JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. Present appeal is filed by the appellant – E.S.I.C. against the judgment and award dated 21.07.2006 passed by the learned Judge, Employees Insurance Court, Ahmedabad (hereinafter be referred to as “the ESI Court”) in ESI Application No. 28 of 1994, whereby the ESI Court has allowed the application and restrained the appellant from recovering the amount of contribution and interest etc from the respondent. 2. Brief facts of the present case are that the respondent herein is engaged in supplying, distributing and refilling the gas cylinders to the customers in the Ahmedabad. That the respondent is providing gas cylinders to the industrial units in the city. For that purpose, the respondent has engaged number of employees, allegedly known as contractors, only on oral agreement, to ply tempos, auto rickshaw, loading rickshaw and pedal rickshaw to supply and provide the gas cylinders at the residence as well as industrial unit of its own customers on the basis of lump sum amount, to be paid as wages and the amount of wages has been paying in the name and style of transport charges to its employees. 2.1 The respondent is paying the said amount as wages to its employees, who have been supplying cylinders to their customers since inception. After the respondent has already been covered under the Provisions of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter be referred to as “the Act”), the respondent was not deducting contribution from the amount paid to those employees and not depositing with the appellant. That after verifying the record, the appellant issued notice to comply with the Act and directed to deposit the amount of contribution and the respondent was given an ample opportunity before covering them under the Act. That despite of various notices and reminders and the reasons best known to them, the respondent did not opt to follow the direction issued to produce relevant record. Thereafter the appellant has no other option but to issue notice under Section 45A demanding the amount of contributions with interest. 2.2 It is alleged that after issuance of the certificate and giving full opportunity of hearing and affording sufficient opportunity to pay the contribution on such wages, the respondent instead of paying contribution on wages filed an application under Sections 77 /75 of the Act. 2.2 It is alleged that after issuance of the certificate and giving full opportunity of hearing and affording sufficient opportunity to pay the contribution on such wages, the respondent instead of paying contribution on wages filed an application under Sections 77 /75 of the Act. 2.3 The learned Judge, after appreciating the evidence on record, has framed the following issues at Exhibit 13. (1) Whether the applicant proves that the amount paid towards petrol driven tempos hiring charges, transport charges for shifting the cylinders from one godown to another and the delivery charges paid to individual contractors for delivering cylinders (does not) forms the part of wages u/s. 2(22) of the ESI Act? (2) Whether such agencies as referred to above can be said to be the employees as defined under Sec. 2(9) of the ESI Act? The ESI Court answered the aforesaid issue No.1 in the affirmative and issue No.2 in the negative. 2.3 The ESI Court has, after hearing the respective parties and considering the evidence available on record, allowed the application and restrained the appellant not to recover the contribution dues. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and award, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 4. On 09.02.2007, the Division Bench of this Court admitted the appeal and the civil application was disposed of as not pressed. 5. Heard Mr.Sachin Vasavada, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr.Dipak Dave, learned counsel appearing for the respondent at length and perused the material available on record. 6. Mr.Vasavada, learned counsel has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of appeal and has submitted that the impugned judgment and award is based on surmises, conjectures and presumption and, therefore, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. He has submitted that the appellant issued notice under Section 45 A (2) r/w. Section 45 B r/w Section 75 of the Act. He has submitted that the respondent is running gas agency and in the said agency there are more than 40 employees are working and they are not paying their contribution under the Act and, therefore, the appellant passed an order for recovery of an amount vide order dated 12.08.1992 under Section 45 of the Act which is further modified by the appellant and the same is produced by the Corporation at page No.33 of the paper-book. He has submitted that the said order came to be challenged by the respondent before the competent ESI Court by way of ESI Application No. 28 of 1994 whereby the appellant has raised an objection by filing written statement at Exhibit 6. He has submitted that though the respondent running cooperative stores and having LPG gas distribution agency where more than 40 employees were working for the purpose of delivery of the gas cylinders in hired tempos, auto rickshaw, loading rickshaw and pedal rickshaw and they have not paid contribution as provided under the Act and regulation therein. He has submitted that the appellant has considered the fact that the respondent is paying the wages to all the workers and they are under the supervision of the respondent and they are having direct control over the workmen and, therefore, the respondent is liable to deposit the contribution as provided under the Act and, therefore, the notice in Form No.C18 was issued on 18.12.1991 and the same was replied. He has submitted that after giving proper opportunity to the respondent and hearing, the authority has rightly passed the order for recovery of Rs.14,157/- along with interest at Rs.5948/-. He has submitted that as the wages defines under Section 2 (22) of the Act, the respondent is paying wages to the concerned employees and, therefore, the provision of the Act is attributed and the respondent is supposed to pay the contribution under the Act. He has submitted that the respondent has produced documentary evidence before the ESI Court and after considering the oral evidence at Exhibit 14 and 15, the ESI Court allowed the application. 6.1 Mr.Vasavada, learned counsel has submitted that the authority has, after considering the relevant documentary evidence, rightly passed the impugned order under Section 45A of the Act which came to be challenged by the respondent before the ESI Court and the ESI Court has allowed the application. He has submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the ESI Court is against the settled legal principle and statutory provisions and amounts to misinterpretation of the Act which leads illegality and infirmity and it is substantial question of law that requires to be decided and, therefore, the present appeal is filed under Section 82 (2) of the Act. Section 82 (2) of the Act reads thus:- “82. Appeal. Section 82 (2) of the Act reads thus:- “82. Appeal. - (1) Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees’ Insurance Court. (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees’ Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law. (3) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (4) The provisions of sections 5 and 12 of the [Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)] shall apply to appeals under this section.” 6.2 Mr.Vasavada, learned counsel has submitted that the authority has given sufficient opportunity to the respondent before issuance of the order under Section 45A of the Act, however, the respondent has not produced any relevant material evidence before the authority and, therefore, the impugned judgment and order based upon the said order committed serious error of law and facts which directly attracted the provision of Section 82 (2) involving the substantial questions of law as the ESI Court has completely misread the provision of Section 2 (9) and 2(22) of the Act; as also committed serious error while interpreting the clause of the notification issued by the authority dated 06.11.2000. He has submitted that the ESI Court has completely overlooked the order passed by the authority under Section 45A of the Act and thus, the impugned judgment and award passed by the ESI Court is contrary to the provision of the Act and the evidence on record and, therefore, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6.3 In support of his submissions, Mr.Vasavada, learned counsel has relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in First Appeal No. 1241 of 1990 dated 28.08.2019 and submitted that this Court has decided the identical issue and quashed and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the ESI Court. He has submitted that the present appeal is squarely covered by the decision dated 28.08.2019 passed in First Appeal No. 1241 of 1990. 7. He has submitted that the present appeal is squarely covered by the decision dated 28.08.2019 passed in First Appeal No. 1241 of 1990. 7. Proposed questions of law framed by the appellant are as under:- (a) In view of the definition of the term “employee” defined in Section 2 (9), Whether the employees and/or contractual workmen employed by the opponent, who do the work in supplying Gas Cylinders in various area of Ahmedabad and who have been appointed / engaged exclusively to do the activities mainly in connection with the business activities of the opponent herein, can be considered as an employee or not? AND Whether payments made to them will qualify for contributions towards ESI Fund and whether the employees, who are working for the opponent company and named as “Contractor” but to do the work in connection of the opponent company be considered as employees of the opponent company AND whether the demand of the appellant for contribution of all the employees at specified rates on such payment is justified or not? (b) In view of the definition under Section 1(5), whether the provisions of ESI Act be made applicable to the present opponent? AND cannot the respondent be said to be liable to pay contribution towards ESI Contribution? (c) Whether it is possible for the opponent to challenge only action of the ESI Act in issuing notices u/s. 45A and not covering the opponent under the provisions of ESI Act? (d) Whether the ESI Court is right and justified in replying the issues No.2 in negative and whether the impugned judgment and order is right, justified and sustainable in law and/or in facts of the present case in combining and deciding both the issues considering one and the same? (e) Whether the diverse findings and conclusions of the ESI Court are right and justified and based on evidence obtaining on record or they are contrary to the weight of evidence on record and whether the ESI Court is right and justified in ignoring or not giving opportunity to lead the evidence of the appellant witnesses’ before the ESI Court? (f) Is the ESI Court justified in not replying on the Inspector’s report and Surveyor’s report, which was relied upon by the appellant herein? 8. (f) Is the ESI Court justified in not replying on the Inspector’s report and Surveyor’s report, which was relied upon by the appellant herein? 8. Per contra, Mr.Dave, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the order passed by the authority under Section 45A of the Act is pro forma order and non- speaking and without assigning any reason the same was passed and even there was no application of mind by the authority while passing the order. Such orders reads thus:- “ GUJARAT REGIONAL OFFICE REGD.A.D. EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION ASHRAM ROAD AHMEDABAD 14. ORDER UNDER SECTION 45-A OF THE ESI ACT 1948 AS AMENDED. M/S Abad Riflr Association co.op stores, Gun house Khanpur, A'Bad Code no 37 9562 a factory establishment covered under Employees's State Insurance Act, 1948 required to pay the contribution in accordance with section 40 of the said Act read with Regulation 29 and 31 of the Employees State Insurance (General) Regulations framed under the Act. As the employer in relation to this factory/Establishment failed to pay the contributions as required by law, a notice was issued to the principal employer by this office vide letter no 37-9562 Ins III C-18 dated 18-12-91 to show cause within 15 days why contributions as per statement enclosed be not recovered from the employer. Where as the employer has replies to the notice under its letter no ARA 274,280 dated 1-1-92 ans 4-1-92 raised objection before me on 21-10-92 personal hearing against the assessment as proposed in the statement enclosed with the show cause notice on the following ground. Employer has submitted break up of the amount paid for transportation charges vide letter no ARA 274 dated 1-1- 92, 280 dated 4-1-92 and 314 dated 29-1-92, 30-9-92 and your personal hearing on 21-10-92 and stated as under. 1. Hearing charges paid for loading rikshaw/Tempo. 2. Hearing charges of padle rikshow. 3. Paid to truck owner for transport from one godown to another godown. 4. Dilivery charges of the cylinders. 5. Rikshow/Tempo, truck owner are indipendent parties and he has no connection with the employer, Accountant has also informed that all records are readily available with him. I have applied my mind to all the relevant facts and have gone into the objections raised by the employer and my findings on each of the objection of the employer are as under. Rikshow/Tempo, truck owner are indipendent parties and he has no connection with the employer, Accountant has also informed that all records are readily available with him. I have applied my mind to all the relevant facts and have gone into the objections raised by the employer and my findings on each of the objection of the employer are as under. There is some contract lies direct/indirect supervision is their, on distribution of gas cylender properly. It has been decided by Head Quarters office that transportation charges is covered in case of Apana Bazar similarly in this case also For the above reasons I Nazeer Ahmed Assistant Regional Director exercise of the powers delegated to me by the Director General, think fit and accordingly order to that contributions totaling Rs. 54584-00 fifty four thousand five hundred eighty four only for the period from 7/83 to 6/87 are finally determined plus interest amounting to 25196.00 twenty thousand one hundred ninty six totalling Rs. 79780-00 Rs. seventy nine thousand seven hundred eighty only upto the date of this order and You as one of the Principal employer is hereby ordered to pay the above amount together with interest payable at rate of 12% for each day of further default from the date of this order till the date of this order, Failing to which this shall be caused to be recovered under Section 2 45-C to 45-I of the Act. Date: 28.9.93 Shri Naresh B. Soni (Manager), C/oM/S A'Bad Rifle Association co-op stores, Gunhouse, Khanpur, A Bad. (S.NAZEER.AHMED) ASSTT REGIONAL DIRECTOR, Copy to; Insurance Inspector At Bad II FOR REGIONAL DIRECTOR, GUJARAT REGIONAL OFFICE BY REGO POST EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION ASHRAM ROAD AHEMDABAD 14. ORDER UNDER SECTION 45A of the ESI Act 1948 AS AMENDED M/S A’Bad Rifle Association Co.OP stores a factory/establishment situate at Gun house, Khanpur A’Bad code no 37-9562 a factory/establishment covered under the Employees' stat Insurance Act 1948 required to a pay the contribution in accordance with section 40 of the said act read with Regulation 29 and 31 of the Employees State Insurance (Geberal) Regulations framed under the Act. As the employer in relation to this factory/establishment failed to pay the contributions as required by law, a notice was issued to the Principal Employer by this office vide letter no 37-9562 18 dated 309-81 to show cause within 15 days why contributions as per statement enclosed be not recovered from the employer. Whereas the employer has replied to the notice under its letter no ARA 274,280 dated 1-1-92 and 4-1-92 raised objection before on 21-10-92 during personal hearing against the assessment as proposed in the statement enclosed with the show cause Notice on the following ground. Employer has submitted breakup of the amount paid for transportation charges vide letter no ARA 274 and 280 dated 1-1-92 and 4-1-92 respectively. letter no 314 dated 29-1-92 and 30-9-92 and as per personal hearing on 21-10-92 and stated as under. 1. Hiring charges paid for loading Rikshow/Tempo. 2. Hiring charges for Paddle Rikshow, 3. Paid to truck owner for transport from one godown to another godown. 4. Dilivery charges of the cylenders. 5. Rikshow/Tempo/truck owner are independent parties and he has no connection with the employer, Accountant has also informed that all the records are readily available with him. I have applied my mind to all the relevant facts and have gone into the objections raised by the employer and my findings on each of the objection of the employer are as under. There is contract lies direct/indirect supervision is their. On distribution of Gas cylender properly. It has been decided by Head Quarters that transportation charges is covered of Apna bazar, Similarly in this case also. For the above reasons I Nazeer Ahmed Assistant Regional Director exercise of the powers delegated to me by the Director General think fit and accordingly order thar contributions totalling 8208.00 Eight thousand two hundred nine only for the period Prom 7/81 to 6/82 are finally determined plus interest amounting to 700.1.00 Rs seven thousand one only ? For the above reasons I Nazeer Ahmed Assistant Regional Director exercise of the powers delegated to me by the Director General think fit and accordingly order thar contributions totalling 8208.00 Eight thousand two hundred nine only for the period Prom 7/81 to 6/82 are finally determined plus interest amounting to 700.1.00 Rs seven thousand one only ? 15210-00 fifteen thousand two hundred ten only upto the date of this order and You are as one of the Principal Employer is hereby ordered to a pay the above amount together with interest payable at the rate of 12% for each day of further default from the date of this order till the date of payment within a period of 15 days from the date of this order, Failing which this shall be caused to be recovered under Section 45 -C to 45 I of the Act. Date: 28.9.93 Shri Naresh B. Soni (Manager), A’Bad Rifle Association co op stores, Gun house, Khanpur, A Bad (SNAZEER AHMED) ASSTT REGIONAL DIRECTOR. Copy to; Insurance Inspector A’Bad II for information and necessary action. FOR REGIONAL DIRECTOR 8.1 Mr.Dave, learned counsel has also submitted that the authority has passed an order under Section 45A, which was contractual order and subsequently, the appellant has amended the order wherein the authority has observed that “I have applied my mind to all the relevant facts and have gone into the objections raised by the employer and my findings on each of the objection of the employer are as under.” He has submitted that the authority has passed an amended order under Section 45A of the Act, the present appeal itself is not tenable and sustainable in the eyes of law. He has submitted that the contractors filed affidavit before the authority stating that they were not the employee of the present respondent and they were independent contractors, who only receiving the commission and not direct supervision of the respondent. Mr.Dave, learned counsel has submitted that the fact of the judgment, as referred by the learned counsel for the appellant, is different then the present appeal on the contrary the impugned order itself is non- speaking and without assigning any reasons passed by the authority. He has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C E S C Limited Vs. He has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C E S C Limited Vs. Subhas Chandra Bose reported in (1992) 1 SCC 441 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has interpreted the provision of Section 2 (9) of the Act and has held and observed in paras – 3, 11, 23, 34 and 35 which read thus:- 3. The sole question which falls for determination in these appeals is, whether on the facts found, the right of the principal employer to reject or accept work on completion, on scrutinizing compliance with job requirements, as accomplished by a contractor, the immediate employer, through his employees, is in itself an effective and meaningful "supervision" as envisaged under sec. 2(9) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (for short the Act)- The said provision, as it stood at the relevant time, is set out below, as is relevant for our purpose: "2.(9) 'employee' means any person employed for wages in or in connection with the work of a factory or establishment to which this Act applies and (i) who is directly employed by the principal employer0 on any work of, or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of, the factory or establishment, whether such work is done by the employee in the factory or establishment or elsewhere; or (ii) who is employed by or through an immediate employer on the premises of the factory or establishment or under the supervision of the principal employer or his agent on work which is ordinarily part of the work of the factory or establishment or which is preliminary to the work carried on in or incidental to the purpose of the factory or establishment; or (iii) whose services are temporarily lent or let on hire to the principal employer by the person with whom the person whose services are so lent or let on hire has entered into a contract of service;" 11. Vehemently was it urged on behalf of the appellants that the High Court fell in error in giving a restricted meaning to the word 'supervision' occurring in sec. 2(9) of the Act and in taking out the final act of rejection or acceptance of work from the purview of that word. Vehemently was it urged on behalf of the appellants that the High Court fell in error in giving a restricted meaning to the word 'supervision' occurring in sec. 2(9) of the Act and in taking out the final act of rejection or acceptance of work from the purview of that word. Strong reliance was placed on a decision of this court in Royal Talkies V/s. ESIC, to project that this court had spelt out that the main aim of the Act was to insure all employees in factories or establishments against sickness and allied disabilities, but the funding, to implement the policy of insurance was by contribution from the employers and the employees. In the same breath it was observed that since the benefits belong to the employees and are intended to embrace as extensive a circle as is feasible, the social orientation, protective purpose and human coverage of the Act were important considerations in the statutory construction, more weighty than mere logomachy or grammatical nicety. Reliance also was placed on Regional Director, ESIC, Trichur V/s. Ramanuja Match Industries', in which it was ruled that beneficial legislation such as the Act is to receive a liberal interpretation. The court yet ruled that it could not travel beyond the scheme of the statute and extend the scope of it on pretext of extending statutory benefits to those not covered by the scheme of the statute. The Act being not meant for universal coverage, the negatives in the Act, one of them being that the Act did not apply to factories or establishments with less than 20 employees, was taken into account to rule that liberal construction would not go to hold a partner to be an employee as he would be a person who would not answer the definition. 23. The Employees' State Insurance Act 34 of 1948 (for short 'the Act') seeks to serve the twin objects namely, social security i.e. medical ' benefits in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and other matters relating thereto and to augment the efficient performance of the duty. The respondents (immediate employers) had contracts with the Calcutta Electricity Supply Corporation (India) Ltd. (for short 'the Corporation'), the principal employer, to carry out excavation, erection of overhead electric lines and laying of underground cables beneath public roads as well as their repairs and maintenance. The respondents (immediate employers) had contracts with the Calcutta Electricity Supply Corporation (India) Ltd. (for short 'the Corporation'), the principal employer, to carry out excavation, erection of overhead electric lines and laying of underground cables beneath public roads as well as their repairs and maintenance. The Act enjoins the employer to contribute his 50 per cent share towards medical reimbursement with a proportionate cut from the wages of 'he employees and to debit it to the Employees' State Insurance Corporation fund to render medical assistance etc. to the employees. In consequence there would be a cut, to the extent of 10 per cent or as may be specified from time to time, in the "profit packet" of the immediate employers. For some time, it was complied with but later they assailed their liability under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The conflagration of the claims between the immediate employers and their employees gave rise to the lis. The immediate employers arming themselves with independent contractor's clout summon the services of the "grammarian" and tell him that "our contracts with the Corporation are bilateral, untramelled by routine supervision or agency with the Corporation under sec. 2(9) of the Act and tell us whether your "golden rule" does not apply to us- Like Shylock, are we not entitled to prevent inroad into our profit pocket not even a farthing from minimal of 10 per cent, though the workman may give us efficient service on receiving medical treatment-" The employees request the social engineer to sharpen his forensic skills of his instruments to provide them social security from health and occupational hazards fastening a part of the liability on the immediate employers whom they serve. Whether the social engineer would avoid unjust results like Portia's judgment- Whether the words in the contract would be masters by golden rules- Whether the words "supervision" or "agent" in sec. 2(9) of the Act would be so construed or adopted by purposive approach as to do what justice and equity required- The result of the combat between the grammarian and the social engineer would provide these answer to these searching questions. 34. 2(9) of the Act would be so construed or adopted by purposive approach as to do what justice and equity required- The result of the combat between the grammarian and the social engineer would provide these answer to these searching questions. 34. In Senior Electric Inspector V/s. Laxmi Narayan Chopra, K. Subba Roa,J.(as he then was)for unanimous court held thus: "In a modern progressive society it would be unreasonalble to confine the intention of a Legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the time the law was made, for a modern Legislature making laws to govern a society which is fast moving must be presumed to be aware of an enlarged meaning the same concept might attack with the march of time and with the revolutionary changes brought about in social, economic, political and scientific and other fields of human activity. Indeed, unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situations, if the words are capable of comprehending them." In M.Pentiah V/s. Muddala Veeramallappa in a separate but concurrent judgment, Sarkar, J.held thus: " Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence." This court approved the ratio in Seaford court Estates Ltd. Vs. Asher. Denning, L.J. said: "When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament ... and then he must supplement the written ward so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature .... A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out- He must then do as they would have done. A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out- He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.' I conceive it my duty, therefore, so to read the new Act, unless I am prevented by the intractability of the language used, as to make it carry out the obvious intention of the legislature." In Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. Vs. United States of America', Frankfurter, J., speaking for himself, joined by Reed, Clark, and Brennan, JJ. held at headnotes 8 & 9 thus: "On more than one occasion, but evidently not frequently enough, Judge Learned Hand has warned against restricting the meaning of a statute to the meaning of its 'plain' words. 'There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally ....' Of course one begins with the words of a statute to ascertain its meaning, but one does not end with them. The notion that the plain meaning of the words of a statute defines the meaning of the statute reminds one of T.H. Huxley's gray observation that at times 'a theory survives long after its brains are knocked out.' One would suppose that this particular theory of statutory construction had had its brains knocked out in Boston Sand & Gravel C. V/s. United States". The words of this legislation are as plain as the court finds them to be only if the 1947 amendment is read in misleading isolation. An amendment is not a repeal. An amendment is part of the legislation it amends. The 1947 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 must be read to harmonise with the central purpose of the original Act. The central purpose of the original Act was to allow recovery against the United States on the basis and to the extent of recoveries for like torts committed by private torfeasors in the State in which the act or omission giving rise to the claim against the United States occurred. The central purpose of the original Act was to allow recovery against the United States on the basis and to the extent of recoveries for like torts committed by private torfeasors in the State in which the act or omission giving rise to the claim against the United States occurred. The 1947 amendment filled the gap, a very small gap, that was disclosed in the scheme formulated by the 1946 Act." In Atma Ram Mittal V/s. Ishwar Singh Punia this court held that the purpose of interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else. It was further held that the contents, subject matter, the effects and consequences or the spirit and reason of the law shall be taken into account. The words must be construed with the imagination "of purpose behind them". 35. Therefore, in an attempt to construe the provisions of the statute construction, as a balancing wheel, should be meaningful so as to make the statute workable and not to render it futile or sterile. Whenever strict interpretation of the statute gives rise to unjust situation or results, the Judges can ensure their good sense to remedy it by reading words in, if necessary, so as to do what Parliament would have done had they had the situation in mind. The meaning of the same words in a statute may be mended in the labyrinth of interpretation and may be enlarged or restricted in order to harmonise them with the legislative intention of the entire statute. The spirit of the statute would prevail over the literal meaning. The jurisprudence and principle, therefore, in such a situation, would be the contextual interpretation to subserve the constitutional scheme and to alongate the legislative purpose, harmonising the individual interest with the community good so as to effectuate social transformation envisioned in the preamble of the Constitution.” 8.2 Mr.Dave, learned counsel has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd Vs. ESI Corporation reported in (2008) 3 SCC 247 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras 15 and 17 as under:- “15. ESI Corporation reported in (2008) 3 SCC 247 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras 15 and 17 as under:- “15. Appellant herein affirmed an affidavit in support of its application in implead the third parties/contractor, stating : "For the period in question, third parties/contractors are involved and only they would be in possession of records relevant to determine whether or not contributions at all are payable or as to whether at all the Employees" State Insurance Act, 1948 is applicable in the first place. This Management viz., Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., do not have details with regards to the work of wages, if any, paid by the third parties/contractors. The relevant information, materials and such like would be available only with said third parties/contractors whose names and addresses in so far as they are available at present are enclosed as annexures to this petition. The names and addresses of the rest of the third parties/contractors who were involved for the period in question would be furnished as and when the same are available." 17. In Food Corporation of India V/s. Provident Fund Commissioner & Ors., 1990 1 SCC 68 , this Court while considering the provisions of Sec. 7A of the Employees" Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 held : "It will be seen from the above provisions that the Commissioner is authorised to enforce attendance in person and also to examine any person on oath. He has the power requiring the discovery and production of documents. This power was given to the Commissioner to decide not abstract questions of law, but only to determine actual concrete differences in payment of contribution and other dues by identifying the workmen. The Commissioner should exercise all his powers to collect all evidence and collate all material before coming to proper conclusion. That is the legal duty of the Commissioner. It would be failure to exercise the jurisdiction particularly when a party to the proceedings requests for summoning evidence from a particular person." 8.3 Mr.Dave, learned counsel has submitted that since the ESI Court has rightly dealt with the provisions in consonance with the settled principle and also dealt with the relevant notification. It would be failure to exercise the jurisdiction particularly when a party to the proceedings requests for summoning evidence from a particular person." 8.3 Mr.Dave, learned counsel has submitted that since the ESI Court has rightly dealt with the provisions in consonance with the settled principle and also dealt with the relevant notification. He has submitted that the ESI Court has opined that the respondent has proved the fact that the amount paid to the individual contractors for transport charges, hiring charges etc did not form part of wages under Section 2 (22) of the ESI Act and the said agencies cannot be said to be employees under the provisions of Section 2 (9) of the Act. 8.4 Mr.Dave, learned counsel has submitted that the ESI Court has has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order and no interference is required and hence, the appeal being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 9. This Court has considered the submissions of learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and the material placed on record and perused the impugned judgment and award passed by the ESI Court. That the present appeal is filed by the appellant under Section 82 (2) of the Act more particularly High Court can entertain the appeal only on the circumstances where the substantial question of law involved. In the present case, of course the appellant has framed the proposed questions of law at the time of admission and the Court has considered the same and admitted the appeal. 10. So far as the order under challenge before the ESI Court under Section 45A itself is required to be seen that whether it is a speaking or reasoned one or not and whether the authority has applied its mind while passing the order under Section 45A or not. 10. So far as the order under challenge before the ESI Court under Section 45A itself is required to be seen that whether it is a speaking or reasoned one or not and whether the authority has applied its mind while passing the order under Section 45A or not. On perusal of the material and the order, I am of the opinion that it is a non-speaking order and it is in pro forma and even in the subsequent amended order at page 37 and 39 of the paper- book, the authority has not assigned any reason though it was mentioned that it has applied mind, but no such reason assigned to the contention raised by the respondent before the authority and, therefore, prima facie I am of the opinion that the order which was challenged before the ESI Court itself is required to be quashed and set aside because the same was non-speaking and non-reasoned order. It simply suggests that the authority has passed the order without application of mind and only relying upon the contention of the appellant and after recording the statements, passed an order. Though the concerned contractors have filed their affidavit before the authority inter alia contending that they were not the employee of the respondent and not working under the direct supervision of the respondent, the authority has not properly appreciated and considered the said facts while passing the order under Section 45A of the Act. The authority has not considered the applicability of the provision under Section 2 (9)(i) r/w. Section 2 (22) of the Act and clause 25 of the notification. Clause 25 of the notification reads as under:- “25. Payment Made to Rickshaw Pullers, Hathrairy Pullers and truck Operators (Including Loading & Unloading Charges When the Loaders / Unloaders are The Employees of The Truck Operators. - Rickshaw pullers, hathrairy pullers and Truck Operators (who bring labour with them) no contribution is payable on the amount paid by the employer if the amount paid is lumpsum amount including loading / un-loading charges and no separate wages are paid by the employer, Similar view was held by Bombay Division Bench in 1990 in the case of Raisaheb Tekchand, Mohate Mills v. R.D. ES/C.” 11. It is also profitable to refer to the decisions of this Court in the case of E.S.I.C. Vs. It is also profitable to refer to the decisions of this Court in the case of E.S.I.C. Vs. Vasantbhai Bhudarbhai Parmar reported in 2007 (1) GLR 879 and in the case of Employee State Insurance Corp. Vs. Mahalaxi Taxtile Mills reported in 2025 JX(Guj) 701 12. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd and Ors. Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and Ors. /b> reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para – 51 as under:- 51. Summarizing the discussion, this Court holds: a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.” 13. It is profitably to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basudev Dutta Vs. State of West Bengal & others reported in 2024 (12) JT 585 wherein the Hon’ble Court has held and observed as under:- “(d) Indian Administrative Law - principles governing administrative decisions - examination of procedural fairness in administrative actions leading to employment termination - focus on necessity for reasoned decisions and opportunities for defense - Held that every administrative decision must be supported by reasons and provide an opportunity for affected parties to present their case; absence thereof renders such decisions arbitrary and subject to judicial review.” 14. It is also pertinent to refer to the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Ambili S. Pilla, Vs. Vinod Kumar Pilla and others in O.P. (FC) No. 4 of 2022 decided on 23.12.2022 wherein the Kerala High Court has held and observed in para – 9 as under:- “9. The object underlying the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action. The recording of reasons by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions making. It would apply equally to all decisions made by such authority and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. The recording of reasons by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions making. It would apply equally to all decisions made by such authority and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. At the same time, it is not the requirement that, the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. What is necessary is that, the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. Hence, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law that, some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in the order passed by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority.” 15. The ESI Court has rightly considered the submissions canvassed by both the sides and interpreted the provision of Section 2 (9) of the Act while referring the order passed by the ESI Court in the case of Ahmedabad District Cooperative Mill Producer Union Limited which was referred by the respondent wherein considering the facts the ESI Court has rightly applied the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajkamal Transport Vs. Employee State Insurance Corporation. Under such circumstances, this Court does not find any infirmity or illegality which involves the substantial questions of law as envisaged under Section 82 (2) of the Act and therefore the order of the authority under challenge before the ESI Court itself is non-speaking and pro forma order and without assigning any reason and without application of mind and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is well settled that the order which is passed by the authority exercising quasi judicial power has to pass a speaking and reasoned order and also must apply mind before passing the order, the reasons are required to be assigned by quasi judicial authority. On perusal of the order at page No.27 and the second order at page No.37 of the paper- book, prima facie I am of the opinion that these orders passed by the authority are completely illegal, unjust and erroneous and that no any substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal. 16. On perusal of the order at page No.27 and the second order at page No.37 of the paper- book, prima facie I am of the opinion that these orders passed by the authority are completely illegal, unjust and erroneous and that no any substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal. 16. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does not find any error in the judgment and order passed by the ESI Court and are not find any illegality and infirmity and the same is sustainable in the eyes of law. The appeal being meritless deserves to be dismissed. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Registry is directed to transmit back the record and proceedings of the case to the concerned Court forthwith.