ORDER 1. This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been preferred by petitioner seeking following relief(s):- "1. That, the order dated 21.9.2015 passed by Respondent No.2 (Annexure P/1) may kindly be quashed and petitioner be permitted to continue on the post. 2. That, cost of the petition may kindly be granted." 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that at the relevant point of time, petitioner was posted as Sub-Inspector. Charge-sheet dated 1.4.2013 was issued against petitioner and thereafter petitioner submitted reply to the charge-sheet. After submission of reply, Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter, without issuing any show-cause notice to petitioner, the Inspector General of Police, Gwalior Zone, Gwalior, passed the order dated 21.9.2015 (Annexure P/1) imposing punishment of reversion of petitioner from the post of Inspector to Sub-Inspector for a period of three years. It was further mentioned in the order that this was a temporary decision and the final decision would be taken after receiving petitioner’s reply. It is further submitted that there is no provision under the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules, 1966 and M.P. Police Regulations for taking a temporary decision. Learned counsel for petitioner placing reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble apex Court in case of Shekhar Ghosh v. Union of India and Another, (2007) 1 SCC 331 submitted that the Disciplinary Authority had already made up its mind before affording petitioner an opportunity of hearing. Such a post-decisional hearing is not permissible in law. It is further submitted that the allegation made in the charge-sheet merely falls under the category of carelessness or negligence and such an act cannot be treated as misconduct. Learned counsel for petitioner also placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in S.D. Bind v. Union of India and Others, 2015 (1) M.P.L.J. 74 . 3. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents/State opposed the prayer made by learned counsel for petitioner. It is further submitted that the impugned order is not a punishment order, rather it is only a show-cause notice and the final punishment has not been imposed by impugned order dated 21.9.2015 (Annexure P/1). He relied upon the judgment passed by the apex Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 . He relied upon the judgment passed by the apex Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 . 4. In rejoinder, learned counsel for petitioner submits that though the time was granted to file reply but till date no reply has been filed by the counsel for respondents/State. It is further submitted that the impugned order was passed by respondent/concerned authority imposing temporary punishment of reversion of petitioner from the post of Inspector to Sub-Inspector for a period of three years. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The relevant part of impugned order dated 21.9.2015 (Annexure P/1) is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience: esjs }kjk foÒkxh; tk¡p uLrh dk Òyh&Òkafr vè;;u ,oa fo'ys"k.k fd;k x;kA foÒkxh; tkap uLrh d¢ vè;;u mijkar eSa tk¡pdrkZ vfèkdkjh d¢ vfÒer ls lger gw¡A vkj¨ih mi&fujh{kd ujsaæ oekZ gky&fujh{kd d¢ fo#) vfèkj¨fir vkj¨i¨a d¢ iw.kZr% çekf.kr ik;s tkus d¢ dkj.k eSa vkj¨ih mi&fujh{kd gky fujh{kd d¢ 3 o"kZ rd dh vofèk d¢ fy, mi&fujh{kd d¢ in ij inour djus dk n.M fn, tkus dk vLFkkà :i ls fu.kZ; ysrk gw¡A rnuqlkj vkj¨ih mi&fujh{kd gky fujh{kd d¢ ;g dkj.k crkv¨ u¨fVl tkjh dj funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og bl u¨fVl çkfIr d¢ 7 fnu d¢ vanj vius fyf[kr tokc vko';d :i ls çLrqr djsa ;fn mud¢ }kjk u¨fVl çkIr dj ysus d¢ ckn Òh fuèkkZfjr le; lhek esa tokc çLrqr ugÈ fd;s tkrs gSa r¨ ;g le>k tkosxk fd og d¨Ã tokc çLrqr ugÈ djuk pkgrs gSaA rnuqlkj çdj.k esa vfxze vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;k tkosxkA tkapdrkZ vfèkdkjh dh vkifÙk layXu gSA 7. Perusal of the record reveals that as per the impugned order dated 21.9.2015 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent–Inspector General of Police, Gwalior Zone, Gwalior, punishment has already been imposed on petitioner of reversion from the post of Inspector to Sub-Inspector for a period of three years as a temporary measure but once such punishment has been imposed by the respondent, even if treated as an interim measure, it partakes the character of a punishment order. There is no provision under the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules, 1966 and M.P. Police Regulations for awarding such type of punishment. There is no provision under the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules, 1966 and M.P. Police Regulations for awarding such type of punishment. Learned Government Advocate appearing for respondent/State is unable to point out any rule or regulation empowering the Inspector General of Police, Gwalior Zone, Gwalior, to impose such a temporary punishment. The relevant part of order passed in the case of Shekhar Ghosh (supra) is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience: “14. A post-decisional hearing was not called for as the disciplinary authority had already made up its mind before giving an opportunity of hearing. Such a post-decisional hearing in a case of this nature is not contemplated in law. The result of such hearing was a foregone conclusion”. As per charges mentioned in the impugned order, they do not come within the definition of misconduct. As per the Division Bench judgment passed in the case of S.D. Bind (supra), at best, the act of petitioner may fall under the category of carelessness or negligence. The relevant extract of order passed in the case of S.D. Bind (supra) is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience: 15. That apart, another aspect of the matter warrants consideration. The irregularities which is found against the petitioner is only non-following of certain procedure in the matter of awarding contract. The question is as to whether such an irregularity in the matter of following the procedure can be termed as a misconduct. The Supreme Court has considered the aforesaid aspect in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 : AIR 1979 SC 1022 which has been followed again by the Supreme Court in the case of Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt, of National Capital Territory of Delhi, (2007) 4 SCC 566 , wherein it has been held by the Supreme Court that merely lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability or negligent or careless want of dealing with a matter on one isolated may not constituted a misconduct for which punishment can be imposed. 16. In the present case apart from the fact that the Division Bench has made the observations as reproduced hereinabove and interfered with the imposition of cost, it found that there was certain discrepancy in the guidelines laid down and, therefore, in paragraph 9 fresh guidelines for future action was issued. 16. In the present case apart from the fact that the Division Bench has made the observations as reproduced hereinabove and interfered with the imposition of cost, it found that there was certain discrepancy in the guidelines laid down and, therefore, in paragraph 9 fresh guidelines for future action was issued. Once this is the factual scenario then merely because the petitioner failed to follow the guidelines for once, it cannot be said that the petitioner has committed misconduct in the matter. At best action of the petitioner may fall in the category of careless or negligence in the matter of dealing with the case once an isolated occasion and if the principles laid down by the Supreme Court as indicated in the case of J. Ahmed (supra) is applied, we are of the considered view that allegations levelled even do not amount to misconduct for which action can be taken. 8. Considering the aforesaid facts and grounds, there is no provision for imposing the punishment on temporary basis in the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules, 1966 and M.P. Police Regulations. Accordingly, impugned order dated 21.9.2015 (Annexure P/1) is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to extend all consequential benefits to petitioner within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 9. However, the respondents would be at liberty to take appropriate action against the petitioner in accordance with law, if so advised. 10. With the aforesaid, present petition stands disposed of. 11. Interlocutory applications, if any, are disposed of.