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Andhra High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 650 (AP)

A. Sreedhar Reddy v. State of A. P.

2025-05-05

CHALLA GUNARANJAN

body2025
ORDER: CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J. In all these three writ petitions, petitioners, who were working as Senior Programmers with 3 rd respondent, were sought to be superannuated on attaining age of 60 years, claiming parity and benefit of G.O.Ms.No.15 Finance (HR.IV-FR&LR) Department, dated 31.01.2022, issued by the Government, claimed to enhance age of superannuation from 60 years to 62 years. As they were sought to be superannuated on attaining 60 years, preferred present writ petitions. 2. The prayer in one of the writ petitions, i.e. W.P.No.18076 of 2022, reads as under: “to issue writ, order or a direction, more particularly, one in the nature of writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in issuing proceedings No.ITC51- 17021(42)/3/2019-ADMIN&HRD-APTS, dated 13.06.2022 whereby and whereunder petitioner was asked to retire from service on the afternoon of 03.06.2022 on attaining the superannuation age of 60 years, as highly illegal, arbitrary and violation of principles of natural justice and contrary to G.O.Ms.No.15, dated 31.01.2022, and Board’s decision on 18.04.2022 (31.03.2022) and also violation of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and consequently, to set aside the proceedings No.ITC51-17021(42)/3/2019- ADMIN&HRD-APTS, dated 13.06.2022, by directing the respondents to continue the petitioner’s service in the Andhra Pradesh Technology Services Limited (APTS) and to continue the petitioner till attaining the age of 62 years in the interest of justice and to pass…” 3. Initially, this Court passed interim order, dated 29.06.2022, which reads as under: “Notice before admission. Learned Government Pleader for Services-I takes notice on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 and Sri Prakash B, learned standing counsel takes notice on behalf of the 3 rd respondent and seeks time to file counter-affidavit. On 21.04.2022, the Board of Directors of the 3 rd respondent in its 120 th Board meeting adopted G.O.Ms.No.15, dated 31.01.2022, and the Government was requested to consider extension of superannuation from 60 years to 62 years. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 3 rd respondent addressed a letter to the 1 st respondent on 31.05.2022 seeking necessary directions for enhancement of the age of superannuation from 60 years to 62 years and the matter is still pending with the Government. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner will not claim salary till the matter is decided. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner will not claim salary till the matter is decided. In view of the facts and circumstances, the 3 rd respondent is directed to continue the petitioner in service till 31.07.2022. However, as the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner will not claim the salary till the matter is decided, petitioner shall not claim equities and salary till the counter-affidavit is filed and writ petition is disposed of. List the matter on 25.07.2022 for counter-affidavit of the respondents.” 4. In other two writ petitions, similar interim orders were passed. Following the interim order mentioned above, petitioners were allowed to continue till they attained the age of 62 years. 3 rd respondent preferred W.A.Nos.616 and 617 of 2023. The Division Bench of this Court, by common judgment, dated 08.08.2024, allowed appeals in- part and interim orders granted in W.P.Nos.9225 and 10400 of 2023 came to be set aside. The Division Bench while disposing the Appeals has expressed prima facie opinion that the amendment made by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.15, dated 31.01.2022, would not ipso facto amend Chapter-B of Staff Regulations of Andhra Pradesh Technology Services Limited, 2012, and Regulations 14 and 15 in particular, for claiming benefit of enhanced age of superannuation. 5. Heard Sri K.Gani Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-I for respondents 1 and 2; and Sri Harinath Reddy Soma, learned Standing Counsel, for 3 rd respondent. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in view of subsequent developments, petitioners though were initially continued to work as Senior Programmers in terms of interim orders, which extended the age of superannuation to 62 years, in view of common judgment of the Division Bench, dated 08.08.2024, in W.A.Nos.616 and 617 of 2023 and batch, they were disengaged from service. Be that as it may, since the petitioners have worked under interim orders till they were disengaged are entitled to be paid salaries. It is further contended that the 3 rd respondent has paid salaries to other similarly situated persons, who have worked beyond 60 years under the guise of interim orders. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Chet Verma v. State of U.P. , Order in Civil Appeal No.618 of 2019, dt.11.01.2019. It is further contended that the 3 rd respondent has paid salaries to other similarly situated persons, who have worked beyond 60 years under the guise of interim orders. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Chet Verma v. State of U.P. , Order in Civil Appeal No.618 of 2019, dt.11.01.2019. (SC) to buttress the argument that even if persons are continued to work under interim order, they are entitled for claiming salary during the said period. 7. Learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-I appearing for respondents 1 and 2 have opposed the above submissions by contending that petitioner in W.P.No.18076 of 2022 has clearly through his counsel undertook not to claim salary till matter is decided and also that he was not claiming equities. Further, as the Division Bench in the common judgment, dated 08.08.2024, has categorically expressed opinion that mere existence of Board Resolution would not suffice for giving effect to enhancement of age of superannuation in terms of G.O.Ms.No.15, dated 31.01.2022, unless there is a corresponding amendment to Service Regulations made by the 3 rd respondent, even if petitioners are allowed to continue with service are not entitled to claim salary as such continuation is illegal. He also relied on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1033 of 2022 and batch, dated 05.05.2023, by which the claim of persons who were working with various State Corporations for enhancement of age of superannuation from 60 years to 62 years came to be rejected. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has confined his challenge and grievance to the extent of non-payment of salaries during the period petitioners were continued to serve beyond 60 years. It is not in dispute that petitioners on attaining age of 60 years were sought to be superannuated and by virtue of interim orders passed by this Court, they were continued to work beyond 60 years. Petitioners were disengaged from service after the Division Bench by common judgment, dated 08.08.2024, has set aside the interim orders. The position that emerges is that petitioners did work with 3 rd respondent during aforesaid period. Petitioners were disengaged from service after the Division Bench by common judgment, dated 08.08.2024, has set aside the interim orders. The position that emerges is that petitioners did work with 3 rd respondent during aforesaid period. One of the contentions raised by the respondents being that petitioner in W.P.No.18076 of 2022 undertook not to claim equities and salary, therefore, cannot claim for salary now is misconceived, in as much as, the undertaking recorded by the Court was only till counter-affidavits are filed and matter is decided. As the very main writ petition itself is taken up for hearing, considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the relief in the writ petition is confined only regarding non-payment of salary, this Court is examining only to that extent. The respondents have not denied the factum of petitioners being continued in service in pursuance to the interim orders and they are also in tandem that petitioners came to be disengaged only after passing of the common judgment by the Division Bench. As 3 rd respondent has extracted service from the petitioners during the aforesaid period, their claim for salaries is legitimate. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in cases of Collector of Madras v. K.M.Rajamanikkan , (1995) 2 SCC 98 : MANU/SC/0643/1995 : (1995) II LLJ 677 SC ; and Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Deen Bandhu Majumdar , (1995) 4 SCC 172 : (1995) 3 SCR 712 held that an employee who actually worked on the strength of an interim order would be entitled to his salary even though the writ petition may have been dismissed subsequently. 10. Further the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Surya Deo Mishra v. State of U.P. /b>. , [2006 (62) ALR 769 : MANU/UP/1849/2005] , while answering reference made to it on the aspect of the benefits that an employee is entitled to who continued in service beyond superannuating age on the strength of interim order held as follows: “ 18. Thus, broadly speaking, the principle which can be culled out from these decisions is that in commercial matters, the successful party is not only entitled to the amount withheld on the basis of the interim order, but it is also entitled to interest thereon. Thus, broadly speaking, the principle which can be culled out from these decisions is that in commercial matters, the successful party is not only entitled to the amount withheld on the basis of the interim order, but it is also entitled to interest thereon. However, in service matters, if the incumbent has worked and has been paid, unless his claim was fraudulent, based upon frivolous grounds or upon acute factual dispute, the amount so paid ought not to be recovered. Even in cases of excess payment, it cannot be recovered unless said payment is result of the employee’s mistake or on his showing. But, if the employee has been paid without working or has not been paid though has worked, he would not be entitled to it if the petition is dismissed as infructuous. We hasten to add, that the court cannot draw a exhaustive list of such situation, as each case is to be decided on its facts.” 11. This Court is oblivious to the fact that in one of the above judgments, it was observed that if the main case is dismissed as infructuous, person instituted the same cannot be entitled for the benefit of salary, as in the present case, the main cases are now being decided and that the question as to whether petitioners are entitled to be continued upto 62 years is now not pressed in view of vacation of interim orders, without going into the aforesaid aspect, as the claim for salary for the period worked on the strength of interim orders, is considered, this Court is of the opinion that petitioners are entitled for the salary on the principle of “pay for work”. This view is fortified by the order of Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Chet Verma , relevant portion of which reads thus: “Since the appellants have served as per the interim order, obviously they have to be paid the salary for the period they have rendered their services. Non-payment of salary to them for the period they have served under the interim order or otherwise would tantamount to taking begar from them, which is prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution of India.” 12. Non-payment of salary to them for the period they have served under the interim order or otherwise would tantamount to taking begar from them, which is prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution of India.” 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion and having regard to the authoritative pronounces of Hon’ble Apex Court, in as much as, petitioners have worked and rendered services by virtue of interim order, though their claim of continuation in service upto the age of 62 years has been prima-facie rejected by the Division Bench, because of which their services came to be disengaged, petitioners having rendered service in part for sometime are entitled for the salary alone and that they will not be entitled for any other service benefits. 13. In view of the same, all these writ petitions are disposed of directing the 3 rd respondent to pay salary to the petitioners for the period they have served under the interim orders, if not already paid, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 14. Accordingly, all these writ petitions are disposed of. No order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration, if any, in this case shall stand closed.