.2014, on the basis of which Judgment and Decree dated 09.04.2014 was passed. He is not in a position to dispute that on the said date the petitioner had attained majority. 13. In view of above, this Court finds that the Trial Court rightly non- suited the petitioner holding that in case if he was aggrieved with any of the observations made in the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court while decreeing the suit on the basis of compromise, the only option was to prefer an appeal as per the provisions of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant application, the Trial Court could examine only the validity of the compromise on the basis of which decree was passed and not the validity of compromise on the basis of which suit was filed. Explanation appended to Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC makes it abundantly clear. The expression used in the main provision “any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties” is the one qua explanation has been appended to the provision. 14. Finding no fault in the well-reasoned order passed by the Court below, the present revision is order to be dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.